

TALLINNA ÜLIKOO  
SOTSIAALTEADUSTE DISSERTATSIOONID

TALLINN UNIVERSITY  
DISSERTATIONS ON SOCIAL SCIENCES

97



TALLINNA ÜLIKOO



**RENE TOOMSE**

**DEFENDING ESTONIA IN PEACE AND WAR.  
RETAINING A SMALL STATE NEAR AGGRESSIVE  
NEIGHBOR BY UTILIZING UNCONVENTIONAL  
STRATEGIES**

Tallinn 2015

TALLINNA ÜLIKOOL  
SOTSIAALTEADUSTE DISSERTATISOONID

TALLINN UNIVERSITY  
DISSERTATIONS ON SOCIAL SCIENCES

97

**Rene Toomse**

**DEFENDING ESTONIA IN PEACE AND WAR. RETAINING A SMALL STATE  
NEAR AGGRESSIVE NEIGHBOR BY UTILIZING UNCONVENTIONAL  
STRATEGIES**

School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia

The dissertation was accepted for the defence of the degree of *Doctor Philosophiae* in Government and Politics by the Doctoral Committee of Social Sciences of Tallinn University on September 29th, 2015.

Supervisor: Jyrki Käkönen, PhD, Professor at Tallinn University

Opponents: Jari Rantapelkonen, PhD, Professor at the Finnish National Defence  
University, Finland  
Eric Allan Sibul, PhD

The defence will take place on November 19th, 2015 at 14 o'clock at Tallinn University  
lecture hall M-648, Uus Sadama st 5, Tallinn.

Copyright: Rene Toomse, 2015

Copyright: Tallinn University, 2015

ISSN 1736-3632 (printed publication )

ISBN 978-9949-29-239-4 (printed publication)

ISSN 1736-793X (pdf)

ISBN 978-9949-29-240-0 (pdf)

Tallinn University  
25 Narva Rd  
10120 Tallinn  
[www.tlu.ee](http://www.tlu.ee)

## CONTENTS

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS.....	7
ABSTRACT.....	9
INTRODUCTION.....	10
Backround.....	10
Focus.....	12
Scope.....	15
Research questions.....	15
General framework.....	16
Limitations.....	17
Reflections on methodology.....	18
1. RELEVANT THEORIES.....	24
1.1. The theory of security strategies of european small states.....	25
1.2. The theory of strategic preemptive development operations.....	27
1.3. The theory of unconventional deterrence.....	31
2. ADVISED STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR ESTONIA.....	34
2.1. Three advised military core-strategies for Estonia.....	36
2.2. Five strategic concepts as sub-strategies.....	38
2.2.1. The concept of Collective Defense outside Estonia.....	39
2.2.2. The concept of Hybrid Defense inside Estonia (the main effort).....	39
<i>Iran's Mosaic Doctrine</i> .....	40
2.3.3. The concept of Total Resistance.....	41
2.3.4. The concept of Strategic Development Operations during war.....	42
2.3.5. The concept of Strategic Development Operations during peace.....	43
2.3. The national defense development plan.....	44
2.4. Summary.....	44
3. PREEMPTIVE PEACEMAKING BY DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS.....	46
3.1. The problem.....	46
3.1.1. Fourth generation warfare?.....	48
3.1.2. Why state systems fail?.....	51
3.1.3. When and how the West should engage?.....	53
3.1.4. Time perspective and the development of the next generation.....	55
3.2. The conduct of preemptive strategic development operations.....	56
<i>Malaysian emergency</i> .....	61
3.3. The strategic development group as the prime mover.....	61
3.4. Special operations forces as the main implementation body in the PSDO.....	63
3.4.1. ESTSOF background.....	65
3.4.2. The purpose and comprehensiveness of the ESTSOF.....	66
3.4.3. Organizational setup.....	67
3.4.4. Operational domains.....	68
3.4.5. Proposed missions and essential tasks.....	69
<i>A hypothetical case of PSDO in use</i> .....	71
3.5. Summary.....	72
4. HYBRID DEFENSE CONCEPT.....	74
4.1. Debate on the current national defence development plan.....	74

4.2. Nato article 5 and help from allies .....	77
4.3. The threat of war and the readiness to mobilize.....	80
4.4. Advised small force tactics against stronger .....	85
<i>The fall of France in 1940</i> .....	86
<i>The Israel – Hezbollah conflict of 2006</i> .....	91
4.5. Pre-positioned supply as a key to success.....	94
4.6. Protection of civilians as one of the core tasks during war.....	95
4.7. Summary.....	97
CONCLUSIONS.....	99
REFERENCES.....	104
PUBLICATIONS .....	119
I. Small States’ Special Operations Forces in Preemptive Strategic Development Operations: Proposed Doctrine for Estonian Special Operations Forces .....	121
II. The New Command Structure of the Estonian Defence Forces and its Resilience ....	141
III. The Concept and Framework of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations ...	183
KOKKUVÕTE.....	230
ELULOOKIRJELDUS.....	231
CURRICULUM VITAE .....	232

## LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

This dissertation embeds following published articles (in order of publishing, last first):

### A. MAIN ARTICLES

- I. Toomse, Rene (2015). Small States' Special Operations Forces in Preemptive Strategic Development Operations: Proposed Doctrine for Estonian Special Operations Forces. *Special Operations Journal*, Vol 1, Issue 1. London: Routledge, pp. 44–61.
- II. Toomse, Rene (2014). Kaitseväe uus juhtimisstruktuur ja selle jätkusuutlikkus. [The New Command Structure of the Estonian Defence Forces and its Resilience]. *ENDC Proceedings 19/2014*. Tartu: KVÜÕA, pp. 183–219.
- III. Toomse, Rene (2012). The Concept and Framework of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations. *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol 14 Issue 2. Tartu: Baltic Defence College, pp. 102–146.

### B. ADDITIONAL ARTICLES OF RELEVANCE

- IV. Toomse, Rene (2015, Jan 9). Eesti julgeoleku ja riigikaitse realistlik visioon. [The Realistic Vision on Estonian Security and State Defense]. *Sirp*, pp. 16–17.
- V. Toomse, Rene (2013). Eesti kaitsepoliitika dilemmad muutuvast maailmakorralduses. [Dilemmas of the Estonian Defence Policy in the Changing World Order]. *Acta Politica Estica* 4. Tallinn: Tallinn University, pp. 114–134.
- VI. Toomse, Rene (2013, Feb). Mali mitmekihiline ja habras julgeolek. [Mali's Multilayered and Fragile Security Situation]. *Diplomaatia* 113/114, pp. 17–19.
- VII. Toomse, Rene (2011, May 27). Eesti ja sõjaohu. [Estonia and Threat of War]. *Eesti Ekspress*, pp. 22–23.
- VIII. Toomse, Rene (2011). Sõjapidamine XIII: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 5. [Warfighting XIII: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 5]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 5, pp. 33–37.
- IX. Toomse, Rene (2011). Sõjapidamine XII: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 4. [Warfighting XII: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 4]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 4, pp. 33–39.
- X. Toomse, Rene (2011). Sõjapidamine XI: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 3. [Warfighting XI: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 3]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 3, pp. 37–43.
- XI. Toomse, Rene (2011). Sõjapidamine X: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 2. [Warfighting X: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 2]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 2, pp. 37–41.
- XII. Toomse, Rene (2011). Sõjapidamine IX: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 1. [Warfighting IX: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 1]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 1, pp. 33–37.
- XIII. Toomse, Rene (2010). Rahvas sõjas. Väikeriigi võimalus olla suurem suurriigist. [Nation at War. An Option of a Small State to be Larger than Major Powers]. *Diplomaatia* 5 (81), pp. 14–18.

XIV. Toomse, Rene (2010). Sõjapidamine VIII: Kaitseliidu võitlusgruppide doktriini selgitus ja projekt. [Warfighting VIII: Explanation and Project of the Doctrine of the Defence League's Fighting Groups]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 8, pp. 33–38.

XV. Toomse, Rene (2010). Sõjapidamine VI: Esmase kaitsevõime – tegelikkus ja doktriin. [Warfighting VI: Initial Self-defense Capability – Reality and the Doctrine]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 6, pp. 33–36.

XVI. Toomse, Rene (2010). Sõjapidamine IV: Doktriinidest, strateegiatest (ja tankidest). [Warfighting IV: On Doctrines, Strategies (and Tanks)]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 4, pp. 27–31.

XV. Toomse, Rene; Plaser Martin (2009). Luure kui pusle II: Kaitseliidu võitlusgrupid on paiksed eksperdid. [Intelligence as puzzle II: Defence League fighting groups as local experts]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 1, pp. 14–18.

## ABSTRACT

### *Defending Estonia in Peace and War. Retaining a small state near aggressive neighbor by utilizing unconventional strategies.*

The readiness of a state to conduct a war to protect itself has always been, and will remain, an essential component of its survival. It is a fallacy to believe that in today's world there is no serious physical threat to an independent country. Recent history, such as the current situation in Ukraine, Syria or Iraq reinforces this on a daily basis. Therefore military power, and the intelligent use of it for defense and deterrence purposes against an aggressor, is still relevant and vital.

This thesis is a hypothetical example of how a small state, like Estonia, could physically supplement its security by using balancing, rather than bandwagoning strategies in international relations, and thus elevate both its domestic security, and international influence.

First, for small states to ensure their long-term survival, they must constantly move forward, innovate and stay relevant in world affairs. The latter is a key factor in the decision making process of the allies as to whether or not to provide real assistance in the event of war. A potentially rewarding and also strategically important undertaking would be the pre-emption of armed conflicts around the world through the use of primarily civilian assistance with the aim of addressing the root causes of the rising discontentment.

Eventually, the effect created would not be limited to just the containment of a threat in its early stages, but would also be extended to the more important mission of bringing recognition to a small state as a positive and effective peacemaker in the international arena. This would boost the influence of the nation worldwide, which would in turn make a small state a more valuable ally to assist in case of aggression against it.

Second, every small state has the potential to construct a much more effective fighting capability against a larger potential opponent by embracing the principles of hybrid warfare instead of sticking with traditional methods of fighting. It would not diminish the conventional capability that is needed for a joint fight alongside the allies. It would, however, offer a solid backup plan if the coalition partners cannot arrive at the desired time or, due to some unfortunate circumstance, will not commit their forces at all.

## INTRODUCTION

*War can occur in many different ways. But the worst ones usually happen because one power believes it can advance its objectives, either without a war at all or at least with only limited war that it can quickly win – and, consequently miscalculates. Both psychology and cold steel therefore always have been a part to play in a rounded and coherent security policy.*

Margaret Thatcher<sup>1</sup>

## BACKGROUND

In his famous 1989 essay "The End of History?" Francis Fukuyama was certain that Western liberalism and democracy had finally triumphed over other alternative world orders. After the decades long struggle between Western capitalism and Russian communism, the ideals of the latter had ultimately collapsed. Therefore Fukuyama proposed that history had reached its peak and future historians would have very little of significance to chronicle precisely because the great conflict between these ideologies had finally ended. Democracy and the western economic liberalism would remain indefinitely and there would be nothing to challenge them in the future.<sup>2</sup> Only a few years later it became clear that history did not in fact end, but rather took a brief rest<sup>3</sup>.

Now, less than two decades since Fukuyama's essay, the world is witnessing a massive surge of Islamic extremism, and a Russian autocracy that ignores the sovereignty of its neighboring states. In addition, no-one really knows what the true intent of China's silent economic expansion is, and what lies behind the strengthening of its military power. Despite being heavily criticized at the time, Samuel P. Huntington was perhaps right after all, and the next dominant conflicts will occur because of cultural differences, and the world will be shaken by the clashes between civilizations<sup>4</sup>.

With such a rapidly changing security situation and redistribution of power balances, a valid question remains for many small states in Europe – how protected and sustainable are they?

---

<sup>1</sup> **Thatcher**, Margaret (1998, p. xi) in foreword to Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer *The next war*, Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.

<sup>2</sup> **Fukuyama**, Francis (1989). The End of History? *The National Interest*, Summer, pp. 3–18.

<sup>3</sup> **Will**, George (2001, Sep 12). The end of our holiday from history. *Jewish World Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/will091201.asp> (accessed 5 Apr 2015).

<sup>4</sup> **Huntington**, Samuel P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 72, pp. 22–49.

While great powers can enforce their agenda by virtue of their being powerful,<sup>5</sup> this is not a luxury smaller states can afford. Small states must employ a different method. In their desire to sustain their independence and the wellbeing of their citizens, smaller nations must expend a greater effort to advance their agenda, and need to “fight above their weight class” when it comes to making headway in international relations. This approach can indirectly add to their security, and also has the potential of creating a powerful additional deterrent for a possible aggressor – whether it be a belligerent neighbor, or groups of extremists that originate from distant countries.

This paper is a rebellious one. While the majority of schools of thought advise that small states, particularly in the vicinity of an aggressive neighbor, should align and *bandwagon* with great powers, and place their fate in the hands of larger allies,<sup>6</sup> it is my intention, to counter this theory.

I would like to make two points. First, it is possible that a small state can gain more by focusing on *balancing* (forming alliances with other smaller states to reach the balance of power)<sup>7</sup>, and second, a small state can implement strategies to defend itself without the assistance of large states. By applying these two factors a small state would have the potential to achieve serious *influence capability* in the international environment<sup>8</sup> and at the same time it would allow a small state to pursue its own national goals.

Although the ideas below are hypothetical, the understanding that I have gained through my years of experience led me to conclude that they are in fact feasible. There are ways for small states to have a substantial presence, and also exert influence in the world affairs, while at the same time maintaining its capacity to defend itself alone in the event of a war. By drawing on my background, this thesis will focus on the military capabilities of a small state – and how to best apply these in rather unconventional<sup>9</sup> ways in order to raise the stature of a small state in the International Arena. I will use the Republic of Estonia, with its existing capabilities and opportunities, as an example for this discourse.

---

<sup>5</sup> Neumann, Iver B. & Gstöhl, Sieglinde (2006, p. 20). Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World. *Small States in International Relations*. Christine Ingebritsen et al. (eds.). Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 3–36.

<sup>6</sup> Lamoreaux, Jeremy W. & Galbreath, David J. (2008, p. 6). The Baltic States as ‘Small States’: Negotiating the ‘East’ by Engaging the ‘West.’ *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 39, No 1, March, pp. 1–14, and Sutton, Paul (1987, p. 29). Political Aspects. *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*. Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds.). London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 3–25.

<sup>7</sup> Neumann & Gstöhl (2006, p. 18).

<sup>8</sup> McGowan, Patrick J. & Gottwald, Klaus-Peter (1975, p. 475). Small States Foreign Policies. A Comparative Study of Participation, Conflict, and Political and Economic Dependence of Black Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4 December, pp. 469–500.

<sup>9</sup> Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Unconventional – very different from the things that are used or accepted by most people : not traditional or usual : not conventional. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconventional> (accessed 14 August 2015).

My motivation for writing this paper arises from the concern that many of my countrymen, including politicians, and high officials are not doing enough to advance and develop the state security of Estonia. The overwhelming reliance on the theoretical conventional assistance of the allies does not support conceptualizations of an independent warfare capability. In addition, the development of the capacity of the state military to achieve national strategic directives during peace time is also lacking. Ultimately a state must utilize all of its resources and capabilities through a combination economy, efficiency, and effectiveness to achieve national prerogatives. The military branch is a component of this. It must be one of the most effective tool of a state to achieve the desired results.

As overall the debate regarding military reforms and defense concepts is relatively lacking, and actually even discouraged in Estonia, I have sought to address this disparity and encourage “out of the box” thinking.

## **FOCUS**

The capability and readiness of a state to enforce its security and also conduct a war to protect itself has always been, and will remain, an essential component of its survival. It is a fallacy to believe that in today’s world there is no serious physical threat to an independent country. Recent history, such as the current situation in Ukraine, Syria or Iraq reinforces this on a daily basis. Therefore military power, and the intelligent use of it for defense and deterrence purposes against an aggressor, is still relevant and vital. However, trying to sustain analogous defense budgets, tanks, and manpower levels as a large state quickly becomes too exhaustive. Small states need to find some more creative solutions.

In Estonia, meaningful public debate on security matters is not really encouraged. Changes in defense policy and modifications of the forces, even the most important ones, are not thoroughly explained and critics of these reforms are largely ignored.<sup>10</sup> There is a view that only the higher headquarters and politicians can draft the best solutions. Unfortunately the present leaders place too much emphasis on the hope that NATO will surely and effectively commit the necessary physical forces in the

---

<sup>10</sup> **Toomse**, Rene (2014, pp. 213, 216). Kaitseväe uus juhtimisstruktuur ja selle jätkusuutlikkus. [The New Command Structure of the Estonian Defence Forces and its Resilience]. *ENDC Proceedings* 19/2014, pp. 183–219.

event of a war.<sup>11</sup> In reality, hope is not, and has never been, a viable defense method. Serious homework needs to be done.

Also, there is neither an overall vision, nor a public discussion as to how the national military establishment could best contribute towards the goal of gaining national influence within the world. This is something that should be closely intertwined with a state's foreign policies. However, at present there exists little more than a policy wherein we wait for our allies to come to our assistance, or they request assistance from us, and then we deploy our troops to an already existing conflict. There is no real Estonian national agenda in world affairs. Therefore we gain little, and have a great deal to lose.

These are some of the main reasons for my writing this thesis. I believe that Estonian defense planners have not seriously considered strengthening the state influence and security by other means – i.e. by using unconventional strategies such as *hybrid*<sup>12</sup> approaches. The concern is that in the sphere of foreign policy Estonia could take a more proactive role in conflict resolution by intelligently pre-empting conflicts, and not just mainly committing infantry units to current, and often hopeless ones. To sum up there is great potential for the enhancement of national defense capabilities and also diplomatic influence and relevance in the international arena if the ideas below are considered. The conditions and potential do exist.

The argument I am making here is twofold. First, for small states to ensure their long-term survival, they must constantly move forward, innovate and stay relevant in world affairs. Using such an active approach to become a leader and remain important in vital areas of the global picture will also contribute to the overall economic development of a small state and, will in turn add significantly to the desire of other nations to offer their support. The latter is a key factor in the decision making process of the allies as to whether or not to provide real assistance in the event of war.

---

<sup>11</sup> **MOD** (2010a, p. 41). National Security Concept of Estonia. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National\\_Security\\_Concept\\_of\\_Estonia.pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf), **MOD** (2010b, pp. 3, 10–12). National Defence Strategy. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM\\_riigikaitse\\_strateegia\\_eng\(2\).pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng(2).pdf), and **MOD** (2013a, p. 1). Riigikaitse Arengukava 2013–2022 [The National Defence Development Plan 2013 – 2022] (in Estonian). *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13204\\_Riigikaitse\\_arengukava\\_2013-2022.pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13204_Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022.pdf) (all accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>12</sup> **Merriam-Webster Dictionary**. Hybrid—something that is formed by combining two or more things. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hybrid> (accessed 14 August 2015).

A potentially rewarding and also strategically important undertaking would be the implementation of well-balanced *smart power* strategy<sup>13</sup>. Such a strategy could be made manifest through the preemption of armed conflicts around the world by using primarily civilian assistance with the aim of addressing the root causes of rising discontentment in an area of probable conflict.

Estonia also has the potential to construct a much more effective fighting capability against a larger potential opponent by embracing the principles of *hybrid warfare*<sup>14</sup>. It would not diminish the conventional capability that is needed for a joint fight alongside the allies. It would, however, offer a solid backup plan if our partners cannot arrive at the desired time or, due to some unfortunate circumstance, are unable to commit their forces at all. Note that the latter assumption is not intended to undermine the commitment of NATO's Article 5, but is rather a cautious consideration of the backup options. It is not advisable to bet on one card, and it can never be known as to how tactical politics will play out in the future. It is certain that the one who is not prepared for the worst will not be on the winning side.

While the above mentioned may seem like two separate and unconnected endeavors, this is not actually the case. There exists in Estonia a unique organization called the *Kaitseliit* (the Defence League) that has tremendous potential and could feasibly connect both of the tasks described above. The *Kaitseliit* is a voluntary national defense organization that is structured according to military principles and connects close to 2% of Estonian population, and is also actually growing.<sup>15</sup> Its members are citizens from every facet of society – from farmers to top specialists, to the executives of successful firms. They are the most patriotic of Estonia's citizens and therefore willingly undergo training in order to cope with physical dangers that many ordinary people would not care to face. They would be the best resource for carrying out unconventional warfare methods if there were to be an assault against the homeland.

It is specifically because of their training and skills that these specialist members could be of great assistance in implementing preemptive strategic stabilization operations outside of Estonia. The success of such an endeavor would make larger

---

<sup>13</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2009). Get Smart. Combining Hard and Soft Power. Foreign Affairs, July/August. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart> (accessed 14 August 2015). Nye describes smart power as a combination of tools from soft and hard powers. It requires appliance of contextual intelligence what is the intuitive diagnostic skill that helps policymakers align tactics with objectives to create smart strategies.

<sup>14</sup> Hoffman, Frank G. (2007, p. 8). Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars. Hoffman defines Hybrid warfare as threats that “incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

<sup>15</sup> See on the *Kaitseliit* [Estonain Defence League] on their webpage: <http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/edl> (accessed 3 Apr 2015) and Reinhold, Liivi (2015, pp. 8, 9). Kaitseliit (Estonian Defence League) and I wouldn't mess with us. *Kaitse Kodu!* Nr 1, pp. 8–9.

countries take notice. And this is something that would ultimately enrich the diplomatic capital of the Estonia.

Since 2009 I have published a number of articles on the topic of national military thinking and have been encouraging a broader and more innovative view of warfare and peace operations.<sup>16</sup> History is full of important examples of smarter, smaller forces defeating less flexible, larger forces, and also solving problems that may seem difficult for superpowers.

In the realm of self-defense it is very important to avoid creating a clone of the armed forces of a large state, as this is the surest path to destruction. There are many other, more unconventional, methods, which our political and military leadership can and should learn. Using this study, it is my intention to move us step closer towards a more capable defense force that could realize both of these main directives which have previously been outlined, and which would also allow Estonia to maintain the “preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages” which is the purpose of the Republic of Estonia according to its Constitution<sup>17</sup>.

## SCOPE

### Research questions

The overarching question of this discussion is: could a small state, in the vicinity of an aggressive neighbor, achieve the similar levels of security and international influence as a great power?

I assert that it can be done, so therefore the aim of this thesis is to provide a suitable framework to the following question: how would a small state, like Estonia, effectively:

- 1) Accrue substantial diplomatic capital by using its civilian and military capabilities outside the country with the aim of making itself more relevant and valuable to its allies;
- 2) Build feasible strategies for an independent self-defense capability that would be a serious deterrent to any potential aggressor?

It should be noted that the aforementioned is not part of a design to reorder or rule the world, it is rather an effort to seek out the most efficient methods and means of sustaining the constitutional purpose of a state through domestic and international policies which will guarantee the survival and development of the nation. It is therefore reasonable to expect that a small state should strive harder in order to

---

<sup>16</sup> See the articles of relevance on List of Publications.

<sup>17</sup> **Constitution** of the Republic of Estonia, Preamble. Retrieved from <http://www.president.ee/en/republic-of-estonia/the-constitution/> (accessed 6 April 2015).

make an impact and secure a place of respect among the larger nations and not merely remain in their shadows and dependent upon them.

### **General framework**

The intention of this study is to elaborate on several theories that do not necessarily adhere to current western orthodox military thought. The theories will then be put to a hypothetical test, using the Republic of Estonia as an example, and will include an analysis of its existing systems and its potential.

The First chapter of the main body will introduce three theories that are pertinent to the topic. First, the classical theory of small states' security strategies will be explained. The same theory will then be critiqued and two lesser known, but relevant, theories: the theory of strategic preemptive development operations and the theory of unconventional deterrence will be offered as more viable alternatives.

The next chapter will propose a strategic framework and define the main strategic concepts, related to the previous theoretical approaches, which would be most suitable for Estonia. Here strategy will be defined as a path towards the achievement of finite goals, and a way of smartly combining means and methods to achieve the most efficacious outcome. Therefore the proposals in this chapter are not necessarily set in stone, but are rather, more importantly, a way of thinking about how a particular strategy problem could be approached by a small state.

The following two chapters of the main body will focus sequentially, and in a more detailed way, on addressing the previous research questions.

Chapter three will propose a framework and a developmental approach that could make Estonia more relevant in world affairs. The aim is to contribute to the prevention of armed conflicts in distant countries. This would also prevent the greater potential loss of life of Estonian soldiers as well as make Estonia a valuable strategic player in the international arena whose independent existence truly matters. It would also conceivably increase the likelihood of outside allied forces actually physically coming to help us in the event of a war on our own soil and not just condemning it from a distance. This chapter is comprised primarily parts of my main articles III<sup>18</sup> and I<sup>19</sup>.

Chapter four describes the *hybrid defense* concept that has largely been influenced by the theory of unconventional deterrence and describes a concept for a defense system that could resist a larger aggressor without the immediate assistance of the allies. It begins with an assessment of the latest development plan of the Estonian

---

<sup>18</sup> **Toomse**, Rene. (2012). The Concept and Framework of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations. *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol 14 Issue 2, pp. 102–146.

<sup>19</sup> **Toomse**, Rene. (2015). Strategic Operations Forces in Strategic Development Operations. Proposed Doctrine for Small States Strategic Operations Forces. *Special Operations Journal*, Vol 1, Issue 1. London: Routledge, pp. 44– 61.

Defense Forces, the implementation of which could result in a major reduction of combat power, and be less of a deterrent in terms of self-defense capabilities. Implicit within the chapter is the idea that we have not wisely learned from the mistakes of others.

In the chapter I support the preservation and even reinforcement of the previous decentralized command system due to the fact that it corresponds to the modern principles of warfare, and it would greatly increase the options that Estonia could use in its resistance against a possible aggressor. Further aspects and the most suitable deployment of forces and their advised tactics are explained in the context of *hybrid warfare*. The chapter is the basis of my second main article<sup>20</sup> which I have combined with other articles that are relevant to the topic.

Finally in the conclusion, I will summarize the concepts and tie all the preceding thoughts together in order to prove that people and resources can be used cost effectively in both the presented concepts.

According to Dr. Jeanne Hey, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of New England, small states, being smaller in their internal and organizational systems, can often be more flexible and creative in their ability to induce internal changes.<sup>21</sup> If national strategists grasp this idea, they can make those concepts work in multiple ways – by mitigating future threats to the state and the alliance, and at the same time increasing the political cachet of a state in the international arena.

Finally, I would like to note that this thesis is a hybrid in both a technical and stylistic sense. It falls somewhere between an article-based thesis, and a monograph. My intention was to give a more elaborate overview of some key concepts in a stand-alone paper and to not lose the reader in the technical matters that are described in greater detail regarding various topics in the main articles.

### **Limitations**

Although the topic is generally very broad and the strategic concepts' chapter outlines only a handful of the guidelines, the ensuing chapters will focus on two main concepts and will delve in greater detail into the topic of *strategic pre-emption via development operations* and *hybrid defense*.

The purpose of this work is to show that there is a need for more innovative and independent thinking in the military sphere rather than blindly relying on standardized concepts and beliefs. The world, and the security situation within it, are constantly changing and therefore the policy makers and defense planners need stay on top of the relevant trends at all times. Rather than offering universal truths

---

<sup>20</sup> Toomse (2014).

<sup>21</sup> Hey, Jeanne A. K. (2003, p. 4). Introducing Small state Foreign Policy. *Small States in World Politics. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* Jeanne A. K. Hey (ed.). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1–11.

or silver bullets to enhance Estonia's homeland security, the intention here will be to provide a framework for applying the present options in a bolder and more unrestricted way than is presently the case.

It should also be noted that in this work the concept of security has a narrow meaning that is directly related to the military sphere. This paper will not delve into other areas of security such as economic, social, cyber and financial etc. security in detail. Nor does it touch on the possible social or demographic readiness of Estonia to adopt the described concepts. These could actually be separate research topics in and of themselves.

## REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY

This study is essentially a hybrid between a policy paper and an academic research paper. It is also a nascent theory that has been constructed using rigorous analysis and synthesis in order to improve the existing system.

As was explained in the introduction, it is designed to provoke deeper thought and debate among policy makers in order to encourage them to approach some of our current problems from a different perspective. In this sense it is not a pure and classical academic research paper. Every good idea should create an impact and become an impetus for better practical outcomes, and this is what I have sought to do with this study – offer better solutions and back them up with sound and critical argumentation.

The research methodology of Critical Security Studies, which is what this thesis is ultimately about, is a complicated one. As the discipline is relatively new and incorporates the Humanities, the Social and Political Sciences, as well the hard sciences, it still requires the creation of methodologies to accommodate this evolution.<sup>22</sup> The same is true of the study at hand; it also utilizes multiple methodological approaches, or perhaps variations of them, simultaneously.

Before the main methods are described, I should explain how the work itself was empirically developed. Having been a soldier and officer for many years, and also having participated in deployments to two different conflict zones, I started to seek out the root causes for these conflicts, which led me to ask certain questions such as: what are the underlying causes of what is happening here? And, if the situation is not stable but rather disturbing and dangerous, what can be done to fix it? Here I entered an epistemological phase of learning while moving towards interpretive, constructive and pragmatic paradigms.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> **Bailey**, Bill (2011, p. 9). Case studies: A security science research methodology. Proceedings of the 4th Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 5<sup>th</sup>–7<sup>th</sup> December.

<sup>23</sup> **Given**, Lisa M. ed. (2008, pp. 116–119, 464–467, 671–675). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research methods. Volumes 1 & 2. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

While learning all that I could from all the available sources, I also kept notes and outlines that eventually I incorporated into various articles which have been published in specialized magazines since 2008<sup>24</sup>. Over time the concepts developed; some were merged while others were refined. I continually developed the theories over the years as I acquired new information and knowledge.

In the beginning the building of these theories was not systematic but was rather based on reflections on different topics of mainly military issues. Since 2010 I began merging some of these disparate concepts. This led to a successive series of theory developments that were unified into a coherent framework and focused towards answering a single question – What is a better way of defending Estonia against possible aggression?

What were before two distinct concepts, or perhaps principles, gradually became more connected with one another over time. The first existed on the macro level and concerned the development of humanitarian infrastructure enhancement operations as part of a proactive foreign policy for a small state, while the second existed on the micro level, and concerned strategic defense concepts and force proposals for the creation of a hybrid defense model for a smaller actor defending against an aggressive larger one. These two theories gradually evolved into a single unified concept which I present in this paper.

The methodological approach I used for this study is mainly a mixture of *action research* and *grounded theory*.

*Action research* is aimed at addressing the gap between theory and practice. One of the distinguishing elements of this methodology is that it is not a linear process but, rather consists of cycles. The first cycle begins with the identification of the underlying source of a problem or grievance. This is followed by the collection and analysis of the data gathered regarding the problem, and the development of a hypothesis to inform the action that will be taken to address the problem. The next cycle consists of putting the hypothesis to the test in practice and evaluating the efficacy of the changes. In the event that the changes are ineffective, the cycles can be repeated. However, the peculiarity of this methodology lies in that, instead of being a study done from the outside where there is an observer looking in and making recommendations, it is the other way around and the research is carried out by the participants themselves, or by a researcher collaborating with them. It is also always first and foremost rooted in the values of the participants<sup>25</sup>

It is important to recognize that action research is the integration of action and research where one complements another and vice versa. Even though the methodology is connected to theory development, the main emphasis is still action

---

<sup>24</sup> See the list of articles of relevance in beginning.

<sup>25</sup> **Somekh**, Bridget (2005, pp. 89–91, 430). *Action Research. Research Methods in the Social Sciences* Bridget Somekh & Cathy Lewin (eds.). London: SAGE Publications.

oriented, and the intention is to induce change.<sup>26</sup> In this sense action research is useful on the micro level, because it can address the inherent situational problems or shortcomings that a particular subject may face.

*Grounded theory* is a research methodology that is concerned to the generation of a theory. The end result is a theoretical formulation of how the research subjects or objects experience and respond to events that occur around them. The concepts can be derived from many different sources of qualitative data including: observations, field studies, interviews, official documents, books, articles etc. or any combination thereof. The idea is to collect as much data as possible on a topic and then to identify as many properties and dimensions of the concept as are available. The data is bundled with the concepts in order to assign it to a manageable number of relevant categories. Then the data is further reduced by synthesizing it into a core category. When no new concepts emerge the researcher has reached saturation.<sup>27</sup> The theory develops itself through the process of analyzing the data<sup>28</sup>.

The process is also called *axial coding* which is a method of relating categories to their subcategories by disaggregating the data in such a way that it helps identify the relationships between and within the various categories. Coding in general “refers to reducing or breaking down the data, conceptualizing it, and putting back together in new ways”<sup>29</sup>.

This methodology is usually more suitable for dealing with macro problems as it tends to be concerned with the larger picture. It also is used to propose broader, more generic concepts than action research.

Both methodologies share the cyclic process in common, and the way in which the research question and possible solutions are created or refined throughout the process is also similar. However, they differ from one another in a few key areas.

In action research the position of the researcher towards the research topic is participatory (the researcher is an insider within the organization or process under study) whereas in grounded theory the researcher is usually an outsider who collects the data concerning the object of study and does not necessarily maintain an active connection to the subject.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> **Dick**, Bob (2007, pp. 399–405). What Can Grounded Theorists and Action Researchers Learn from Each Other? *The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory. Paperback Edition* Bryant, Antony & Charma, Kathy (eds.). London: SAGE Publications, pp. 398–416.

<sup>27</sup> **Corbin**, Juliet & **Holt**, Nicholas L. (2005, pp. 49–51). Grounded Theory. *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* Bridget Somekh & Cathy Lewin (eds.). London: SAGE Publications.

<sup>28</sup> **Lingard**, Lorelei, **Albert**, Mathieu & **Levinson**, Wendy (2008, p. 459). Qualitative research: Grounded theory, mixed methods, and action research. *BMJ* Volume 337 August. Toronto: University of Toronto, pp. 459–461.

<sup>29</sup> **Mills**, Albert J., **Durepos**, Gabrielle & **Wiebe**, Eiden eds. (2010, p.153) Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. London: SAGE Publications.

<sup>30</sup> **Dick** (2007, pp. 39–405).

The other major difference lies in the desired outcome. Action research is heavily oriented towards the practical improvements of a system (action oriented), while grounded theory research is more oriented towards the creation of a theory, and the researchers are not directly involved with the practical solution of a problem (theory building).<sup>31</sup>

It is possible to combine the approaches, or even perhaps use one as a tool of the other. In the initial stages of research there is often some uncertainty as to what methodology to use. In such cases it is easier to initiate information collection using the cycles of action research. As an understanding of the research situation develops, one can always refine the choice of methodologies. As a recognized action research expert Bob Dick has put it: “Action research can be a meta-methodology to research the practice of research.”<sup>32</sup>

I have utilized just such a combination for this thesis. In fact I have been doing it (not knowingly in the beginning) throughout my years of research. When I began, I was an active participant within an entity (the military) under study and was very focused on improving the practices therein. Over time I acquired more knowledge and gained a larger perspective into some of the greater challenges which then gave rise to the processes I started to conceptualize. I disseminated these conceptions by writing articles, taking part in debates, and imparting critical observations with regard to current practices with the intention of offering constructive advice as to what needed improvement.

Since the end of my active duty I have no longer been a participant in the system (although I continue to be a member of the *Kaitseliit*), although I have kept researching and developing concepts regarding various aspects of Estonian security and military issues while keeping the original overarching question in mind: Is there a better way to defend Estonia against possible aggression?

The reasons for using a combination of the above described methodologies are logical. First, I began research years ago using a similar template before realizing the necessity of using a known and specific methodology. Once I became more knowledgeable of various methodologies of research, things started to fall into place.

The methods and sources used for this research are freely available with the exception of classified information, which was not used. I have used interviews, field studies, case studies, official texts and viewpoints of authorities and compared them to one another and to the threat assessments. The cycle of analysis has been extensive and has engendered a synthesis of measures that a small state (taking into consideration the existing tools of hard power) in the vicinity of an aggressive neighbor could adopt in order to better defend and sustain itself.

---

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 410–412.

As a side note: the action research methodology is also commonly used for military problem solving. The approach was described and taught in a number of lectures by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd (1927–1997),<sup>33</sup> who was one of the foremost military thinkers of the modern era. He called the methodology “Building Snowmobiles.” Boyd’s approach essentially offers a way “of combining both analysis and synthesis and the relevance of continuously generating mental images”<sup>34</sup>. His specific modification to the original methodology was that after analyzing (also deducting or destructing) the original concepts he moved on to synthesizing (also inducting or creating) a new concept which was put together from various parts of the analyzed concepts and then allowed one to arrive to a completely new concept instead of recreating or simply improving the previous ones<sup>35</sup>.

Frans Osinga, in his book *Science, Strategy and War. The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, describes it using the following example: Imagine you are skiing, later on you are steering a motorboat, and then after that riding a bicycle. Now after some time you are parent with your son in a department store and spot a toy tank with rubber treads. All the situations and items are complete systems in and of themselves. Now you break them into constituent components – take the skis, remove the engine from the boat, the handlebar from the bicycle and rubber treads from the toy tank and start constructing a completely new system – a snowmobile.<sup>36</sup> To explain the previous exercise Osinga uses citations from Boyd:

“To discern what is going on we must interact in a variety of ways with our environment. We must be able to examine the world from a number of perspectives so that we can generate mental images or impressions that correspond to that world’. This serves as the introduction to the general survey, for Boyd ‘will use this scheme of pulling things apart (analysis) and putting them back together (synthesis) in new combinations to find how apparently unrelated ideas and actions can be related to one another’.”<sup>37</sup>

This is the same approach that is used in the following chapters. This thesis is primarily theoretical and uses similar theories, methods and case studies as examples by taking them apart and then recombining the most relevant parts in order to create new concepts. This study includes and combines insights ranging from deterrence to small states’ theories in order to form a viable concept of hybrid defense and

---

<sup>33</sup> John R. Boyd was a United States Air Force fighter pilot and Pentagon consultant. In the early 1960's he created theories and concepts on warfighting that have influenced and continue to influence not only militaries around the world, but also the spheres of sports and business.

<sup>34</sup> Osinga, Frans P. B. (2005, p. 245). *Science, Strategy and War. The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers.

<sup>35</sup> Boyd, John, R. *Destruction and Creation* (1976, pp. 1–3). Retrieved from [http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION\\_AND\\_CREATION.pdf](http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf) (accessed 10 August 2015).

<sup>36</sup> Osinga (2005, p. 245).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

deterrence. For strategic preemptive development operations the main components and combinations thereof come from *counterinsurgency*<sup>38</sup> theories and case studies.

The primary sources I have used for this paper include close to 130 publications relevant to the topic (books and articles in respective magazines), including official NATO publications; more than 30 legal acts, information passages from official websites, official documents and statements by officials; more than 50 opinion articles, news briefs, and comments from other, primarily online, sources; interviews and numerous discussions with Estonian Defence Force officials and the *Kaitseliit* volunteers.

---

<sup>38</sup> NATO (2011a, pp. 1-2, 1-3). Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency. Definitions: *Counterinsurgency* is defined as a set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological measures that are employed in order to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances. *Insurgency* is defined as the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.

## 1. RELEVANT THEORIES

*Diplomacy is a disguised war, in which states seek to gain by barter and intrigue, by the cleverness of arts, the objectives which they would have to gain more clumsily by means of war.*

Randolph Bourne<sup>39</sup>

It is a fact that there is no commonly agreed upon definition of a small state. Hans Morgenthau asserts that the strength or weakness of a state can be measured in terms of its geography, natural resources, economic capabilities, military strength, number, and morale of its population, diplomatic skills and its government's ability to strike a balance between the expenditure of its resources and the support of the nation<sup>40</sup>. Olav Knudsen offers that the weaker state is the one whose power-reach is less than that of the neighboring states<sup>41</sup>. Laurent Goetschell explains that power can be defined in two ways: in a positive sense it may be the capacity to modify the conduct of another in a way that is desirable (influence), and in a negative sense, it is the ability to prevent others from affecting one's own behavior (autonomy)<sup>42</sup>.

However, all those definitions are relative and do not matter *per se*. The relevant question for any state is: how do we intelligently improve the wellbeing of our citizens, and insure a secure environment for them, now and in the future? The following theories will try to provide a framework for the further exploration of this problem. The theory of security strategies of small European states will explain the security dilemmas that small states face. The subsequent two theories (on unconventional deterrence and strategic preemptive development operations) will then seek to provide an insight into how small states may break out of the classical realm of the limited powerbase that has, thus far, been ascribed to small states.

---

<sup>39</sup> Bourne, Randolph S. (1919, p. 180). *The State. Untimely Papers*. New York: B. W. Huebsch, pp. 140–230.

<sup>40</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948, pp. 14, 105). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. New York: A.A. Knopf.

<sup>41</sup> Knudsen, Olav F. (1992, p. 6). *Sharing Borders with a Great Power: An Examination of Small State Predicaments. NUPI Report 159*, May. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>42</sup> Goetschel, Laurent (1998, pp. 14–15). *The foreign and security policy interests of small states in today's Europe.* *Small states inside and outside the European Union* Laurent Goetschel (ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 13–31.

## 1.1. THE THEORY OF SECURITY STRATEGIES OF EUROPEAN SMALL STATES

Formally all states are equal, but in reality, the larger states, or the so-called superpowers, make the rules.<sup>43</sup> Every state is primarily focused on its own survival. Once the basic needs are secured, a rational state seeks to expand its influence in order to enhance the wellbeing of its people.<sup>44</sup>

Influence, which is used to gain the resources of other states, can be either soft or hard. *Soft power*<sup>45</sup> is exercised through mutually beneficial economic partnerships. *Hard power*<sup>46</sup> is the policy that enforces the will of the stronger, but on a much less equal basis. It is often expressed through the threat of war. This in turn will create a *security dilemma* for the states under threat. As there is always the fear that other states may forcefully acquire resources by using hard methods, a state must be ready to protect itself and be prepared for the worst-case scenario. That is why military capabilities are built up in first place – to defend a nation against the threat of war by others.<sup>47</sup>

The essence of the *security dilemma* is rather controversial wherein a weak force is just as dangerous as too strong force. The former is not a deterrent against an aggressor. They will believe that the war will be easy and cost effective, meaning that the opponent can be subdued relatively easily.<sup>48</sup> If a state's military capability is too strong, it is viewed as a threat by other states. This creates hypothetical as well as an actual possibility of the strong one taking forceful actions against other states. Therefore, if a state becomes too strong, then the others around him may

---

<sup>43</sup> **Waltz**, Kenneth N. (1979, pp. 88–93). *Theory of International Politics*. Pennsylvania: Addison Wesley Publishing Company.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126 and **Telhami**, Shibley (2003, pp. 106,107). *An Essay on Neorealism and Foreign Policy. Perspectives on Structural Realism* Andrew K. Hanami (ed.). Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 105–118.

<sup>45</sup> **Wilson**, Ernest J., III (2008, p. 114). *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616. L.A.: Sage Publications, pp. 110–124. *Soft power* is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants; and **Oxford Dictionaries**. *Soft power* is understood as a persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence. Retrieved from [http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m\\_en\\_gb0990350#m\\_en\\_gb0990350](http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0990350#m_en_gb0990350) (accessed 11 March 2015).

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* *Hard power* is the capacity to coerce another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests.

<sup>47</sup> **Herz**, John H. (1950, p. 157). *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics*, 2 (2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–180.

<sup>48</sup> **Roe**, Paul (1999). *The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'? Journal of Peace Research* vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 183–202.

consider forcing the strong to give up or dismantle some of his force. If this does not happen via peaceful methods, then the use of war may be considered.<sup>49</sup>

Small states, located near an aggressive neighbor, are at risk of being militarily attacked if they do not agree with their neighbor's policies. The latter can diminish the autonomy of, and even negate the very existence of, an independent state. Therefore a small state needs to create viable security options that will reduce the threats to its freedoms and insure its continuance.

Meanwhile, many small states lack the assets necessary to create the security forces that can match a larger aggressor's forces. The only logical choice is to join a friendly alliance that can extend its security capabilities to the small state – this is the so-called collective security option.<sup>50</sup>

While this path will likely raise the level of security, it is also not without certain risks. First, as a member of an alliance, the small state can become embroiled in the policies of the bigger partners and end up fighting in wars that are not in its own interests. Second, the assistance of partners, in case of a threat to the small state, can never be guaranteed.<sup>51</sup>

Dr. Jean-Marc Rickli, assistant professor of King's College, points out that the traditional security dilemma for small states lies between the maximization of influence and the protection of autonomy. This means that it is necessary to strike an acceptable balance between the ambitions of becoming part of an international system and deciding the domestic acceptability of different policy strategies.<sup>52</sup> This conclusion is very broad and needs to be explained.

What Rickli finds is that the creation of influence is strongly correlated to the military power projection operations that are conducted by the larger coalition partners. He has determined that small states which choose to participate in stabilization and reconstruction operations have little strategic ambition.<sup>53</sup> But this is not necessarily the case anymore. The last two major wars (in Iraq and Afghanistan) have taught the West that the paradigms of persuading adversaries to comply with our strategic intent may have changed. Military means alone, or policies that neglect *soft power*, will not guarantee the desired strategic effects. This

---

<sup>49</sup> **Jervis**, Robert (1976, pp. 58–113). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

<sup>50</sup> **Wiberg**, Hakan (1996, p. 37). Security problems of small nations. *Small states and the security challenge in the new Europe* Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav Knudsen (eds.). London: Brassey's, pp. 21–41.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> **Rickli**, Jean-Marc (2008, p. 310). European small states' military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 21, Number 3, September, pp. 307–325.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 316.

may lead to a perception and outcome that is the opposite of that which was envisioned by the theorists when they were designing their strategic ambitions.<sup>54</sup>

Riina Kaljurand, an Estonian research fellow at the International Center for Defence and Security, also finds that the security of a state or an alliance is not limited to formal operations and protocols – it is also a state of mind. She asserts that security is “something that is perceived and constructed through identity, historical experience and political culture.” She also notes that although the strategies of the collective defense seem to be flawless, the true stability and readiness to protect and assist other members of the alliance may be less secure and more unstable as the commitments and national caveats of other members are diminishing.<sup>55</sup>

While the security dilemmas facing small states are similar, the methods of addressing them should be rethought beyond the confines of classical theories. Therefore the following two theories should serve to complement the aforementioned one by introducing approaches to the strategic preemption of conflicts through developmental operations (using the framework of coalitions) in combination with unconventional deterrence and defense (as a backup plan for a small state in case the collective defense fails after an act of aggression).

## **1.2. THE THEORY OF STRATEGIC PREEMPTIVE DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS**

This theory is not actually a recognized theory, but rather has been constructed from various counterinsurgency doctrines.<sup>56</sup> It will elaborate on the reasons as to why and how more developed states should get involved when there are indications of another states’ possible breakdown. However, since every situation is unique, the theory does not offer a single solution that is wholly applicable under all conditions. It should be taken as a basic guideline to be considered and revised depending on

---

<sup>54</sup> **McFate**, Montgomery (2005). Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship. *Military Review*, March–April, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 24–38.

<sup>55</sup> **Kaljurand**, Riina (2013, p. 57). Security Challenges of a Small State: The case of Estonia. *Defence and Security for the Small: Perspectives from the Baltic States* Raimonds Rublovskis, Dr. Margarita Šešelgyte & Riina Kaljurand (ed.). Reykjavik: University of Iceland, pp. 55–81.

<sup>56</sup> **Toomse** (2012).

the situation and the context. The concept has not yet become widely discussed in the current military literature although the need for it is clearly recognized<sup>57</sup>.

The protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have dramatically changed the world and its understanding of conflicts. Slowly, but steadily, Western nations are coming to the conclusion that military solutions alone are insufficient for addressing violent and destabilizing uprisings. As of yet there remain many complexities to overcome.

NATO, for instance, has officially recognized that there is no purely military solution to armed conflicts.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, NATO notes that there are various ways, other than by military means, to prevent clashes. In the strategic arena, the main areas or functions of a state are diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME)<sup>59</sup>. And in the more elaborate approach, they include the political, economic, military, informational and infrastructural (PEMSII) domains<sup>60</sup>.

These functions are all interconnected and a disturbance in one can result in the collapse of the entire system. Few conflicts arise from military issues alone. Conflicts are often caused by economic or social problems that result in a collapse of a secure state system.<sup>61</sup> John Burton has pointed out that non-negotiable values such as group or ethnic identity and personal recognition are factors that if suppressed, may lead to enduring violence and intransigent discontent. If they remain unaddressed, then state or international coercion will no longer be an effective instrument of rectification.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> **Celeski**, Joseph D. (2005, p. 33). Operationalizing COIN. Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press. Colonel Celeski mentions the concept of *preventative counterinsurgency*. He recognizes the need for early assistance for struggling or failed states and the need to improve their social and economic conditions. However, the rest of his monograph focuses rather on ongoing campaigns, and **Carment**, David B. (2004, pp. 144, 145). Preventing State Failure. *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences* Robert I. Rotberg (ed.). Oxford: Princeton Press, pp. 135–150. Professor Carment stays very broad in his suggestions. He focuses mainly on models to identify signs of failure not the actual action to prevent the collapse of a state.

<sup>58</sup> **NATO** (2004, pp. 4, 10). Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge. Retrieved from <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/nato-strategy/StrategicVision2004.pdf> (accessed 09 April 2015).

<sup>59</sup> **Kozloski**, Robert (2009, p. 1). The Information Domain as an Element of National Power. *Strategic Insights*, Volume 8, Issue 1. Retrieved from [http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/95832/ichaptersection\\_singledocument/9b900ca1-51cd-4cba-86a9-3b91139adbb0/en/kozloskiDec08.pdf](http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/95832/ichaptersection_singledocument/9b900ca1-51cd-4cba-86a9-3b91139adbb0/en/kozloskiDec08.pdf) (accessed 17 April 2015).

<sup>60</sup> **NATO** (2011a, p. 5–128). Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency AJP 3.4.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.

<sup>61</sup> **Rotberg**, Robert I. (2003, pp. 1, 22). Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. *State Failure and State Weakness in the Time of Terror* Robert I. Rotberg (ed.). Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

<sup>62</sup> **Burton**, John W. (1997a). Conflict Resolution: Towards Problem Solving. *George Mason University webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/burton.html> (accessed 17 April 2015).

NATO adopted an important strategic concept in Lisbon in November 2010. Together with the emphasis on collective defense in the event of an attack, it has also placed an emphasis on the prevention of conflicts throughout the world:

*“The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.”*<sup>63</sup>

However, the development of a functioning informational, diplomatic and economic systems demands much more civilian knowledge than regular armed forces usually possess. An army is probably not the best tool to use for fixing a broken economy. However, Westerners still tend to first send their soldiers to failing states, in the hope that they can stabilize a country in turmoil and then it make safe for the civilian experts who can then utilize means, other than military ones, to stabilize the overall situation. Yet this paradigm has changed.

The pre-emption of most modern conflicts requires, in addition to sophisticated military skills, civilian advice and expertise that can address various problems within a social system. This expertise, if applied correctly, can bring the desired effects to a target area, and reduce tensions, and thereby prevent a conflict from occurring at all<sup>64</sup>. This is not likely to be achieved by military means alone; it rather demands extensive cooperation with civilian experts who are on the ground from day one. However, merely resolving an existing conflict is useless unless the roots of the problem are truly understood and addressed while keeping in mind the long term aim of preventing future conflicts<sup>65</sup>.

Therefore, NATO’s emphasis on the prevention of future conflicts needs to be modified for practical application. The theory of Preemptive Strategic Development Operations (PSDO) aims to provide an idea of how to succeed at conflict prevention. Committing the relevant assets and materials before a conflict is underway might be costly. But by applying these assets to improve an existing system in order to prevent a total collapse will prove to be considerably less expensive than rebuilding the entire systems after a war has torn it apart. After adding to the overall cost the loss of life from a war, as well as dealing with masses of refugees, the long-term advantages then become clear. The most current examples of long wars are the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these conflicts were expected to be short and decisive.<sup>66</sup> But this proved not to be the case.

---

<sup>63</sup> NATO (2011b, pp. 19, 20). Strategic Concept 'Active Engagement, Modern Defence'. *NATO webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120203\\_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf) (accessed 7 April 2015).

<sup>64</sup> Carment 2004, p. 145.

<sup>65</sup> Burton (1997a).

<sup>66</sup> Shaw, Martin (2005, pp. 76, 77). *The new Western way of War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Yet we see another problem – the continuing massive growth of violence and instability within an entire region. Those failed military operations have made possible new extremist movements, like ISIS whose expansion and influence is as yet unpredictable. However, already the World Bank experts are predicting a considerable decline in the region's welfare<sup>67</sup>. This in turn places at risk, and increases the threats to, the security of the Middle-East, Africa, and even Europe, due to the massive flood of refugees<sup>68</sup>. Migrants from unchecked conflicts will also drastically alter the balance of Western states' economies and social conditions.

The best preemptive action that would most effectively undermine these rising conflicts is the implementation of balanced development, as well as through educational and participatory strategies to restrain corruption and create alternatives for the future generations of the target societies<sup>69</sup>. This is based on the reasoning that those citizens who are satisfied with their economic status and have positive expectations of the future are more risk averse, and less likely to challenge the state order than those who are unsatisfied and pessimistic about the future<sup>70</sup>.

The cornerstone of PSDO is the shift in attention towards the human dimension, local culture and the economic situation of possibly failing states, and the application of necessary measures before a conflict arises. The aim is to improve these social systems before they break down and thereby undermine the possibility of, the reasons for, and the space for a violent conflict. This again requires the developed states to pay attention to trends and become involved long before violence has broken out. Also, the West needs to accept the reality that military means alone are insufficient for providing long-term solutions. Quite the opposite, they escalate the problem.<sup>71</sup>

Using this approach, small European states have tremendous potential to assist in multiple fields where they are strong, such as information technology, economics, and local governance. The capabilities of every participating nation should be taken into consideration and applied. Alliances (the EU and NATO in cooperation) should be platforms for the planning, coordinating and utilization of the respective

---

<sup>67</sup> **Ianchovichina**, Elena & **Ivanic**, Maros (2014). Economic Effects of the Syrian War and the Spread of the Islamic State on the Levant. *Policy Research Working Paper 7135 of World Bank*. Retrieved from <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/7135.pdf?abstractid=2535615&mirid=1> (accessed 9 March 2015).

<sup>68</sup> **Fargues**, Philippe (2014, p. 3). Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, but How? *Policy Briefs* 2014/01, Migration Policy Centre. Retrieved from <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/29919> (accessed 9 March 2015).

<sup>69</sup> **Gurr**, Ted R. (2003, p. 215). Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails. *The New Global Terrorism. Characteristics, Causes, Controls* Charles W. Jr. Kegly (ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.

<sup>70</sup> **Metz**, Steven (2007, pp. 45, 46). Rethinking Insurgency. *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College webpage*. Retrieved from: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>71</sup> **Toomse** (2012, pp. 103, 116, 117).

capabilities of each of the members which can then be combined towards one common purpose – the attenuation of future threats to Western societies by using a full range of assets (diplomatic, informational, military, social and economic) in concert, while still keeping Western values in mind.<sup>72</sup>

### 1.3. THE THEORY OF UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Deterrence in theory, as Thomas Schelling puts it, is “the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, which can make someone yield or comply.” The implied violence is intended to alter an opponent’s motives and plans.<sup>73</sup> The essence of deterrence is to prevent the other party from doing something unacceptable, through threats of harm if they actually do carry out their intention.<sup>74</sup>

However, this deterrence must somehow be backed up by real power, and this must also be clear to the adversary at the same time. Deterrence should work if the mindset of the potential aggressor is rational, the military capability is sufficient, and the desire to use it in the event of an attack is strong enough. Classical deterrence theory is based on conventional military balance<sup>75</sup>. Yet, for small nations, there may be another way of achieving balance through the use of a strategy which has not been analyzed as much as conventional deterrence.

Mindaugas Rekasius, a Lithuanian officer, defended his thesis on unconventional deterrence strategy in 2005. He has taken the classical deterrence theory a step further and constructed an innovative philosophy and perspective on how a smaller state could establish a reliable deterrence against a stronger one. His main research question was: “[...] whether a strategy of unconventional deterrence employed by relatively weak states can deter greater powers from their aggression.”<sup>76</sup>

Rekasius admits that he could not find direct case from the annals of war history; nevertheless, he was able to make a convincing argument that would be possible under certain conditions. First, the weaker must shift their focus from denying the adversary their military objectives, to denying them their political aims.<sup>77</sup> This means a significant shift in the mindset of the weaker state, which would thereby influence the way in which they fight.

---

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>73</sup> **Schelling**, Thomas C. (1966, p. 3). *The Diplomacy of Violence in Arms and Influence*. Yale University: Virginia.

<sup>74</sup> **Morgan**, Patrick (2003, p. 1). *Deterrence Now*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>75</sup> **Russett**, Bruce (1994, p. 41). *Between General and Immediate Deterrence*. *Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge* Aaron S. Klieman and Ariel Levite (eds.). Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 34–44.

<sup>76</sup> **Rekasius**, Mindaugas (2005, p. 4). *Unconventional Deterrence Strategy*. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 13, 14.

Essentially, the method would consist of guerrilla type attacks to gradually break the opponent's will, instead of trying to defeat his forces in the battlefield. This would be achieved by "[...] harassing the enemy and exhausting him, via hit-and-run attacks in a frontless war, instead of trying to annihilate him in decisive battles<sup>78</sup>." This is the primary method to annihilate the enemy's political will.

The defender, using unconventional defense tactics, must accept a long and protracted war. This in turn frustrates the aim of most aggressors to defeat the enemy quickly. Long wars are disliked because of their high cost and unpredictability.<sup>79</sup>

However, beyond these general assumptions, the exact strategies and threats must be carefully tailored to a very specific enemy and also take into account their historical experiences in this type of war as well as the vulnerabilities and fears of the aggressor. But most importantly, the adversary must know and be convinced that the means to engage in such a fight are real, and the threats will become actualized if an attack is carried out.<sup>80</sup>

Rekasius also finds that: "[t]he deterrence theory groups deterrence strategies into two general categories – punishment and denial. Unconventional deterrence strategies, as well, fit into this general framework, and threats have to be designed either to punish the challenger (primarily through terror acts), or to deny him his objectives (mainly via guerrilla resistance)."<sup>81</sup>

It is important to note that both components should be considered when designing a strategy. Due to the fact that the main aim is to wear down the will of the aggressor's leadership, relevant actions must also be pursued outside of the warzones. The aim will always be to create frustration for the adversary's population and to remove their support of the current war.<sup>82</sup> In democracies classical terror attacks are neither legal nor moral, so the means of modifying the attitudes of the aggressor nation's populace should be carefully designed and implemented. Contravention of international law should be avoided.

Rekasius concludes with the valid assertion "[...] the weak, resisting by guerrilla warfare, just need not lose, while the aggressor has to win, because, usually, he cannot sustain operations indefinitely. Time, thus, is always on the guerrillas' side. [...] If the weak state considers deterring the strong through the denial of their objectives and adopting a guerrilla warfare strategy, it will likely be more of a

---

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 23.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>82</sup> **Lind**, William S. et al. (1989, p. 24). *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Marine Corps Gazette*, October, pp. 22–26.

deterrent than preparing to defend the territory conventionally, simply because in the latter case, the victory of the strong appears to be preordained.<sup>83</sup>

At the time of writing his thesis (2004–2005) Rekasius did not have the case of Israel–Hezbollah war (2006) to study. This particular conflict nicely highlights and validates the assumptions that Rekasius makes in regards to the infliction of pain by a small more unconventional force on a large conventional adversary (see the description of that conflict below in Chapter 4).

Also, since then, at least one middle power, Iran, has officially adopted the hybrid defense concept (Mosaic Defense), which strongly relies on unconventional deterrence (see the description of Iran’s concept below in Chapter 2).

---

<sup>83</sup> Rekasius (2005, pp. 43, 44).

## 2. ADVISED STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR ESTONIA

*The simplest ideas are not always the easiest to grasp, and neither need they be the correct ones. However, strategy is a simple subject in its essential logic, but alas it is one that lends itself to what can become an intellectually disabling granularity in treatment; especially when no effort is expended to promote the thought that detail only has meaning in context.*

Colin S. Gray<sup>84</sup>

Strategy matters. Numerous wars have been lost because of a weak strategy (if not every war that has been lost). Often, winning all the tactical battles does not necessarily mean that the overall war will be won. Therefore strategic thinking is one of the most vital components of state security. The following chapter tries to give an overview of what strategy means and then proposes some relevant strategic concepts for Estonia based on present threats, existing national strengths and presumptions.

Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, defines the different levels of strategy as follows:

1. “*Strategy* (content neutral): The direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends.
2. *Grand strategy*: The direction and use of any and all among the total assets of a security community for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.
3. *Military strategy*: The direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purpose of policy as decided by politics.”<sup>85</sup>

The French General André Beaufre has outlined the most common patterns of military strategies that states use in a given condition. According to him the patterns are:

1. *The direct threat*: used when the objective is of only moderate importance and the resources available are plentiful (also used if powerful allies are likely to be involved).
2. *Indirect pressure*: used when the objective is of moderate importance but the resources available are too inadequate to carry out a decisive threat. This pattern is most suitable for instances where freedom of action is limited.
3. *Series of successive actions*: used if freedom of action is restricted, and the resources are limited, but the objective is of major importance. This pattern is most suitable for nations that are in a strong defensive position (or well protected by nature) but lack the resources to carry out a large offensive.

---

<sup>84</sup> Gray, Colin S. (2013, p. 2). Perspectives on Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

4. *A protracted struggle, but at a low level of military intensity*: used if freedom of action is good, the resources are very limited, but the objective is of major importance. This is a classical guerilla warfare strategy. However, it demands a highly developed sentiment of national solidarity and the assistance of auxiliary forces.
5. *Violent conflict aiming at military victory*: used if the military resources available are of sufficient strength and the aim is to keep the war short through the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. However, it will likely succeed only if the issue at stake is not completely vital to the enemy. If the stakes are high, the entire territory must be occupied.<sup>86</sup>

It is important to note that the choice of any of these patterns and the tactics therein must be based on a careful study of the current situation and combined with an evaluation of changes to come. Leaders must be ready to shift from one pattern to another as the conditions demand.

Every security strategy must be based on a valid assumption of a threat.<sup>87</sup> Therefore it is important to perceive what can happen, to understand the enemy's doctrine and strategies, and then to exploit the weaknesses within them<sup>88</sup>.

One of the major threats to Estonia and to rest of the Baltic countries is Russia's aggressive influence. While the propaganda war has been going on for years already<sup>89</sup>, there are several prominent analysts who are now warning of a possible military attack<sup>90</sup>. Furthermore, as the threat builds, small European states are facing the challenges of the Eurozone crisis, which is consequently causing some members of the military alliance to be more selective about their obligations. At the same time, the United States is increasingly shifting its focus to Asia<sup>91</sup>.

The situation is somewhat contradictory. While reputable analysts are seriously concerned, Estonian ministers deny that there is a threat, and announce to the public

---

<sup>86</sup> **Beaufre**, André (1965, pp. 27, 28). *Introduction to Strategy*. London: Faber and Faber.

<sup>87</sup> **Kerry**, John F. (2009, Sep 27). Testing Afghanistan Assumptions. The lesson of Vietnam is don't commit troops without a clear strategy. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574438660617984826.html> (accessed 21 March 2015).

<sup>88</sup> **Lind**, William S. (1985, p. 18). *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. Boulder: Westview Press.

<sup>89</sup> **Smith**, David (2013, pp. 162, 163, 166). *Estonia: Independence and European Integration*. Oxon: Routledge.

<sup>90</sup> **Fallon**, Michael (2015, Feb 19). Russia a threat to Baltic states after Ukraine conflict, warns Michael Fallon. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/feb/19/russia-a-threat-to-baltic-states-after-ukraine-conflict-warns-michael-fallon> and **Rasmussen** Anders Fogh (2015, Feb 6). Putin attacking Baltics - scaremongering or a real danger? *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://news.err.ee/v/International/cd81ee87-4a81-4558-983d-475e5b324d1d> (all accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>91</sup> **Kaljurand** (2013, pp. 66, 73).

that Estonia is defended better than ever before<sup>92</sup>. However, an examination of the most recent developments in Russian military policy and a consideration of the latest patterns of Russian operations in Ukraine, where the *hybrid warfare* approach has been used extensively<sup>93</sup>, shows a picture that is less cheerful than the one leading politicians are trying to present. An elaboration of the patterns and trends of the threats will be presented in the respective chapters below.

## 2.1. THREE ADVISED MILITARY CORE-STRATEGIES FOR ESTONIA

Estonia published its most recent National Defense Strategy in 2010.<sup>94</sup> Unfortunately it does not fulfill the criteria of being a strategy (e.g. a guide of methods and means used to achieve an outcome) but rather falls more into the category of doctrine (setting the core principles).<sup>95</sup> There exists no other public document that would explain what strategic approaches Estonia could use in the event of a war or how to deter one. The following will seek to fill this gap by proposing some ideas to build a strategic framework upon.

In principle, the core strategies may be divided into three groups: independent defense strategies, collective defense strategies, and strategies of international operations (both in war and peace). All three of these must be interconnected, and also be sufficiently flexible to ensure their collective application, or a smooth transition from one to the other, as the situation demands.<sup>96</sup>

The above-mentioned strategies of warfare are, in essence, plans of action which, when combined with higher doctrines, would then create a guideline for the forces,

---

<sup>92</sup> **Pevkur**, Hanno (2014, Apr 14): Eesti on kaitstud, kui me provokatsioonidele ei allu [Estonia is defended if we don't respond to provocations]. *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://uudised.err.ee/v/eesti/7705e4a4-44f8-4c09-bc77-4fbda78d5f31> and **Mikser**, Sven (2014, Dec 17). Eesti on täna kindlamini kaitstud kui aasta alguses [Estonia is better defended today than at the beginning of the year]. *Social Democratic Party webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.sotsdem.ee/mikser-eesti-on-tana-kindlamini-kaitstud-kui-aasta-alguses> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>93</sup> **McDermott**, Roger N. (2014). *Myth and Reality: A Net Assessment of Russia's 'Hybrid Warfare' Strategy Since the Start of 2014. A Net Assessment of Developments in Eurasia Since the Start of 2014*. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, pp. 7–9.


<sup>94</sup> **MOD** (2010b) National Defence Strategy. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM\\_riigikaitse\\_strateegia\\_eng\(2\).pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng(2).pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>95</sup> **NATO** (2014, p. 2-D-9). AAP-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions defines doctrine as a set of “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.” Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.

<sup>96</sup> **Toomse**, Rene (2011a, p. 40). Sõjapidamine X: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 2. [Warfighting X: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 2]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 2, pp. 37–41, and **Toomse**, Rene (2011b, p. 37). Sõjapidamine XI: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 3. [Warfighting XI: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 3]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 3, pp. 37–43.

and for the entire general population as to what action to take in a given circumstance. The various strategies are comprised of conceptual subcategories that would further specify the exact actions to take that would assist the defenders of the state in focusing on the best tactics for each situation and that would also allow them to orient themselves towards a common goal, even if the plan of the existing command should cease to function. Operational plans are precise blueprints which outline the activities of the units in time and space<sup>97</sup>. Naturally, these specific plans are secret.

And yet the above-mentioned strategic concepts<sup>98</sup> must be made public because of three factors. First, these are general instructions that shorten the time necessary for orienting oneself while waiting for a specific operational plan. Second, if a specific plan is not suitable, or the existent one does not function, each subunit can quickly improvise a new one by following the appropriate strategic concept. Third, the flexibility of viable and functioning general strategies (particularly in the domain of warfare methods) shapes the opponent's sense of the situation, or acts as a deterrent. Still, those strategic concepts must not include in writing details that the opponent could exploit as a weakness.<sup>99</sup>



**Picture:** Core strategies with strategic concepts and the main influencing policies and doctrines

<sup>97</sup> MOD (2010b, p. 25).

<sup>98</sup> Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Concept as an abstract or generic idea generalized from particular instances. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concept> (accessed 14 August 2015).

<sup>99</sup> Toomse (2011a, p. 40).

The foundation of all of this is a realistic National Security Policy, which in conjunction with the National Foreign Policy, lays out the directions, conditions and doctrinal principles of the entire state defense.

It is important for a small country to involve all its national strengths, in particular Research and Development (R&D), in safeguarding the state's security. The R&D of a localized defense industry is an essential source of supplies during a war when the regular channels of supplies from foreign producers are disrupted.<sup>100</sup> The role of a national R&D is also important for the Preemptive Strategic Development Operations. See Chapter 3 below for a more detailed explanation.

The question then arises concerning the position and precedence of international law as well as the agreements, doctrines and directives of the allies, i.e. NATO and the EU, within the Estonian context. It is evident that universal doctrines cannot be utilized line-by-line by any force, as each of them has their own peculiarities. In the event of a contradiction, international agreements constitutionally overrule a state's internal legal acts; however, in this particular instance, there is no contradiction. Although the doctrines of NATO or the EU have been ratified, they must also be made public, and we must use the ones that are suitable, and that work here, while at the same time adapting them to the present cultural space and context. It is important to be aware of the fact that the existence of allies' doctrines does not free us from thinking of a localized state defense and our own unique solutions.<sup>101</sup>

An observant reader has likely noticed that both the scheme and the descriptions lack references to local legislation. Where is its place within the system? The correct answer lies in the adaptation of the state's internal laws to the requirements of the overall strategies, or in other words, the necessary amendments and new laws, if they are needed, must be made only after the strategies have been formed. The state's needs are a priority, and the laws must always support and follow these needs. If our approach proceeds from the other way around, then the laws would introduce restrictions that the strategies would have to observe in order to secure the state's survival, but this would be unproductive. Moreover, this would even be destructive. The correct approach is then always: strategy first and then the laws, directives and regulations to enforce it following after.<sup>102</sup>

## 2.2. FIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AS SUB-STRATEGIES

The actual content of the three strategic approaches that were discussed above consists of more specific concepts. Herein it must be noted that the following five

---

<sup>100</sup> **Toomse**, Rene (2011d, pp. 36, 37). Sõjapidamine XIII: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahus 5. [Warfighting XIII: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 5]. Kaitse Kodu! 5, pp. 33–37.

<sup>101</sup> **Toomse** (2011a, pp. 40, 41).

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

concepts need not be authoritative and are far from perfect, but rather serve to represent deliberations on some of the multiple variations that are possible.

It is important to consider that everything that was presented in the previous proposal is not only interrelated hierarchically from top to bottom, but also horizontally, backward and forward. For example, doctrine and strategies are always interdependent and mutually prescriptive. Another reason why the present proposal should function is the fact that all military-strategic concepts are connected; they function sequentially as well as simultaneously, and the option to move quickly from one to the other and back again, if necessary, has been preserved. Strategic operations and strategic communication, which occur continually and independently of operations carried out in Estonia's territory, form a separate category. Yet these operations can always be directed towards Estonia's assistance in the narrower as well as broader sense.<sup>103</sup>

### **2.2.1. The concept of Collective Defense outside Estonia**

According to this concept, it is Estonia's binding duty to participate in the collective defense of another member state if that state is under attack, as formulated in Article 5. Such warfare adheres most clearly to NATO's doctrines and is also compatible with them. It is perhaps the only kind of operation which requires and allows for a relatively conventional military approach. The main actors in this concept are subunits from mechanized brigades consisting of professional members of the Defence Force.<sup>104</sup>

This concept has the potential to offer us extensive opportunities to contribute our own unique national capabilities that could also be extensively employed for independent defense in particular. The main effort of our forces will most likely not be specified until it becomes clear what kind of war we are dealing with: conventional, unconventional or hybrid. Once this becomes known, Estonia will be able to direct the military units who possess the necessary capabilities to assist the allies, and also determine the main effort therein.<sup>105</sup>

### **2.2.2. The concept of Hybrid Defense inside Estonia (the main effort)**

The actuation of a collective defense within the Estonian territory in the event of war is undoubtedly predicated upon the existence of a sound independent defense strategy. When shaping this strategy, there are major factors to consider such as the opponent's ambitions and capacities, as well as the local conditions and the actual ability of the Estonian Defence Forces to prevent the opponent from reaching their goals. The best way for us to prepare for this is by following the hybrid warfare concept, which is in its essence, a total defense. The actors in this concept include

---

<sup>103</sup> **Toomse** (2011b, pp. 37, 38).

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

the reserve troops deployed by the Defence Forces, professional brigades as well as the combat units of the *Kaitseliit* (the Defence League)<sup>106</sup>, who would be utilized in conventional battles and in *fighting groups*<sup>107</sup> in an unconventionally.<sup>108</sup>

Such a concept would also be used if there were to be sufficient forewarning to allow some of the allies' forces to actually arrive and render assistance. Unconventional methods are in no way prohibited by the allies' doctrines, and fall into the deep operations category according to NATO taxonomy<sup>109</sup>. Regardless, the current State Defence Strategy has proclaimed guerrilla war and more broadly resistance within a territory occupied by the opponent as an obligation<sup>110</sup>. Unfortunately, at present, this potential is not discussed nor has it been seriously and sufficiently developed<sup>111</sup>.

In this concept, the leading role would be played by the *Kaitseliit* who would create a 360 degree battlefield around the opponent that would drain them, and make them vulnerable, or in other words, create weaknesses. The main effort of the next phase revolves around the destruction of the combat units of the sufficiently weakened opponent which is enacted either by the Estonian Infantry Brigades or in cooperation with the allies. A more thorough discussion of this concept is presented below in Chapter 4.

### *Iran's Mosaic Doctrine*

The Islamic Republic of Iran might be a first state actor who has officially adopted hybrid defense concept. They named it Mosaic Defense (*defa e mozaik*). Their experience and lessons learned have largely come from the eight year long war with Iraq in the 1980s, as well as from the observations of the war between Israel – Hezbollah in 2006, and most certainly, from careful observation of the struggle of the Western armies against Iraq since 2001.<sup>112</sup>

Iran's armed forces have adopted the style of asymmetric warfare to counter technologically superior enemies. They have recognized that there is a little chance of winning a conventional, force-on-force conflict against the larger

---

<sup>106</sup> MOD (2010b, pp. 13, 14) and webpage of the *Kaitseliit*. Retrieved from <http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>107</sup> Toomse, Rene and Plaser, Martin (2009). Luure kui pusle II: Kaitseliidu võitlusgrupid on paiksed eksperdid [Intelligence as Puzzle II: Defence League's Fighting Groups as the local experts]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 1, pp. 14–18 and Toomse, Rene (2010b). Kaitseliidu võitlusgruppide doktriini selgitus ja projekt [Explanation on Defence League Fighting Groups' Doctrine and the Project]. *Kaitse Kodu!* Nr. 8/2010, pp. 33–38.

<sup>108</sup> Toomse (2011b, p. 38).

<sup>109</sup> NATO (2009c, pp. 2–9, 2–10). Allied Land Tactics ATP-3.2.1. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.

<sup>110</sup> MOD (2010b, pp. 11, 13).

<sup>111</sup> The author's personal experiences as an active voluntary instructor of the *Kaitseliit*.

<sup>112</sup> Nader, Alireza (2012, Oct 12). How Would Iran Fight Back? *Rand Blog*. Retrieved from <http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/10/how-would-iran-fight-back.html> (accessed 9 April 2015).

Western and Israeli forces. Therefore they have created deterrence-based attrition concept that aims towards inflicting psychological defeat on the adversary while preserving their own will to fight.<sup>113</sup>

Iran is betting on two major threats against their enemies: missile deterrence and unconventional warfare. The centerpiece of the defense will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). They will organize and lead the asymmetric defense and also mobilize the reserves in case of an attack by larger force. The prime methods will be ambushes, guerrilla attacks, the massing of shoulder fired weapons against the enemy, and etc. The main strength of the system is the total decentralization of command. The IRGC has 31 regional commands spread throughout the country that are designed to fight independently, commando style, behind enemy lines. There is also regular army, *Artesh*, which is meant to be the first line of defense. It is also restructured the similar way – into independent brigades, that are ready to adopt asymmetric tactics when necessary.<sup>114</sup>

### 2.3.3. The concept of Total Resistance

If the allies cannot arrive within a reasonable amount of time and the Estonian Defence Forces are not able to prevent the preponderant opponent from reaching their geographical objectives, a sensible back-up plan for the entire force would be to engage in total guerrilla warfare. The precondition is that we have run out of resources, and it would not be rational to hold the territory under our control. As assumed above, total guerrilla warfare is, for any super power, a deterrent as it means the loss of clear-cut targets, vast expenditures to ensure the security of the force, and most importantly, an inability to use a quick raid to achieve desired political objectives<sup>115</sup>.

The transition to total guerrilla warfare would also mean that the basic tenets of guerrilla warfare have been taught to the entire force, including the reserve, already during one's military service. In the event of the opponent's attack coming as a strategic surprise (which is usually the aim of a rational attacker<sup>116</sup>), and thereby leaving us no opportunity to carry out mobilization to assemble the regular force, Estonia could and must instantly engage in total guerrilla warfare in order to disrupt the momentum of the aggressor's movement. This does not prevent one from carrying out mobilization in areas free from the opponent's presence, and the plans

---

<sup>113</sup> **Connell**, Michael (2010, p. 71). Iran's Military Doctrine. *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy* Robin B. Wright (ed.). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 70–73.

<sup>114</sup> **Ward**, Steven R. (2014, pp. 327, 328). *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces*. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

<sup>115</sup> **Rekasius** (2005, p. 59), and **Toomse** (2011b, p. 38).

<sup>116</sup> **Handel**, Michael, I. (2003, pp. 1, 2). Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise. *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence* Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken (eds.). London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 1–58.

of conventional action may be re-adopted once a sufficient number of the members of the regular force have been armed. Here, the example worth following is the defense concept of Switzerland, in particular their unconventional warfare philosophy and practical recommendations<sup>117</sup>.

No action of the opponent can rapidly and easily obstruct a pre-planned and well prepared guerilla movement. The adoption of this concept might actually be what makes possible the mobilization itself, and from there, the defense of strategic landing places in order to receive the arriving troops of the allies.<sup>118</sup>

The interplay between these two concepts (hybrid warfare and total resistance), when the force is concentrated for a decisive strike at times and then again dispersed into original units at others, will pose a serious problem for any preponderant opponent. In this concept, the balance is undoubtedly placed on the units of the *Kaitseleit*, in particular the combat units who are most knowledgeable of, and can traverse in the most organized manner, the local geography and other conditions throughout the country.<sup>119</sup>

#### **2.3.4. The concept of Strategic Development Operations during war**

Strategic operations as well as strategic communication are activities that are in continuous development regardless of the style of combat that would be utilized within the Estonian territory. Strategic operations involve physical surprise operations in the opponent's territory that are performed by striking at the links that support his military activity and stability. These operations can be physical or electronic (*cyberwarfare*). The ideal is to combine the two in situations where a team with the respective equipment and software gains proximity and then sabotages the opponent's closed networks. In this method of warfare, Special Operations Forces play the central role.<sup>120</sup>

Communications operations encompass at least four functions: securing psychological protection for the people,<sup>121</sup> undermining the opponent's nation's faith in the legitimacy and purposefulness of the war, playing on the fears of the opponent's government, and creating a positive image of our justified fight for the rest of the world, which in turn would speed up the arrival of the allies' troops. In order to effectively apply the respective measures of influence, we must put the necessary means of media and communications at the disposal of each unit.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>117</sup> **Von Dach**, Hans (1965). Total Resistance. Translated by H. Lienhard. Boulder: Paladin Press, and **Toomse** (2011b, p. 38).

<sup>118</sup> **Toomse** (2011b, p. 38).

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 39.

<sup>120</sup> **Toomse** (2015, pp. 53–55). See also Chapter 3 below on proposed ESTSOF operational domains, missions and essential tasks, and **Toomse** (2011b, p. 39).

<sup>121</sup> **MOD** (2010b, p. 23).

<sup>122</sup> **Toomse** (2011b, p. 38).

### 2.3.5. The concept of Strategic Development Operations during peace

One of the principal aims of this concept is the creation of operational channels, and the actuation of wartime communications. This involves the timely creation of a positive perception of ourselves for the allied nations, the construction of the necessary networks of foreign intelligence, the attempts to persuade the possible opponent to relinquish their war plans, and if war proves unavoidable, then the respective preparations of strategic operations in the opponent's territory. In addition this category includes the participation of the members of the Defence Forces and civilians in international operations which always must be marked by the effort of reaping a "maximum" benefit from the viewpoint of the principal objective. Thus, for instance, investments should be made in those areas which, in addition to being in the interests of the allies, also represent national interests. Attempts should always be made to employ those unique capacities in which Estonia excels and has made great progress in.<sup>123</sup>

Each foreign peacetime operation also attempts, as much, and as broadly as possible, to create economic channels for Estonian enterprises, which would profit Estonia financially and allow it to gain a good reputation in the world. Other tasks falling under this concept include the release of Estonian hostages and the evacuation of Estonian citizens from crises-hit areas<sup>124</sup> using Special Operations Forces, which is one of their responsibilities.<sup>125</sup>

Most importantly, however, strategic development operations would create an opportunity for Estonia to increase its diplomatic capital due to the fact that the main purpose of these operations is to avert armed conflicts and thereby save the resources of the allies as well as human lives.<sup>126</sup> This concept is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3.

The five key concepts that were discussed above constitute a foundation for reasonable plans of action for Estonia from the strategic point of view. On the basis of these concepts, it would be possible to work out functioning operational plans which guide specific units to act in a particular situation according to the larger purpose.

---

<sup>123</sup> **MOD** (2010b, p. 9). Unfortunately this guidance is rarely followed (author's comment), and **Toomse** (2011b, p. 38).

<sup>124</sup> **MOD** (2010b, p. 17).

<sup>125</sup> **NATO** (2009a, pp. 2-2, 2-4). Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, and **Toomse** (2011b, p. 38).

<sup>126</sup> **Toomse**, Rene (2010a, p. 18). Rahvas sõjas. Väikeriigi võimalus olla suurem suurriigist. [Nation at War. An Option of a Small State to be Larger than Major Powers]. *Diplomaatia* 5 (81), pp. 14–18.

### 2.3. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

It is only after the formulation of strategies that a realistic National Defense Development Plan<sup>127</sup> that proceeds from the aggregate of the above-mentioned points can be drawn up. Since the necessary capabilities would actually only become clear after the strategic concepts have been formulated and tested in war games, the developments and public procurements which are necessary for the creation and strengthening of the capabilities must proceed from a clear plan and organization of the necessary actions and units. If we undertake public procurements and developments without previously formulating the necessary strategies, we essentially approach the whole thing from the wrong end. Such miscalculations are destructive for the defense capacity of a small nation and the safety of the entire country, particularly so given our limited resources.<sup>128</sup>

For more on the current Estonian National Defense Development Plan and criticism on it see Chapter 4 below.

### 2.4. SUMMARY

In conclusion it can be said that there are always more than one or two strategic choices available. Moreover, there must be more than one choice because each situation is unique and no universal solution exists. At the same time, it is essential to maintain flexibility in order to move between different strategic concepts. When considering a state defense, it is imperative to commit to the resolute construction of an independent defense capability that also makes a substantial contribution to deterrence as well. At any rate, an actual defense capability must be created for a possible war, and this must be done by implementing the strategy that would cause the most difficulties for the attacker. In other words, all the war activities must place the opponent in such a situation where he would be unable to fight, and the costs would be too high for him to achieve the outcomes he desires.

Wartime and peacetime strategies must be closely inter-connected and informed by the same overall vision. The flexibility of strategic concepts and their points of overlap must also be maintained in order to move quickly from one to another according to the changes in circumstances. Despite there being on occasion completely disparate operational and tactical approaches to the realization of various strategies, if the respective universal conditions are present, there will not be a conflict when creating and developing the forces.

Since no one is able to do everything, it is essential that we ascertain the areas of emphasis for each segment of the force, assuming that these segments are the most suited to their area of expertise. The guiding principle is that strengths must be

---

<sup>127</sup> MOD (2010b, p. 24).

<sup>128</sup> Toomse (2011a, p. 41).

further improved and areas of weakness must be brought to a satisfactory level. At any rate, we must avoid developing all the segments of the force according to the principle that everybody should be trained to perform moderately well at doing one and the same thing – a principle that is even now occasionally is still practiced. In the latter case the force will not actually improve as a whole, but will remain average. However, if we pursue the former, and focus on improving strengths, then the overall quality of the force would be considerably raised. This in turn would compel the commanders to cleverly focus the various segments of the force on precisely those operations and sub-operations where they are the strongest, and at the same time combine them based on needs that must be responded to as well as insure that every unit is most suited to the task that it performs.

### 3. PREEMPTIVE PEACEMAKING BY DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

*And you know that in the changing world the one wins who walks alongside the world, walks a bit faster than the world, gets ahead of it and is able to see the problems, questions and solutions that life imposes to him.*

Lennart Meri, Estonian President 1992-2001  
in addressing the beginning of 2001 school year.

#### 3.1. THE PROBLEM

At present there is unprecedented turmoil and violence in North Africa and the Middle East<sup>129</sup>. The rise of Islamic extremism and its impacts have had drastic regional effects<sup>130</sup> and have also had serious consequences for Western European countries, where it seriously endangers the peace and security of even the most distant countries. One of the main problems stems from the exodus of masses of refugees from the various conflict zones to Europe<sup>131</sup>. They bring with them their culture and religion which often conflicts with the Western way of life<sup>132</sup>. This creates the conditions for extremist movements and deadly terror attacks in Western cities as we have witnessed recently<sup>133</sup>.

These developments in global security may stem from Western states having attacked tyrannical systems in the hope of creating democratic societies in the region, as some researchers have asserted<sup>134</sup>. However, assigning blame does not help resolve the problems and serious thought needs to be given to ways in which to prevent such situations in the future.

---

<sup>129</sup> **UNCHR** (2015a). 2015 UNHCR regional operations profile – Middle East and North Africa. Working Environment. *UNCHR webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02db416.html> (accessed 6 April 2015).

<sup>130</sup> **Manyuan, Dong** (2014, Nov 14). The Rise of ISIS: Impacts and Future. *CIIS Time*. Retrieved from [http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-11/14/content\\_7369551.htm](http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-11/14/content_7369551.htm) (accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>131</sup> **UNCHR** (2015b). 2015 UNHCR regional operations profile – Europe. Working Environment. *UNCHR webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d9346.html> (accessed 6 April 2015).

<sup>132</sup> **Caldwell, Christopher** (2015, Jan 16). Immigration and Islam: Europe's Crisis of Faith. France and the rest of Western Europe have never honestly confronted the issues raised by Muslim immigration. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-immigration-and-islam-europes-crisis-of-faith-1421450060> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>133</sup> **Anderson, Gary** (2015, Feb 13). Were the Paris Attacks the First Phase of Coming Urban Warfare in Europe? *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/paris-islamist-guerrilla-jihad-charlie-hebdo/?wp\\_login\\_redirect=0](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/paris-islamist-guerrilla-jihad-charlie-hebdo/?wp_login_redirect=0) (accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>134</sup> **Reynolds, Ben** (2014, Aug 31). Iran Didn't Create ISIS; We Did. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/iran-didnt-create-isis-we-did/> (accessed 4 April 2015).

Therefore, democratic societies must work harder to prevent wars. This is something that NATO has recognized and begun to prioritize at least in statements<sup>135</sup>. Distant violent conflicts sow discord in local Western cultures and the need to conduct Crisis Response Operations<sup>136</sup>, or the readiness to fulfill the obligations of NATO Treaty Article 5<sup>137</sup> is growing. In the past Western nations would form coalitions and deploy to a crisis area and seek to re-establish peace. In the past this worked, for the most part, but somehow circumstances have changed and this is no longer as effective. Today's adversary, usually a non-state actor, is somehow stronger than ever. Despite the lack of equipment and training, irregular enemies make superior armies bleed and are able to wage long wars.

The intent of this chapter is to take a deeper look into some of the changes in today's conflicts. Some key questions that arise are: why are some of the current insurgencies so successful and how are they able to bring about the downfall of a state? Is this preventable? If so, then how can it be prevented? And finally, what can small states, like Estonia, with fewer resources do to make an effective contribution to Western security?

Most Western nations seek to be actively engaged in the prevention of conflicts. Yet, despite this shared imperative, there is no common agreement as to how this conflict prevention should take place. So, while NATO Article 5 serves as a mandate and a guideline for policy, there must also be a practical vision for a concept of operations, and the organization and methods to meet this goal.

In this chapter I will propose a concept, and an approach that could be used as a catalyst for further discussions. It is called the Preemptive Strategic Development approach. In addition to the previously presented theoretical concept (see Chapter 1), this study will formulate a possible organization and the actors within it. The intention is to offer an approach and an outline of an organization that could be effective for the prevention of future conflicts.

This approach would require extensive resources, and it is not possible for a small state on its own to enact the changes in the political, economic, military, informational, infrastructural (PEMSII) and educational spheres<sup>138</sup> that are necessary for the improvement of the social systems of failing countries. It is most likely that there are just a few specialized areas, such as engineering, healthcare,

---

<sup>135</sup> NATO (2011b, p. 6). Strategic Concept 'Active Engagement, Modern Defence'. *NATO webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120203\\_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf) (accessed 7 April 2015).

<sup>136</sup> NATO (2005, p. 1-1). Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations AJP 3.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.

<sup>137</sup> NATO (1949). Article 5 in The North Atlantic Treaty. *NATO webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed 28 March 2015).

<sup>138</sup> NATO (2011a, p. 5-128). Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency AJP 3.4.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency. That is the author's view that one of the most vital fields is also education what deserved to be displayed separately.

information technology, education and so on where a small state could best focus its efforts. These would be the unique fields in which a small nation, such as Estonia, would have strong capabilities. Thus, the strengths of a small state should be coordinated within the Alliance to fulfill the common strategy. This would be the essence of the Preemptive Strategic Development Operations (PSDO).

Please note that in the following, the term *war* is used to indicate armed conflict between state and non-state actors. Also, as many of the next paragraphs are synthesized from various *counterinsurgency* doctrines and practices, the respective terminology is used.

### 3.1.1. Fourth generation warfare?

An armed conflict, or war is commonly understood to be, and is legally defined as, a violent conflict between states. However, at present, the most common type of warfare takes the form of a state actor engaging with non-state opponents. Often it is more difficult to succeed in this type of conflict than it is to overcome a state actor<sup>139</sup>. Why? To answer this question one must keep in mind and recognize that war is essentially the violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable human wills, each trying to impose itself on the other<sup>140</sup>. In a war against an irregular, non-state enemy, local public support and their welfare can often count more than firepower<sup>141</sup>.

The US Marine Corps warfighting doctrine describes three major forces inherent to armed conflict: they are the physical, the mental and the moral forces. The physical characteristics of war are generally easy to understand and measure. These include equipment capabilities, supplies, force ratios, and so on. The mental force is the ability to grasp complex battlefield situations and to make effective estimates and decisions. The moral force is much more difficult to grasp and measure. One cannot easily weigh factors such as national and military resolve, conscience, emotion, fear, courage, leadership, or esprit. Yet these are what galvanize a force<sup>142</sup>. In short, the moral force is decisive<sup>143</sup>. Although the decisions to start, wage and end wars are made at a mental level, they are always motivated by a rational conclusion made under moral pressure, by an actor in a conflict.

Today the widespread use of guerrilla tactics with strategic impact by a weaker side against a stronger opponent has become increasingly common. Some theoreticians,

---

<sup>139</sup> **Zenkevicius**, Gintautas (2007, p. 28). Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Rebuilding Afghanistan – Is That Post-conflict Reconstruction? *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, pp. 28–56.

<sup>140</sup> **U.S. Marine Corps** (1997, p. 3). MDCP 1, Warfighting. U.S. Government Printing Office.

<sup>141</sup> **Department of the Army** (2006, p. 1-27). FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. U.S. Government Printing Office.

<sup>142</sup> **U.S. Marine Corps** (1997, pp. 15, 16).

<sup>143</sup> **Lind**, William S. (2006). Critics of the Fourth Generation. *LewRockwell* webpage. Retrieved from <https://www.lewrockwell.com/2006/01/william-s-lind/critics-of-the-fourth-generation> (accessed 3 April 2015).

such as William S. Lind and Col. Thomas X. Hammes, call this phenomenon fourth generation warfare, and classify it as a type of conflict that has emerged from (actually more to oppose–author’s comment) the second and third generations of warfare<sup>144</sup>.

U.S. Marine Col (ret.) Thomas X. Hammes, author of “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century”, argues that, “strategically, fourth generation attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policy makers.”<sup>145</sup> Lind argues that what is different about the fourth generation concept is that it centers on who fights and what they fight for. According to Lind, it is a mistake to believe that fourth generation fighters are focused on the mental level. In fact, fourth generation fighters turn their state enemies inward against themselves on the moral level, which makes political calculations at the mental level irrelevant.<sup>146</sup>

This might seem contradictory, but actually it is not. What Hammes means is that policymakers, and the people who have the power to command war, make rational decisions based on the moral calculations of the electorate. In such a case, the nation’s will becomes a tool that is used by the fourth generation strategists to influence the adversary’s policy makers and coerce them into arriving at a rational decision to terminate the war. The behavior of the leaders is shaped by the attitude of the electorate (moral level), and a politician’s sophisticated rationality recognizes the electorate’s reluctance to continue the war (mental level), which then forces them to make decisions that favor the opponent.

One case that illustrates this logic is the Spanish pullout from Iraq in 2004. The election for a new government was won by a party that promised to end the participation of Spanish troops in that war. A few days before the election Spain experienced a terror attack where 10 bombs exploded on four trains and killed 191 people, while injuring close to 2000 people. The attackers were affiliated with Islamic extremist cells and the announcements of Al-Qaeda leaders indicated that this was a strategic plan to attack with terror one of the coalition members where the nation-wide support to Iraq campaign was the weakest.<sup>147</sup>

---

<sup>144</sup> **Lind** (1989) and **Hammes**, Thomas X. (2004). *The Sling and the Stone: on war in the 21st century*. St. Paul: Zenith. For the full description on the theory of generations of warfare see also Lind or Hammes.

<sup>145</sup> **Hammes** (2004, p. 208).

<sup>146</sup> **Lind**, William S. (2004). *The Sling and The Stone*. *Military.com webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind\\_110504,00.html](http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_110504,00.html) (accessed 6 March 2015).

<sup>147</sup> **Morris**, Daniel R. (2010, pp. 79, 80). *Waging war through surprise and terror*. *The Character of War in the 21st Century*. Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter and Christopher Coker (eds.). Oxon: Routledge, pp. 72–87; **Jeffery**, Simon (2004, Mar 15). *New Spanish PM promises Iraq withdrawal*. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/15/spain.iraq> (accessed 17 April 2015) and **Burridge**, Tom (2014, Mar 11). *Spain remembers Madrid train bombings 10 years on*. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26526704> (accessed 16 April 2015).

Lind is convinced that fourth generation fighters are not satisfied with seeing the war against their entity ended, but will also seek revenge and will continue to, on the moral level, pull apart states that oppose them<sup>148</sup>. For some fourth generation strategists the simple removal of the occupiers from one's territory may be insufficient and in order to prevent future attacks they would further seek the collapse of the society where the threat originates. This is a logical next step, but it is not necessarily a certainty. Whether fourth generation strategists take that direction would depend on many factors related to previous conflict outcomes, perceived future threats, and the ambitions of the leaders.

Nevertheless, in the scope of physical warfare, who is fighting is less relevant than what the fight is about. For the armed forces of the state, the biggest challenge is to locate the fight and discern what methods are being used. Strategies and tactics matter. Fourth generation warriors have modified classic guerrilla tactics and extended them to battlefields across the globe, and this makes it difficult to target them as a physical entity<sup>149</sup>. If an idea has become an inspiring principle, and the opposing force has mastered the skill of emerging and dispersing among the civilian population within minutes, then there is little to target physically as was the case in the Iraq insurgency<sup>150</sup>. This is the reason why technical superiority on the contemporary battlefield is less important, and armed forces alone cannot cope with modern insurgencies.

Fourth generation strategists use tactics that render the opponent's high tech and structured hierarchical army almost irrelevant<sup>151</sup>. The overall intent of the irregular faction or insurgent is to undermine the enemy's moral support base in their home country through the utilization of all the forces of war – physical, mental and moral<sup>152</sup>. Irregular warfare, through terrorism, can bring the physical fight to the Western states and make their argument manifest. The irregulars' main effort is not focused on physically defeating their enemy's armed forces; it is rather to target public opinion in the opponents' home country and destroy the enemy's will to continue the struggle.<sup>153</sup> Against such an enemy a traditional army cannot win, as the actual war is not limited to the space where the fight is being carried out.

It should however be noted that there are those who argue that this kind of warfare is not new and the 4th generation concept is irrelevant. The noted military scholar

---

<sup>148</sup> Lind (2006).

<sup>149</sup> Lind, William S. et al. (2009, p. 86). FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation War. *Global Guerrillas webpage*. Retrieved from <https://www.traditionalright.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FMFM-1A-revised-17-Jul-09.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2015).

<sup>150</sup> Kilcullen, David (2010, p. 9). *Counterinsurgency*. London: Hurst & Company.

<sup>151</sup> Osinga, Frans P. B. (2007a, p. 9). John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era. *The Air University webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga\\_boyd\\_postmod\\_copyright2007.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_boyd_postmod_copyright2007.pdf) (accessed 11 March 2015).

<sup>152</sup> Lind, William S. et al. (1989).

<sup>153</sup> Osinga (2007a, pp. 10, 11).

and Army War College professor Dr. Antulia J. Echevarria II dismisses the theory completely due to its being flawed and creating more confusion than it resolves.<sup>154</sup> He finds the theory to be weak, poorly constructed and selective of its use of history.<sup>155</sup> Despite this criticism, there are reasons why it is still a useful and valuable concept and these are probably best articulated by Frans Osinga:

“4GW [fourth generation warfare] is inspiring discussion, debate, frustration, refinement of insights, assertions, conjectures and refutations, in short, like many other works that try to make sense of our uncertain and ever-changing environment, it helps us refine and adjust our orientation pattern and learn. Whatever one may think of 4GW, considering the wide audience, one cannot ignore the importance of it as an idea in strategic theory, and as an appealing, - resonating - description of problems confronting western military and political elites today. 4GW does not cover all aspects of the evolving strategic landscape, and perhaps 4GW is not the entirely academically correct analysis, but as an exercise in strategic thinking, creating a coherent synthesis out of a myriad of disparate trends and developments, it certainly has merits by making people aware of potential contours and dynamics of the future strategic landscape.”<sup>156</sup>

It should be mentioned that how the problem is labeled is less important. What matters is that resistance, especially armed, does not happen without serious underlying factors. There must be a severe collapse in the system in order for it to push an ordinary man into grabbing a weapon or plunging into suicide bombing mission.

### 3.1.2. Why state systems fail?

A state’s stability and security can be shattered either from the outside (an attack by other country) or from the inside (violent resistance, also called insurgency). Often a collapse is due to the combination of both factors.

The Chinese Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, authors of “Unrestricted Warfare”, state that the official reason for a war starting can be anything from a dispute over a territory and resources, to ideology, to the distribution of power. The real reason for a war is, often times, different from the official reason.<sup>157</sup> One factor

---

<sup>154</sup> **Echevarria**, Antulio J. II (2005, p. 2). Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths. Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB632.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2015).

<sup>155</sup> **Freedman**, Lawrence (2008, pp. 78, 85) A Comment on T.X. Hammes. Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. Debating fourth-generation warfare, Aaron Karp et al. (eds.). New York: Routledge, pp. 78-86.

<sup>156</sup> **Osinga**, Frans P. B. (2007b, p. 22). On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory. *On new Wars*, John Olson ed. Retrieved from [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga\\_4gw\\_boyd\\_copyright2007.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf) (accessed 14 August 2015).

<sup>157</sup> **Liang**, Qiao & **Xiangsui**, Wang (1999, pp. 38). *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.

that could potentially trigger future struggles would be the combination of limited resources where there is a growing population together with a fear that the nation will be unable to preserve its standard of living, or even fail to survive, if resources are not secured<sup>158</sup>. The reasons can also be psychological. They can include a lack of security, non-recognition of grievances and the suppression of identity<sup>159</sup>. Regardless of whether the unbalancing factors originate from the outside, or stem from rulers turning against their people, it makes little difference for individuals if their way of life is in serious danger. Either way, eventually, there will be some kind of resistance that can easily escalate from a local problem to a global one.

Although it is unlikely that an entire population will unite as an organized resistance if they lack capable leadership, there will always be smaller groups of people who are ready to mobilize and preserve their way of life. If this is not achievable in a peaceful manner, the situation will turn violent. This creates a snowball effect in which the state (alone or with assistance of allies) kills the rebels, and then their families and tribes seek revenge. Before, this was a common local problem, but Western technological advances and innovations have created a “globalization effect” and the local now quickly becomes an international issue<sup>160</sup>.

In his book “The Accidental Guerrilla”, Dr. David Kilcullen, former Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, attributes the present status of the so-called gap countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, (sometimes also called “rogue states”) to the uneven pace and spread of globalization. These gap countries have become safe havens for terrorist activity where the savvier groups can organize, recruit, and promote their cause.<sup>161</sup> This was the case with Al Qaida in late 1990’s when they found sanctuary in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s protection.<sup>162</sup>

Dr. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the author of “The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century”, argues that globalization is a phenomenon that makes terrorists react to what they regard as an infringement upon their values. He finds the cultural invasion of the West to be the trigger of violent actions in the Third World<sup>163</sup> which may be true in some cases. A

---

<sup>158</sup> **Osinga**, Frans P. B. (2005, p. 177). *Science, Strategy and War. The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers.

<sup>159</sup> **Burton** (1997a).

<sup>160</sup> **Kilcullen**, David (2006, p. 3). *Counterinsurgency Redux. The Air University (USAF) webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/counterinsurgency\\_redux.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/counterinsurgency_redux.pdf) (accessed 12 March 2015).

<sup>161</sup> **Kilcullen**, David (2009, p. 10). *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big On*. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>162</sup> **Tawil**, Camille (2010, pp. 7, 8). *The Other Face of Al-Qaeda. Quilliam Foundation webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-other-face-of-al-qaeda.pdf> (accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>163</sup> **Rasmussen**, Mikkel V. (2006, p. 165). *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

straightforward intervention in another nation's affairs can result in the type of clash that the West has encountered in Afghanistan<sup>164</sup>. However, as globalization is more about the spread of information and lifestyles, there is no clear evidence that globalization in and of itself, could be the reason for a deadly conflict with another culture.

For people who engage in active resistance against the West, or a government that is perceived as pro-Western, globalization may remain irrelevant. If people lack basic resources, or they believe that their security, identity, culture, and future are threatened, any justification that promises the preservation of their desired status can become the initiator of a violent struggle<sup>165</sup>. Once a critical mass of dissatisfied people is mobilized, the focus of the fighting might shift towards gaining more than just the preservation of one's way of life. It may move towards an attack on the systems of Western states in order to prevent future interventions as Lind and Hammes have concluded above.

Meanwhile, the leaders of such an uprising need proximity to masses of unsatisfied people in order to maintain their influence.<sup>166</sup> This is normally accomplished through physical interaction. Today, however, media and communications have multiplied the means of gaining proximity. In this manner globalization plays a key role by bringing a psychological presence via cyberspace and media<sup>167</sup> to remote areas, as well as the potential for terror attacks into Westerners' backyards. Globalization provides opponents with unprecedented access to a number of tools such as the Internet, cell phones, satellite communications, and electronic fund transfers. It connects geographically distant groups that were previously unable to coordinate their actions<sup>168</sup>. This means that today, and in the future, the battlefield is everywhere<sup>169</sup>.

### 3.1.3. When and how the West should engage?

A united response to early indications that a state is on the verge of collapse is vital and would be more beneficial than waiting, and then reacting to a complete meltdown. For Western nations, an early intervention could provide better security for everyone in the long run and would prove to be less expensive financially and culturally, as well as in terms of the cost of human lives.

---

<sup>164</sup> **Racius**, Egdunas (2007, p. 60). The 'Cultural Awareness' Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan. *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, pp. 57–78.

<sup>165</sup> **Burton**, John W. (1997b, p. 38). Violence explained. Oxford: Manchester University Press and **Kilcullen** (2009, p. 263).

<sup>166</sup> **Kilcullen** (2009, pp. 28–38).

<sup>167</sup> **Rid**, Thomas & **Hecker**, Marc (2009, p. 128). War 2.0. Irregular Warfare in the Information Age. London: Praeger Security International.

<sup>168</sup> **Kilcullen** (2009, pp. 9, 10).

<sup>169</sup> **Liang & Xiangsui** (1999, p.43).

Robert Martinage, Senior Defence Analyst at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, asserts that in the future Western nations may not only be called upon to provide and build internal security and law enforcement capabilities, they must also assist in “non-military” areas critical to the stability of the state (e.g., electrical power generation and distribution, water treatment and distribution, provision and distribution of food, sanitation, and medical care etc.).<sup>170</sup> Additionally, in 2008, RAND researchers found that due to the amount of time it takes for real changes to become actualized in a society, counterinsurgent groups need to apply civil measures preventively at the first signs of trouble<sup>171</sup>.

There are three primary domains to current conflicts that must be addressed: the informational, the political and the economic. These domains would be addressed in two phases. The first phase would consist of the application of the necessary informational, political and economic measures (*soft power*) in the time-period before a conflict is about to emerge (the pre-conflict phase). The second phase would consist of the transitioning of stabilization measures carried out by military means, to the respective civilian support groups (the transition phase). In these phases and domains civilian expertise is needed on site, however, civilian experts who lack a good military preparation are often unable to operate in such areas due to the high risks involved. Therefore, an entity that can survive in harsh conditions while meaningfully addressing the conflict area’s key social systems (see on that below), is needed.

In the pre-conflict phase the key is to be present and implement the needed actions that will target the root causes of an arising conflict. This can reduce tensions and prevent a complete collapse. However, this phase must be carried out in close cooperation with the key players of an area. It is vital to have a meaningful and achievable strategy to deal with the regional political groups and to ensure their support. However, in many cases it may not be a good idea to impose a democratic system that might clash with the local culture and produce a violent social reaction<sup>172</sup>.

The problem lies in recognizing the root causes and applying the right influence at the right time, and in the right locations. In the meantime intelligence gathering and support networks should be developed to shorten the lead-up time for critical

---

<sup>170</sup> **Martinage**, Robert (2008, p. 75). Strategy for the Long Haul. Special Operation Forces. Future challenges and Opportunities. *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_.pdf](http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special_Operation_.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2015).

<sup>171</sup> **Gompert**, David C. & **Gordon**, John IV (2008, p. 101). War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities *RAND webpage*. Retrieved from [www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 27 March 2015).

<sup>172</sup> **Huntington**, Samuel P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 72, No 3, pp. 22–49.

decisions in case the deployment of conventional military forces becomes necessary. If prevention fails and a conflict nevertheless emerges, the network and communication platforms would already be in place for the newly arriving forces to build on<sup>173</sup>. At least in theory it would enhance the overall perspective of military commanders and help them to avoid serious mistakes outside the purely military realm.

The same approach could be used when a conflict emerges unexpectedly and the West needs to commit military forces on short notice. The systems and the organization of a state are at their weakest when a high intensity conflict is nearing its end. As in Iraq after the Coalition forces defeated Saddam's forces, there was a breakdown of the state apparatus and the vacuum left by the invading forces contributed to the conditions that encouraged an insurgency.<sup>174</sup> In such situations special units with the proper resources can address the system breakdown and prevent an insurgency from emerging. The transition phase is when it is most dangerous in terms of force protection and operators must be competent in military tactics and also possess civilian expertise. An example of the failure to follow this common sense approach would again come from Iraq, where civil governance and reconstruction efforts went largely unsupported in 2003–2004 when they were most needed<sup>175</sup>. This was not improved later<sup>176</sup> and contributed significantly to the failure of the mission.

#### **3.1.4. Time perspective and the development of the next generation**

Finally the perspective of time and a focus on the next generation are important. No country wants to be committed to a protracted war. However, at present, this is a problem and the phenomenon will continue as long there are developing insurgencies. Relatively short-term perspectives will likely extend current problems for decades.

In the West, the idea that “time is money” creates a sense of urgency and an impatience to achieve goals without realizing there are other perspectives of time<sup>177</sup>. By emphasizing a focus on the short-term, the long-term effects are missed. One of the most vital questions is – who will be in charge in this state in ten, or twenty

---

<sup>173</sup> **Kilcullen**, David (2008). Remarks at the NATO SOF Symposium, 3–5 June 2008 in Deauville, France.

<sup>174</sup> **Sepp**, Kalev I. (2005, Mar 2014). Prepared Statement before House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005\\_hr/050314-sepp.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/050314-sepp.pdf) (accessed 11 March 2015).

<sup>175</sup> **Gompert & Gordon** (2008, p. 120).

<sup>176</sup> **van Burden**, Peter (2011). *The American Empire Project. We Meant Well. How I helped lose the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.* NY: Metropolitan Books.

<sup>177</sup> **Department of the Army** (2009, p. 1-5). FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency. U.S. Government Printing Office.

years' time? Current counterinsurgency doctrines do not stress the need to educate and develop the next generation of leaders for today's unstable states.

Thus, a functioning school system is essential and is one of the most important projects to invest in. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980's, an entire generation of youth was educated in *madrasahs* (religious schools) in Pakistan, where they were, from a Western perspective, radicalized<sup>178</sup>. This generation was in their 40s by 2010 that was the bloodiest year of the war for the coalition<sup>179</sup>. This means that in that year, the men in charge were already shaping the perceptions of the next generation, who had also been in one way or another shaped by the presence of the Western coalition since 2001. However, this shaping was not done in a way that was beneficial to the Western cause.

Reports that mid-level Taliban leaders were younger than they were during the initial invasion (usually in their mid-20s),<sup>180</sup> which indicates that the age of the fighters was below that (early 20s on average). Some of the most dangerous fighters were of elementary school age in the early 2000's when the West invaded Afghanistan. Had the West supported a school system that started shaping the youth at that time it could have dramatically reduced the corps of insurgents that are still operating today. Such factors should be a serious part of an overall strategic consideration.

The simple truth is this that today's young people will have the vote tomorrow. Ignoring the need to shape their world-view drastically prolongs a conflict. A military force would be integral in supporting and sustaining an educational system by protecting infrastructure, teachers, and routes from villages to schools. There are numerous ways to incentivize becoming part of such an education system, such as by providing lunches, clothing, and additional family support for school attendance. For local people such as in Afghanistan, their children are what is most important and it is via the children that the perceptions of parents can be shaped as well. This can be a powerful indirect approach to a problem that must inevitably be resolved.

### 3.2. THE CONDUCT OF PREEMPTIVE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

The strategy and special teams of the Preemptive Strategic Development Operations (PSDO) need to be prepared well in advance. The exact type and mode of assisting

---

<sup>178</sup> **Afsar**, Shahid, **Samples**, Chris & **Wood**, Thomas (2008, p. 61). The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis. *Military Review* May–June, pp. 58–73.

<sup>179</sup> **iCasualties** (2015). Operation Enduring Freedom. Retrieved from <http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed 29 March 2015).

<sup>180</sup> **Shanker**, Thom & **Rubin**, Alissa (2010, Jun 28). Quest to Neutralize Afghan Militants Is Showing Glimpses of Success, NATO Says. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29military.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29military.html?_r=1) (accessed 8 March 2015).

presence must be agreed upon and given legitimacy by the local authorities and the main political movements of the area because only these groups can create and sustain a stable situation in the long-run. One cannot simply externally impose stability. Direct contraventions of local beliefs and traditions are to be avoided in order to prevent friction<sup>181</sup>.

Every effort should be made to immediately identify and address the causes of a failing system before the situation becomes a conflict. Therefore, Kilcullen in his book “The Accidental Guerrilla” suggests the application of two mission sets: Strategic Disruption and Military Assistance<sup>182</sup>.

Strategic disruption aims at keeping potentially problematic groups off balance by preventing the emergence of new terrorist threats, disrupting safe havens, and defeating the adversary’s propaganda. Disruption may also include lethal means. Although it may seem that this mission set is offensive in nature, and it is that on a tactical level, it is actually defensive on the strategic level, because it deals only with today’s threats and does not help prevent the next generation of enemies from emerging.<sup>183</sup>

The decisive mission set is actual military assistance. This is aimed at restructuring the environment over a long period of time by denying the enemy, or a potential enemy, a prominent role, by reducing the recruitment base, and by influencing conditions that may generate a threat. This requires a low-profile civilian type presence over and above the overwhelming military display in a crisis area. All the activities aimed at influencing the situation should be carried out as discreetly as possible in order to avoid negative reactions from the local populace. This mission set is seen as being defensive tactically, but it is actually offensive on the strategic level.<sup>184</sup>

However, the PSDO concept would even take this a step further. First, the strategy of this approach should be planned, coordinated, and supported within the auspices of an alliance and not solely by the nation leading or conducting the operation. This allows for the utilization of a wider range of assets and unique capabilities that each nation possesses. Additionally, it is vital to consider the various national ambitions and aspirations of countries where the operations are being conducted.

Secondly, emphasis should be placed on the physical improvements of actual weak points in a social system, and in addition, the economic, informational, diplomatic and military support applied to the target area should be designed to supplement the conditions favorable to its social stability. Operators should use all available

---

<sup>181</sup> **Choharis**, Peter C. & **Gavrilis**, James A. (2010, p. 38). Counterinsurgency 3.0. *Parameters*, Spring, pp. 34–46.

<sup>182</sup> **Kilcullen** (2009, pp. 288, 289).

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

resources and subject matter expertise to implement those assets with minimum losses to corruption, misuse or incompetence. The focus will be on building loyalty and seeking “to empower local people to act as partners with government and foreign aid agencies toward shared, long-term objectives”<sup>185</sup>.

All the activities are to be carried out using non-provocative methods – there should be no reasons for the discontent of the populace, and the projects should be perceived as improving the future. These are to be long-running operations, where physical presence and resource support are important and should be maintained until the situation has actually improved, and can be sustained without external assistance.

According to Professor Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College and General Charles F. Wald, USAF, former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, a counterinsurgency strategy must offer alternative sources of identity and empowerment for bored, disillusioned, and disenfranchised young males who are the main risk group and the most likely to become insurgents. Simply providing low paying, low status jobs or the opportunity to attend school is not enough.<sup>186</sup> Again, the same paradigm must apply to Preemptive Strategic Development Operations. The creation of diverse job options as well as productive markets are most likely to be the main preventive factor of conflict by virtue of their being a source of hope for a better future.

The approach of PSDO operations would differ considerably from the current *Clear-Hold-Build* concept in operations as described in the NATO Counterinsurgency doctrine. The participation and presence of host nation (HN) security forces (which include the armed forces and police) may be a misstep. The NATO description leaves the impression that NATO forces alone conduct the *Clear* and *Hold* phases and then transition stabilization measures to HN security (and other) forces during the *Build* phase<sup>187</sup> when it already may be too late.

The PSDO approach would consist of the *Identify-Invest-Supervise* phases. The Identify phase would be comprised of reconnaissance to identify the key problems, personnel and gather information. This information would in turn be provided to the Strategic Development Group (see below) that would then work on plans, and seek the committal of partners and NGOs willing to assist and address the identified weak spots. The other phases would then be conducted concurrently rather than sequentially.

---

<sup>185</sup> **Choharis & Gavrilis** (2010, p. 41).

<sup>186</sup> **Metz**, Steven (2007, p. 53). Rethinking Insurgency. *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College webpage*. Retrieved from: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB790.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2015) and **Byrd**, Miemie W. (2006, p. 16). Combating Terrorism. A Socio-Economic Strategy. *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 41, 2d Quarter, pp. 15–19.

<sup>187</sup> **NATO** (2011a, pp. 5-15–5-17). Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency AJP 3.4.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.

Invest means building relationships with key personnel in order to apply solutions together, while the actual operators stay in the shadows. The control of monetary assets would remain in the hands of the operational team. Operators would apply their subject matter expertise and at the same time control the use of donated money and equipment to ensure an honest and purposeful application.

The supervision of asset distribution would be conducted throughout the invest phase, but this function should remain in the background even when the parts of the development program are withdrawn after a successful operation. It would remain necessary to track the continuity of the strategy and to be ready to insert a specialist team with the necessary resources quickly in the event of a probable breakdown.

For Preemptive Strategic Development Operations to be effective, actors at all levels need to understand and accept the following three major principles:

First, every project and action should take the local cultural context into consideration. The population's world view and social systems must be understood and accepted as they are. If their existing systems are ineffective, then the changes must be implemented using acceptable methods and time frames. Rushing and imposing may create friction and lead to failure. Patience and understanding are the key words.<sup>188</sup>

One cannot remake another culture to resemble one's own, especially in a short span of time. Imposing democratic values and even women's rights in the Islamic world can create enormous friction<sup>189</sup> and also jeopardize the mission. Altering the values of another culture is an extremely sensitive topic and a major source of conflict. If a change is needed, then it should be introduced as carefully and as indirectly as possible within a time frame that is acceptable to the targeted population.

Second, there is no need to impose changes in systems when these are not needed. Systems in different cultures that seem dysfunctional or ineffective to Westerners may be acceptable and even practical in a local context.<sup>190</sup>

Third, NATO nations need to reconsider the belief that an army can first prepare an area, and then have ordinary civilian experts follow. In most situations civilian experts should have the greater portion of directive control. And the military, by maintaining a low profile, can provide basic, local security for civilian experts and ensure that they have a secure space to implement the necessary development

---

<sup>188</sup> **Celeski**, Joseph D. (2005, pp. 31, 40, 74, 95). *Operationalizing COIN*. Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press.

<sup>189</sup> **Mogahed**, Dalia (2006). *Islam and Democracy*. Special Report: Muslim World. Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization and **Peter**, Tom A. (2011, Mar 8). Women's rights in Afghanistan lose steam. *The Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0308/Women-s-rights-in-Afghanistan-lose-steam> (accessed 13 March 2015).

<sup>190</sup> **Rasmussen** (2006, pp. 166–168).

programs. The role of military power should be supportive and low key due to the fact that overwhelming displays of force will most likely provoke the local people, and therefore pose a threat to strategic goals.<sup>191</sup>

A sufficient military force, at high readiness, must be located in the area in order to defend the project teams. In the event of hostile actions, quick reaction forces should take direct and decisive action to extract the project teams. The use of *kinetic power*<sup>192</sup> must be carefully calculated to cause minimum negative effects to the overall aims.

The PSDO approach suggests that nations should work towards building coordinated bilateral liaison and cooperation strategies with target states to create a framework in which consultants, trainers, and project managers with access to national and international funds would be present in the area. They would work in a civilian capacity and follow the local rules while monitoring the situation and sending information back home. Staying connected to civil society networks, operating behind the scenes, supporting local initiatives, and using diplomatic persuasion to modify the behavior of the target area's government are important tactics in such kinds of operations<sup>193</sup>.

Preemptive Strategic Development Operations should pursue practical coalitions where states come together to develop projects that complement each other's capabilities, and apply commonly agreed upon strategies. This kind of partnering is most suited to smaller states with fewer resources and would focus on their specific fields of expertise. The most important thing is to have a well-defined and agreed upon strategic aim that is shared by all the actors. If the project teams are as civilian oriented as possible, there is a better chance of attracting the involvement of non-profit organizations and private funds. If it should happen that the attempt to prevent the conflict fails and it becomes necessary to commit military forces, then there should already be in place a subsequent agreement wherein project teams would become advisers to the Joint Force Commander. They would be responsible for suggesting the proper methods, appropriate uses of force, and suitable targets as they would already have the most experience concerning the political, social and cultural conditions.

There have been successful applications of these principles in the past such as in Malaysia for example:

---

<sup>191</sup> **Cassidy**, Robert M. (2008, pp. 68–70). Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars. *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 10, pp. 53–85.

<sup>192</sup> **Noah**, Timothy (2002). Birth of a Washington Word. When warfare gets "kinetic." Retrieved from [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth\\_of\\_a\\_washington\\_word.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth_of_a_washington_word.html) (accessed 18 August 2015). *Kinetic* action has become a synonym on lethal action as opposed to nonlethal means of warfare.

<sup>193</sup> **Kilcullen** (2009, pp. 15, 16).

### *Malaysian emergency*

The Malayan emergency of 1948 – 1960 was a communist insurgency consisting mainly of ethnic Chinese fighting to create a Marxist Malaysian State. Initially the British plan was to defeat the insurgents militarily. After four years of ineffective operations, Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952 – 1954, developed a political and social strategy to deal with the insurgents. He built a new organization that focused on raising the quality of life of the local population by constructing schools, new housing for the Chinese, and controlling the distribution of food. He brought electricity to rural villages and increased the number and quality of local security forces. He also empowered the Chinese community and allowed them to govern and secure themselves with British support. These actions undermined the appeal of the insurgents and made the local government stronger, and more popular in the eyes of the people. This strategy and the unified organizational focus that integrated both the military and the civilian efforts at all levels were the key to successfully bringing peace and stability to Malaysia.<sup>194</sup>

### **3.3. THE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP AS THE PRIME MOVER**

To lead and contribute to the Preemptive Strategic Development Operations, a national Strategic Development Group would have to be created and tasked with advising of national leaders and the coordination of plans with partners. The purpose of this group would be to study and create strategies that cohere with the overall strategy of the nation. As with national strategies, the planning and executing of Preemptive Strategic Development Operations should be done by fully integrating civil and military expertise. The intention is to fill the gap between academics and practitioners by joining them together within a functioning and permanent working group.

This requires the avoidance of service centric attitudes and competition between entities. Every ministry and office should have a participatory role within the body and should keep their focus on the end result – this being the improvement of the nation's position in the international arena and the mitigation of future security risks. This body would also be responsible for monitoring, analyzing, planning and guiding the action process. It would embody the interagency cooperation needed to combine the best practices from all the necessary fields. The group must have a

---

<sup>194</sup> Sepp, Kalev I. (2005, p. 9). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. *Military Review*, May–June, pp. 8–12. Retrieved from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015) and Gompert & Gordon (2008, pp. 91, 101).

direct communication link to the government and the allied partners in order to conduct *multidimensional coordination*<sup>195</sup>.

The group should be comprised of leading experts in a variety of sectors such as economics, intelligence, internal security, defense forces, science, education, energy, and IT. The group should exercise its authority by guiding all national departments, experts, advisors, and civilian companies in their involvement in development operations. When an operation is identified, then planning, leading, supporting, and monitoring the execution of the operation become the tasks at hand.

The primary tasks of the group would be to monitor global trends and conduct analyses of strategic and operational issues within the military, economic, diplomatic and informational domains of a threatened country. The aim would be to identify developments that may pose a threat or that may create an opportunity. The validity of these developments should be commonly agreed upon and, if deemed necessary, an operation would be launched as soon as possible.

In order to avoid exhausting national resources it would be necessary to maintain communications and establish liaison contacts with allies, international organizations, non-government organizations and foundations. Once the needed actions are identified, validated and coordinated by the partners, the group would put together an integrated action team to gather data from the field. It would then be possible to execute the mission. Once the operation is initiated, a reach-back system would be maintained to advise and support the efforts.

The group should work to identify specific domains in need of future improvement by analyzing national needs and threats, and then provide the ministries, departments and other relevant organizations with that information. This approach would require fewer resources. It also would use and intelligently combine the existing range of capabilities that are already in place. If the resource needs exceed a national capacity, then assistance will be sought from umbrella organizations, such as the EU or NATO, strategic bilateral partners, or non-government organizations and private groups.

The Strategic Development Group's assessment should complete the following phases: The monitoring of the situation and its trends, analyzing information to identify whether there exists a need to commit resources, devising a preliminary plan of execution, using a comprehensively combined expert team to conduct reconnaissance, finalizing the plan, gaining commitment from partners and acquiring the necessary resources, drawing support for the execution of the operation, and finally, gathering and analyzing the feedback.

---

<sup>195</sup> **Liang & Xiangsui** (1999, p. 138). Multidimensional coordination –coordinating and allocating all the forces which can be mobilized in the military and non-military spheres covering an objective.

Some relevant questions then arise: who makes up the comprehensive combined action teams? What entity possesses the required civil expertise and can also survive in high threat areas?

#### **3.4. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AS THE MAIN IMPLEMENTATION BODY IN THE PSDO**

Remote areas, failing states, or conflict zones as can be found in many countries in the Middle East and Africa can be extremely challenging and pose a grave physical threat to civilian workers. Planning at home is worth little if there is no one to send to implement the fieldwork. Often, in such a situation, the potential for violence is so severe that civilian experts, even under close protection, are in mortal danger<sup>196</sup> and therefore cannot perform as needed. This obstacle, however, can be overcome by creating or modifying “intermediate” units. The ideal platforms to build on are Special Operations Forces (SOF), whose members are trained to cooperate with indigenous people in stealth mode, in remote areas, and in high-risk environments<sup>197</sup>.

These modified SOF units should develop expertise in vital civilian areas and also receive additional training in skills other than soldiering, such as language/cultural awareness. They should look, talk and act like civilians while still retaining the strategic “reach back” communication options to experts in their home country. However, when under physical attack, these teams would metamorphose into fighters and defend themselves.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Moore argues that the future roles of SOF are to shape and prepare the strategic context and enable the application of elements of national (or international – author’s comment) power. SOF should operate throughout a crisis (before, during, and after) and conduct overt, covert, and clandestine operations to support the strategic objectives of the nation (or coalition – author’s comment). In this particular case SOF would conduct engagement activities to detect a crisis and try to prevent it. Successful engagement operations can lead to the elimination of a crisis before it escalates into war. All elements of national (and international – author’s comment) power are to be focused towards the identification of a potential crisis. Actions are then initiated to neutralize its development. The critical periods are immediately before and after a crisis.<sup>198</sup>

General Peter J. Schoomaker envisages that, “Special Operations Forces need to access such diverse areas as commercial information technologies, utilization of

---

<sup>196</sup> Gompert & Gordon (2008, p. 120).

<sup>197</sup> Martinage (2008, p. 7) and Celeski (2005, p. 9).

<sup>198</sup> Moore, Scott (2004, p. 189). Special Operations Forces. Visioning for the Future in Force of Choice. Perspectives on special operations, Bernd Horn, et al. (eds.). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 169–198.

space, biomedicine, environmental science, robotics, organizational design, and commercial research and development”<sup>199</sup>.

Currently, the NATO New Strategic Concept identifies cyber-attacks conducted by NATO’s adversaries as one of the greatest threats to security and stability. It recognizes that such attacks can inflict costly damage to Western societies.<sup>200</sup> However, the response to this threat, especially since it may originate from well-protected systems, is extremely complicated. Martinage suggests educating and empowering SOF units to gain the access to closed cyber network systems in remote areas that would be unreachable by other means. He then advises that SOF master the skills of tapping fiber-optic and other lines, and also acquire the necessary hacking skills.<sup>201</sup>

David Kilcullen further argues that there will always be a need for SOF to react quickly to strategic situations where a low-visibility force is required and it is not possible to send a mass of regular forces. However, this is not enough. SOF must also become more preemptive because by simply reacting to situations, the West has already lost the international initiative. Kilcullen suggests the use of NATO SOF for the preemption and prevention of conflicts. This would be the most beneficial scenario politically and economically for the whole West.<sup>202</sup>

However, the political and economic development of target areas demands much more civilian knowledge than is presently covered by the traditional Special Operations education. Learning vital civilian skills, in addition to military training, can produce the desired effects for a target area and reduce tensions and subsequently prevent a conflict from occurring in the first place. This necessitates a qualitative shift in SOF training and its focus on deployments. It does not mean that SOF should drop their current training and tasks. Rather they just need to learn and do more<sup>203</sup>.

In the following paragraphs a hypothetical concept and doctrine is described that could be actualized by the Estonian Special Operations Forces (ESTSOF) to support of the PSDO approach.

---

<sup>199</sup> **Schoomaker**, Peter J. (2004, p. 167). Special Operation Forces. The way ahead in Force of Choice. Perspectives on special operations, eds. Bernd Horn, et al. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 161–168.

<sup>200</sup> **NATO** (2011b, p. 4).

<sup>201</sup> **Martinage** (2008, p. 36).

<sup>202</sup> **Kilcullen** (2008).

<sup>203</sup> **Celeski** (2005, p. 83). Colonel Celeski appoints the need of additional skills as law enforcement, intelligence agent, and humanitarian areas; as well he stresses the need of education on “human terrain”.

### 3.4.1. ESTSOF background

Estonia participated actively in a series of common capacity development programs with NATO before becoming a member state in 2004.<sup>204</sup> Among these programs was the creation and integration of a national Special Operations Forces (SOF). Initially, the request from NATO was based solely on Allied operational needs, and the role of this force for national needs was to be defined by Estonian policy-makers. However, in 2003 when the actual organization and the idea began to develop at the unit level, it was found that in the highest military headquarters and in the Ministry of Defense there was still a significant knowledge gap.<sup>205</sup> This situation led to a series of problems and delays in the development of this capability and to a waste of time and resources due to a lack of strategic and operational guidance.

In 2003 there were only a few decision-makers who understood the capabilities and uses of SOF as a strategic asset. For others, the ESTSOF looked dangerous, and they were not sure of how it could be applied to defend Estonia or be used for other purposes. Many leaders thought in terms of a small team of operators being able to destroy a large group of enemy forces.<sup>206</sup>

The draft of NATO's Special Operations Forces doctrine did not give a clear picture of utilization because it described the SOF in terms of NATO's needs, which are mostly tactical. There was no official reference for policy-makers to use that would have helped them to understand the strategic possibilities offered by a Special Operations Force for national use. This was actually a common problem for many countries, and not just specific to Estonia.<sup>207</sup>

For a long time there was no direct representation of Special Operations Forces in the General Staff. The small entity was subordinated to the Military Intelligence Battalion. This created some difficulties in terms of manning and budgeting. One of the more recent and positive developments is that the SOF Commander is now a direct subordinate of the Chief of the Defence Forces.<sup>208</sup> The current Special

---

<sup>204</sup> **MOD** (2015). NATO. *Estonian Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.mod.gov.ee/en/nato> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>205</sup> Since 2003, when I was appointed as the commander of ESTSOF, I started choosing men for the unit and educating us all on the essence of Special Operations. It took several years to understand with what I'm really dealing with. In that sense there can be no blame to higher – how could they know about this one issue while having hundreds of other problems to be solved at the same time?

<sup>206</sup> That is the author's perception acquired from countless meetings and briefings with higher officials throughout 2003–2008.

<sup>207</sup> **NSCC** (2008, p. 21). The NATO SOF Study. Retrieved from <http://everyoneweb.com/WA/DataFileskorps-mariniers-forum/nscc.pdf> (accessed 8 April 2015).

<sup>208</sup> **Riigi Teataja** (2013, §1). Kaitseväe erioperatsioonide põhimäärus [Defence Forces Special Operations Forces Statute]. *RT I, 24.05.2013, 10*. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/124052013010> (accessed 6 April 2015).

Operations Commander, appointed in 2012, and whom I have known personally for many years, is undoubtedly the best possible man for this position and possesses all the right values, understanding and experience.

However, as of yet, the ESTSOF still lack a clear and bold strategic concept. Current public explanation regarding the purpose of the ESTSOF states: “The primary objective of the Special Operations Force, in terms of Estonia’s national defense, is the development of capabilities for unconventional warfare. In addition to that, the tasks of the unit include special reconnaissance, military assistance and direct action.”<sup>209</sup> This is inadequate as this purpose does not really address the strategic needs of the State in peace and war. Therefore the following doctrinal proposals offer a better way of perceiving and further developing; not only the ESTSOF, but any small state Special Operations Forces.

### **3.4.2. The purpose and comprehensiveness of the ESTSOF**

The purpose of the Estonian Special Operations Force (ESTSOF) is to conduct strategic operations beneficial to the Republic of Estonia and to contribute towards national strategic ambitions. Therefore, the ESTSOF should aim towards an understanding of these goals and plan their upcoming missions by creatively utilizing the full range of available options.

The ESTSOF should work closely with other relevant national intelligence organizations, and carry out common training with police special units, as well as with selected units of defense forces including the *Kaitseliit*<sup>210</sup> (Defence League). There also should exist a direct liaison with the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economic and Communication as well as with other significant state actors. This would ensure a rapid response for every possible scenario where the capabilities of the unit may be needed. Special operations plans take time due to the risks, and it is precisely through these direct links that planning time could be made most efficient. An ESTSOF liaison needs a permanent seat in the national Strategic Development Group to provide advice on the capabilities and limitations of the units when the group is considered for an operation.

Operators within the unit should have rotations working in the intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies, and other useful entities, including civilian businesses, for the purpose of better understanding other systems and to facilitate cooperation. The rotation of operators should include service in the Estonian embassies, and other representative bodies, particularly in current or potential areas

---

<sup>209</sup> EDF (2013). Special Operations. *Estonian Defence Forces webpage* updated 03.10.2013. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces/special-operations> (accessed 9 April 2015). Note. There is a mistake on the year (2005) when the ESTSOF project was started. The formation of the group was initiated in 2003.

<sup>210</sup> See on the *Kaitseliit* in introduction.

of interest in order to gather information, create networks, and get the feel of the local culture and the dynamics therein.

The approach of the ESTSOF in Strategic Development Operations should emphasize *soft power* rather than *hard power*, and be based on a comprehensive knowledge of the social, economic, diplomatic, and informational fields. Operators with the right background will need to attend respective civilian conferences, workshops, etc. in order to learn about, and identify new ideas that could then be elaborated upon and applied to areas of operations. Additionally, these events are probably the best resource for building relationships and recruiting the supporting staff members for planned and ongoing missions.

### 3.4.3. Organizational setup

Special operations units that are solely oriented towards, and limited to the military domain, are unlikely to produce the desired effects. Therefore, a combination of “shooters” and “assisters” must be created. It is important that embedded “assisters” have the same basic operator skills that “shooters” possess. They must be physically and mentally fit, highly qualified, and train in tandem with the “shooters.” Of course, these embedded “assisters” are not expected to take the lead in direct military action, but they must be capable of performing competently in fire-fights. Every member of the unit should be able to protect themselves and their teammates.<sup>211</sup>

“Shooters” should primarily be experts in reconnaissance and surveillance and direct action tactics, as well as be capable of mentoring the respective local national forces in conventional and unconventional modes of operations (military assistance). They should be trained in depth and possess such specialty skills as communications, engineering, weapons and medicine.<sup>212</sup>

“Assisters” are the personnel with the specific civilian education and skills that are essential for the application of *soft power* to the designated target system. They would have the comprehensive knowledge of a vital civilian field that could be used as the best leverage for the prevention of crisis. These would include, but not be limited to, information technology, the energy industry, health care, local governance, political science, law, media, economics, and psychological operations. Extensive analysis is required to determine the exact branch of civil expertise required for an area and the extent to which it would best contribute towards the prevention of a conflict. In essence the “assisters” would be the true operators in a

---

<sup>211</sup> *Amici Curiae* Special Forces Association and U.S. Army and Ranger Association (2009, p. 25). Brief on Appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in support of Appellants. Retrieved from [http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh\\_%20amicus\\_as\\_filed.pdf](http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh_%20amicus_as_filed.pdf) (accessed 27 March 2015).

<sup>212</sup> **Department of the Army** (2001, pp. 3-29, 3-30). FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations. U.S. Government Printing Office.

target area, as it would be them applying the corrective measures through non-kinetic means. This would mostly be done using an indirect operational/strategic approach, and only after careful consideration of the possible effects. Their approach would be to work closely with local key leaders or their advisers.

The unit's staff should be organized in a manner similar to that of operational teams by completely integrating sophisticated military and civilian knowledge in order to ensure the best understanding of, and planning for, upcoming operations. The staff is to maintain contact with the respective organizations such the *Kaitseliit*, the police, key civilian experts, and others. In addition, their duties would also include organizing training and courses for the whole unit, monitoring the development of capabilities, and commanding and coordinating unit actions. The staff must also act as a link between the higher staff and the Strategic Development Group, while advising and reporting on actions that the units take.

#### **3.4.4. Operational domains**

By taking into account the current and possible future security environment, and analyzing it in conjunction with the local environment and conditions, the ESTSOF should be able to operate in two major direction and meet the requirements of national needs and NATO/EU/allied operations. There are possible conflicts related to purpose, tasks, and equipment that need to be solved.

In the broad sense there are three different domains for the ESTSOF to operate in in order to counter some of the national threats described in this paper:

- a) International support;
- b) Peacetime support of the homeland and;
- c) War time operations to defend the homeland.

*International support* falls under the auspices of NATO Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations with the aim of supporting the common goals of a coalition. These operations can be conducted in bilateral, NATO, EU or UN frameworks, and outside of Estonia. The emphasis may be on SOF military tasks as described in NATO SOF doctrine, or on methods of conducting Strategic Development Operations in support of allies. For Estonia, as for any other small state, it is most beneficial to employ the strategic development type of operations as these are likely to contribute more to the state's strategic aims and to also augment its national economy and raise the participating nation's profile in the international community.

*Peacetime support of the homeland* is an operations set that is mainly nationally oriented. These operations can be conducted inside the country to support law enforcement in case of an emergency, or they can be pursued abroad in order to fulfill a variety of functions that are of strategic importance to the state. The operations outside Estonia can include Preemptive Strategic Development

Operations to pursue national interests in a variety of areas or they can provide a foundation<sup>213</sup> to augment further operations. This can include the prevention of conflicts that might influence Estonia directly, such as planned terror attacks prepared outside of Estonian borders. Other types of operations in this set can include the national requirement to protect and save citizens in the case of an emergency in another country. The non-combatant recovery and rescue of one's own citizens, or those of an ally if requested, from man-made or natural emergency situations, as well as hostage rescue operations from conflict zones are to be in this operations' set.

*War-time operations to defend the homeland* would commence as soon as a direct military threat towards Estonia is identified and confirmed. Conventional military units are deployed when the declaration of mobilization is given by the President of Estonia<sup>214</sup>. The ESTSOF must be on the enemy's territory as quickly as possible and as close to their respective targets. Here the main tasks should be the direct interdiction of the opponent's high-level command and their communications, the disruption of their strategic and operational transport networks and weaponry that would interrupt the enemy's systems and create the favorable strategic conditions for Estonia to receive reinforcements from the allies. Where appropriate and in accordance with the rules of war, the disruption of civil infrastructure that supports enemy's forces should not be ruled out.

#### **3.4.5. Proposed missions and essential tasks**

The following are delineations of the main missions of the ESTSOF that support Estonia's national ambitions (including the PSDO needs), and also align with the present NATO SOF doctrinal missions:

- a) *Civil and Military Assistance (CMA)* will be the main emphasis of the Strategic Development Operations. Here the operators will build relationships with key leaders to advise and assist them in producing the desired effects that have been planned according to a development strategy that is based on the full spectrum of political, economic, military, social, informational, and infrastructural (PEMSII) components. Interpersonal and trainer skills, as well as a mastery of psychological and informational operations, are the most important requirements to succeed in this task. Additionally, the availability of proper finances and material resources to be placed under the control of the operators must be guaranteed so that new weapons to arm regular or irregular forces or the needed civilian materials can be provided to a district. Additionally, regardless of the

---

<sup>213</sup> NATO (2009a, pp. Lex-6). Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency. A special operations force troop contributing nation that is capable of providing the framework for a combined joint force special operations component command.

<sup>214</sup> **Riigi Teataja** (2015, § 23). Riigikaitseadus [State Defense Law]. *RT I, 12.03.2015, 1*. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13001744> (accessed 6 April 2015).

level of the operation that has been agreed upon among alliance members, using the contributions of Estonian industries and private companies, is an imperative, as it creates outputs for the Estonian economy. It would be the most effective utilization of opportunities to develop national industry and thereby contribute to the state budget and it complies with the national strategic aims, so it should be used for this whenever possible.

- b) *Strategic and Operational Reconnaissance* (SOR) will be conducted before, during and after every operation that ESTSOF is tasked to do. This focuses on first hand observation and requires the operator's immediate presence in the area of operation. It can be conducted using a variety of methods. The operators should be prepared to perform various types of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks such as covert observation; pursuit; human intelligence (HUMINT); electronic intelligence (ELINT); imagery intelligence (IMINT); local open sources analysis (OSINT); sensitive site exploitation (SSE); environmental assessments, and chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) material detection etc.<sup>215</sup> It essentially gathers data that cannot be obtained from a distance and which can then be used to construct a comprehensive assessment of the target area, including the full spectrum of PEMSII domains.
- c) *Cyber Network Operations* (CNO) are aimed at accessing the adversary's closed networks and then operating within them. This is to be done when access from a distance is not possible, but monitoring or interdiction has strategic value. Here the operator needs to possess advanced hacking skills and the knowledge of network infrastructures. These types of operations may be conducted to disrupt the adversary's decision cycle or take control of strategic weapon systems. As more and more systems rely on cyber networks, vulnerabilities that can be discovered become more critical. Operators, with a mastery of these tasks and who are able to survive within the proximity of a proper access point, could potentially disrupt an opponent's entire strategy.
- d) *Direct Action* (DA) missions are to be conducted in support of assistance operations, or Cyber Network Operations would could then be used to disrupt strategically or operationally important means of the adversary. Usually Direct Action is limited in duration and scope and aimed at an actor posing a vital threat. Direct Action missions can be carried out through the conduction of ambushes, raids, sniping, and through the placement and detonation of explosives etc. that require the close range proximity of the operator. From a safer distance most deniable methods include the use of Terminal Guidance Munitions and proxy forces to conduct destruction.<sup>216</sup>
- e) *Personnel and Material Recovery* (PMR) is often similar to the raid in the Direct Action category. However, the risk of injuring or killing the personnel that are to

---

<sup>215</sup> NATO (2009a, pp. 2-1-2-4).

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2-2.

be rescued may often be higher. Another reason for putting this in a separate category is the frequent lack time to adequately plan and prepare. Therefore it is riskier than any other operation.<sup>217</sup> Within the country in question, where the rescue is usually needed, the supporting networks are often virtually non-existent. These would fall under the category of emergency tasks and would be undertaken if there were no other suitable units to conduct the mission. If Estonian citizens become entrapped in natural disaster or conflict zone, or are taken hostage, or have crash-landed outside the reach of normal Search and Rescue units, this task would likely be assigned to ESTSOF.

The missions and tasks listed above are not exhaustive. As analysis develops and new threats emerge, modification would certainly become necessary. For all these and future missions the ESTSOF must maintain the initiative and the flexibility to adjust to whatever strategic effect is required.

#### *A hypothetical case of PSDO in use*

The following is a short description of an actual country that will be referred to as State X. State X is presently experiencing a growing rift between various ethnic groups. This rift can actually be attributed to a lack of electricity in certain parts of the country. The government lacks the funds to renew the infrastructure and if the current trend continues and there are no improvements made to the energy sector, then it is predicted that the living standard of the one of the ethnic groups will drop. This could in turn lead to the particular group becoming more radicalized and militant. This will pose a major threat to the overall stability of that country and in the worst-case scenario, will lead to a civil war.

To address this growing threat the Estonian Strategic Development Group (ESDG) would initially make a study of State X and identify the underlying problems that are causing the rift between the ethnicities. In this case the primary solution would be modifications to State X's energy sector and infrastructure. The Estonian government would then make an offer to the government of State X to send an advisory team of energy sector experts who would assess the current infrastructure and overall situation. The team would be comprised of special operations forces operators and certain members of the *Kaitseliit*, who are also experts in the energy sector. If the offer were accepted, they would deploy, assess and report as to precisely which improvements would be needed, and then present a budget to the ESDG. The matter would then be moved to the political level, where assets would be sought from the respective international development funds, and proposals and invitations to participate would be extended to other partners.

Once the funds are guaranteed, the actual work in upgrading the energy sector of State X would begin. The Estonian *Kaitseliit* experts, who would control the

---

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-2, 2-4, 2-5.

budget, would initiate the work and employ as much of the local workforce as possible. The aim would be to raise the failing sector to a level where the source of the grievance is no longer a factor. The training and education of local engineers in the field would take place throughout the whole project, and once the project is completed, the entire system would be placed under the control of the locals. If necessary a few advisors would remain in place until the safety and continuity of the system is secured.

This is only an example of what could be done initially. There are many more variables and related areas that would need to be concurrently developed in order to sustain, and improve this particular sector; these would include such areas as information technology, power saving systems etc. It is also likely that collateral needs would arise, such as the necessity for lecturers at the nation's respective universities, the teaching of new curriculums, and a permanent advisor to State X's energy ministry. While this would be a long-term project, it would also give immediate and continuous feedback on the overall situation, and speed up the implementation of analogous projects, as well as facilitate measures to address any shortcomings. This would be part of the overall mission to stabilize the country and preempt the possibility of violence breaking out.

### **3.5. SUMMARY**

For Strategic Development Operations to be effective, Western nations need to combine and integrate civilian and military entities, and then adjust the policies and cultures of these organizations to develop a common understanding, planning, operational philosophy, and set of procedures. It is essential that Western societies as a whole, take action in third world countries with a common purpose – to prevent negative outcomes that may later harm their own societies. It does not necessarily mean the imposition of democratic values if this approach is not likely to fulfill the goal. A feasible end result and the strategies to achieve this require contributions from individual nations as well as from NATO and the EU. There is a role and place for all the members in this approach to secure an acceptable future for Western nations.

This is not the sole domain of major powers. With this approach small states may have more flexibility in applying their expertise in various fields where they are strong, such as information technology, education, or local governance. Alliances (the EU and NATO in cooperation) should become platforms for the planning, coordination and connection of all members' respective capabilities for a unified purpose – to diminish future threats to Western societies by using a full range of assets (diplomatic, informational, military, social and economic) in concert.

For small states, Preemptive Strategic Development Operations are the best possibility of improving their status, and increasing influence in the international

arena. It is easier for smaller states to change their systems, reorient and reach compromises amongst themselves more quickly than large nations<sup>218</sup>. Speed is vital in order to proactively curtail negative actions. It is not enough to simply react. Small states can also benefit from this approach due to the fact that it would create business opportunities for their industrial and technological sectors that would facilitate the overall economic growth of the nation.

Estonia also has a few other unique advantages in this situation due to its not having a long legacy of Special Operations Forces, or a strongly entrenched community that would be resistant to change. Traditional systems could make the transformation slower. However, it does not mean that the ESTSOF should drop their classical approach to Special Operations. The key is to find the best balance of traditional SOF tasks and contemporary or even, most likely, future ones. A concept with the main principles of implementation has been proposed in this study.

Also, thanks to the existence of the voluntary defense organization – the *Kaitseliit*, Estonia has a number of high-level civilian experts who are already trained and able to perform in high threat environments. This increases the pool of civilian expertise and would assist in the pre-emption of conflicts. By intelligently combining the members of the *Kaitseliit* with Special Operations Forces and using them in conflict pre-emption operations, we would considerably enhance the level of needed civilian expertise and thereby, the likelihood of success.

Sometimes less is more. The Preemptive Strategic Development Operations conducted by a smart and capable Special Operations Force could be just the right tool for a small state to use to do something useful and beneficial while not exhausting its limited resources. One could look at it as a new approach to warfare that differs from previous ones in many ways. This approach would exert not so much physical as social influence. The aim would be to prevent the outbreak of physical warfare in the first place, and thereby contribute to the future of Western security in a better and more effective manner. For small states, it grants the opportunity to improve their position and acquire more respect and acknowledgment in the international arena and the opportunity to improve their economic well-being and thereby the endurance of a small nation.

---

<sup>218</sup> Hey (2003, p. 4).

## 4. HYBRID DEFENSE CONCEPT

*History suggests God is on the side of the bigger battalions unless the smaller battalions have a better idea. A slugging match against someone much stronger than yourself is never very promising. Even if you win, the cost is usually high. But if you can use judo against your larger opponent, if you can psych him out, throw him off balance, and use his own momentum against him, you can win, and often you can win quickly and at small cost.*

William S. Lind<sup>219</sup>

### 4.1. DEBATE ON THE CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

State security<sup>220</sup> and state defense are inseparable topics and also extend beyond the defense establishment (primarily the Ministry of Defense and Defense Forces). Security involves the right of each citizen to feel safe from both internal and external threats. This is an abstraction that rests upon a perception, and not on an actual, tangible and finite outcome. State security is the result of a long and endless process that needs continuous maintenance. State defense (which also incorporates defense planning), is precisely this process or continuous activity that elevates and maintains security to the level which will satisfy citizens<sup>221</sup>. If this process ceases, security also vanishes. Therefore state defense will never reach completion because it must always be capable of pre-empting a constantly shifting danger situation<sup>222</sup>.

However, security may also be a propagandistic formality. In this scenario, citizens, who are not familiar with the field of state defense, are consistently assured that they have no reason to worry, and in the planning of strategies political interests take precedence over an objective analysis<sup>223</sup>. The reassurance is difficult to dispute, and the moment of truth will arrive only when the source of the actual threat is upon us. Only then will the real truth become clear, as well as the effectiveness of the planned readiness to deploy forces against threats and protect the state's inhabitants.

---

<sup>219</sup> Lind, William S. (1985, p. 3). *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc.

<sup>220</sup> Baldwin, Davis A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Studies*, 23, pp. 5–26. Baldwin highlights the multiplicity of meanings of the concept of security. This chapter focuses on military security.

<sup>221</sup> Ritchie, Nick (2011, pp. 356, 357). Rethinking security. *International Affairs*, 87(2), pp. 355–376.

<sup>222</sup> Gray, Colin S. (2010, pp. 9, 10). War–Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity. *Parameters*, 40 (Summer), pp. 5–13.

<sup>223</sup> Ritchie (2011, pp. 359, 360).

Yet in order to obtain and maintain the optimal level of security, one must have a realistic, honest and critical attitude towards the development of the state defense. As mentioned before, this is not the exclusive domain of a small circle of professionals and politicians, about which a lay person has no right to make inquiries and ask questions such as, is this really the best that we can do? Citizens do possess this right, both by virtue of the constitutionally guaranteed principle of the protection of an individual life, and by virtue of being a taxpayer who makes contributions to the defense budget<sup>224</sup>. To keep this balance, decision makers need not divulge all the details to the public, which may expose the weak aspects of the state defense to a possible opponent. At the same time, what must be made clear to everyone before the crisis hits, is the conceptual, outcome based<sup>225</sup>, logical operation of the state defense system and the position of each citizen therein and what is expected of him or her.

As a result of Russia's aggressive foreign policy (the occupation of Crimea, and the support of separatists in east Ukraine) discussions concerning state security in Estonia have come into sharper focus. The debate concerning Estonia's security and state defense actually began earlier, mainly in connection with the ratification of the new National Defence Development Plan<sup>226</sup>.

The plan has been seriously criticized by Lieutenant Colonel Leo Kunnas<sup>227</sup>, who is the former Chief of the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defense Forces, and by General Ants Laaneots<sup>228</sup>, the former Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces. Unfortunately there was no response to their negative evaluation, nor did the official planners of the security policy attempt to publicly

---

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 362.

<sup>225</sup> **Cornish, Paul & Dorman, Andrew** (2009, p. 746). National Defence in the Age of Austerity. *International Affairs*, 85(4), pp. 733–753.

<sup>226</sup> **MOD** (2013b). The National Defence Development Plan 2013–2022 (in English). *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13373\\_NATIONAL\\_DEFENCE\\_DEVELOPMENT\\_PLAN\\_2013.pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13373_NATIONAL_DEFENCE_DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_2013.pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>227</sup> **Kunnas, Leo** (2013, Dec 13). Uus arengukava tähendab kaost kaitseväge sõjaaja juhtimises [The new national defense development plan means chaos for the directing of the Defence Forces in war]. *Delfi*. Retrieved from <http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/arvamus/leo-kunnas-uus-arengukava-tahendab-kaost-kaitsevae-sojaaja-juhtimises?id=67438418> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>228</sup> **Laaneots, Ants** (2014, May 9). Uus arengukava lõhkus ära kaitsejõudude tervikliku juhtimissüsteemi [The new national defense development plan demolished the integral command system of the Defense Forces]. *Maaleht*. Retrieved from <http://maaleht.delfi.ee/news/maaleht-uidised/ants-laaneots-uus-arengukava-lohkus-ara-kaitsejoudude-tervikliku-juhtimissusteemi.d?id=68638117> (accessed 9 April 2015).

address their criticisms. It is nevertheless maintained that: “Estonia is better defended than ever before”<sup>229</sup>.

On the one hand, it could be argued that the coalition parties who adopted the development plan cannot admit that there are any possible errors due to security reasons. But on the other, it is naive to presuppose that Russia cannot understand the present shortcomings of Estonia’s defense system.

The main reproaches concern the dismantling of the former decentralized command model through the abolishment of the Defence Districts<sup>230</sup>. This renders the current leadership overly centralized and places it at odds with modern principles of warfare, which suggests decentralizing command structure as much as possible<sup>231</sup>. Each opponent first attempts to destroy the command system in order to terminate conceptual opposition. Given an overly centralized command there is a great danger that in case of the loss of the higher headquarters, conventional resistance will become uncoordinated or wholly paralyzed<sup>232</sup>.

In addition, the chain of command and the collaborative relationship between the Defence Forces<sup>233</sup> and the state’s defense structures, such as the *Kaitseliit* (the Defence League)<sup>234</sup>, has not been made unequivocally clear, which also compromises the principle of a clear chain of command<sup>235</sup>. There are several valid questions that remain unresolved, and there are still doubts as to whether the reforms in state defense that have been carried out over the past year (2014) pose a security threat to Estonia<sup>236</sup>.

At the same time, the development plan does not mention a single instance of the development of unconventional capabilities despite the fact that guerrilla warfare methods have been a component of the country’s National Defence Strategy since

---

<sup>229</sup> **EDF** (2014, Dec 23). *Kaitseväe juhataja: Eesti on kindlamalt kaitstud kui kunagi varem* [The Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces: Estonia is better defended than ever before]. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/8497/kaitsev%C3%A4e-juhataja:-eesti-on-kindlamalt-kaitstud-kui-kunagi-varem> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>230</sup> **MOD** (2010c, p. 13) *Sõjalise kaitse arengukava 2009–2018* [The National Defence Development Plan 2009–2018]. Retrieved from <http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/SKAK.pdf> (01.04.2015).

<sup>231</sup> **NATO** (2010, p. 6-1) *Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D)*. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.

<sup>232</sup> **Kunnas**, Leo (2014, pp. 158, 159, 163, 198–201). *Ukraina häirekell. Takerdunud rünnak II* [The Ukrainian Alarm clock. A stalled attack II]. Tallinn: OÜ Hea Lugu & Leo Kunnas.

<sup>233</sup> **EDF** (2015a). *Estonian Defence Forces. Estonian Defence Forces webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces> (accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>234</sup> See on the *Kaitseliit* [Estonian Defence League] on their webpage: <http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/edl> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>235</sup> **NATO** (2010, p. 6-1).

<sup>236</sup> **Toomse** (2014, pp. 214, 215).

2010<sup>237</sup>. As there in reality exists no development plan for the respective field or a methodical training system to the whole army,<sup>238</sup> it means that the Estonian state defense has so far failed to train soldiers in methods of warfare such as unconventional and hybrid (which is a well-orchestrated mixture of conventional and unconventional) warfare. An inclusion of these principles, strategies and tactics into the arsenal of the state defense would considerably increase a small nation's defense capabilities and be more advantageous than the sole conventional approach would. Likewise, the incorporation of such strategy of warfare and the respective training would also considerably strengthen deterrence<sup>239</sup>.

Of course, nothing would better confirm the superiority of the conception of the current development plan of our state defense than an actual test in a crisis situation. Unfortunately by then it would be too late to pose the question: Did we really do our best when preparing for this?

In the chapter below, I highlight some major points of reflection as for what the reality could be for Estonia in the event of war and how the resistance and deterrence of Estonia's state defense may be considerably strengthened without a noticeable increase to the current budget expenditure.

#### 4.2. NATO ARTICLE 5 AND HELP FROM ALLIES

Estonia is a member of NATO, and this is an important aspect to consider. However it would be disingenuous to assert that membership with the alliance would automatically guarantee our security, which, at present, is the official message to the people<sup>240</sup>. The processes of the allies coming to assist would take time and resources. Russia is also aware of this in the event that it should actually decide to attack Estonia or another Baltic State.

Even if the decision to come to the assistance of Estonia, if it is under attack, has previously been agreed upon, the actual initial response would consist of 30,000

---

<sup>237</sup> **MOD** (2010b, pp. 11, 13) National Defence Strategy. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM\\_riigikaitse\\_strateegia\\_eng\(2\).pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng(2).pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>238</sup> **Kunnas** (2014, p. 197). It must be mentioned that unconventional methods are trained by ESTSOF and *Kaitseliit*'s fighting groups. However, this is only a small part of Defence Forces and far not enough to implement an overarching strategy of the hybrid defense described in Chapter 2.

<sup>239</sup> **Rekasius** (2005, pp. 60, 61).

<sup>240</sup> **Mikser**, Sven (2015, Feb 22) Mikser: astudes Eesti vastu, satub Venemaa konflikti kogu NATO-ga. [Mikser: Russia, if stepping against Estonia, will be in conflict with whole NATO]. *Social Democratic Party webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.sotsdem.ee/mikser-astudes-estiviastu-satub-venemaa-konflikti-kogu-nato-ga/> (accessed 9 April 2015).

soldiers, the vanguard of NATO's response force (NRF)<sup>241</sup>. The NRF must be ready to be deployed to a crisis area within a minimum of 5 days of the decision having been made. At the same time it is not a secret that the NRF has never been properly assembled, and the various components of the force are located in home countries and are also undermanned<sup>242</sup>. Likewise the deployment capability of the force in the region of military conflict has not actually been tested in real threat situations.

This situation may not be improved by the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is presently being formed and will consist of around 5,000 troops. It will be a component of the NRF, and will be required to exhibit readiness to deploy within two to three days<sup>243</sup>. This unit will most likely encounter the same problems as the NRF, i.e. it will not be located in the region of the immediate threat, but in the homeland of the contributing states, and then be moved to the crisis region in case of alarm<sup>244</sup>.

The most prominent weakness in the whole collective defense system of NATO is the continual reduction of defense expenditure and downscaling of military strength on the part of its European member states. During the NATO summit in Wales, in September 2014, it was announced that those members who do not yet contribute 2% of their GDP to their defense expenditures should rectify this<sup>245</sup>. Despite promises, many members actually continue to decrease their defense expenditure<sup>246</sup>, thereby rendering the NATO's collective defense capabilities not only slow, but questionable as well. What cannot be doubted is that if there are deficiencies in the capability of the force, then members cannot physically send their forces to assist, even if there is a political desire to do so.

When realistically assessing the commitment trends of most of the European allies, and considering the fact that the political will for improvements is questionable or diminishing, it becomes quite evident that the alliance is becoming "a coalition of the unwilling"<sup>247</sup>. Therefore Estonia should not take for granted the immediate arrival of allies in the event on an attack.

---

<sup>241</sup> NATO (2015). NATO Response Force. *NATO webpage*, updated: 23 Feb. 2015. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49755.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm) (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>242</sup> NATO (2009b). From AMF to NRF (2009). *NATO Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090204/ET/index.htm> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>243</sup> NATO (2015).

<sup>244</sup> Hardt, Heidi (2014, Dec 23). Is the NATO rapid-reaction force fiction? *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/23/is-the-nato-rapid-reaction-force-fiction/> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>245</sup> NATO (2014). Wales Summit Declaration. *NATO webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm) (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>246</sup> Beale, Jonathan (2015, Feb 26). Nato defence spending falls despite promises to reverse cuts. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-31619553> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>247</sup> Kaljurand (2013, p. 73).

Most probably an aggressor would be able to cause considerable harm to bordering countries with a surprise attack, long before NATO forces could physically extend their assistance. This method is commonly used by Russia, and consists of dispatching armies into a war during training exercises in areas close to the border. This tactic was pursued in Georgia in 2008<sup>248</sup> and in a more covert form in Ukraine in 2014<sup>249</sup>. Given this situation, the company-size unit (approximately 150 U.S. soldiers)<sup>250</sup> and the Baltic Air Policing Mission<sup>251</sup> which are now stationed in Estonia are good examples of unity, but neither their mass, nor their mandate would be sufficiently considerable in case of a war<sup>252</sup>.

Dr. Heidi Hardt, Assistant Professor in Department of Political Science of University of California finds that NATO's new spearhead force will likely be incapable of preventing further conflict along NATO's borders with Russia. She bases this assertion on historical experience that such forces have never been deployed on time due mainly political reasons.<sup>253</sup>

Even if NATO is capable of making a quick decision and the NRF arrives within 2–5 days and penetrates the Russian naval and air defense's firewall, then the opponent will have the opportunity to retreat unhurriedly back within its borders, where no one will follow to punish them. A speedy war in the form of a punitive attack would be over for the moment, but the damage caused would be catastrophic<sup>254</sup>. First, there would be the shock and physical destruction to Estonia; second, the entire NATO deterrence capability, which is the foundation of this organization, would probably collapse. Thus, unfortunately, the guarantee of NATO Article 5 belongs to the category of wishful thinking that cannot be confirmed before the crisis arrives.

---

<sup>248</sup> **Ühtegi**, Riho (2013, pp. 6, 7). The 2008 Russia-Georgia War five years later. *Diplomaatia*, Nr. 8 (120) August, pp. 4–9.

<sup>249</sup> **Kravtsova**, Yekaterina (2014, Mar 13). Russia heightens tension with military exercises near Ukrainian border. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10695077/Russia-heightens-tension-with-military-exercises-near-Ukrainian-border.html> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>250</sup> **BNS** (2015, Mar 10). US to station tank platoon in Estonia. *Postimees*. Retrieved from <http://news.postimees.ee/3118035/us-to-station-tank-platoon-in-estonia> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>251</sup> **Jennings**, Gareth (2014, Dec 17). NATO extends enhanced Baltic air policing until end of 2015 at least. *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*. Retrieved from <http://www.janes.com/article/47065/nato-extends-enhanced-baltic-air-policing-until-end-of-2015-at-least> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>252</sup> **Lobjakas**, Ahto (2014, Aug 22). NATO egiidi all siin viibivad üksused ei sekkuks Eesti poolel sõjategevusse [The units present here under the auspices of NATO would not enter a war on the Estonia's side]. *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://uudised.err.ee/v/arvamus/19e1404d-e266-43fb-8fde-a5a6d7179739> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>253</sup> **Hardt** (2014).

<sup>254</sup> **Toomse**, Rene (2013, p. 121). Eesti kaitsepoliitika dilemmad muutavas maailmakorralduses [Dilemmas of Estonian Defence Policy in the Changing World]. *Acta Politica Estica*, 4, pp. 114–134.

Consequently, in light of the aforementioned, Estonia's principal endeavors for the defense of the state should be directed toward the creation and maintenance of an independent and sufficiently *stable* self-defense capacity – and not one which relies solely on an *initial* self-defense strategy that is based entirely on the reliance of a collective defense, as has been envisioned by the primary national defense documents<sup>255</sup>. It is necessary to prepare for a long and arduous fight and to perceive this as a normal state of affairs.

Each instance of assistance that is extended by the allies is a good bonus that will make warfare easier. At the same time, being both physically and psychologically prepared to conduct an extended fight against an opponent by relying on one's own resources insures that the morale will not break as easily as would be the case were we to be left alone in reality. Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. Such a philosophy is important in raising the actual warfare capacity of the people and the forces.

By looking at risk scenarios realistically it becomes possible and imperative that we create the necessary preemptive strategies and countermeasures that do not necessarily predominantly rely on the mass of armor technology, but rather rely predominantly upon unconventional solutions. In order to achieve this, defense policy makers must admit that there is at least the smallest possibility that the nation would remain alone in the fight for its freedom. It would be much worse if we found ourselves in the opposite situation where we have heavily relied on the assumption that we can be certain that we will be assisted, but then the assistance does not arrive quickly enough or not at all. Estonia would not be sufficiently ready to act in such a situation in physical, mental or moral terms<sup>256</sup>.

### 4.3. THE THREAT OF WAR AND THE READINESS TO MOBILIZE

In principle there are two possible methods of initiating and conducting a physical war against a country such as Estonia: a low intensity conflict such as in Ukraine since 2014, or a strong military attack that relies on speed and mass as Russia introduced in Georgia 2008; each method can transform into the other. In the case of the first method, local insurgents play an important role. They will receive

---

<sup>255</sup> MOD (2010a, p. 41). National Security Concept of Estonia. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National\\_Security\\_Concept\\_of\\_Estonia.pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf); MOD (2010b, pp. 3, 10–12), MOD (2013a, p. 1). Riigikaitse Arengukava 2013–2022 [The National Defence Development Plan 2013–2022] (in Estonian). *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13204\\_Riigikaitse\\_arengukava\\_2013-2022.pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13204_Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022.pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>256</sup> See on physical, mental and moral forces in Chapter 3.

support from Russia, who denies its involvement, in the form of instructors and the relevant supplies<sup>257</sup>.

Currently in Estonia such insurgents would initially be the responsibility of the police, but this is effective only during official peacetime. Due to the fact that they are very lightly armed, the police would not likely be able to cope with a mass of well-armed criminals. According to the present law they cannot receive armed assistance from Estonian Defence Forces or the *Kaitseliit* until a state of emergency has been declared.<sup>258</sup>

Fortunately, the needed amendments will become active in the beginning of 2016 when such assistance will be clearly legalized. What still remains a concern is the lengthy procedure from police request until the actual permission for armed assistance. The request will need to go from Ministry of Interior Affairs to the Government who will grant the permission upon acceptance from the President.<sup>259</sup> This can take too much valuable time that is needed for the quick containment of the threat situation.

In the event of the appearance of well-armed “green men”<sup>260</sup> on the streets, the order to surrender their arms and submit to arrest must be given with deterrence of a machine gun rather than a megaphone. Speed, determination and sufficient force become essential from the very beginning and determine the future of the entire conflict. Vacillations and delays in the neutralization of insurgent elements will pave the way for successive provocations and possibly also a full-scale invasion by the enemy forces. Therefore an adequate and reasonable legal process needs to be in place to resolve these types of situations virtually instantly and with full force.

According to various analysts, in the event of a full-scale military attack against Estonia, Russia may dispatch two to three maneuver brigades (Russia’s Western Military District includes a total of nine brigades with tanks and armored vehicles, of which three are in the strategic reserve for the assistance of other districts<sup>261</sup>).

---

<sup>257</sup> **U.S. State of Department** (2014, Jul 14). Russia's Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine's Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability. *U.S. State of Department webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229270.htm> (accessed 9 April 2015).

<sup>258</sup> **Riigi Teataja** (2015, §81(1), §16 (1)). Korrakaitseadus [Law Enforcement Act]. *RT I*, 22.03.2011, 4. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/KorS> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>259</sup> **Riigi Teataja** (2015, §111, §105, §106). Riigikaitseadus [State Defense Law], *RT I*, 12.03.2015, 1. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/112032015001> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>260</sup> **Shevchenko**, Vitaly (2014, Mar 3). "Little green men" or "Russian invaders"? *BBC*, Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>261</sup> **Carlsson**, Märta, **Norberg**, Johan & **Westerlund**, Fredrik (2013, pp. 43, 44). The Military Capability of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2013. *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective* Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin (eds.). Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, pp. 23–70.

This will likely be combined with an attempt to gain air superiority with surface-to-air missiles (S-300 and S-400) which can cover the entire Estonian territory, from behind the Russian border<sup>262</sup>.

Estonian intelligence can see and hear a great deal behind the eastern border, both via its own resources<sup>263</sup> as well as through the assistance of its allies<sup>264</sup>. This is not a secret to Russia. The movement of tank battalions and other larger units to attack positions can be discerned early on if they are carried out in public and in a deliberately visible fashion. Regrettably, such movements can also be concealed through the use of disguise techniques as well as through distraction.

The most recent example again derives from Ukrainian events. The whole world was startled when well-armed soldiers, lacking insignias appeared in Crimea in March 2014. They were definitely not locals. Clearly they were Russia's special operations forces, although officially Russia categorically denied the involvement of its troops. The newly appointed interim Ukrainian government of the Ukraine was paralyzed; Europe and NATO were simply speechless. Once they were able to pull themselves together, it was already too late to save anything. Crimea had been occupied.<sup>265</sup>

The aforementioned operation will enter the annals of military history as one the most brilliant examples of strategic surprise. The method was actually simple. A large and deliberately visible number of troops were deployed for surprise military exercises close to the Ukrainian border<sup>266</sup>.

---

<sup>262</sup> **Schwartz**, Paul N. (2014, Jun 30). Russia Announces Sale of S-400 to China. *Center for Strategic and International Studies website*. Retrieved from <http://csis.org/blog/russia-announces-sale-s-400-china> (accessed 3 Apr 2015) and **Kaas**, Kaarel (2014, p. 20). Venemaa relvajõud Läänemere piirkonnas [Russian Military Forces Near Baltic Sea]. *Diplomaatia*, Nr 6/7 (130/131), pp. 17–20.

<sup>263</sup> **Luik**, Hans H. & **Simson**, Priit (2013, Nov 7). Hans H. Luige ja Priit Simsoni usutlus Riho Terrasega: Eesti riik sõdib viimase meheni [Riho Terras: Estonia will fight to the last man]. *Eesti Ekspress*. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/8002/hans-h.-luige-ja-priit-simsoni-usutlus-riho-terrasega:-eesti-riik-s%C3%B5dib-viimase-meheni> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>264</sup> **Kunnas**, Leo (2010, May 13). Leo Kunnas: tankivägi võimaldab Eestil kaitsta oma võtmepiirkondi kuni liitlaste saabumiseni [Leo Kunnas: The Estonian armored force will help to protect key areas until the allies arrive]. *Fortel*. Retrieved from <http://forte.delfi.ee/news/militaaria/online-intervjuu-leo-kunnas-tankivagi-voimaldab-eestil-kaitsta-oma-votmepiirkondi-kuni-liitlaste-saabumiseni?id=31021311> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>265</sup> **Hurt**, Martin (2014, May 5). Lessons identified in Crimea – does Estonia's national defence model meet our needs? *Estonian World*. Retrieved from <http://estonianworld.com/security/lessons-identified-crimea-estonias-national-defence-model-meet-needs> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>266</sup> **Norberg**, Johan (2014, Mar 13). The Use of Russia's Military in the Crimean Crisis. *Carnegie webpage*. Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/use-of-russia-s-military-in-crimean-crisis> (accessed 3 Apr 2015) and **Smith-Spark**, Laura, **Black**, Phil & **Pleitgen**, Frederik (2014, Feb 27). Russia flexes military muscle as tensions rise in Ukraine's Crimea region. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/26/world/europe/ukraine-politics> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

This attracted the anxious attention of the entire Ukraine and the rest of the world. In the shadow of these exercises, it was relatively safe for Russians to send a considerable number of special operations forces troops without insignias to its Crimean bases who then infiltrated the streets at an appointed time. Denials and bluffing<sup>267</sup> at the highest level caused increasing confusion, thereby robbing the new Ukrainian government and the Western countries of critical time which they should have used to make a concrete decision.

With this Russia showed that its operations planning capability is excellent and free of constraints in terms of the methods that it employs. Russia realized that it is important to focus on the objective (the annexation of Crimea in a manner that would not raise major international outcry) and was able to find the right balance in combining means and methods (strategic surprise, denials, and a bloodless occupation with a limited use of force). It was a perfectly executed operation.

The aforementioned description does not purport to express admiration for the activities of Russian military leaders, but presents rather an unemotional observation. Those who underestimates their opponent and overestimate their own present resources will lose, as a rule. Therefore the most important aspect of a defense policy and in warfare must be unemotional assessment of the opponent's activities. Only such an evaluation can create an understanding of an actual possible plan plotted against oneself. In this phase any emotion is superfluous and even counterproductive because it freezes the brain within the sphere of wishful thinking which brings no profit, is useless, and rather brings harm when one needs to work out a realistic plan of successful countermoves.

It would also be wrong to lock oneself within the aforementioned example and argue that Estonia's circumstances are not similar to those of Crimea because of, for instance, demographic factors. Of course they are not, but then it is a fantasy to suppose that in northeastern Estonia, or even Tallinn, the similar concept would not be attempted. It could not be exactly copied but it certainly could be modified respectively. The planners on the opposing side undertake a very careful analysis of what exactly are the weak points of Estonia and from this analysis they ascertain possibilities of reaching their objectives. The planning of a good mission is akin to the making of a tailor made suit: it will always proceed from the peculiarities of the opponent and never limit itself to standard solutions.

---

<sup>267</sup> Lally, Kathy (2014, Apr 17). Putin's remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html) (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

Russia's military planners have demonstrated their ability to act within these categories.<sup>268</sup> The task of Estonia is to outthink and outplan Russia. The essence of war and success does not actually lie solely within mechanical processes and physical aspects, but primarily within the mental (an understanding of the reality and the ability to use the situation in accordance with one's objectives) and moral (the courage to make critical decisions) spheres.

The side that is more clever and decisive can apply less physical force and still be capable of defeating the larger but slower and illusion bound opponent. These are categories towards which Estonia should develop its state defense ideas. Unfortunately NATO's classic doctrine is outdated and if we extend the aforementioned analogy of the tailor made suit, it is like a *one size fits* all baseball cap. Those planning Estonia's defense have no choice but to be thorough in their homework.

After war has already broken out, in order for the allies to come to Estonia's assistance, the preplanned locations for their arrival (primary and alternate) must be kept protected. As a rule, it is during the landing, either by air or by sea, that troops are at their most vulnerable as they are not yet ready to engage in battle. According to the principles of warfare, such weakness is one of the most important targets of the opponent – attack the enemy when and where he is not ready for it thus creates strategic surprise<sup>269</sup>. In other words, if the preplanned points of arrival are not made sufficiently safe, then the allies will not send their troops, because losses would not be acceptable.

The Ämari airbase, the Tallinn airport, and seaports of Tallinn and Paldiski are good reception points in peace-time. But during a time of war, these will unfortunately become the first targets that would be neutralized by the opponent. Taking into account Estonia's currently insufficient air defense capability, it would not be a difficult task for the opponent to launch GPS and laser guided Iskander SS-26 ballistic rockets<sup>270</sup> to those objects which would paralyze any kind of activity for a considerable amount of time.

In order to counter the opponent's bombing and missile attacks, it is absolutely essential to procure surface to air missiles in order to protect strategically important landing locations. Since no air defense system will give a 100% guarantee, alternative landing locations must also be always made ready, particularly in the

---

<sup>268</sup> For a comprehensive analysis on the Russian view of modern warfare see the Latvian military scholar Janis Berzinš' policy paper: **Berzinš**, Janis (2014). Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy. Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia. Retrieved from <http://www.naa.mil.lv/~media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx> (accessed 14 August 2015).

<sup>269</sup> **Kalistratov**, Alexander (2008). К вопросу о применении принципа внезапности в вооруженной борьбе [Concerning the application of the principle of surprise in the armed struggle]. *Военная Мысль* № 9, pp. 19–26.

<sup>270</sup> **Kaas** (2014, p. 20).

western Estonian coast and larger islands<sup>271</sup>, where additional troops may have quicker and safer access to the mainland.

#### 4.4. ADVISED SMALL FORCE TACTICS AGAINST STRONGER

According to the current development plan of the Estonian state defense, at present the highest priority is the development of two mechanized or armored brigades. Of secondary importance is the actualization of five territorial defense battalions by the Estonian *Kaitseliit*.<sup>272</sup>

In contrast with the previous development plan, the force to rapidly mobilize has been quickly decreased from ca 42,000 combatants to 21,000<sup>273</sup>. One of the main justifications for this, and possibly the greatest miscalculation, is articulated in the first paragraph of the preface of the document: “In the case of both our own initial defense capacity and NATO’s collective defense we will only benefit from the units that possess trained members and prescribed equipment and arms”<sup>274</sup>. This statement in itself puts a limit on the development of other units, which can already be discerned in practice. Likewise the entire development plan lays an emphasis on conventional methods and unconventional warfare methods for the whole force are not mentioned at all<sup>275</sup>.

Another more serious problem with the development plan lies in the centralization of the command chain. Previously, Estonia was divided into four territorial Defence Districts that were administered by the Estonian Defence Forces who were given ample freedom to coordinate the defense activities within their territories relatively independently.<sup>276</sup> Now a similar responsibility for structured Territorial Defence

---

<sup>271</sup> **Moora**, Kristjan (2014, Sep 17). Sõjalise riigikaitse vajadusest Eesti saartel [Regarding the necessity of military state defense on the Estonian islands]. *Saarte Hää*. Retrieved from <http://www.saartehaal.ee/2014/09/17/sojalise-riigikaitse-vajadusest-est-i-saartel/> (accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>272</sup> **MOD** (2013b, pp. 2, 3).

<sup>273</sup> **EDF** (2015a) vs. **Kunnas** (2014, p. 158).

<sup>274</sup> **MOD** (2013a, p. 1). Note that the statement exists only in Estonian version of the document.

<sup>275</sup> Remark: The National Defence Development Plan 2013 on page 3 mentions that the capability to conduct special operations throughout the country’s territory shall be achieved. However, even though special operations fall into category of unconventional methods special operations do not constitute the whole range of guerilla warfare that is meant by National Defence Strategy. See more on special operations in Chapter 3.

<sup>276</sup> **Riigi Teataja** (2008). *Kaitseväge korralduse seadus* [Estonian Defence Forces Organisation Act] (valid until 1 Aug 2014, §16). *RT I 2008*, 35, 213. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032014035> (accessed 3 April 2015) and **Riigi Teataja** (2013). *Kaitseringkondade vastutusala* [Defence Districts’ areas of responsibility] (valid until 1 Aug 2014). *RT I*, 25.03.2013, 6. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/125032013006> (accessed 3 April 2015).

Districts has been delegated to the *Kaitseliit*,<sup>277</sup> but unfortunately, without the necessary budget,<sup>278</sup> manpower and lawful authorizations.<sup>279</sup> All in all, the force developed according to the current development plan may not be sustainable in unassisted warfare.

The third major problem the Estonian force may likely encounter is the lack of a capable reserve. The emphasis on two mechanized brigades located in two major likely enemy's avenues of approach (North East and South East)<sup>280</sup> leaves the impression that the brigades are intended to take the initial battle singlehandedly as main effort. There will be some assistance planned by Battalions formed from the *Kaitseliit* but the method of their usage remains questionable.<sup>281</sup>

However, once the brigades, the most powerful of Estonia's conventional combat units, are both engaged in close combat, the force in rear area will not be sufficient enough to repel the enemy's passage, breakthroughs, amphibious landings or air assault operations.<sup>282</sup>

Strategic wisdom (see the note of General Beaufre below) and lessons from the war history suggests a better economy of force. For instance the fall of France in the Second World War serves as a good example of a bad return on too much centralization, lack of reserves and an inflexible overly centralized command culture.

### *The fall of France in 1940*

A classical case analysis, offering several important lessons, is France's defeat by Germany within the period of only six weeks in the spring of 1940. It was a victory that stunned the entire world. In essence, the German force, which was half the size of the French, cut France into two after entering the country from a direction that had been previously considered an impossible route for

---

<sup>277</sup> MOD (2013b, pp. 2, 3).

<sup>278</sup> Compare the amount and change of the budget of the *Kaitseliit*: **Riigi Teataja** (2013). 2014. aasta riigieelarve seadus [2014 State Budget Law]. RT I, 28.12.2013, 10. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/128122013010> vs. **Riigi Teataja** (2014). 2015. aasta riigieelarve seadus [2015 State Budget Law], RT I, 29.12.2014, 79. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/129122014079> (accessed 3 Apr 2015). In 2015 the allocation of funds to *Kaitseliit* is 7.9% from the whole defense budget and the rise since previous year allocation was only 10.7%.

<sup>279</sup> **Jõesaar**, Ivar (2013b, pp. 12, 14). *Kaitseliidu tugevus on selle unikaalsus* [The strength of the Defence League lies in its uniqueness]. *Sõdur*, nr 5, pp. 10–14.

<sup>280</sup> **EDF** (2015b). *Riigikaitse arengukava* [The National Defence Development Plan]. *Estonian Defence Forces webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/et/kaitsevagi/riigikaitse-arengukava> (accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>281</sup> **Jõesaar**, Ivar (2013a, p. 8). *Kaitsevõe reformi algatasid väeosade ohvitserid-allohvitserid* [The reforms of the Defence Forces were initiated by the units' officers and non-commissioned officers]. *Sõdur*, nr 2, pp. 6–11.

<sup>282</sup> **Toomse** (2014, pp. 203, 204).

approach. The speed and coordination of the German force caused a perfect strategic shock in the French administration. Herein, it would probably be best to present an account of the main reasons for the success of German force by citing the reminiscences of General Heinz Guderian, the author and executor of the attack plan.

Guderian was well aware that the balance of forces was to his disadvantage. In May of 1940, at the beginning of the attack, the English and French forces had at their disposal 4,800 tanks, whereas the German army had only about 2,200. Guderian writes: “Thus, we were about twice outnumbered which was made even larger by virtue of the fact that the French tanks were superior in their armor thickness and cannon caliber.”<sup>283</sup>

In his recollections, the General highlights the main reasons why the French could not withstand the attack, even with the help of the allies. First their intelligence was inadequate. And, although though Guderian’s attack plan was foreseen at the lower levels, the higher command did not consider it likely. Second, when the attack was underway, and the French realized what was happening, they lacked sufficiently strong reserves to stop the German penetration. Due an inflexible leadership culture, reserves could not be amassed or used without permission from the higher command which unfortunately led to the allies missing all the important chances. Guderian describes this as follows: “The French administration desired to lead their armies in such a manner that decisions based on resolute plans would guarantee a confident manner of movement and coordinated attacks or defense maneuvers.” In the end a stronger army and the whole country were defeated due to the excessive self-confidence and inflexibility of the leaders.<sup>284</sup>

For a small country, the possession of a small mechanized force, which is what Estonia has prioritized for its defense capacity, would not necessarily be its most effective capability. Many armed conflicts, and some very recent ones, around the world indicate that weaker opponents are more successful when they use hybrid warfare strategy against an opponent (see the example of the Israel – Hezbollah war below).

Frank G. Hoffman, a senior researcher at the National Defense University, maintains that at the strategic level, both regular and irregular components have been utilized in many wars. However, in the majority of conflicts these components have been separate and fought in different realms of the battlefield. In hybrid wars these forces are merged into one on the same battlefield. If the irregular component

---

<sup>283</sup> Guderian, Heinz (2009, pp. 87–117). *Ühe sõduri mälestused [Memories of a Solider]*. Tallinn: Olion.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*

is operationally integrated and tactically focused, it can be turned into an operationally decisive force, and not simply something that extends the conflict.<sup>285</sup>

Thus hybrid warfare is a manner of combat that cleverly unites both conventional and unconventional methods within a single combat space. As a rule, the primary role is played here not by the armored corps, but rather by the light infantry who are of sufficient number to act in an extended area. The emphasis is laid upon wearing down the preponderant opponent while at the same time saving one's own combat power. In light of the above described assumptions – that the allies may not come to Estonia's assistance with sufficient speed – the entire conception of Estonia's defense strategy should be thoroughly updated, and by extension, the National Defense Development Plan as well. This should proceed from the following principles:

Presently, as well as in the future, the largest and most rapidly deployable force is most likely the *Kaitseliit*. This unique organization already possesses a great moral power, precisely by virtue of its desirousness to defend on the part of its voluntary members. No weapon or gun can fight by itself—it is always a human with courage and will who fights. If the *Kaitseliit* were to be further strengthened both in terms of training and equipment then its members would become the greatest deterrent for the opponent.

In order to amplify the deterrence effect of this force, one must avoid making the units of the *Kaitseliit* clear-cut and predictable because these are the qualities that the opposing intelligence analysts seek out—these are the actual weaknesses that the opponent can use against you. The *Kaitseliit* must become like a ghost haunting for the opponent in our land. Just like those whom Estonia sought to combat in the Middle East with the allies. Naturally the arsenal of those opponents included methods which we should never apply due to law of war and moral restraints, but a large number of combat methods and principles can successfully be developed by learning from one's former and present opponents.

A vital key to success is trained people who are able to mobilize within a short span of time and over a large area if the decisions and plans are sensible. The members of the Estonian *Kaitseliit*, who at the moment include close to 15,000 troops,<sup>286</sup> have the right to possess a firearms and ammunition at home, which means that they can be instantly mobilized as light infantry. In the event of war, placing those reserve troops who have not been incorporated into the two mechanized brigades and the support units, under the command of the *Kaitseliit*, should also be considered.

---

<sup>285</sup> **Hoffman**, Frank G. (2007, p. 29). Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

<sup>286</sup> **Reinhold** (2015, pp. 8, 9).

In a time of war it is a realistic objective to obtain a quickly mobilized force of 100,000 troops, including the *Kaitseliit*, which is approximately half of the eligible Estonian male citizens available for mobilization<sup>287</sup>. This number is analogous to the size of the Estonian forces that were successful in the War of Independence in 1919<sup>288</sup>. At the same time, the entire *Kaitseliit* and the reserve force should be required (and not just be given the right) to keep arms and personal equipment at home, following the example of Swiss national defense concept<sup>289</sup>. This would considerably shorten the reaction time for the entire mobilized force, particularly in the case of a surprise attack. In addition, such readiness would have a considerable deterrence effect.

The French General André Beaufre has noted that when making decisions crucial to the success of action, two distinct but equally important components must be considered: a decisive strike and the preparatory maneuver that makes that strike possible:

„In any strategy, therefore, there are two distinct but equally vital components: 1. Selection of the decisive point to be attacked (this depends on the enemy's vulnerable points). 2. Selection of the preparatory manoeuvre which will enable this decisive point to be reached. Since each of the opposing sides will be doing the same thing, there will be a clash between the two preparatory manoeuvres. Victory will go to the side which succeeds in blocking his enemy's manoeuvre and carrying his own through to its objective.”<sup>290</sup>

In light of the above principle, in the event of war, professional brigades must be kept in reserve for as long as possible and must be utilized only at the most decisive moments in counterattacks, as also formulated by the theory of maneuver warfare<sup>291</sup>. Keeping one's most lethal striking fist concealed makes the opponent hesitate and cautious to act, thereby giving one a good opportunity to seize the initiative in combat and force the opponent to uncover their weak side.<sup>292</sup>

---

<sup>287</sup> CIA (2015). CIA Factbook. Estonia. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>288</sup> Eesti Instituut (2012) Estonian War of Independence. *Estonica webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1914-1920\\_The\\_First\\_World\\_War\\_and\\_Estonian\\_independence/Estonian\\_War\\_of\\_Independence/](http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1914-1920_The_First_World_War_and_Estonian_independence/Estonian_War_of_Independence/) (accessed 3 Apr 2015)

<sup>289</sup> Bachmann, Helena (2012, Dec 20). The Swiss Difference: A Gun Culture That Works. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://world.time.com/2012/12/20/the-swiss-difference-a-gun-culture-that-works/> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>290</sup> Beaufre (1965, pp. 34, 35).

<sup>291</sup> Wyly, Michael D. (1985, pp. 129–133). Fundamentals of Tactics. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* William S. Lind. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., pp. 67–133.

<sup>292</sup> Toomse, Rene (2011c, p. 38). Sõjapidamine XII: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahus 4. [Warfighting XII: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 4]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 4, pp. 33–39.

In war, initiative determines everything. In the case of the reverse scenario, by laying out all of our aces at the start of the game we leave too little space for surprising the opponent and make it much easier for them to proceed towards their goal. One of the most important warfare principles is to create unpleasant surprises for the opponent—this is what makes it possible to seize the initiative<sup>293</sup>.

For conscripts, or those who will later become reserve troops, and members of the *Kaitseliit*, training must include not only the preparation to be able to act within a larger group, but also to fight independently when communication and supplies have ceased. They must be able to act without precise orders, even at the level of the smallest unit in order to gain a larger objective, or in the worst possible warfare conditions – the unconventional way.<sup>294</sup>

The emphasis of the training must be primarily laid on aggressive sharp attacks against the opponent while being in constant movement around the opponent's units. This is called *swarming tactics*<sup>295</sup>. In this way a smaller force is able to cause considerable damage to the larger one, while sparing its own manpower. As a rule, the conventional unit of the opponent does not wish to disperse and has been prepared to break through the defenses of its opponents. Also defensive positions must be established in order keep the opponent at a distance. But under no circumstances must the opponent be given the opportunity to focus and calmly deal with them.<sup>296</sup>

Within a single battle the entire surrounding of the opponent must be filled with small sharp ambushes and lightning attacks which would drain the enemy force – from every direction at every kilometer. To be sure, those would not cause instant grave damage but will become a very serious problem for the opponent as he will not have many opportunities to fight with such a ghost force in the conditions of gradually diminishing troops. The opponent is not able to follow each small unit responsible for the sharp attack. Those units would simply run into a new ambush and the losses would be even larger. Hezbollah also fought in a similar fashion with a very small force against the Israeli raid in 2006<sup>297</sup>. Israel whose army is one of the world's most modern and powerful did not achieve a single strategic goal, thus Israel, in effect, lost the war for the first time in history.

---

<sup>293</sup> Wyly (1985, pp. 129–133).

<sup>294</sup> Toomse (2011b, p. 42, 43).

<sup>295</sup> Arquilla, John & Ronfeldt, David (2005). Swarming and the Future of Conflict. *Rand webpage*. Retrieved from [www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented\\_briefings/2005/RAND\\_DB311.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf) (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>296</sup> Toomse (2011c, pp. 35–39).

<sup>297</sup> Knickmeyer, Ellen (2008 January 31). 2006 War Called a 'Failure' for Israel. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html> (accessed 3 April 2015).

### *The Israel – Hezbollah conflict of 2006*

In 2006 Israel transferred war to the territory of neighboring Lebanon in order to destroy the sub-state organization Hezbollah. Israel attacked with 8 brigades (10,000 troops). The operation began with an extensive air raid campaign which was followed by a classical dispatch of ground troops. The war, which officially lasted for 34 days, ended with a treaty and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Allegedly, by the end of the war, Israel's losses numbered 119 and Hezbollah's 650 to 750 troops<sup>298</sup>. But what was achieved and who won?

It is difficult to examine this war in terms of clear outcomes and both sides have admitted this. If we proceed from the number of soldiers lost then Hezbollah lost in spades. And yet this number is only about 5% of the presumable might of Hezbollah<sup>299</sup>. But if we consider Israel's strategic objective which included destruction of the opponent's operational capacity and eliminating thereby the rocket threat to its cities, then Israel could be considered as defeated because those objectives were not fulfilled<sup>300</sup>.

Throughout the entire war, Hezbollah continued to bomb Israeli cities with rockets and the Israeli air forces had little effect on them. When the Israeli ground troops were moving to southern Lebanon the analysts all over the world were stunned by their low efficiency and successful resistance of Hezbollah fighters.<sup>301</sup>

The conclusions of Israel's own experts concerning the war are critical. The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces has been accused of entering the war without a definite plan for the ground troops. Over the years an excessive dependence on technology has grown, while the planning and utilization of classical warfare methods, including techniques in which Israel has previously excelled – large scale maneuvers were neglected. An illusion had been created that wars could be won from a distance, particularly through the use of airpower, which in turn led to a misconception: there is no need for a large and well trained reserve army.<sup>302</sup> Strong reprimands were made concerning the

---

<sup>298</sup> **Biddle**, Stephen & **Friedman**, Jeffrey A. (2008, pp. 29–33). *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

<sup>299</sup> **Arkin**, William M. (2007, p. 74). *Divining Victory: Airpower in the Israel – Hezbollah War*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press.

<sup>300</sup> **McCauley**, David J. (2007, p. 52). *Israeli – Hezbollah Conflict of 2006: EBA in Joint Ops. Fires Bulletin*, September – December, pp. 50–55.

<sup>301</sup> **Matthews**, Matt M. (2008, p. 1). *We were caught unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah–Israeli War*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press.

<sup>302</sup> **Susser**, Leslie (2008, Jan 8). *Closing Ranks. The Jerusalem Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.jewishtoronto.com/page.aspx?id=140639> (accessed 3 April 2015).

preparation of the officers corps, especially concerning the paucity of strategic thinking, classical war theory and history in the war academies<sup>303</sup>.

Hezbollah on the other hand was well prepared. Their methods of warfare were clearly distinct from classical guerilla warfare. They were rather a blend of conventional and unconventional methods. Being a non-state opponent, Hezbollah placed the main emphasis on keeping its territory, and hiding itself in the landscape rather than among the local populace. Likewise their units were more concentrated than guerillas would normally be.<sup>304</sup>

In his analysis of the above war Dr. Ariel Cohen, Senior researcher of the Heritage Foundation interestingly observed that:

“When facing sub-state actors, conventional, twentieth-century military doctrines aimed at wars against nation-states and industrial-era mass armies are effectively dead. Even the best traditional militaries, such as the U.S. and Israeli armies, face formidable difficulties when confronted with irregular, well-motivated, and foreign-supported forces, which enjoy media battlefield advantages. The Israel – Hezbollah conflict was not so much a defeat of Israel as it was a defeat of the old-style warfare by the new.”<sup>305</sup>

A smaller country with more limited resources such as Estonia can learn from the lessons of this conflict and adapt and apply them to its own context. For Estonia an analogous force would be the *Kaitseliit*. It has the ability to operate in the area between a regular army and a guerrilla force and has the potential to become powerful deterrent.

To actualize this potential, the *Kaitseliit* must become an actual swarm of “vicious wasps” in a manner similar to what was described above. Hundreds of dispersed fighting groups that are everywhere, surrounding the enemy and attacking them from each direction – piece by piece destroying their armor, support units, and the headquarters would inflict effective pain and be a deterrence for the opposing units. Such warfare offers no clear targets for the opponent’s heavy artillery or air force, as our tanks, mobile columns, defensive positions and logistic deliveries would. Such tactics would render the opponents mass and overwhelming armaments relatively useless. The destruction of the headquarters and the supplies would have a direct effect on the morale and therefore the combat capability of their forces.<sup>306</sup>

In principle the approach above would consist of “free hunting” within an area of responsibility in each instance when they are not required directly to support maneuver brigades. Such an approach would directly align with the concepts of Hybrid Defense and Total Resistance strategies.

---

<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>304</sup> **Biddle & Friedman** (2008, p. xiii).

<sup>305</sup> **Cohen**, Ariel (2007, p. 53). Knowing the Enemy: How to Cope with Global Jihad. *Policy Review* No. 145 October/November, pp. 41–54.

<sup>306</sup> **Toomse** (2011c, pp. 35–39).

Static defensive positions should be avoided as much as possible so the opponent would be robbed of the opportunity to pin down and destroy the units. The following pattern must be adopted: strike and withdraw, strike from another direction, and so forth. A tank, a cannon, or and a supply vehicle of the opponent, one by one, bit by bit, falling prey, while the attacker, always withdraws before they can become a target themselves. This must be the main endeavor of the *Kaitseliit*'s tactics along with the skillful use of explosives and weaponry left behind by the opponent. Such a "tormentor" serves as the most effective deterrent, as it destroys the morale and combat will of the aggressor.<sup>307</sup>

A team of guided anti-tank missiles, is a weapon system that is many times more cheaper than a tank, and it is able to destroy the opponent's armored vehicles with the same degree of effectiveness as an actual tank. Such teams with light off-road vehicles, which can be driven on forest paths or in the moors, would make suppression by the enemy, from both the land and from the air, very complicated. A tank in turn would not offer much protection from an aircraft or a helicopter, whereas an ATV can take you to a shelter in the forest or a pre-dug hideout. Here the *Kaitseliit* has the home field advantage.<sup>308</sup>

The T-72B tank carries 45 shells and can cover 480 km with a full tank of diesel. The moment that these run out it becomes 46 tons of scrap iron<sup>309</sup>. According to the maneuver warfare theory, the tank is a strength that should be avoided whenever possible, and the destruction of its more vulnerable logistics unit which is a weak point, will subsequently bring about the collapse of the tank or the strength<sup>310</sup>. This is the way of thinking and the tactical emphasis that the smaller force must always adopt. A maneuver not only entails the movement of one's forces in relation to those of the opponent, it is imperative that it also, by outsmarting them, force the opponent into a position where they eventually lose the will to fight. The opponent is then vulnerable and conquerable.<sup>311</sup>

After having actively worn out the opponent by cutting through their fuel and ammunition supply line, it is then time to strike with a force that would break them and make them retreat. It is at this moment that the armored force should step in. In circumstances where the opponent has been worn out by scores of uncatchable groups, an unexpected attack of armor vehicles in a close fight would have a completely devastating effect that would also crush the last hope for the success of their plan and force them to retreat. But the rear area is not safe to pull back to

---

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>309</sup> **Army Guide.** T-72. Retrieved from <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product890.html> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>310</sup> **Lind** (1985, p. 18).

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5–8.

either. The *Kaitseliit*'s ambushes, already in place, will diminish the retreating force thus making the opponent's recovery for the next offensive even more difficult.<sup>312</sup>

The equipment and technology for such tactics must be light and mobile. Tanks which weigh dozens of tons and heavy self-propelled artillery are not always the best option in the Estonian context. Our landscape, which has remained undrained for decades, most probably could not carry heavy vehicles in most of the regions of Estonia, which would limit their mobility to the road network. There, however they would become a good targets for the opponent's air force and artillery as their movements can be anticipated. Once their change of position is predictable these expensive armor vehicles, together with the crews will quickly be depleted.<sup>313</sup>

The same is true of a tank battle: of the two tank units that encounter each other in the battle within a limited open space on a hard ground – the winner will be the one with more tanks. In that sense heavy combat vehicles are of quite questionable value within the context of Estonia as they would not be of much use in a war against a stronger opponent. The classical tank battle serves as an example of an unacceptable strength versus strength tactic, whereupon it is possible to predict through mathematical calculations which side, and how quickly, will be defeated. At the same time armored protection for decisive strikes is necessary, but it must be as small and light as possible, thereby allowing the advantage of using the shelter of off-roads as well as creating moments of surprise.<sup>314</sup>

#### 4.5. PRE-POSITIONED SUPPLY AS A KEY TO SUCCESS

Already Napoleon regarded logistics in warfare to be as important as the battle itself.<sup>315</sup> In this area Estonia's state defense could still develop greater advantages. In order to avoid exposing large supply convoys to destruction, both battle supplies as well as support resources (food, drinking water, medicine, etc.) must be scattered throughout the country in storage caches which can be accessed in the event of war by combat units in the front lines and those in the enemy's rear. Only this would make possible the above described combat tactics, which includes the opponent's deep rear where they do not wish to carry out a battle.

Likewise, logistics prepared in such a way will remove an important target from the opponent's target list. They also think in terms of similar categories and know that if we are out of ammunition and fuel, it would be easy to defeat us. Thus each

---

<sup>312</sup> **Toomse** (2011c, pp. 35–39).

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>315</sup> **Hammond**, Michael F. (2012) Army Logistics and Its Historical Influences in *Army Sustainment*, January–February, Vol 44 Issue 1. Retrieved from [http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb12/Logistics\\_Historical\\_Influences.html](http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb12/Logistics_Historical_Influences.html) (accessed 09 April 2015).

supply unit and vehicle on the road is a high value target. In our own land, in peacetime, we have the opportunity to bring such targets to a minimum by preplacing the needed supplies. This would give a great advantage over the opponent and also raise the morale and provisions of our troops. If, for instance, a unit is about to run out of ammunition, they need not hope that a supply truck can make it to their positions. Instead they know where the closest cached supply point is located and can bring the necessary supplies from there.

In addition it must be taken into account that during the war it is difficult if not impossible to transport additional provisions from abroad. Therefore it is essential to develop and sustain the local defense industry. The objective is to obtain the capability to produce in our own country all the critical supplies for a successful combat outcome. The respective institutions are already realizing this, but there is a long way to go before real changes are implemented. In order to create and maintain this capability, definite measures at the state level are called for, especially in regards to the regulations for procurement, which should insure that critical supplies be developed and ordered from Estonian manufacturers because they would remain in place and be capable of supplying in the event of war.<sup>316</sup>

A system that has not been prepared in peacetime would not, unfortunately, function in a time of war. Therefore the state should support and direct a local manufacturing effort. The most basic examples of the current bottlenecks include ammunition, explosives, weapons, and mobility. Those are also the most critical elements necessary for immediate combat.

#### **4.6. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AS ONE OF THE CORE TASKS DURING WAR**

One must not forget for a second the protection of the people whom the troops of the Estonian Defence Force and the *Kaitseliit* endanger their lives for during a war. It is for the lives of children, mothers, and the elderly that the force repels the opponent. Therefore in addition to a clever combat ability, a strong and well-functioning civil defense system must also be developed. In the settled areas there must be bomb shelters, water and food supplies, warm clothes, and blankets for refugees according to our climate conditions. If the survival of people is not guaranteed there is no point in fighting at all because no country is worth anything

---

<sup>316</sup> Toomse (2011d, p. 36).

without its people. Unfortunately today the system is not in place<sup>317</sup> nor is it even seriously discussed (rather dismissed)<sup>318</sup>.

Here likewise the *Kaitseliit* plays an essential role, as do particular sub-organizations such as the *Naiskodukaitse* (Woman's voluntary defense organization), *Noored Kotkad* (Young Eagles), and *Kodutütred* (Home Daughters)<sup>319</sup>. It is not their responsibility to fight during the war, and yet at the same time they still lack a purposeful function within the state defense system during a crisis. Civil defense is precisely the task these organizations can undertake in order to secure and coordinate a functioning system of support services. They are in a unique position to do so by virtue of their national network and also through their collaboration with the local governments' and emergency services. The members of special organizations receive regular training in first aid and field provisioning, as well as other instruction, which would be vital necessities for the civil population in a crisis situation.<sup>320</sup>

When viewed from a larger perspective, it is precisely the *Kaitseliit* that would be able to serve as the best coordinator and educator of a nationwide civil defense by virtue of its being one large network. Local authorities are responsible for the functioning of essential services and for guaranteeing shelter and supplies, but because there is always a change in town mayors, county elders, and councils change, there will always be a problem with the continuity of the system. Likewise, local authorities do not exactly command a large corpus of trained manpower, nor do they possess considerable experience administering during an extensive crisis.<sup>321</sup>

This is where the *Kaitseliit*, through its special organizations, can and should contribute. The above-mentioned organizations can function as a collective memory that remains and further develops the system also at times when a complete re-election in local governance occurs. They will be able to quickly indoctrinate the new administration as the situation demands. In the event of a crisis or war, they will not move to the front, but need to implement what was planned and what they were trained for: first aid, feeding, providing warm clothing, arranging the continuation of child care and education and etc. Their network must be

---

<sup>317</sup> **Miil**, Marek (2014, pp. 33–37). Mida sina sõja korral hakkad tegema? [What are you going to do if there is a war?]. *Kaitse Kodu!* Nr 7, pp. 33–37 and **Toomse** (2011, pp. 37, 38).

<sup>318</sup> **ERR** (2015, Jan 28). Rõivas: sõjaohu pole nii suur, et peaks inimesi harjutama sõjalukorras [Rõivas (PM): the threat of war is not serious enough to warrant civilian war preparations]. *ERR webpage*. Retrieved from <http://uudised.err.ee/v/eesti/0e5b46a1-a803-4851-a0d8-546da0e48555> (accessed 3 Apr 2015).

<sup>319</sup> See on the organizations on their respective websites: **Naiskodukaitse** [Woman's Voluntary Defence Organization] webpage. Retrieved from <http://www.naiskodukaitse.ee/> Introduction\_1218.htm, **Noorkotkad** [Young Eagles] webpage. Retrieved from <http://nk.kaitseliit.ee/>, **Kodutütred** [Home Daughters] webpage. Retrieved from <http://www.kodutytar.ee/> (all accessed 3 April 2015).

<sup>320</sup> **Toomse** (2011c, p. 35), and **Toomse** (2011d, pp. 37, 38).

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid.*

supplemented by the reserve personnel who have also been trained in the civil service.<sup>322</sup>

#### 4.7. SUMMARY

In conclusion it can be said that a state defense system which relies upon the previous principles could be more affordable for a small nation, while simultaneously serving as a considerably greater deterrent. It would also be more effective as a defense concept than the copying of scaled down concepts of large nations. All this needn't guarantee a quick and decisive victory in the case of war, but it would doubtlessly be more durable than the current plan and mindset.

It is precisely by drawing on the manpower of the militias, which is what the Estonian *Kaitseliit* essentially is, and the advantages of our home field that we can become a serious opponent for the aggressor as well as a provide a deterrent. Estonia could be a place where, figuratively, fire could come from behind every tree and from any direction and where the enemy would have no place to feel safe and would constantly lack supplies to realize their plans.

The modern art of warfare emphasizes the importance of the destruction of the moral strength of the opponent which in turn will neutralize their combat power. The hybrid defense concept offers far greater possibilities for a plausible and functioning independent defense even in the most difficult of circumstances. Such a strategic approach and the respective preparations therein provide an opportunity to combine or join conventional and non-conventional methods for the sake of a common objective within the same combat space.

In addition, this approach would also enable one to adopt a total guerrilla warfare strategy when conventional methods have been depleted or it is no longer rational to pursue them. From the viewpoint of deterrence, it would create a significantly larger problem for the opponent who will be threatened with the prospect of a long drawn out and tiresome raid, where the expected profit would not equal the expenses in terms of manpower, money, and time. This would be a serious deterrent to any aggressor.

A smart logistic system is the key to success in combat. Here also Estonian defense planners should think more unconventionally and in terms of a large-scale repositioning of essential supplies already during peace time. Equally the ability to produce the most needed combat supplies in in the homeland is absolutely essential as during a war the procurement channels from other countries can easily be cut. Soldiers without ammunition cannot defend the country.

---

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*

Citizens who are not in the fight need to be protected at all costs. They are the real value of the state and negligence in planning for and ensuring their survival will make the whole fight pointless. Therefore it is absolutely essential to develop the concepts beforehand and actually enact a system of reliable civil defense.

The adoption of the described concept would require far more local research from the Estonian defense planners as well an assessment of respective programs and public procurements. There are a number of historical examples where a smart smaller force has defeated a larger one. It is time for Estonian defense establishment to take an honest look at itself and become smart and not place all bets on the hope that if we are in trouble someone will come and save us. Hope has never been a reliable method and Estonia has actually the power to cope with a stronger opponent independently.

## CONCLUSIONS

*A culture not willing to think hard and test itself does not augur well for the future.*

Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper<sup>323</sup>

The world is still a violent place where unwanted changes can happen via armed conflicts. In its worst embodiment, at the individual level, war means painful injuries and the loss of human lives. At the state level it means the suppression of one's national goals or even the extinguishment of an independent actor. Once again, the latter is the true real threat to European small states that share a border with an aggressive state, which is indiscriminately pursuing its imperialistic ambitions.

In the beginning I asked a rhetorical question: how protected are the European small states in reality? This cannot actually be correctly measured, nor is it really a valid question. Protection of a state means more than security or the mere readiness to repel an aggressor. It also means the ability of a society to ensure a better future. For small states with fewer natural resources this must be achieved by continually seeking to be positively engaged in world affairs so that they will be perceived as valuable, and be recognized as equal partners.

Security means protection from harm, but security does not happen by itself. It is the continuous preparation of the state's defense system, and it is a never-ending process that necessitates creating sufficient deterrence to prevent any aggressor from attacking the state. There is no respite from respective developments. As soon a small state takes a break and drops its readiness, the threat-level rises, and the level of security drops.

Most small states lack the resources to build an army large enough to counter a greater enemy in conventional battle. At present the answer is to join a coalition and hope that the collective defense will be invoked if there is an act of aggression against one of the members. This, in principle, is what NATO is designed for and should do according to the principle that an attack against one is tantamount to an attack against all the members of the coalition. The policy is strong, but in reality there are some serious weaknesses.

Despite this agreement most of the European states are reducing their defense expenditures and their armed forces. Often it seems to be forgotten that NATO is merely a concept and does not possess any forces of its own. All the soldiers, tanks and airplanes belong to the various member states that are currently cutting their defense budgets. Less money means less military power and by extension, a

---

<sup>323</sup> **Borger**, Julian (2002, Sep 6). Wake-up call. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/06/usa.iraq> (accessed 9 April 2015).

diminished ability to deploy in case of an emergency in a distant country. Therefore, smaller states need to think harder about how to create a stronger and more stable self-defense capability and also be mentally prepared to fight alone for a long time if there is an act of aggression.

However, a small state cannot spend all its resources on tanks or planes. A capable defense development needs an intelligent approach that achieves the best results in the most economical way possible. In the meantime security also needs to be boosted by gaining influence in world affairs by disseminating an image of a country that is vital and worthy of support in the event that it is attacked.

Here I would then posit a new question: could a small state, in the vicinity of an aggressive neighbor, achieve the same levels of international influence and security as a great power? To answer this question, it was necessary for me to break the two topics into separate sub-questions and create theoretical concepts for them. First, an insight into how to gain significant diplomatic capital in world affairs through the balanced use of smart power in order to render the state more valuable for the allies so that they would desire to support and protect it, and second, a way of building a sound and feasible self-defense capability in case the state still needs to protect itself without the assistance of allies for a considerable amount of time.

While these two areas may seem to be at first unrelated and physically separate from one another, they are in fact connected, although it would seem to require double the number of people and the expenditure of money to fully integrate them—a luxury that small states often do not have. However, this is not a reason for avoiding the resolution of both of these problems, it simply needs to be approached creatively, and through the use of unconventional means that would combine all the national strengths and maximize the outcomes in the most economical ways possible.

The theories I selected regarding small states security strategies suggest that, for the most part, small states have few choices when it comes to security against external threats. They cannot do much more than rely on being part of an alliance and follow the greater members' advice in world affairs. In return they are provided with the hope that they will be protected by the others in the event of an attack.

Being unsatisfied with the “hope theory”, I based the first concept on the premise that Estonia should take a proactive approach in world affairs and become focused on conflict prevention. This is the Preemptive Strategic Development concept. This idea outlines an approach, wherein Estonia intervenes wherever there are signs that an armed conflict may arise. In such cases Estonia could plan, and send in specialist mediators. Here the emphasis should be on the national Strategic Development Group that possesses the combination of sagacity, and knowledge, and can also foresee, plan and act before a war breaks out and devastates the preexisting systems of a third-world country. The rationale behind this is that it will be less expensive in the long run, and a better alternative than waiting until a full scale war has torn

functioning state systems apart, and generated masses of refugees that will inundate the Western countries.

However, this approach requires a very strong body of civilian expertise due to the fact that the main issues of failing states fall within the economic and social domains. The necessary *soft power* applied to the *root causes* of an escalating conflict could be the best way to prevent potential bloodshed. One foreseeable problem within this concept lies with the ever-present physical threat danger posed to civilian specialists. Here I would propose a modification of the recently founded Estonian Special Operations Forces (ESTSOF) so that it could incorporate the relevant civilian expertise in fields where Estonia is especially strong. Such experts could survive in the harshest of conditions and still be able to complete the necessary tasks of their respective civilian areas of expertise. They would be the physical doers in the field, staying in the background as much as possible and distributing the donated funds, thus preventing the project from becoming a source of uncontrolled corruption.

Special operatives have the right mentality and creativeness to survive in harsh conditions while still being able to focus on the overall mission. At present NATO SOF doctrine prioritizes the mission set of Military Assistance, which is used only to supplement the sector of state security, but this is very inadequate. Assistance needs to focus on the entire social system, and not merely on security.

The ESTSOF is very small and will never be large due the limited pool of candidates of a small nation. Here the voluntary defense organization the *Kaitseliit* (Defence League) could be of great assistance. The organization is comprised of people from a variety of fields ranging from farmers, to top specialists of many different areas, to the executives of successful firms.

Eventually, the effect created would not be limited to just the containment of a threat in its early stages, but would also be extended to the more important mission of bringing recognition to Estonia as a positive and effective peacemaker in the international arena. This would boost the influence of the nation worldwide, which would in turn make Estonia a more valuable ally to assist in case of an act of aggression against it. This would be an indirect approach in this sense. In addition, the involvement of a full range of Estonian industries should be considered as well, as this would in turn help to develop economic growth via the export of technologies and services to the target areas.

However, these types of operations should be primarily conducted in cooperation with other nations wherein each representative acts within the auspices of a commonly agreed upon strategy of providing the services in which they are the best suited. Here Estonia could be an initiator nation that proposes the plan and coordinates the actions of the all participants.

In the second concept I rebutted the current defense development trends with the theory of unconventional deterrence and defense that outline the methods of creating a sustainable self-defense strategy through the use of the *hybrid defense*

concept. This concept has the potential to be more sustainable than a purely conventional approach. Here it was necessary for me to more thoroughly analyze Estonia's existing systems in order to identify which forces and capabilities would be suitable for building the concept.

I concluded that the *Kaitseliit* could be the backbone of the *hybrid defense* concept, wherein conventional and unconventional units operate synchronously within the same battlespace. This idea is centered on the concept of avoiding decisive engagements with the enemy force until it is worn down by constant guerilla attacks that take place all around it, and by cutting its force and its support units until it has lost the will to fight. The method is called *swarming tactics*. Once the shaping has reached its culmination only then is it time to strike the enemy with a decisive armored counterattack that makes him give up or retreat.

For the contingency strategy of *total resistance*, the *Kaitseliit* would also serve in the main role if it became impractical or irrational to further pursue conventional activities. In such a case the war would be dragged out in order to make it as costly to the enemy as possible. However, in the meanwhile, the conventional force should be ready to assemble again once and be ready for when the balance shifts, either through the intervention of the allies or the fatigue of the adversary.

For these concepts to succeed, the command system must be as decentralized as possible. This would mean that, in the event of war, the loss of higher staff would not be a serious problem and fierce resistance would continue. It should be a mix of the Swiss territorial defense concept combined with Hezbollah and Iranian hybrid concepts. It would inflict true pain on any conventional enemy, and they would lack targets large enough to make their superior firepower advantageous. Therefore this method of warfare would be a very serious and unpleasant deterrent for any enemy regardless of their ambitions, size and strength.

Inherent within the previously mentioned concepts is the necessity of logistical preparations consisting of the prepositioning of essential supplies, as much as possible, in caches. The aim is to reduce supply convoys in the event that the enemy has full control of air. Supply trucks are always high priority targets and their destruction will reduce a force's fighting capability. Estonia has many possibilities during peace-time to prepare the relevant sites for caches and develop a system of safe access for its own forces.

For Estonia the overall focus should be on a *stable* self-defense capability and any assistance from the allies would serve as a good bonus that would make warfare easier. Acceptance of this mindset would necessitate that the citizens of the state be physically and psychologically prepared for the worst case scenario so that if it did happen, it would not come as a shock to the people and fighters. Therefore the respective mental, physical and moral strengths must be continually developed.

It is equally vital to develop a state level civil protection system, although, at present this is completely dismissed. The laws are in place but there has been no serious action undertaken, not in education, nor in preparation. The people are the

most important part of any state and therefore they are the ones that the fighters actually fight for. Here, again the assistance potential of the *Kaitseliit* is tremendous. With its special sub-organizations and by virtue its focus on training in vital areas, and due to its possessing a state-wide cooperative network it can fulfill many functions.

In case of a covert intrusion by an aggressor, where a local insurgency will be created in a manner similar to what was done in Ukraine, the containment of the situation must be fast. In case of armed resistance during peace-time the police are in charge. However, their weapons and tactics do not work in large-scale scenarios and they are no match for militarily trained criminals. Therefore they must receive assistance from the Defence Forces and the *Kaitseliit*. The process for legally requesting and obtaining the physical help must be fast, as those types of situations in populated areas tend to escalate very quickly. The key to containing the situation is by preventing its spread, and this must be done with suitable force and decisiveness. However, the option of assistance from military bodies with the right to use force will only legally come into effect at the beginning of 2016. Still the process of authorization remains too long and could be considerably reduced.

As previously mentioned, for Estonia the *Kaitseliit* is most likely the best vehicle for combining both of these main concepts. Its members can be trained as independent and smart fighters in their free time, and yet they are already specialists in their various civilian capacities. Trained elite specialists together with properly educated SOF members could be deployed to potential crisis areas in order to improve the badly functioning and failing systems of an at risk state, thus preventing a potential conflict. In the event of war, the same force could be deployed to the aggressor's territory in order to incite disturbances and cause disruptions in the enemy's systems, something that could ultimately tip the strategic balance during a war.

This has been a hypothetical example of how a small state, like Estonia, could physically supplement its security through the use of more *balancing*, rather than *bandwagoning* strategies in international relations, and thus elevate both its domestic *security*, and international *influence*.

In conclusion: there are in fact some strategic changes that must be initiated in order to improve the social and economic outlook of Estonia, and to counter the threats posed by an aggressive neighbor. Being small is not an excuse. Every state is as large it wants to be.

## REFERENCES

### A. PUBLICATIONS

- Afsar**, Shahid, **Samples**, Chris & **Wood**, Thomas (2008). The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis. *Military Review* May – June, pp. 58–73.
- Arkin**, William M. (2007). *Divining Victory: Airpower in the Israel-Hezbollah War*. Alabama: Air University Press.
- Arquilla**, John & **Ronfeldt**, David (2005). Swarming and the Future of Conflict. *Rand webpage*. Retrieved from [www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented\\_briefings/2005/RAND\\_DB311.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf) (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Bailey**, Bill (2011). Case studies: A security science research methodology. Proceedings of the 4th Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 5th–7th December.
- Baldwin**, Davis A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Studies*, 23, pp. 5–26.
- Beaufre**, André (1965). *Introduction to Strategy*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Berzinš**, Janis (2014). Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy. Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia. Retrieved from <http://www.naa.mil.lv/~media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx> (accessed 14 August 2015).
- Biddle**, Stephen & **Friedman**, Jeffrey A. (2008). *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.
- Bourne**, Randolph S. (1919). The State. *Untimely Papers*. New York: B. W. Huebsch, pp. 140–230.
- Burton**, John W. (1997a). Conflict Resolution: Towards Problem Solving. *George Mason University webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/burton.html> (accessed 17 April 2015).
- Burton**, John W. (1997b). *Violence explained*. Oxford: Manchester University Press.
- Byrd**, Miemie W. (2006). Combating Terrorism. A Socio- Economic Strategy. *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 41, 2d Quarter, pp. 15–19.
- Carlsson**, Märta, **Norberg**, Johan & **Westerlund**, Fredrik (2013). The Military Capability of Russia's Armed Forces in 2013. *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective* Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin (eds.). Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, pp. 23–70.
- Carment**, David B. (2004). Preventing State Failure in When States Fail. *Causes and Consequences* Robert I. Rotberg (ed.). Oxford: Princeton Press.
- Cassidy**, Robert M. (2008). Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars. *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 10.

- Celeski**, Joseph D. (2005). Operationalizing COIN. Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press.
- Choharis**, Peter C. & **Gavrilis**, James A. (2010). Counterinsurgency 3.0. *Parameters*, Spring, pp. 34–46.
- Cohen**, Ariel (2007). Knowing the Enemy: How to Cope with Global Jihad. *Policy Review* No. 145 October/November, pp. 41–54.
- Connell**, Michael (2010). Iran's Military Doctrine. *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy* Robin B Wright (ed.). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 70–73.
- Corbin**, Juliet & **Holt**, Nicholas L. (2005, pp. 49–51). Grounded Theory. *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* Bridget Somekh & Cathy Lewin (eds.). London: SAGE Publications.
- Cornish**, Paul & **Dorman**, Andrew (2009). National Defence in the Age of Austerity. *International Affairs*, 85(4), pp. 733–753.
- Department of the Army** (2001). FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Department of the Army** (2006). FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Department of the Army** (2009). FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Dick**, Bob (2007). What Can Grounded Theorists and Action Researchers Learn from Each Other? *The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory. Paperback Edition* Bryant, Antony & Charma, Kathy (eds.). London: SAGE Publications, pp. 398–416.
- Fargues**, Philippe (2014). Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, but How? *Policy Briefs* 2014/01, Migration Policy Centre. Retrieved from <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/29919> (accessed 9 March 2015).
- Freedman**, Lawrence (2008) A Comment on T.X. Hammes. Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. Debating fourth-generation warfare, Aaron Karp *et al* (eds.). New York: Routledge, pp. 78–86.
- Fukuyama**, Francis (1989). The End of History? *The National Interest*, Summer, pp. 3–18.
- Given**, Lisa M. ed. (2008). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research methods. Volumes 1 & 2. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Goetschel**, Laurent (1998). The foreign and security policy interests of small states in today's Europe.' *Small states inside and outside the European Union* Laurent Goetschel (ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 13–31.
- Gompert**, David C. & **Gordon**, John IV (2008). War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities. *RAND webpage*. Retrieved from [www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 27 March 2015).
- Gray**, Colin S. (2010). War – Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity. *Parameters*, 40 (Summer), 5–13.

- Gray**, Colin S. (2013). *Perspectives on Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guderian**, Heinz (2009). *Ühe sõduri mälestused [Memories of a Solider]*. Tallinn: Olion.
- Gurr**, Ted R. (2003). Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails. *The New Global Terrorism Characteristics, Causes, Controls* Charles W. Jr. Kegly (ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., pp. 202–215.
- Hammes**, Thomas X. (2004). *The Sling and the Stone: on war in the 21st century*. St. Paul: Zenith.
- Hammond**, Michael F. (2012) *Army Logistics and Its Historical Influences. Army Sustainment*, January – February, Vol 44 Issue 1. Retrieved from [http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb12/Logistics\\_Historical\\_Influences.html](http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb12/Logistics_Historical_Influences.html) (accessed 09 April 2015).
- Handel**, Michael, I. (2003). Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise. *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence* Richard K. Betts & Thomas G. Mahnken (eds.). London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1–58.
- Herz**, John H. (1950). Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, 2 (2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–180.
- Hey**, Jeanne A. K. (2003). Introducing Small state Foreign Policy. *Small States in World Politics. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* Jeanne A. K. Hey (ed.). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1–11.
- Hoffman**, Frank G. (2007). *Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
- Huntington**, Samuel P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 72, pp. 22–49.
- Ianchovichina**, Elena & **Ivanic**, Maros (2014). Economic Effects of the Syrian War and the Spread of the Islamic State on the Levant. *Policy Research Working Paper 7135 of World Bank*. Retrieved from <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/7135.pdf?abstractid=2535615&mirid=1> (accessed 9 March 2015).
- Jervis**, Robert (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 58–113.
- Jõesaar**, Ivar (2013a). Kaitseväe reformi algatasid väeosade ohvitserid-allohvitserid [The reforms of the Defence Forces were initiated by the units' officers and non-commissioned officers]. *Sõdur*, nr 2, pp. 6–11.
- Jõesaar**, Ivar (2013b). Kaitseliidu tugevus on selle unikaalsus [The strength of the Defence League lies in its uniqueness]. *Sõdur*, nr 5, pp. 10–14.
- Kaas**, Kaarel (2014). Venemaa relvajõud Läänemere piirkonnas [Russian Military Forces near Baltic Sea]. *Diplomaatia*, Nr 6/7 (130/131), pp. 17–20.
- Kalistratov**, Alexander (2008). К вопросу о применении принципа внезапности в вооруженной борьбе [Concerning the application of the principle of surprise in the armed struggle]. *Военная Мысль* № 9, pp. 19–26.

- Kaljurand**, Riina (2013). Security Challenges of a Small State: The case of Estonia. *Defence and Security for the Small: Perspectives from the Baltic States* Raimonds Rublovskis, Dr. Margarita Šešelgyte & Riina Kaljurand (ed.). Reykjavík: University of Iceland, pp. 55–81.
- Kilcullen**, David (2009). *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big On*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kilcullen**, David (2010). *Counterinsurgency*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Knudsen**, Olav F. (1992). Sharing Borders with a Great Power: An Examination of Small State Predicaments. *NUPI Report 159*, May. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- Kozloski**, Robert (2009). The Information Domain as an Element of National Power. *Strategic Insights*, Volume 8, Issue 1. Retrieved from [http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/95832/ichaptersection\\_singledocument/9b900ca1-51cd-4cba-86a9-3b91139adbb0/en/kozloskiDec08.pdf](http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/95832/ichaptersection_singledocument/9b900ca1-51cd-4cba-86a9-3b91139adbb0/en/kozloskiDec08.pdf) (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Kunnas**, Leo (2014). Ukraina häirekell. Takerdunud rünnak II [The Ukrainian Alarm clock. A stalled attack II]. Tallinn: OÜ Hea Lugu & Leo Kunnas.
- Lamoreaux**, Jeremy W. & **Galbreath**, David J. (2008). The Baltic States as ‘Small States’: Negotiating the ‘East’ by Engaging the ‘West.’ *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 39, No 1, March, pp. 1–14.
- Liang**, Qiao & **Xiangsui**, Wang (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
- Lind**, William S. (1985). *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc.
- Lind**, William S. et al. (1989). The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. *Marine Corps Gazette*, October, pp. 22–26.
- Lind**, William S. et al. (2009). FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation War. *Global Guerrillas webpage*. Retrieved from <https://www.traditionalright.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FMFM-1A-revised-17-Jul-09.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2015).
- Lingard**, Lorelei, **Albert**, Mathieu & **Levinson**, Wendy (2008). Qualitative research: Grounded theory, mixed methods, and action research. *BMJ* Volume 337 August. Toronto: University of Toronto, pp. 459–461.
- Martinage**, Robert (2008). Strategy for the Long Haul. Special Operation Forces. Future challenges and Opportunities. *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_.pdf](http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special_Operation_.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2015).
- Matthews**, Matt M. (2008). We were caught unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah – Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press.
- McCauley**, David J. (2007). Israeli – Hezbollah Conflict of 2006: EBA in Joint Ops. *Fires Bulletin*, September – December, pp. 50–55.

- McDermott**, Roger N. (2014). Myth and Reality: A Net Assessment of Russia's 'Hybrid Warfare' Strategy Since the Start of 2014. *A Net Assessment of Developments in Eurasia Since the Start of 2014*. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, pp. 7–9.
- McFate**, Montgomery (2005). Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship. *Military Review*, March–April, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 24–38.
- McGowan**, Patrick J. & **Gottwald**, Klaus-Peter (1975). Small States Foreign Policies. A Comparative Study of Participation, Conflict, and Political and Economic Dependence of Black Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4 December, pp. 469–500.
- Metz**, Steven (2007). Rethinking Insurgency. *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College webpage*. Retrieved from: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Miil**, Marek (2014). Mida sina sõja korral hakkad tegema? [What are you going to do if there is a war?]. *Kaitse Kodu! Nr 7*, pp. 33–37.
- Mills**, Albert J., **Durepos**, Gabrielle & **Wiebe**, Eiden eds. (2010) Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. London: SAGE Publications.
- Mogahed**, Dalia (2006). Islam and Democracy. Special Report: Muslim World. Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization.
- Moore**, Scott (2004). Special Operations Forces. Visioning for the Future in Force of Choice. Perspectives on special operations, Bernd Horn, et al. (eds.). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 169–198.
- Morgan**, Patrick (2003). Deterrence Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgenthau**, Hans J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. New York: A.A. Knopf.
- Morris**, Daniel R. (2010). Waging war through surprise and terror. *The Character of War in the 21st Century*. Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter and Christopher Coker (eds.). Oxon: Routledge, pp. 72–87.
- NATO** (2005). Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations AJP 3.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.
- NATO** (2009a). Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.
- NATO** (2009c). Allied Land Tactics ATP-3.2.1. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.
- NATO** (2010). Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D). Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.
- NATO** (2011a). Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency AJP 3.4.4. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.
- NATO** (2014). AAP-06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency.
- Neumann**, Iver B. & **Gstöhl**, Sieglinde (2006). Lilliputians in Gulliver's World. *Small States in International Relations*. Christine Ingebritsen et al. (eds.). Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 3–36.

- Nye**, Joseph S. Jr. (2009). Get Smart. Combining Hard and Soft Power. *Foreign Affairs*, July/August. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart> (accessed 14 August 2015).
- Osinga**, Frans P. B. (2005). *Science, Strategy and War. The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers.
- Racius**, Egdunas (2007). The 'Cultural Awareness' Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan. *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, pp. 57–78.
- Rasmussen**, Mikkel V. (2006). *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Reinhold**, Liivi (2015). Kaitseliit (Estonian Defence League) and I wouldn't mess with us. *Kaitse Kodu!* Nr 1, pp. 8–9.
- Rekasius**, Mindaugas (2005). *Unconventional Deterrence Strategy*. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School.
- Rickli**, Jean-Marc (2008). European small states' military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 21, Number 3, September, pp. 307–325.
- Rid**, Thomas and **Hecker**, Marc (2009). *War 2.0. Irregular Warfare in the Information Age*. London: Praeger Security International.
- Ritchie**, Nick (2011). Rethinking security. *International Affairs*, 87(2), pp. 355–376.
- Roe, Paul (1999). The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'? *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 183–202.
- Rotberg**, Robert I. (2003). Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. *State Failure and State Weakness in the Time of Terror* Robert I. Rotberg (ed.). Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Russet**, Bruce (1994). Between General and Immediate Deterrence. *Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge* Aaron S. Klieman and Ariel Levite (eds.). Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 34–44.
- Schelling**, Thomas C. (1966). *The Diplomacy of Violence in Arms and Influence*. Yale University: Virginia.
- Schelling**, Thomas C. (1994). The Diplomacy of Violence. *The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age* Gérard Chaliand (ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schoomaker**, Peter J. (2004). Special Operation Forces. The way ahead in Force of Choice. *Perspectives on special operations* Bernd Horn, et al. (eds.). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 161–168.
- Sepp**, Kalev I. (2005). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. *Military Review*, May – June, pp. 8–12. Retrieved from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015).
- Shaw**, Martin (2005). *The new Western way of War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Smith**, David (2013). *Estonia: Independence and European Integration*. Oxon: Routledge.

- Somekh**, Bridget (2005). Action Research. *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* Bridget Somekh & Cathy Lewin (eds.). London: SAGE Publications.
- Sutton**, Paul (1987). Political Aspects. *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*. Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds.). London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 3–25.
- Tawil**, Camille (2010). The Other Face of Al-Qaeda. *Quilliam Foundation webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-other-face-of-al-qaeda.pdf> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Telhami**, Shibley (2003). An Essay on Neorealism and Foreign Policy. *Perspectives on Structural Realism* Andrew K. Hanami (ed.). Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 105–118.
- Thatcher**, Margaret (1998) in foreword to Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer *The next war*, Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.
- Toomse**, Rene (2010a). Rahvas sõjas. Väikeriigi võimalus olla suurem suurriigist. [Nation at War. An Option of a Small State to be Larger than Major Powers]. *Diplomaatia* 5, pp. 14–18.
- Toomse**, Rene (2010b). Kaitseliidu võitlusgruppide doktriini selgitus ja projekt [Explanation on Defence League Fighting Groups' Doctrine and the Project]. *Kaitse Kodu!* Nr. 8/2010, pp. 33–38.
- Toomse**, Rene (2011a). Sõjapidamine X: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 2. [Warfighting X: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 2]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 2, pp. 37–41.
- Toomse**, Rene (2011b). Sõjapidamine XI: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 3. [Warfighting XI: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 3]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 3, pp. 37–43.
- Toomse**, Rene (2011c). Sõjapidamine XII: Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 4. [Warfighting XII: Defending Estonia in War and Peace 4]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 4, pp. 33–39.
- Toomse**, Rene (2011d). Sõjapidamine VIII. Eesti kaitsmisest sõjas ja rahu 5 [Warfighting VIII. Defending Estonia in war and peace 5]. *Kaitse Kodu!* Nr 5, pp. 33–38.
- Toomse**, Rene (2012). The Concept and Framework of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations. *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol 14 Issue 2, pp. 102–146.
- Toomse**, Rene (2013). Eesti kaitsepoliitika dilemmad muutuvast maailmakorralduses [Dilemmas of Estonian Defence Policy in the Changing World]. *Acta Politica Estica*, 4, pp. 114–134.
- Toomse**, Rene (2014). Kaitseväe uus juhtimisstruktuur ja selle jätkusuutlikkus. [The New Command Structure of the Estonian Defence Forces and its Resilience]. *ENDC Proceedings* 19/2014, pp. 183–219.
- Toomse**, Rene (2015). Strategic Operations Forces in Strategic Development Operations. Proposed Doctrine for Small States Strategic Operations Forces. *Special Operations Journal*, Vol 1, Issue 1. London: Routledge, pp. 44–61.
- Toomse**, Rene and **Plaser**, Martin (2009). Luure kui pusle II: Kaitseliidu võitlusgrupid on paiksed eksperdid [Intelligence as Puzzle II: Defence League's Fighting Groups as the local experts]. *Kaitse Kodu!* 1, pp. 14–18.
- U.S. Marine Corps** (1997). MDCP 1, Warfighting. U.S. Government Printing Office.

**Ühtegi**, Riho (2013). The 2008 Russia – Georgia War five years later. *Diplomaatia*, Nr. 8 (120) August, pp. 4–9.

**van Burden**, Peter (2011). *The American Empire Project. We Meant Well. How I helped lose the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.* NY: Metropolitan Books.

**Von Dach**, Hans (1965). *Total Resistance.* Translated by H. Lienhard. Boulder: Paladin Press.

**Waltz**, Kenneth N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics.* Pennsylvania: Addison Wesley Publishing Company.

**Ward**, Steven R. (2014). *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces.* Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

**Wiberg**, Hakan (1996). Security problems of small nations. Werner Bauwens. *Small states and the security challenge in the new Europe* Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav Knudsen (eds.). London: Brassey's, pp. 21–41.

**Wilson**, Ernest J., III (2008). Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616. L.A.: Sage Publications, pp. 110–124.

**Wyly**, Michael D. (1985). *Fundamentals of Tactics. Maneuver Warfare Handbook* Lind, William S. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., pp. 67–133.

**Zenkevičius**, Gintautas (2007). Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Rebuilding Afghanistan – Is That Post-conflict Reconstruction? *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, pp. 28–56.

## **B. LEGAL ACTS, OFFICIAL WEBPAGES, DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS**

**CIA** (2015). Estonia. *CIA Factbook.* Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Constitution** of the Republic of Estonia, Preamble. Retrieved from <http://www.president.ee/en/republic-of-estonia/the-constitution/> (accessed 6 April 2015).

**EDF** (2013). Special Operations. *Estonian Defence Forces webpage* updated 03.10.2013. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces/special-operations> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**EDF** (2014, Dec 23). Kaitseväe juhataja: Eesti on kindlamalt kaitstud kui kunagi varem [The Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces: Estonia is better defended than ever before]. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/8497/kaitsev%C3%A4-juhataja:-estoni-kindlamalt-kaitstud-kui-kunagi-varem> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**EDF** (2015a). Estonian Defence Forces. *Estonian Defence Forces webpage.* Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**EDF** (2015b). Riigikaitse arengukava [The National Defence Development Plan]. *Estonian Defence Forces webpage.* Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/et/kaitsevagi/riigikaitse-arengukava> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Kaitseliit** [Defence League] webpage. Retrieved from <http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Kodutütred** [Home Daughters] webpage. Retrieved from <http://www.kodutytar.ee/> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**MOD** (2010a). National Security Concept of Estonia. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National\\_Security\\_Concept\\_of\\_Estonia.pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

**MOD** (2010b). National Defence Strategy. *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM\\_riigikaitse\\_strateegia\\_eng\(2\).pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng(2).pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

**MOD** (2010c). Sõjalise kaitse arengukava 2009–2018 [The National Defence Development Plan 2009–2018]. Retrieved from <http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/SKAK.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**MOD** (2013a). Riigikaitse Arengukava 2013–2022 [The National Defence Development Plan 2013–2022] (in Estonian). *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13204\\_Riigikaitse\\_arengukava\\_2013-2022.pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13204_Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022.pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

**MOD** (2013b). The National Defence Development Plan 2013 – 2022 (in English). *Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13373\\_NATIONAL\\_DEFENCE\\_DEVELOPMENT\\_PLAN\\_2013.pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/13373_NATIONAL_DEFENCE_DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_2013.pdf) (accessed 9 April 2015).

**MOD** (2015). NATO. *Estonian Ministry of Defence webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.mod.gov.ee/en/nato> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Naiskodukaitse** [Woman's Voluntary Defence Organization] webpage. Retrieved from [http://www.naiskodukaitse.ee/Introduction\\_1218.htm](http://www.naiskodukaitse.ee/Introduction_1218.htm) (accessed 5 April 2015).

**NATO** (1949). Article 5 in The North Atlantic Treaty. NATO webpage. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed 28 March 2015).

**NATO** (2004). Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge. Retrieved from <http://www.bits.de//NRANEU/nato-strategy/StrategicVision2004.pdf> (accessed 09 April 2015).

**NATO** (2009b). From AMF to NRF (2009). *NATO Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090204/ET/index.htm> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**NATO** (2011b). Strategic Concept 'Active Engagement, Modern Defence'. *NATO webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120203\\_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf) (accessed 7 April 2015).

**NATO** (2014). Wales Summit Declaration. *NATO webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm) (accessed 9 April 2015).

**NATO** (2015). NATO Response Force. *NATO webpage*, updated: 23 Feb. 2015. Retrieved from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49755.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm) (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Noorkotkad** [Young Eagles] webpage. Retrieved from <http://nk.kaitseliit.ee/> (accessed 5 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2008). Kaitseväge korralduse seadus [Estonian Defence Forces Organisation Act] (valid until 1 Aug 2014, §16). *RT I 2008*, 35, 213. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032014035> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2011). Korrakaitse seadus [Law Enforcement Act]. *RT I*, 22.03.2011, 4. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/KorS> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2013). 2014. aasta riigieelarve seadus [2014 State Budget Law]. *RT I*, 28.12.2013, 10. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/128122013010> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2013). Kaitseringkondade vastutusalad [Defence Districts' areas of responsibility] (valid until 1 Aug 2014). *RT I*, 25.03.2013, 6. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/125032013006> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2013). Kaitseväge erioperatsioonide põhimäärus [Defence Forces Special Operations Forces Statute]. *RT I*, 24.05.2013, 10. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/124052013010> (accessed 6 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2014). 2015. aasta riigieelarve seadus [2015 State Budget Law], *RT I*, 29.12.2014, 79. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/129122014079> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Riigi Teataja** (2015). Riigikaitse seadus [State Defense Law]. *RT I*, 12.03.2015, 1. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/112032015001> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**U.S. State of Department** (2014, Jul 14). Russia's Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine's Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability. *U.S. State of Department webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229270.htm> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**UNCHR** (2015a). 2015 UNHCR regional operations profile – Middle East and North Africa. Working Environment. *UNCHR webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02db416.html> (accessed 6 April 2015).

**UNCHR** (2015b). 2015 UNHCR regional operations profile – Europe. Working Environment. *UNCHR webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d9346.html> (accessed 6 April 2015).

### C. OTHER SOURCES

**Amici Curiae** Special Forces Association and U.S. Army and Ranger Association (2009). Brief on Appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in support of Appellants. Retrieved from [http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh\\_%20amicus\\_as\\_filed.pdf](http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh_%20amicus_as_filed.pdf) (accessed 27 March 2015).

**Anderson**, Gary (2015, Feb 13). Were the Paris Attacks the First Phase of Coming Urban Warfare in Europe? *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/paris-islamist-guerrilla-jihad-charlie-hebdo/?wp\\_login\\_redirect=0](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/paris-islamist-guerrilla-jihad-charlie-hebdo/?wp_login_redirect=0) (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Army Guide**. T-72. Retrieved from <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product890.html> (accessed 3 April 2015).

- Bachmann**, Helena (2012, Dec 20). The Swiss Difference: A Gun Culture That Works. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://world.time.com/2012/12/20/the-swiss-difference-a-gun-culture-that-works/> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Beale**, Jonathan (2015, Feb 26). Nato defence spending falls despite promises to reverse cuts. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-31619553> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- BNS** (2015, Mar 10). US to station tank platoon in Estonia. *Postimees*. Retrieved from <http://news.postimees.ee/3118035/us-to-station-tank-platoon-in-estonia> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Borger**, Julian (2002, Sep 6). Wake-up call. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/06/usa.iraq> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Boyd**, John, R. Destruction and Creation (1976). Retrieved from [http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION\\_AND\\_CREATION.pdf](http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf) (accessed 10 August 2015).
- Burrige**, Tom (2014, Mar 11). Spain remembers Madrid train bombings 10 years on. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26526704> (accessed 16 April 2015).
- Caldwell**, Christopher (2015, Jan 16). Immigration and Islam: Europe's Crisis of Faith. France and the rest of Western Europe have never honestly confronted the issues raised by Muslim immigration. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-immigration-and-islam-europes-crisis-of-faith-1421450060> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Echevarria**, Antulio J. II (2005). Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths. Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB632.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2015).
- Eesti Instituut** (2012) Estonian War of Independence. *Estonica webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1914-1920\\_The\\_First\\_World\\_War\\_and\\_Estonian\\_independence/Estonian\\_War\\_of\\_Independence/](http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1914-1920_The_First_World_War_and_Estonian_independence/Estonian_War_of_Independence/) (accessed 3 April 2015)
- ERR** (2015, Jan 28). Rõivas: sõjaohu pole nii suur, et peaks inimesi harjutama sõjalukorras [Rõivas (PM): the threat of war is not serious enough to warrant civilian war preparations]. *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://uudised.err.ee/v/eesti/0e5b46a1-a803-4851-a0d8-546da0e48555> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Fallon**, Michael (2015, Feb 19). Russia a threat to Baltic states after Ukraine conflict, warns Michael Fallon. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/feb/19/russia-a-threat-to-baltic-states-after-ukraine-conflict-warns-michael-fallon> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Hardt**, Heidi (2014, Dec 23). Is the NATO rapid-reaction force fiction? *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/23/is-the-nato-rapid-reaction-force-fiction/> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Hurt**, Martin (2014, May 5). Lessons identified in Crimea – does Estonia's national defence model meet our needs? *Estonian World*. Retrieved from <http://estonianworld.com/security/lessons-identified-crimea-estonias-national-defence-model-meet-needs> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**iCasualties** 2015. Operation Enduring Freedom. Retrieved from <http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed 29 March 2015).

**Jeffery**, Simon (2004, Mar 15). New Spanish PM promises Iraq withdrawal. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/15/spain.iraq> (accessed 17 April 2015).

**Jennings**, Gareth (2014, Dec 17). NATO extends enhanced Baltic air policing until end of 2015 at least. *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*. Retrieved from <http://www.janes.com/article/47065/nato-extends-enhanced-baltic-air-policing-until-end-of-2015-at-least> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Kerry**, John F. (2009, Sep 27). Testing Afghanistan Assumptions. The lesson of Vietnam is don't commit troops without a clear strategy. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574438660617984826.html> (accessed 21 March 2015).

**Kilcullen**, David (2006). Counterinsurgency Redux. *The Air University (USAF) webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/counterinsurgency\\_redux.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/counterinsurgency_redux.pdf) (accessed 12 March 2015).

**Kilcullen**, David (2008). Remarks at the NATO SOF Symposium, 3–5 June 2008 in Deauville, France.

**Knickmeyer**, Ellen (2008 Jan 31). 2006 War Called a 'Failure' for Israel. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Kravtsova**, Yekaterina (2014, Mar 13). Russia heightens tension with military exercises near Ukrainian border. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10695077/Russia-heightens-tension-with-military-exercises-near-Ukrainian-border.html> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Kunnas**, Leo (2010, May 13). Leo Kunnas: tankivägi võimaldab Eestil kaitsta oma võtmepiirkondi kuni liitlaste saabumiseni [Leo Kunnas: The Estonian armored force will help to protect key areas until the allies arrive]. *Forte*. Retrieved from <http://forte.delfi.ee/news/militaaria/online-intervjuu-leo-kunnas-tankivagi-voimaldab-eestil-kaitsta-oma-votmepiirkondi-kuni-liitlaste-saabumiseni?id=31021311> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Kunnas**, Leo (2013, Dec 13). Uus arengukava tähendab kaost kaitseväge sõjaaja juhtimises [The new national defense development plan means chaos for the directing of the Defence Forces in war]. *Delfi*. Retrieved from <http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/arvamus/leo-kunnas-uus-arengukava-tahendab-kaost-kaitsevae-sojaaja-juhtimises?id=67438418> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Laaneots**, Ants (2014, May 9). Uus arengukava lõhkus ära kaitsejõudude tervikliku juhtimissüsteemi [The new national defense development plan demolished the integral command system of the Defense Forces]. *Maaleht*. Retrieved from <http://maaleht.delfi.ee/news/maaleht/uudised/ants-laaneots-uus-arengukava-lohkus-ara-kaitsejoudude-tervikliku-juhtimissusteemi.d?id=68638117> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Lally**, Kathy (2014, Apr 17). Putin's remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes->

course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1\_story.html (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Lind**, William S. (2004). The Sling and The Stone. *Military.com webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind\\_110504,00.html](http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_110504,00.html) (accessed 6 March 2015).

**Lind**, William S. (2006). Critics of the Fourth Generation. *LewRockwell* webpage. Retrieved from <https://www.lewrockwell.com/2006/01/william-s-lind/critics-of-the-fourth-generation> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Lobjakas**, Ahto (2014, Aug 22). NATO egiidi all siin viibivad üksused ei sekkuks Eesti poolel sõjategevusse [The units present here under the auspices of NATO would not enter a war on the Estonia's side]. *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://uudised.err.ee/v/arvamus/19e1404d-e266-43fb-8fde-a5a6d7179739> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Luik**, Hans H. & **Simson**, Priit (2013, Nov 7). Eesti riik sõdib viimase meheni [Riho Terras: Estonia will fight to the last man]. *Eesti Ekspress*. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/8002/hans-h.-luige-ja-priit-simsoni-usutlus-riho-terrasega:-eesti-riik-s%C3%B5dib-viimase-meheni> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Manyuan**, Dong (2014, Nov 14). The Rise of ISIS: Impacts and Future. *CIIS Time*. Retrieved from [http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-11/14/content\\_7369551.htm](http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-11/14/content_7369551.htm) (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary**. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concept> (accessed 14 August 2015).

**Mikser**, Sven (2014, Dec 17). Eesti on täna kindlamini kaitstud kui aasta alguses [Estonia is better defended today than at the beginning of the year]. *Social Democratic Party webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.sotsdem.ee/mikser-eesti-on-tana-kindlamini-kaitstud-kui-aasta-alguses> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Mikser**, Sven (2015, Feb 22) Mikser: astudes Eesti vastu, satub Venemaa konflikti kogu NATO-ga. [Mikser: Russia, if stepping against Estonia, will be in conflict with whole NATO]. *Social Democratic Party webpage*. Retrieved from <http://www.sotsdem.ee/mikser-astudes-eesti-vastu-satub-venemaa-konflikti-kogu-nato-ga/> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Moora**, Kristjan. (2014, Sep 17). Sõjalise riigikaitse vajadusest Eesti saartel [Regarding the necessity of military state defense on the Estonian islands]. *Saarte Hää*. Retrieved from <http://www.saartehaal.ee/2014/09/17/sojalise-riigikaitse-vajadusest-eesti-saartel> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**Nader**, Alireza (2012, Oct 12). How Would Iran Fight Back? *Rand Blog*. Retrieved from <http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/10/how-would-iran-fight-back.html> (accessed 9 April 2015).

**Noah**, Timothy (2002). Birth of a Washington Word. When warfare gets "kinetic." Retrieved from [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth\\_of\\_a\\_washington\\_word.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth_of_a_washington_word.html) (accessed 18 August 2015).

**Norberg**, Johan (2014, Mar 13). The Use of Russia's Military in the Crimean Crisis. *Carnegie webpage*. Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/use-of-russia-s-military-in-crimean-crisis> (accessed 3 April 2015).

**NSCC** (2008). The NATO SOF Study. Retrieved from <http://everyoneweb.com/WA/DataFileskorps-mariniers-forum/nscc.pdf> (accessed 8 April 2015).

- Osinga**, Frans P. B. (2007a). John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era. *The Air University webpage*. Retrieved from [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga\\_boyd\\_postmod\\_copyright2007.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_boyd_postmod_copyright2007.pdf) (accessed 11 March 2015).
- Osinga**, Frans P. B. (2007b). On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory. *On new Wars*, John Olson ed. Retrieved from [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga\\_4gw\\_boyd\\_copyright2007.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_4gw_boyd_copyright2007.pdf) (accessed 14 August 2015).
- Oxford Dictionaries**. Retrieved from [http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m\\_en\\_gb0990350#m\\_en\\_gb0990350](http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0990350#m_en_gb0990350) (accessed 11 March 2015).
- Peter**, Tom A. (2011, Mar 8). Women's rights in Afghanistan lose steam. *The Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0308/Women-s-rights-in-Afghanistan-lose-steam> (accessed 13 March 2015).
- Pevkur**, Hanno (2014, Apr 14): Eesti on kaitstud, kui me provokatsioonidele ei allu [Estonia is defended if we don't respond to provocations]. *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://uudised.err.ee/v/eesti/7705e4a4-44f8-4c09-bc77-4fbda78d5f31> (accessed 5 April 2015).
- Rasmussen** Anders Fogh (2015, Feb 6). Putin attacking Baltics – scaremongering or a real danger? *ERR News*. Retrieved from <http://news.err.ee/v/International/cd81ee87-4a81-4558-983d-475e5b324d1d> (accessed 9 April 2015).
- Reynolds**, Ben (2014, Aug 31). Iran Didn't Create ISIS; We Did. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/iran-didnt-create-isis-we-did/> (accessed 4 April 2015).
- Schwartz**, Paul N. (2014, Jun 30). Russia Announces Sale of S-400 to China. *Center for Strategic and International Studies website*. Retrieved from <http://csis.org/blog/russia-announces-sale-s-400-china> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Sepp**, Kalev I. (2005, Mar 2014). Prepared Statement before House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005\\_hr/050314-sepp.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/050314-sepp.pdf) (accessed 11 March 2015).
- Shanker**, Thom & **Rubin**, Alissa (2010, Jun 28). Quest to Neutralize Afghan Militants Is Showing Glimpses of Success, NATO Says. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29military.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29military.html?_r=1) (accessed 8 March 2015).
- Shevchenko**, Vitaly (2014, Mar 3). "Little green men" or "Russian invaders"? *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Smith-Spark**, Laura, **Black**, Phil & **Pleitgen**, Frederik (2014, Feb 27). Russia flexes military muscle as tensions rise in Ukraine's Crimea region. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/26/world/europe/ukraine-politics> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Susser**, Leslie (2008, Jan 8). Closing Ranks. *The Jerusalem Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.jewishtoronto.com/page.aspx?id=140639> (accessed 3 April 2015).
- Will**, George (2001, Sep 12). The end of our holiday from history. *Jewish World Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/will091201.asp> (accessed 5 April 2015).



# PUBLICATIONS



I

**Toomse, Rene** (2015). Small States' Special Operations Forces in Preemptive Strategic Development Operations: Proposed Doctrine for Estonian Special Operations Forces. *Special Operations Journal*, Vol 1, Issue 1. London: Routledge, pp. 44–61.

## Small States' Special Operations Forces in Preemptive Strategic Development Operations: Proposed Doctrine for Estonian Special Operations Forces

Rene Toomse

*Tallinn University, Estonia*

This study looks at the practical implementation of the theory of preemptive strategic development operations. The key actors in these operations could be small states with their unique capabilities and their modified special operations forces (SOF) units. The small states' SOF could be the physical doer and could literally apply the correct and needed soft push in the most difficult environments and circumstances. However, the preparations, methods, and approaches will likely differ greatly from the majority of tasks such entities currently conduct. Although the study focuses on small states' SOF, and on Estonia's particularly, the specific focus does not matter on a conceptual level. The approach, if proved feasible, could be a basis for any state's thoughts on the development of more effective strategic approaches that could be undertaken in prevention of armed conflicts.

Keywords: warfare, small states, special operations, strategy, conflict management, Estonia

*And you know that in the changing world the one wins who walks alongside the world, walks a bit faster than the world, gets ahead of it and is able to see the problems, questions and solutions that life imposes to him.*

—Lennart Meri, Estonian president, 1992–2001, addressing the beginning of 2001 school year

### THE NEED FOR A BETTER APPROACH

Today's wars are long; they are costly in terms of human life and economics; and they are often ill-defined in scope, with no quantifiable end state. Emerging nonstate actors are entities with low structure, but their ideologies make responses by states' armed forces more difficult to determine and less productive in execution. Western societies need to reexamine how to help resolve emerging conflicts.

Could special operations forces (SOF) act in the prevention of armed conflict? The tools to preempt some wars are present today but, for many reasons, may not be used effectively. Because major nations have difficulties changing their complex systems in time, smaller nations might show an ability to adapt more quickly to changes in world affairs. One of the most successful approaches for using SOF is to support local forces, especially in training and professionalizing them. But this support is not enough. In such situations, local forces often

---

Correspondence should be addressed to Rene Toomse. E-mail: [rene.toomse@gmail.com](mailto:rene.toomse@gmail.com)

become the supporters, not the drivers, of the desired developments in those states. More work needs to be done to improve Western response.

In 2012 my thoughts on the concept of preemptive strategic development operations were published in the *Baltic Security and Defence Review* (Toomse, 2012). By studying the possible root causes of insurgencies I synthesized a concept that could possibly diminish at least some armed conflicts before they arise. Usually the shift toward conflict starts for economic and political reasons. These can be mismanagement of resources or processes, corruption, or other similar factors. The bottom line is that the causes stem from somewhere outside the military, so the fix and aid need to address and be conceived from where the symptoms started. Sending money or humanitarian aid alone is not an answer. There needs to be well-coordinated moral and physical oversight and mentoring on the use of all available assets.

While being general in approach in the mentioned study, I concluded that for such operations additional systems need to be created at the political level. The main idea is the need to create national strategic development groups that will act beyond the concerns of daily politics and instead pursue the long-term goals of the nation. However, such goals should always be adjusted to account for the common interests of allies and therefore be well coordinated within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Planning is important, but it is worth little if there is no force available to execute the plans. Therefore, the previous study argues that the states' SOF should broaden their approach to include more civilian expertise and be present at all times in potential hotspots. Their role is not the classic one, as SOF is seen today; instead, they would shoulder the usual tasks of civilian experts in locations where civilian specialists do not want to go or might not be willing to risk their lives.

Upgraded SOF, in my opinion, could be the best physical asset in conflict prevention operations. To diminish or prevent the causes of future crises demands an understanding of the problems as well as an ability and will to apply the most effective ways and means in time to affect the root causes. The larger the state the more difficult it will be to adopt new models. Therefore here, in preemptive strategic development operations, smaller democratic nations may have an upper hand.

According to Jeanne Hey, small states are often less complex and more streamlined in their internal and organizational systems, and thus can often be more flexible and creative in their ability to induce internal changes (2003, p. 4). This is also logical because in small states there are usually fewer bodies to coordinate; therefore, decisions can thus be made faster than in larger states, where there are numerous agencies and offices that must affirm and agree to the coordination effort. As small units have faster reaction and readiness circles, smaller countries have faster response times at the strategic level. Decision makers of small states could make rapid and sound decisions to act on complex problems alongside adaptive military organizations that could respond as a part of the solution. This would mitigate future threats to the state and the alliance, as well as increase the political credibility of the state in the international arena.

How could small states contribute to prevention strategies exactly? What approach could their SOF take to support those strategies? In this study I use the Republic of Estonia as a hypothetical model to answer these questions. I look into national settings and strengths that could be used to support the greater idea of the previously described operations.

Today, Estonia does not take advantage of its full capabilities in employing an effective strategy in world affairs. Currently Estonia contributes mainly conventional forces units to

ongoing conflicts. One could argue that a small state with a population of less than 1.3 million people does not have an option to take the initiative in world affairs, but that would not be entirely true. There can be some good opportunities for Estonia in prevention of conflicts, as this study tries to show.

As mentioned, for small states, engaging in sound and proactive activities in prevention of conflicts could offer possibilities to increase their influence in the international arena. Being smaller often means also being more flexible. Small nations usually are often more appreciative of the diversity of cultures, as they have greatly depended on their neighbors' behaviors, economies, and policies. Smartly utilizing the cooperation of nations and within alliances, a small state could likely even lead strategic development operations without exhausting its own national resources.

Although this study focuses on Estonia particularly, such specifics do not matter on the conceptual level. The approach, if proved feasible, could be the basis for any state's thoughts on the development of more effective strategic approaches. The main idea is that each nation, large or small, could offer its best national qualities and expertise to the larger programs.

## OVERVIEW ON REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA AND PROPOSALS ON STRATEGIC LEVEL SYSTEMS

### Facts, Activities, and Ambitions

Estonia is a small state geographically (with an area of 17,462 square miles, or 45,226 square kilometers) with a population of about 1.3 million, located in the Eastern Europe region on the shore of the Baltic Sea and neighboring with Finland in the north, Sweden in the northwest, Latvia in the south, and Russia in the east. In modern history, after being an independent state from 1918 to 1940, the outcome of World War II included Estonia suffering a decades-long occupation by the Soviet Union. Estonia regained its independence on August 20, 1991.

Since then Estonians have made great progress in developments in such fields as economics, education, and science (Landler, 2005). Estonia became a member of NATO and the European Union (EU) in 2004. Having small professional armed forces numbering close to 3,800 personnel (Estonian Defence Forces, 2015), Estonia has participated in international military operations since 1995, with more than 2,500 soldiers supporting its allies. On the front lines during Allied operations, Estonia contributes mainly with conventional military capabilities, such as armored infantry, mortar teams, and logistics divisions (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2015).

However, the thinking in terms of comprehensiveness has been evolving in state-level documents for some time. The latest Estonian security concept was amended in May 2010, and it is aimed at preventing threats as well as responding to them in a swift and flexible manner. According to the document, Estonia's security is ensured through coordinated foreign and domestic policy measures (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010, p. 4). That concept is undoubtedly a qualitative step forward from its previous version; however, the policy seems to lack clear implementation guidance.

The document promises general guidelines for an integrated approach, where foreign policy, defense policy, and internal security policy, as well as the cohesion and resilience of society,

should be employed for the purpose of achieving the security policy goals for the country as a whole (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2010, p. 3). In the end it seems to make the government responsible for the implementation of the integration without further guidance on how to do it (p. 21). Such a policy again leads to unanswered questions: Who has the task to prepare the whole state-integrated security system and lead the development? Who has the authority to keep the real developments in line with the spirit of the concept to ensure its independence from daily politics and populist promises?

There is often no continuity between agreed-upon policies and promises made at elections. This discrepancy could probably be diminished by establishing and giving an advisory role to a strategic development group (see concept in Toomse, 2012, pp. 125–126) that would be responsible for providing analysis on these types of shortcomings to the parliament to allow them to exercise constitutional control over the government. As long as analyses are conducted by individual parties and within single ministries on their own, true comprehensiveness is not likely to be reached.

The current approach, which does not enforce the agreed-upon principles, might be a serious obstacle in the way of implementing a nationwide comprehensive approach that should lead to the successful fulfillment of the main objective of the Republic of Estonia as defined in its Constitution, which proclaims that all state efforts “shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages” (Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 1992). This objective is the very reason the state exists. Therefore, the government should implement the philosophy of comprehensiveness, as it is stated within the National Defence Strategy (2010, pp. 8–10), and focus on the nation’s strengths. Estonia, for instance, is reasonably well developed in the information technology field (e-Estonia, 2015). Estonians are proud of that fact, but there is a risk of losing this position due to increasing difficulties in exporting this capability (Estonian Development Fund, 2009, pp. 17–19). There are only two options: Sit and watch Estonia’s technological successes diminish or get creative and take innovative steps forward to maintain this accomplishment.

#### Cyber Operations Capability

Estonia accommodates the NATO-certified Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE, 2015), which could effectively be put to use to execute the previously mentioned approach. A widening of the mission statement, which is currently focused on cyber defense, into a more comprehensive one could provide a solid platform for establishing networks and systems in remote areas in cooperation with private companies, as well as for providing cyber protection and necessary cyber network attack capabilities (Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 2009, p. 46) to hinder their adversaries’ information operations.<sup>1</sup>

Also, in 2011, Estonia officially created a paramilitary cyber defense capability called Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit (EDL CU). The unit’s purposes are listed here:

- Development of cooperation among qualified volunteer information technology (IT) specialists
- Raising the level of cyber security for critical information infrastructure through the dissemination of knowledge and training

- Creation of a network that facilitates public/private partnership and enhances preparedness in operating during a crisis situation
- Education and training in information security
- Participation in international cyber security training events (Estonian Defence League's Cyber Unit, 2015).

This unit is officially a part of Kaitseliit, which is a voluntary, militarily organized, national defense organization operating under the government's Ministry of Defence. It has more than 23,000 active volunteers out of the country's noted population of about 1.3 million (Estonian Defence League, 2015).

Few know what the EDL CU is doing, because the organization's actions tend to take place in the world that common computer users rarely see or recognize. Having some friends in this unit, I have learned that the EDL CU provides support to and also conducts cyber security penetration tests for Defence Forces and Defence League exercises. From time to time, this unit is forced to cease its activities during training events to allow the rest of the systems to work. Allegedly, the EDL CU is very good in the cyber domain and is capable of doing more than it is tasked to do at the moment. EDL CU could be a great asset to strategic development operations in shaping cyber avenues of approach to target audiences, and much more.

Following is an example of how a small nation could contribute to the alliance's agreed-upon strategies. Each nation has developed its own unique capabilities, and the possible use of all of those capabilities should be analyzed and synchronized, taking strategy into account, in order to achieve the desired alliance end state.

One of the means to achieve these goals could be the "Internetization" of potential crisis areas to allow the alliance to exercise indirect influence with the aim of preventing crisis. The strategic development group, along with its allied partners, would study and create programs that are most effective for the target audience. Then the action teams would be physically deployed to set up networks, deliver the computers and equipment, and teach the basics of their use. Another partner within the same operation could be responsible for building or repairing the electric power infrastructure where needed.

Estonia has considerable competence in the information systems security measures necessary to combat serious cyberattacks (Cyber Security Strategy Committee, 2008, p. 16). Similarly, the state should step forward to interdict the attacks and to take the offensive position, where needed and agreed, as well to focus on development and required control of the systems in third-world countries.

In this light, the announcement by the minister of economic affairs and communications in 2010 that Estonian IT companies were looking forward to developing IT infrastructure in Iraq was a push in the right direction (Raus, 2010). However, that course of action did have a number of issues that were not solvable by the Estonian civil sector alone. Iraq was and still is an unstable country with a high risk of physical harm to travelers there. To send civilian IT experts there on their own is probably not an acceptable risk. The project never materialized.

The questions remain: What would help balance the risks that are obstacles to these possible strategic gains for a small state? Who could do the needed fieldwork? Would it be feasible to integrate civilian IT knowledge and Estonian SOF to increase national strength and to enter a market where it is desperately needed but not yet a priority for other suppliers? Some conceptual changes are needed to develop such a capability in the special operations entity.

### PROPOSED DOCTRINAL CONCEPT OF ESTONIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF PREEMPTIVE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

This section describes the proposed main approach of establishing small states' SOF using Estonian Special Operations Forces (ESTSOF) as an example and model. By adopting these principles, ESTSOF could probably produce great benefit to Estonian strategic goals. The concept keeps in mind that during wartime there are additional possible tasks compared to operations during peace.

#### Historical Overview of Estonian Special Operations Forces

Estonia, as a member state of NATO since 2004, participated actively in a series of common capacity development programs before becoming a member state, which included the creation and integration of national SOF (Special Operations, Estonian Defence Forces, 2014). In the beginning, the request from NATO was based solely on Allied operational needs, and the role of this force for national needs had to be defined by Estonian policymakers. However, in 2003, when the actual organization and idea started to develop on the unit level, there was still a significant knowledge gap at the highest military headquarters and in the Ministry of Defense.<sup>2</sup> The situation led to a series of problems and delays in development of this capability and to a possible waste of time and resources due to lack of strategic and operational guidance.

In 2003, only a few decision-makers understood the capabilities and uses of SOF as an asset. For others, ESTSOF looked dangerous, and they were not sure how to use it for Estonian defense or for other purposes. Many leaders thought in terms of a small team of operators being able to destroy large enemy forces.<sup>3</sup> Reading the 2007 draft of NATO's *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations* (AJP-3.5) did not give a comprehensive picture of such a unit's utilization, because it described SOF in terms of NATO's needs, which are mostly tactical roles and effects. There was no official reference for policymakers that could help them understand the strategic options for national use of special operations. That was a common problem of many countries and not just specific to Estonia (NATO's Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], 2008, p. 21).

Because of the "Hollywood image" of this type of force and the disgraceful ending of the Estonian Special Operations Group (SOG) in 1999, the midlevel decision makers felt that they needed to have firm control over every move of ESTSOF (Pöld, 1999; Oolo, 1999).<sup>4</sup> This diminished the initiative of the unit. However, SOF without an initiative is no longer SOF. Understanding of SOF theory was enhanced, thanks to involvement of NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) led by Admiral William McRaven in person in 2006. However, there is arguably still a lack of a true strategic guidance for development of the national SOF.

Current state-level development plans seem to envision an elite infantry unit being developed, but not much more than that. There is still no comprehensive political direction in accordance with the changing security situation in the world. Recently, the push was for a classic kinetic approach.<sup>5</sup> Now the unit seems to be shifting more to classic military assistance, and the first unit members have conducted missions in Afghanistan since summer 2012 (Ühtegi, 2013).

The National Defence Development Plan for 2013–2022 (n.d.) supports the idea that Estonian SOF will be restricted to operating within Estonia's borders in case of war against Estonia (see point 14). This seems like a self-induced restriction that should have no place in such a high-level document. Special operations need to produce strategic effects, and most likely the needed actions to achieve the effects in the favor of Estonia in case of war will not be conducted on Estonian soil.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Moore (2004) has expressed doubt that even U.S. SOF, however successful today, may not be adequately prepared for the new types of missions and challenges that they will encounter in the future (p. 171). There is a suggestion that new SOF entities, such as ESTSOF, should focus on new possible directions immediately upon organization, before they become entrapped in classical military culture. This is a most difficult thing to change later on (Hart, 1943, p. 115). Estonia is still at the beginning of the development of SOF capability, and this task should be approached comprehensively and innovatively from the start.

For a long time there was no direct representation of SOF in the general staff. The small entity was subordinated to the Military Intelligence Battalion. This created some difficulties in manning and budgeting. It is good to see the recent development wherein the commander of Special Operations has directly been subordinated to the chief of Defence Forces (Defence Forces Special Operations Forces Statute, 2013). The current commander, whom I have personally known for many years, is undoubtedly the best possible person for this position, having the necessary values, understanding, and experience.

However, it seems that a clear and bold doctrinal concept is still missing. The current public explanation for the purpose of the ESTSOF reads: "The primary objective of the Special Operations Force, in terms of Estonia's national defense, is the development of capabilities for unconventional warfare. In addition to that, the tasks of the unit include special reconnaissance, military assistance and direct action" (Special Operations, 2014). This definition is likely not enough, as this purpose does not really address the strategic needs of the state. Therefore, the following sections are provided as proposals of additional ways of thinking about and further developing not only ESTSOF but any small state SOF.

### Purpose and Proposed Ambitions

The purpose of ESTSOF is to conduct strategic operations in the interests of the Republic of Estonia and to contribute to the national strategic ambitions. Therefore, ESTSOF should aim to understand these goals and plan for upcoming missions utilizing the full range of options available.

The National Security Concept of Estonia (2010) defines the main threats to Estonia as follows:

1. The impact of distorted information that the development of information and communication technology and the media are facilitating
2. The amplification and rapid proliferation of local and regional crises and tensions over natural resources
3. Failed states that threaten regional and wider international security by allowing terrorist organizations and organized crime to gain a foothold in states with weak or nonexistent governments

4. Coordinated cyberattacks, the sources of which are difficult to identify, causing significant damage to society; abuse of cyberspace, including by terrorist groups and organized crime, growing
5. Military attacks against Estonia unlikely in the present and near future; nevertheless, one cannot exclude this possibility in the long term (pp. 5, 6).

The ambition of ESTSOF should be comprehensive and bold on identification of precise threats that are outside the reach of any other national capabilities. The SOF should plan and prepare a strategic offensive against the problems and challenges that endanger Estonia's security.

### Comprehensiveness

ESTSOF should have direct access to other national intelligence organizations and common training with police special units, as well as with selected units of Defense Forces and Kaitsepolitsei. The direct liaisons of the SOF should be present in the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Economic Affairs and Infrastructure, as well as in other significant state actors. This positioning would ensure rapid action in any scenario where the capabilities of the unit may be needed. Special operations planning takes time due to the risky nature of its tasks and goals, and direct links could shorten time for planning. ESTSOF liaisons need a permanent seat in a national strategic development group to provide advice on the capabilities and limitations of the unit when the strategic development group is considering initiation of an operation.

The operators of the unit should be rotated purposefully through other state intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, and also the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, for the purposes of better understanding other systems to facilitate the enhancement of cooperation. Along the same lines, the staff of partner organizations could serve in ESTSOF on a rotational basis. The rotation of operators should include service in Estonian embassies and other representative bodies, particularly in current or potential areas of interest. While serving there the operators could be useful in security matters. However, the primary role of operators should be gaining knowledge about countries of interest and identification of possible networks, influence areas, and themes in case the strategic development group decides to launch a strategic development operation.

ESTSOF should also maintain permanent contacts with NATO SOF headquarters and relevant institutions in the EU, as well as with allied SOF units. The units and the staff element should participate in common exercises to display the high quality and unique capabilities they possess, as well as study the approach to allies and find opportunities for cooperation.

The approach of ESTSOF in Strategic Development Operations should emphasize soft power<sup>6</sup> rather than military power—in other words, the tools and knowledge on social, economy, diplomatic, and informational fields. The operators, with necessary background, will need to attend respective civilian conferences, workshops, and so on, to learn and identify new ideas to be elaborated in areas of operations. In addition, those events are probably the best pools for building relationships and recruiting the supporting staff members for planned and ongoing missions.

### Organization

Solely militarily oriented special operations units cannot likely produce the effects desired that are mainly outside the military domain. Therefore, a combination of “shooters” and “assisters” must be developed. It is important that embedded assisters have the same basic operator skills that shooters possess. They must be physically and mentally fit, highly qualified, and trained in tandem with the shooters. Of course, these embedded assisters are not expected to take the lead in direct military action as forced entry, but they must be capable of performing competently in firefights. There should be no members in the unit who cannot protect themselves or their teammates (Brief of Amici Curiae, 2009, p. 25).

Shooters are to be trained according to classical SOF standards. They should be experts on reconnaissance and surveillance and direct action tactics, as well as mentoring other military forces on conventional and unconventional modes of operations (military assistance). They should be trained in depth in such specialty skills as communications, engineering, weapons, and medicine (Department of the Army, 2001, pp. 3–29, 3–30).

Assisters are the personnel who have specific civilian education and skills that are essential for applying soft power to the designated target system. Assisters should focus on vital civilian fields that would be the best leverage in prevention of crisis. These areas include but are not limited to information technology, energy industry, health care, local governance, political science, law, media, economics, and psychological operations. Extensive analysis is required to determine the exact civil expertise and its extent needed that would make the best contribution to prevention of conflict. In essence the assisters are the true operators in target areas who apply the nonkinetic means, usually via indirect lines of operational/strategic approach with careful calculation of possible effects. Their approach is mainly face-to-face with key leaders or their advisers.

The unit’s staff is to be composed like the operational teams by completely integrating sophisticated military and civilian knowledge to ensure the best understanding and planning for upcoming operations. The staff is to keep liaison with respective partners at their level, organize training and courses for whole unit, monitor the development of capabilities, and command and coordinate unit actions. The staff also acts as a link between higher staff and the strategic development group while advising and reporting on actions the units take. The staff personnel should comprise former operators who have extensive experience that makes them most suitable in their positions. The staff structure could be set by following the new NATO operational staff layout that comprises three main divisions: knowledge development, operations, and resources (Comprehensive Operational, 2010, pp. 4–5, 4–7).

The Knowledge Development Division should maintain a constant overview of the situation in areas of interest, collecting information from all sources and cooperating with partners in that matter. In addition, the division is the primary hub of directing the needs for training, education, and developments for the future.

The Operations Division’s primary function is to lead planning of operations and provide constant monitoring and assessment of ongoing missions. This division is to offer immediate support for action teams in terms of finding and providing the necessary highly sophisticated subject matter expertise to the action units in the field, and so on.

The Resources Division will cover all personnel, logistics, and financial issues. This division should seek recruits, build operators development and plan careers. In logistics, they organize transportation, supplies, infrastructure, and necessary finances for all ESTSOF needs.

Flexibility to form a planning group, which will consist of necessary experts from all divisions, should be ensured at any given time.

The Command Group could comprise of Commander and Chief of Staff who are the most experienced officers to ensure the best understanding and quality of decisions (NSCC, 2008, p. B1). The command system is described in the last section.

### Operational Domains

By taking into account the current and possible future security environment and analyzing it together with local environment and conditions, ESTSOF should be able to operate in two major directions: *national needs* and *NATO/EU/Allied operations*. There are possible conflicts involving purposes, tasks, and equipment that need to be solved. Again, this is difficult as long as Estonia has not defined the long-term national needs and ambitions for fulfilling its constitutional purpose. In the broad sense there are three different domains for ESTSOF to operate in to counter national threats: (1) *international support*; (2) *peacetime support to the homeland*; and (3) *wartime operations to defend the homeland*.

International support comprises NATO Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations with the aim of supporting the common goals of a coalition. These operations can be conducted in bilateral, NATO, EU, or UN frameworks, and outside Estonia. The emphasis may be on SOF military tasks as described in NATO SOF doctrine, or on methods of conducting strategic development. For Estonia, as for any other small state, it is important to employ the strategic development type operations as these are likely to contribute more to the state's strategic aims and also to facilitate national economics and raise the participating nation's profile in the international community. Purely preemptive operations, without a declared crisis but warning signs of one forthcoming, are the most beneficial for this operational line. In this situation, the physical threat is not as high and the mix of ESTSOF and real civilian experts can contribute the best for strategic aims.

Peacetime support to the homeland is an operations set that will carry a solely national purpose. These operations can be conducted inside the country as support to law enforcement in case of emergency, or abroad to fulfill the variety of tasks with strategic importance to the state. The operations outside Estonia can include strategic development operations to pursue national interests in a variety of areas. This can include prevention of conflicts that might influence Estonia directly such as planned terror attacks prepared outside of Estonian borders. Those operations can also include certain operations in a third country at the request of an ally whose vital interests are in danger but who does not possess the access or capability to act. Other types of operations in this set can be the national requirement to protect and save national citizens in the case of an emergency in another country. The noncombatant recovery and rescue of own nationals and, upon request, allies from manmade or natural emergencies, as well hostage rescue operations from conflict zones are to be in this operations set.

Wartime operations to defend the homeland commence once the direct military threat toward Estonia is identified and confirmed. As for conventional military units it begins with the declaration of mobilization by the president of Estonia (Estonian Wartime Law, 1994). ESTSOF should be close to their respective targets on the enemy's territory as early as possible.

Here, the main tasks should be the direct interdiction of the opponent's high-level command and communications, disruption of strategic and operational transport networks and weaponry that will cause friction in the enemy's systems, and create favorable strategic conditions for Estonia to receive reinforcements by allies. Where appropriate and according to the rules of war, disruption of civil infrastructure that supports the enemy's forces should not be ruled out.

However, the true art is to combine the men, training, weapons, equipment, and, most important, to create the long-term development plan to perform in these operational domains. That is not to be done in isolation of the strategic picture, nor without having all necessary subject-matter experts developing sophisticated concepts. It is crucial to understand that ESTSOF are not a given capability by themselves, but their capabilities will be created only according to national needs.

One of the national needs is to support allies with ESTSOF in operations that can be very tactical in nature. Estonia needs to clearly define the national goals and end states to maximize the strategic effects of this small entity in international arena despite the possible tactical tasks and purposes of deployment. The goals, in the long run, should focus on raising the national flag higher and higher by creating reliance within the coalition to entrust Estonia to take the lead in certain operations.

#### Missions and Essential Tasks

Following are the main missions to be defined for ESTSOF that support the national ambitions and are also in line with today's NATO SOF doctrinal missions (AJP 3.5, 2009, pp. 2-1-2-3):

1. *Civil and military assistance* (CMA) is the main effort of strategic development operations. Here the operators will build relationships with key leaders to advise and assist them to produce the desired effects that have been planned according to a development strategy in the full spectrum of political, economic, military, social, informational, and infrastructural aspects (PEMSII). Human handling and influencing skills, as well mastery in psychological and information operations, are the most important requirements to succeed in this task. In addition, the availability of proper finances and materiel resources in control of operators must be guaranteed, be that weapons to arm regular or irregular forces or generators and Internet routers to district. In addition, no matter to what level the operation is agreed upon among alliances, using the contribution of Estonian industries and private companies is a must, as it creates outputs for the Estonian economy. National strategic aims include these operations contributing to the state budget, so it is important to make the best use of opportunities to develop national industry whenever possible.
2. *Strategic and operational reconnaissance* (SOR) is to be conducted prior to, during, and after every operation that ESTSOF is tasked with. This is focused on eyes-on and operators' presence in the area of operation and can be conducted using a variety of methods. The operators should be prepared to perform different types of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, such as covert observation; pursuit; human intelligence (HUMINT); electronic intelligence (ELINT); imagery intelligence (IMINT); local open sources analysis (OSINT); sensitive site exploitation (SSE); environmental assessments; chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) materiel detection, and so on. The

essence is to collect data that cannot be obtained from a distance and contribute to a comprehensive assessment of the target area, including the full spectrum of PEMSII.

3. *Cyber network operations* (CNO) are aimed at accessing and operating an adversary's closed networks. This is to be done when access from a distance is not possible, but monitoring or interdiction has strategic value. Here the operator needs to possess advanced hacking skills and knowledge of network infrastructures. These types of operations may be conducted to disrupt the adversary's decision cycle or take control over the strategic weapon systems. As more and more systems relay on cyber networks, any vulnerabilities that can be discovered become more critical. The operators, with a mastery of these operations and able to survive in proximity of proper access point, could potentially disrupt the whole war.
4. *Direct action* (DA) missions are to be conducted in support of assistance operations and cyber network operations, or to disrupt strategically or operationally important adversary means. Usually direct action is limited in duration and scope and is aimed at an actor posing a vital threat. Direct action missions can be carried out by conducting ambushes, raids, sniping, emplacing and detonating explosives, and so on—activities that require close range proximity of the operator. From a safer distance most deniable methods include the use of terminal guidance munitions and proxy forces to undertake destruction events.
5. *Personnel and materiel recovery* (PMR) is often similar to raids in the direct action category. However, the risk of injuring or killing the personnel under rescue may often be higher. Another reason to put this in a separate category is the frequent lack of planning and preparation time. This mission type puts the operation at greater risk than does any other deliberately planned operation. In a third country, where the rescue is usually needed, supporting networks are often nonexistent. These are emergency tasks, and there are no other suitable units to conduct the mission. Such missions could be Estonian citizens trapped in a natural disaster or conflict zone, taken hostage, or crash landed outside the reach of normal search-and-rescue units; these tasks are likely to be handed to ESTSOF.

The missions and tasks listed here are not exhaustive. As analyses develop and new threats emerge, modification is definitely needed. For all these and upcoming missions ESTSOF must maintain the initiative and flexibility to adjust to whatever strategic effect is required. There should be no limitations other than legal and national strategic constraints.

#### Main Principles, Methods, Support, and Limitations

To create a force that can operate in the fields described, a few principles should be applied. The main focus should be on a nonkinetic approach in accordance with scientific developments in the civilian education and research sector that are prioritized in a respective national strategy. In Estonia these are currently defined Information and Communication Technology (ICT); health technologies and services; and more effective use of resources (Estonian RDI Strategy, 2014–2020, 2014, p. 12). The same approach and focus could be enforced in future strategic operations of the nation. The principle here is to amplify national strength via a comprehensive approach.

This focus could have a twofold effect: It would add the necessary uniqueness and influence to ESTSOF and create an output for Estonian scientists and businesses. On the strategic level it will

strengthen the country's position in the international arena. Smart application of this integrated capability will add to Estonia's protection against new threats and old types of threats that still exist.

Strategic development operations, while assisting forces, interact with vital actors in a low-visibility mode; the shooters operate as a "shadow force" to provide security for the assistance group and to produce kinetic effects as needed. However, they are required to be able to help the assistants as well, having basic knowledge of a particular topic. Such education helps to keep the force small to avoid unnecessary attention, while at the same time maximizing the number of subject-matter experts deployed. Flexibility is a keyword when organizing the unit for a specific mission. The best ratio of shooters to assistants and their optimal qualifications must be determined during the planning phase.

Sophisticated intelligence collection and analysis systems are a must. While ESTSOF should use its own intelligence analysts in the first instance, cooperation with all other national and allied systems is also needed. ESTSOF should have its own situation center to monitor and predict the situations that may require the involvement of ESTSOF all around the world. Parallel planning for time-sensitive operations must be conducted continuously to shorten preparation time for possible actions.

Freedom of action and mission orders approach must be endorsed within the force, allowing and encouraging initiative and thinking outside the box. This means training and educating people how to think, not just what to think (Schoemaker, 2004, p. 167). It might be difficult to achieve in a situation where control is so strict that it can restrict the creative achievement of assigned missions. That is something to be left up to the ESTSOF commander, higher command, and the political leadership to determine on a case-by-case basis. No classical rules or procedures should be enforced only because they are standard practice within the Estonian Defence Forces, with the exception of the agreed-upon legal framework.

Language proficiency and cultural awareness of the area of operations are rudimentary to most operational teams. Therefore, identification and study of the possible areas of operations should start as early as possible. As mastering language takes much effort and time, the languages of interest should be divided reasonably among the operators.

Planning capability and assessment of developments must be possessed at the lowest levels that will allow the operational teams to adapt rapidly to the changing conditions and make sound strategic decisions on the spot when needed.

In addition to previously mentioned support and comprehensive cooperation, it is advisable to have agreements with national privately owned aviation companies for emergency strategic airlift possibilities. These agreements are necessary in case of emergency personnel or materiel recovery.

Last but not least, all of the previously described SOF mission assessment criteria and classical SOF truths (see concepts in Toomse, 2012, pp. 126–134) should be followed.

#### Development and Sustainment

Constant development of knowledge, education, training, and equipment is key for a successful force to be ahead of threats and in readiness to act properly at any given task. The ability to adapt quickly to rapidly changing conditions and environments should become a norm (NSCC, 2008, p. 21).

Education at the highest level is the key to success (Grice, 2009). Thereby, the operators should complete a variety of civilian courses to gain knowledge on topics that have to be used in operations. Extensive cooperation with national science and education institutions should be agreed upon among proper authorities to ensure their cooperation with minimum bureaucracy.

The procurement system for ESTSOF will likely be different from the common and standardized approach within the defense forces. The allocation of funds to procure and modify equipment and weapons should be granted. It will be the responsibility of SOF to understand their needs, while always keeping in mind that the purpose of technology is to equip the man, not man the equipment (Schoemaker, 2004, p. 167).

As the operators are the most vital asset, a sophisticated and long-term career system must be built for every operator. An internal career system should provide the shooters an option to move to the assistants' league when proven sufficiently mature and willing to acquire an optimal educational background. The force should develop the next generation of staff members, the commander, and also the permanent advisors and decision makers for higher echelons.

The size of the force is to be decided based on strategic analyses according to national strategic goals. The pool of resources (human, finances, etc.) sets the limits. The most important principle to keep in mind is the need to create and sustain an adequate motivation system for people to avoid the loss of high-cost investments.

#### Support Requirements

A comprehensive national support system to the force must be created via analysis. Some components are needed to be organic to the unit and some can be outsourced. As mentioned, the links to national and allied intelligence organizations should constantly provide the most updated data to the force (NSCC, 2008, pp. A6, A7).

To enable units to conduct the most effective operations, strategic communication and reach-back systems to the supporting staff in the homeland need to be established. This may require satellite communications over encrypted networks with data transmission capabilities. Advice and more sophisticated subject-matter expertise guidance should be constantly available to the operational team in action. Financial resources and appropriate equipment should be available in accordance with the plan in assessed quantities. Here the use of national equipment and technologies should be prioritized. Logistics and administration in the homeland can be shared with a larger unit to minimize nonoperational issues. The oversight and guidance of these matters remain under the control of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the unit where the qualified experts should also be located (NSCC, 2008, pp. A8, A9).

With national and partners' support, the need for a professional and open-minded analysis is required for long-term plans as well as for emergency tasks. The requirements are to be tested via war games to determine the best organizational layouts in support of the missions to ensure the best applicability in variety of operations. There are no ready answers or set rules. It all depends on the mission and resources available.

### Command and Control

To be able to act quickly in required tasks, as well to lose as little information and time as possible due to communications, SOCOM was created under Defence Forces general staff (Defence Forces Statute, 2008). However, the command line must be dual: Special operations sits beside the other components (Land, Air, and Maritime) in general staff, but straight communication to highest political level is also an absolute necessity (NSCC, 2008, p. B1).

If a national strategic development group is created, then the unit's liaison must be presented accordingly. If the group is not in force, the respective strategic operations adviser/liaison should be embedded in the Ministry of Defence. Eventually, it is the political level that decides the use of ESTSOF, taking into consideration all political risks and effects. Military leadership chiefly acts in a supporting role and is responsible for providing assets and facilities needed for SOF sustainment and development.

ESTSOF does not belong to the usual military culture, because more extensive freedom of action is needed that allows SOF to focus on mission accomplishment with the most strategic impact. Of course, higher military commanders would still be in command, ensuring that a proper path to and correct and legal use of force is followed. This responsibility and its extent must be clearly defined to ensure the minimum loss of desired effectiveness to strategic demands.

SOCOM responsibility is to exercise direct command and control over ESTSOF and to coordinate, oversee, and integrate various powers; advise and inform higher military and political leadership on the proper use of ESTSOF; and establish a resourcing strategy that links together policy, doctrine, organization, training, education, partnering, and procurement to execute operations effectively in the field (NSCC, 2008, p. 20). Naturally, those in SOCOM should also have extensive knowledge of and experience in the strategic operations field.

### CONCLUSIONS

To be effective in strategic development operations, Western nations need to combine and integrate civilian and military entities, adjust the cultures and policies of those organizations to develop common understanding, planning, operational philosophy, and procedures. It is essential that Western societies as a whole act in third-world countries for a common goal: to prevent negative interference in their own societies. It does not mean necessarily exporting democratic values if this approach is not likely to fulfill that goal. A feasible end state and the strategies to meet the end are needed at all levels, from single nations up to NATO and the EU. There is a role and place for all the members in this approach to secure an acceptable future for Western nations.

This is not the responsibility of major powers alone. Under this approach small states may have more flexibility in different fields where they are the strong, such as information technology, economics, and local governance. These should be utilized, taking account of the capabilities and advantages of these nations. Alliances (e.g., EU and NATO in cooperation) should be platforms for planning, coordinating, and connecting all members' respective capabilities for that one purpose: to diminish future threats to Western societies by using a full range of assets (diplomatic, informational, military, social, and economic) in concert, while keeping Western values in mind.

For small states, strategic development operations are the best possibility to improve their position and increase their influence on the international arena. They likely have greater flexibility to change their systems quickly, as well as reorient and come to compromises among themselves more quickly than larger nations can. And speed is vital to be able not just to react to but be ahead of negative actions. In addition, small states can also benefit from this approach by creating business opportunities for national industry and technology that would facilitate economic growth in the nation.

Estonia, for instance, could seriously assess the development options in informational-technological fields and foster the penetration of the Internet in third-world countries, while at the same time detecting and interrupting an adversary's cyber information operations. This approach would contribute to Western campaign plans by bringing desired images and values into the homes and minds of local people without creating the friction that follows a presentation of overwhelming armed force. Physically, it could be established, in cooperation with the Estonian-based Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, to develop an Estonian Special Operations Forces entity that is still lacking a true strategic purpose. It could be directed to focus on the preemptive strategic development operations approach with the aim of contributing to national strategic ends and not just await activation for military operations. A full range of open-minded options should be discussed at the highest levels and an action plan put together to implement the best possible approaches by maximizing the advantages of the whole nation and alliances.

Estonia has a unique advantage in the situation by not yet having SOF traditions or a strong community that would be difficult to change. Traditional systems in place could make such a transformation a slower and more arduous process. However, this article does not mean to suggest that ESTSOF should dismiss the classical approach of special operations. The key is to find the best balance of traditional SOF tasks and contemporary or even future duties. Such revision may require a change in current traditional military culture, organization, and even command system. This concept and the main principles for implementing it have been proposed in this study.

Sometimes less is more. Preemptive strategic development operations conducted by smart and capable special operations forces could be the best option for a small state that wants to do something really useful while not exhausting its limited resources. One could look at it as a new approach to warfare that differs from previous incarnations in many of its features. This approach would exert not as much physical as social influence. The aim would be to prevent physical warfare in the first place and thereby contribute to the future of Western security in a more effective manner. For small states, it carries the opportunity to improve their position and acquire more respect and acknowledgment in the international arena that could improve economic conditions and thereby survivability options for a nation. Every nation is as strong it wants to be.

## NOTES

1. The mission of the CCDCOE: "Our mission is to enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned and consultation." See <https://ccdcocoe.org/our-work.html>.
2. In 2003, when I was appointed the commander of ESTSOF, I started choosing soldiers for the unit and educating us all on the essence of special operations. It took several years to understand what we were really dealing with. In that sense there can be no blame: How could they know about this one issue while having hundreds of other problems to solve at the same time?

3. That is the author's perception acquired from countless meetings and briefings with higher officials throughout 2003–2008.
4. Estonia's SOG was established in 1995 initially under the counterintelligence section of the Estonian Defence League. The main tasks of the group were Defence League and Defence Forces training in reconnaissance and diversion, as well participation on international special operations competitions. More practical tasks later were to conduct close protection to visiting high-ranking officials. On May 15, 1999, one of SOG's members attempted an armed robbery using his duty weapon. After investigation, the commission under the Ministry of Defence suggested to disband the unit mainly due lack of clear tasks assigned to it. Later comments say that the unit was left on their own with a lack of guidance and funding.
5. The ESTSOF development program is a classified document and exists in Estonian Defence Forces headquarters. The author read it in 2009, and this statement is his personal opinion.
6. According to Oxford Dictionaries, 'Soft power is understood as a persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence'. Retrieved from [http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m\\_en\\_gb0990350#m\\_en\\_gb0990350](http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0990350#m_en_gb0990350)

## REFERENCES

- Brief of Amici Curiae Special Forces Association, U.S. Army Ranger Association, etc. (2009). *In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in support of Appellants*. Retrieved from [michaelyon-online.com, http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh\\_%20amicus\\_as\\_filed.pdf](http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh_%20amicus_as_filed.pdf)
- Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (working version). (2010, November). NATO.
- Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. (1992). *Gateway to Estonia*. Retrieved from <http://www.eesti.ee/eng/riik/pohiseadus/>
- Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. (2015). <http://www.ccdcoe.org/>.
- Cyber Security Strategy Committee. (2008). Cyber security strategy [*Eesti küberjulgeoleku strateegia*]. Retrieved from [http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/Kuberjulgeoleku\\_strateegia\\_2008-2013\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/Kuberjulgeoleku_strateegia_2008-2013_ENG.pdf)
- Defence Forces Special Operations Forces statute [Kaitseväe erioperatsioonide põhimäärus]. (2013). *Riigi Teataja*. RT I, 24.05. 2013, 10. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/124052013010>
- Defence Forces statute [Kaitseväe põhimäärus]. (2008). *Riigi Teataja*. RT I 2008, 50, 279. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/127122012006>
- Department of the Army. (2001, June). *FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations (FM 3-05.20)*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
- e-Estonia. (2015). Retrieved from <http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/economy-a-it/e-estonia.html>
- Estonian Defence Forces. (2015). Estonian Defence Forces. Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces>
- Estonian Defence League. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/edl>
- Estonian Defence League's Cyber Unit. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/cyber-unit>
- Estonian Development Fund. (2009, February). *Eesti Infotehnoloogia tulevikuvaated* [Prospects of Estonian info-technology]. Retrieved from [http://www.arendufond.ee/upload/Editor/EST\\_IT/Eesti\\_Infotehnoloogia\\_tulevikuvaa\\_ted\\_Marek\\_Tiits\\_&\\_Kristjan\\_Rebane.pdf](http://www.arendufond.ee/upload/Editor/EST_IT/Eesti_Infotehnoloogia_tulevikuvaa_ted_Marek_Tiits_&_Kristjan_Rebane.pdf)
- Estonian Ministry of Defence. (2015). Estonia participates in international peace securing operations, depending the security interests of Estonia. Retrieved from <http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/international-operations>
- Estonian Research and Development and Innovation Strategy 2014-2020 "Knowledge-based Estonia." (2014). Retrieved from [https://www.hm.ee/sites/default/files/estonian\\_rdi\\_strategy\\_2014-2020\\_en.doc](https://www.hm.ee/sites/default/files/estonian_rdi_strategy_2014-2020_en.doc)
- Estonian Wartime Law [Sõjaaja riigikaitse seadus]. (1994). *Riigi Teataja*. RT I 1994, pp. 69, 1194. Retrieved from <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13001744>
- Grice, Michael D. (2009, December 12). Where is our Kilcullen? *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from <http://smallwars-journal.com/blog/where-is-our-kilcullen>
- Hart, Basil H. Liddell. (1943). *Thoughts on war*. London, UK: Faber and Faber.
- Hey, Jeanne A.K. (Ed.). (2003). *Small states in world politics: Explaining foreign policy behavior*. London, UK: Lynne Rienner.
- Landler, Mark. (2005), December 13. Hot technology for chilly streets in Estonia. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/13/technology/13skype.html?scp=1&sq=estonia%202005&st=cse>

- Moore, Scott. (2004). "Special operations forces: Visioning for the future." In Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, & David Last (Eds.), *Force of choice: Perspectives on special operations* (pp. 169–198). Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- National Defence Development Plan for 2013–2022. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/arengukavad/kaitseministeerium/Riigikaitse\\_arengukava\\_2013-2022\\_avalik%20osa.pdf](http://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/arengukavad/kaitseministeerium/Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022_avalik%20osa.pdf).
- National Defence Strategy: Estonia. (2010). Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM\\_riigikaitse\\_strateegia\\_eng\(2\).pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng(2).pdf)
- National Security Concept of Estonia. (2010). Retrieved from [http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National\\_Security\\_Concept\\_of\\_Estonia.pdf](http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf)
- NATO's Special Operations Coordination Center. (2008). *The NATO Special Operations Forces Study*. Retrieved from <http://everyoneweb.com/WA/DataFileskorps-mariners-forum/nsec.pdf>
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2009). *Allied joint doctrine for special operations* (AJP-3.5).
- Oolo, Anti. (1999, May 19). Eriüksusel lasti tegutseda omapäi [Special Forces was left on their own]. *Eesti Päevaleht*. Retrieved from <http://epl.delfi.ee/news/est/eriüksusel-lasti-tegutseda-omapai?id=50772557>
- Pöld, Andres. (1999, June 9). SOG-i hukutasid rikkumised [SOG was seduced by violations]. *Eesti Päevaleht*. Retrieved from <http://epl.delfi.ee/news/est/sog-i-hukutasid-rikkumised?id=50773502>
- Raus, Laura. (2010, January 26). Eesti ettevõtjad lähevad Iraaki [Estonian enterprisers going to Iraq]. *Postimees*. Retrieved from <http://majandus24.postimees.ee/216695/eesti-ettevotjad-lahevad-iraaki>
- Schoomaker, Peter J. (2004). Special operation forces: The way ahead. In Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, & David Last (Eds.), *Force of choice: Perspectives on special operations* (pp. 161–168). Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Special Operations, Estonian Defence Forces. (2014). Retrieved from <http://www.mil.ee/en/defence-forces/special-operations>
- Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. (2009, April). *Multiple futures project: Navigating towards 2030: Final report*. Retrieved from [http://www.iris-france.org/docs/pdf/up\\_docs\\_bdd/20090511-112315.pdf](http://www.iris-france.org/docs/pdf/up_docs_bdd/20090511-112315.pdf)
- Toomse, Rene. (2012). The concept and framework of pre-emptive strategic development operations. *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, 14(2), 102–146. Retrieved from [http://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/BSDR/BSDR\\_14\\_2.pdf](http://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/BSDR/BSDR_14_2.pdf)
- Ühtegi, Riho. (2013, February 21). Eriväelane = sõdur + diplomaat [Special operative = soldier + diplomat]. *Riigikaitse.ee*. Retrieved from <http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/02/21/erivaelane-sodur-diplomaat/>

II

**Toomse, Rene** (2014). Kaitseväge uus juhtimisstruktuur ja selle jätkusuutlikkus. [The New Command Structure of the Estonian Defence Forces and its Resilience]. *ENDC Proceedings* 19/2014. Tartu: KVÜÕA, pp. 183–219.

## **The New Command Structure of the Estonian Defence Forces and its Resilience**

(ENDC Proceedings 19/2014. Tartu: KVÜÕA, pp. 183–219)

Rene Toomse

### **Summary in English**

In the beginning of 2013, the Estonian government endorsed the new National Defence Development Plan for 2013–2022. It was publicly praised by the Ministry of Defence and by the President, but has fallen under criticism by the former Commander of the Defence Forces and the former Head of the Headquarters' Planning Section. The clash is not only about minor details, but rather concerns some principal changes that the new plan endorses. The critics have pointed out that the new plan is so defective that implementing it would endanger the security of the State. The main fault lies in the change of the command structure of the Defence Forces as stipulated by the Plan that would arguably collapse the command system that has worked relevantly well for last 14 years. The replacement is not likely to work at all and that would leave the command system vulnerable and perhaps even non-existent in the event of war.

The Plan will abolish the Defence Districts that are meant to conduct operational planning and provide leadership at the regional levels. Consequently, responsibility for territorial defence would be handed over to the mostly volunteer based Defence League in its entirety. Land Forces would retain just two infantry brigades, which would be focused on only two possible avenues of approach by hostile forces in case of war while leaving all other areas weakly defended. The main drawbacks, as professed by several high ranking retired officers, are that the command chain will be more centralized rendering it unable to respond quickly enough, and that the weakly supported Defence League cannot fulfil the new responsibility due to a lack of professional officers and assets.

The dispute and allegations are serious but there has been no convincing response or justification from the other side. These publicly declared criticisms have largely been ignored. The only sources from which to discern some explanations are the interviews with the present leading officers such as the former Commander of Land Forces and the Commander of the Defence League. The new plan is somehow described, but it is not explained how it will lead to a better outcome than the old system. Rather, the descriptions reveal that the planned change has not really been thought through.

This article will, therefore look into the dispute by utilizing recognized and relevant principles of warfare and a few historical case studies that will create the theoretical framework. After presenting the statements regarding the old command structure and then presenting the counterarguments of the critics, the arguments of both sides will be analyzed in order to find evidence as to whether these serious allegations have substance. In the end the conclusions will summarize the findings, which in fact reveal that there is a possible disconnect between the reform plans in the short term, and the necessities of the future. The findings come to conclusions that indeed the current situation could pose a serious threat to the national security due to the absence of an operational level command system the result of which will likely weaken the whole readiness of the defence system for years to come.

The findings also reveal that, contrary to the critics' assertions, the Defence League could actually be more suitable for the regional operational command. However, this would only be feasible if it were adequately supplied with people, funds and enhanced fighting capabilities. The new land defence regional commands should be permanently operable and not just activated during times of crisis. Also, they need to plan and train with all the forces in their area of operations consistently during peacetime in order to achieve the best preparedness for

war. Finally, the regional commands need to have the proper funding and authority to allow them to operate with independency to achieve the needed operational freedom and tempo.

Also the abolishment of the Land Forces Staff is not likely to become a major weakness of the command structure. However, a reasonable restructuring within the Headquarters needs to be done, and a chief of territorial defence needs to be appointed. The vacancy could be filled by the Deputy Commander of the Defence Forces who could focus on land operations while the Commander of the Defence Forces would provide him with other necessary elements.

The study argues that the Commander of the Defence Forces alone should not lead the land battles but he should rather focus on planning and coordinating the bigger picture. Finally, he also needs to provide a suitable buffer between the political level and the commander who leads the battles. The final point is equally important for successful outcomes in combat and for maintaining the strategic focus, as history has proven many times in past wars of many other countries.

# KAITSEVÄE UUS JUHTIMISSTRUKTUUR JA SELLE JÄTKUSUUTLIKKUS

*Rene Toomse*



## Sissejuhatus

2013. aasta alguses võttis Vabariigi Valitsus vastu uue riigikaitse arengukava. Kava on saanud kiita Vabariigi Presidendilt, kaitseministrilt, aga ka näiteks USA Euroopa vägede ülemalt ja Soome kaitseväge juhatajalt. Samas teevad sellele tõsisel etteheited eelmine Kaitseväge juhataja kindral Ants Laaneots ning eriti jõuliselt endine Kaitseväge peastaabi operatiiv- ja väljaõppeosakonna ülem kolonelleitnant Leo Kunnas.

Tegemist on üsna terava vaidlusega. Vaatamata sellele, et meedias ei tekita viimane erilist tähelepanu, tundub endiste kõrgema juhtimistasandi ohvitseride jaoks küsimus vägagi põhimõtteline. Üheks tõsisemaks vaidlusteemaks on kaitseringkondade kui struktuuriüksuste kaotamine. Arengukava nimetab nende kaotamise põhjustena vajadust vähendada bürokraatiat, lihtsustada juhtimissüsteemi ja hoida kokku vahendeid. Kritiseerijad väidavad, et tegemist oli toimiva ja võimalikest parima juhtimismudeli hävitamisega, mille tagajärjel tekib riigikaitseüsteemi oluline lünk.

Eelnenu põhjal tekib mitu olulist küsimust, millele järgnev artikkel vastust otsib. Kas arengukava reformiga loodud uus juhtimismudel muudab Eestit sõjaliselt tugevamaks või haavatavamaks? Kas Eesti riigikaitstes toimub ikka liikumine võimalikult detsentraliseeritud manööversõjapidamise idee suunas või pigem tagasi tsentraliseeritud stiili ja kurnamissõja meetodite poole? Ukrainas asetleidvate sündmuste taustal muutub eriti oluliseks ka küsimus, kas Eestil on uue juhtimismudeli käivitamiseks ikka piisavalt aega. Ehk teisisõnu: ega üleminekuperioodiga teki siiski ohtlikku lünka kaitsevõimes?

Kuna tulevikus võib-olla toimuvaid sündmusi ei saa faktiliselt tõestada, siis jäävad eelnenu küsimused paljuski retooriliseks, kuid arutelu riigikaitseliste probleemkohtade üle tuleb nendega ometi arvestada.

Artikli eesmärk ongi vaadelda vanas ja uues arengukavas esitatavate juhtimismudelite erinevusi ning hinnata, kas uue arengukavaga on võimalik saavutada paremaid tulemusi.

Järgnevas tuleb arvestada kahe olulise piiranguga. Esiteks põhineb artikkel rangelt vaid avalikel allikatel. Teiseks: keskendutakse kaitsevälisele juhtimissüsteemile, kuna see on sõjaedu seisukohalt määravaim faktor.

Täismahus arengukava on riigisaladus, millele autoril ligipääs puudub. Seetõttu on kõik alljärgnevad seisukohad tuletatud avaldatud dokumentide, artiklite ja intervjuude pinnalt. Kahtlemata on paljugi avalikkusele teadmata ja alati on teoreetiline võimalus, et tekstis tõstatatud küsimustele on avaldamata materjalides vastused olemas. Seetõttu on järgnevad kahtlused tõusnud just selle pinnalt, kuidas salastatud kavale ligipääsu mitteomav kaitsevälane, reservvälane, kaitseliitlane ja iga mis tahes teine kodanik võib aru saada arengukava avalikust osast ning seda puudutavatest arvamusalaldustest. Strateegia, juhtimismudeli ja alluvusvahetuste täpne tundmine on kindlasti oluline, sest kriisi korral võib liigselt salastatud plaan, eriti põhimõteteliste küsimustes, osutada kasutuks. Viimasel hetkel avaldatavad juhtnõõrid ei pruugi esiteks anda täitjale piisavalt aega adekvaatselt reageerida. Pealegi nõuab enamik kontseptsioone intensiivseid koostööharjutusi erinevate üksuste ja organisatsioonide vahel. Ka neid ei pruugi jõuda kriisisituatsioonis korraldada ja see võib omakorda tähendada ohtu plaani teokssaamisele.

Lisaks tuleb arvestada veel kahe asjaoluga. Kõigepealt: rahu- ja sõjaajal peab järgitama sama juhtimismudelit. Muistsetele spartalastele omistatud filosoofia – treeni nii, nagu võitle! – kehtib ka tänapäeval. Juhul kui kriisisituatsioonis rakenduv tegutsemismudel erineb oluliselt rahuaegsest, ei saa eeldada, et see vajadusel piisavalt kiiresti toimima hakkaks. Seetõttu ei saa rahuaegne juhtimismudel ja -printsüübid erineda olulisel määral sõjaaegsetest. Teiseks leian, et juhtimismudeli väljatöötamisel tuleb alati arvestada võimalikest halvima stsenaariumiga. Kirjeldatud kontekstis tähendab see ka olukorda, kus piisav hulk liitlasvägesid ei saa mingil põhjusel Eestile appi tulla. Seega peab juhtimissüsteem ja Kaitseväge ning Kaitseliit arenema *püsiva* – mitte vaid esmase – iseseisva kaitsevõime loomise suunas.

Keskendumine juhtimissüsteemile ja selle rakendamisele tuleneb asjaolust, et vähemalt siinkirjutaja arvates on tegu sõjapidamises kõige olulisema komponendiga. Ilma strateegilise eesmärgipüstituse ja plaanita ei saa ka edukalt sõda pidada. Selgete juhiste ja juhtimissüsteemi puudumine sõjas tähendab kaost ning anarhiat, mis muudab kõik muu (võitlejate hulk, varustus, tehnika, taristu, logistika jne) ebaoluliseks, kuna puudub neid siduv ja mõtestatult suunav element. Juhtimissüsteem on kui skelett, millele toetub kõik muu.

Kõne all olev teema on kahtlemata aktuaalne. Venemaa on taas näidanud, sedakorda Ukrainas, et ei hooli naaberriikide sõltumatusest. President Putini

hiljutine kõne avaldas selgelt tema eesmärgi saada tagasi endised Venemaa alad<sup>1</sup>. Väljaõeldu annab alust arvata, et oma endiseks alaks peab Venemaa ka Eestit. Olukorras, kus julgeolekusituatsioon on tõenäoliselt muutunud kiiremini, kui kaitseplaneerijad arengukava luues ette nägid, tekib küsimus, kas ei peaks kava veelkord üle vaatama ja küsima, ega planeeritud ajaraam ning muudatustest tekkivad kasvõi ajutisedki lüngad ei või seada ohtu kogu riigi julgeolekut.

Laskumata siinjuures pikemasse arutellu selle üle, kuivõrd tõenäoline on Venemaa võimalik sõjaline tegevus Eesti vastu, tuleb tõdeda, et igal riigil on oma rahva ees kohustus end sõjaliselt kaitsta kõigi olemasolevate võimete ja vahenditega ning võimalikult tõhusalt. Valmisoleku saavutamisel tuleb arvestada kahte aspekti. Esiteks tuleb säilitada juba saavutatud taset (vältida ümberkorralduste tõttu tekkida võivat võimelünka) ning jälgida, et planeeritud ja eraldatud vahendeid kasutataks parimal võimalikul moel (senises juhtimismudelil ilmnenud võimelünga likvideerimine).

Peab tunnistama, et ka tegevvälaliste seas esineb nii eelmise kui ka uue arengukava suhtes mitmeid vastakaid arvamusi. Peamine etteheide eelmisele kavale oli ilmselge raha ja inimeste nappus niivõrd suurte plaanide realiseerimiseks. Uus arengukava ei paku oma avalikus osas selget kontseptsiooni, kuidas toimib juhtimine ja kuidas täpselt jaotuvad üksuste ülesanded (kes on toetatav, kes toetav). Seega on võimalik, et tekib – või on juba tekkinud – teatav peataolek ehk võimelünk: vana juhtimissüsteemi enam ei eksisteeri ja uus ei ole veel kanda kinnitanud.

Siinkohal tasub lahutada hetkeks teooria ja teostus ning hinnata, kas uue arengukavaga tehtud juhtimismudeli muudatus suudab kriisiolukorras pakkuda paremat lahendust. Kasutades juhtimissüsteemi kujutamisel taas skeleti analoogiat, võib olemasolevaid ja loodavaid võimeid ning üksuseid võrrelda kasvatatavate lihastega, mille suurus (pataljonide arv) ei sõltu niivõrd skeleti kujust (juhtimismudeli ülesehitusest), kui selle võimest ühendada erinevad lihasgrupid eesmärgistatud ja parimaks võimalikuks koostöök.

Samas ei saa juhtimismudel olla asi iseeneses, vaid peab vastama soovitud lõppeesmärgile. Üks tähtsamaid manööversõjapidamise põhimõtteid on, et „taktika ei pea kunagi järgima juhtimismeetmeid. Vastupidi, juhtimismeetmed

<sup>1</sup> Poom, Raimo 2014. Putin kuulutas välja „Vene ajalooliste alade” tagasikahmamise poliitika. – Eesti Päevaleht, 19.03. <<http://epl.delfi.ee/news/valismaa/putin-kuulutas-valja-vene-ajalooliste-alade-tagasikahmamise-poliitika?id=68267291>>, (14.10.2014).

peavad järgima taktikat<sup>2</sup>. Seetõttu on oluline määrata esmajärjekorras kavandatav strateegia ja seda toetav taktika (koos vajalike üksuste ja võimetega), et luua parim võimalik juhtimismudel. Alati on peaesmärk nurjata vastase eesmärgi saavutamine. Uue arengukava puhul pole paraku selge, kas eelnevat põhimõtet on ikkagi järgitud.

Artikkel on jaotatud kolmeks peatükiks. Esimene peatükk kirjeldab tänapäevaseid sõjalise juhtimise printsiipe, selgitab sõjaliste operatsioonide teoreetilist tausta ning lõpeb kahe näitega ajaloost. Teine peatükk keskendub uue ja vana juhtimismudeli võrdlusele. Kolmandas peatükis tehakse kokkuvõtte ja pakutakse eelnenu põhjal välja lahendusi, kuidas olemasolevat juhtimismudelit tõhustada.

Siinses käsitluses ei vaadelda põhjalikumalt, kuidas mõjutab juhtimist maaväe staabi liitmine peastaabiga ning kas toetuse väejuhatuse loomine on põhjendatud. Need valdkonnad on küll kõnealuse teema kontekstis olulised, kuid väärivad eraldi põhjalikumat analüüsi.

## **1. Manööversõjapidamise põhimõtted, lahingutegevuse raamnõuded ja ajaloolisi näiteid**

Enne eelnimetatud probleemiringi käsitlemist tuleb vaadelda tänapäevast lähenemist sõjaväelisele juhtimisele. Täpsemalt võetakse vaatluse alla Kaitseväes ja Kaitseleiidus tunnustatud nüüdisaegsed juhtimisprintsiibid. Erinevate juhtimisteooriate hindamisel tuginetakse ajaloolistele näidetele.

### **1.1. Manööversõjapidamise põhimõtted**

Sõjaväelise juhtimisega seotud soovituslikud printsiibid on kujunenud ajaloo käigus, põhinedes lahingute edulugudel ja läbikukkumistest saadud õppetundidel. Nende printsiipide kohta on kirjutatud palju raamatuid, kuid siinkohal tulevad vaatluse alla NATO doktriinides ja William Lindi „Manööversõjapidamise käsiraamatus” kirjeldatud põhimõtted.

Juhtimisühitsuse (*unity of command*) põhimõte: „.../ sõjaväeliste operatsioonide maksimaalse koostõise efekti saavutamine sõltub koostööst ja koordineeritusest. Sõjalised jõud saavutavad selle ühtse juhtimise abil, mis tagab planeerimiseks ja operatsioonideks vajaliku sidususe. See on võimalik vaid käsudõiguse (üle)andmisel ühe ülema kätte, kellel on õigus

<sup>2</sup> Wyly, Michael D. 2014. Taktika alused. – Lind, William S. Manööversõjapidamise käsiraamat. Tartu: Aburgus, lk 103. [Edaspidi *Wyly 2014*]

juhtida ja koordineerida kõigi üksuste tegevusi ja sõjalisi vahendeid [oma vastutusosalal]”.<sup>3</sup>

Juhtimise detsentraliseerituse (*decentralised command*) nõue: NATO juhtimisfilosoofia nõuab juhtimisstiili, „mis soosib detsentraliseeritud juhtimist, tegevuste kiirust ja initsiatiivi – ulatuses, mis on kooskõlas kõrgema juhtimistasandi suunistega”.<sup>4</sup>

Käsuliini selguse (*clear chain of command*) nõue ütleb, et juhtimisstruktuur peab olema hierarhiline ja arusaadav kõigil juhtimistasanditel. Iga tasand peab saama selgelt aru käsuliini toimimisest hierarhias nii üles- kui allapoole.<sup>5</sup>

Manöövrikeskne lähenemine (*maneuverist approach*) rõhutab vajadust hoiduda jõu kasutamisel otsesest vastandumisest. Oma tugevused tuleb paisata vastase haavatavuste vastu ja seeläbi halvata vastase võitlusvõime moraalselt, mitte niivõrd füüsiliselt. Alati tuleb püüda hävitada vastase võitlustahe ja seda saab teha initsiatiivi haaramise teel ning pideva surve avaldamisega ajal ja kohas, kus vastane seda kõige vähem ootab. Manöövrikeskne lähenemine eeldab tsentraliseeritud plaani, kuid detsentraliseeritud täideviimist, võimaldades tegevusvabadust ja initsiatiivi – ülesandekeskset juhtimist.<sup>6</sup>

Ülesandekeskse juhtimise (*mission command*) abil loovad ülemad alluvatele vabaduse tegutseda eesmärgipäraselt ka juhul, kui tekivad ettenägematud probleemid või hoopis soodsad võimalused edu ära kasutada. Alluvate initsiatiivi ja kiire otsustusprotsessi toetuseks peavad ülemad sõnastama selgelt oma kavatsuse ja eesmärgid, mis on vaja saavutada, samuti otsustama tegevusvabaduse määra ja tegutsemispiirangute üle. Lisaks tuleb alluvatele anda piisavalt ressursse (üksuseid ja vahendeid) ning käsuõigus määral, mis on vajalik ülesannete täitmiseks.<sup>7</sup>

Otsustustsükli kiirema läbimise nõue (*time-competitive observation-orientation-decision-action cycles*): sõjaajalugu tõestab, et kiirema otsustustsükliga pool on vastasest edukam. Kontseptsioon, mida nimetatakse VOOT-tsükliks (*OODA Loop*), koosneb neljast tegevusest: vaatle – orienteeru – otsusta – tegutse. Tegu on universaalse otsustusmudeliga, mis tuleb

<sup>3</sup> NATO Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D) 2010, lk 1–7. <[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/33694/AJP01D.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33694/AJP01D.pdf)>, (14.10.2014).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 6–1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 6–3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 6–3 – 6–4.

läbida igasugusel otsustamisel. Pool, kes teist oma tegevusega ennetab, surub vastasele peale oma tegutsemiskava ja sunnib teda VOOT-tsükli uuesti alustama. Sel moel, pidevalt vastasest oma tegevustega ees olles, tekitatakse vastase üksustes segadust, koormatakse tema juhtimissüsteemi ja muudetakse see haavatavamaks.<sup>8</sup>

Luure juhtrolli (*reconnaissance pull*) rõhutamine tähendab tegevusplaanide kujunemist jooksvalt, oma eesliikuvate üksuste võimaluste ja otsuste pinnalt. Selle asemel et rünnata tagalas asuva staabi määratud läbimurdekohta, otsivad eesmised üksused liikumise käigus vastase lahingurühmituses tühimikke või nõrgalt kaitstud positsioone. Leides soodsa koha ja võimaluse, annavad eesmised üksused sellest järgnevatele teada, kes seejärel tungivad vastase rivistusse ja asuvad teda ründama suundadest, milleks ta valmis ei ole (*edundamine*<sup>9</sup>). Selleks et saavutada vajalik tegutsemistempo ja mitte anda vastasele aega adekvaatselt reageerida, ei saa viita aega käsuliini pidi loa küsimisega. Kõrgem staap peab usaldama eesmist üksuse ülema otsust ja suunama oma üksuste edundamist. Staabi kinnituse ootamine võib anda vastasele kogumisaega, sh aega saata nõrgalt kaitstud löiku tugevdusüksusi.<sup>10</sup>

Eesliinilt juhtimise (*command from the front*) nõue. Selleks et teha pädevaid ja kiireid otsuseid, peab ülem olema eesliinil, mitte juhtima tagalast. Nii on võimalik saada lahinguolukorrast täpne pilt ning tunnetus, et langetada paremaid otsuseid. See ei tähenda, et ülem peaks paiknema oma luureüksuste juures, vaid eesliinile nii lähedal kui võimalik ja vajalik. Ülema koht on tema põhipingutusüksuste juures, mille toetuseks ta saab viivitamatult suunata oma teisi allüksusi ja tuletoetust.<sup>11</sup>

Juhtimismeetmete sõltuvus valitud taktikast (*control measures must follow the tactics*) tähendab, et valitud taktika põhineb alati vastase tegevusel. Eesmärk on vastane võita ja sundida teda esialgsetest plaanidest loobuma. Seetõttu on valitud taktika primaarne ja juhtimismeetmed peavad alati järgima taktikalisi vajadusi, mitte vastupidi.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Lind, William S. 2014. Manööversõjapidamise käsiraamat. Tartu: Aburgus, lk 21. [Edaspidi *Lind 2014*]

<sup>9</sup> *Edundamine* – pealetungitegevus, mis tavaliselt järgneb edukale rünnakule ja on mõeldud vaenlase segipaiskamiseks sügavuses. Vt *Militerm*, <<http://mt.legaltext.ee/militerm/>>, (14.10.2014). [Edaspidi *Militerm*]

<sup>10</sup> Lind 2014, lk 36–37.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 49; Wyly 2014, lk 98–99.

<sup>12</sup> Wyly 2014, lk 103.

Eelnevad juhtimisprintsiibid on universaalsed ja aluseks kõigil juhtimistasemetel – olgu selleks siis rühm, kompanii, pataljon, kaitseringkond või relvajõud kui tervik.

## 1.2. Lahingutegevuse raamnõuded

Operatsiooni- ja taktikatasandil eristatakse kolme põhilist tegevuste liiki, mida nimetatakse ka mõjupõhiseks jaotuseks ja mis peavad olema omavahel kooskõlas: otsustavad, kujundavad ja tagavad tegevused. Sõjapidamises on need kolm võrdselt olulised: ilma kujundavate tegevusteta ei saa luua tingimusi otsustavaks lahinguks ja ilma tagavate tegevusteta ei saa hoida tegevuses väeüksusi kummaski eelmainitud operatsioonis.<sup>13</sup>

Otsustavad on sellised tegevused, mis annavad hävitava löögi vastase vägedele või süsteemile. Nende eesmärk on võidu saavutamine ja olulisima ülesande täitmine. Kujundavad on need tegevused, mis loovad otsustavaks operatsiooniks vajalikud tingimused, mõjutades vastast sellises suunas, mis paljastab otsustavat operatsiooni teostavale üksusele vastase haavatavuse. Kujundavad tegevused võivad olla näiteks õhutoetus, kaudtuletoetus, vastase reservüksuste seiskamine, et takistada nende lahingusse astumist, petterünnakud jne. Tagavad on kõik sellised tegevused, mis on seotud võimete loomise ja varustamisega, niisiis peamiselt logistikaga. Need on ainsad tegevused, mis ei keskendu otseselt vastase mõjutamisele, vaid oma vägede tugevdamisele.<sup>14</sup>

Kirjeldatud tegevused on aluseks iga üksuse ja staabi toimimisele kõigil sõjatasanditel. Kui on puudu kas või üks neist kolmest, ei ole võimalik ei lahingu- ega sõjaedu. Kui taktikatasandil ei pruugi ühes operatsioonis ebaõnnestumine tuua otsustavaid negatiivseid tagajärgi, siis operatsioonitasandil on nende tegevuste planeerimine ja koordineerimine määrava tähtsusega. Näiteks lüngad logistikaketis võivad avada vastasele ligipääsu strateegilise tähtsusega ründeobjektile.

Prantsuse kindral André Beaufre on märkinud, et lahinguedu määravate otsuste puhul tuleb alati kaaluda kaht erinevat, kuid võrdselt olulist komponenti: otsustavat lööki ja ettevalmistavat manöövrit, mis selle löögi võimalikuks teeb. „Ettevalmistav manööver on alati kujundav: see peab seadma

<sup>13</sup> Eesti Kaitseväge maaväe lahingutegevuse alused 2010. Koost Enno Mõts. Tartu: KVÜÕA, lk 102–103. <[http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/maav2e-taktikaline-lahingutegevus\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/maav2e-taktikaline-lahingutegevus_2010.pdf)>, (14.10.2014).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 103; Department of the Army. ARDP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, May 2012, pp. 1–12. <[http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR\\_pubs/dr\\_a/pdf/adrp3\\_0.pdf](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf)>, (25.12.2013).

vastase ebasoodsasse positsiooni ja võimaldama meie jõududel sooritada lõplikku purustavat lööki. Siiski, ka vastane otsib alati meie vägede suhtes samasugust võimalust. Võit on niisiis selle poolel, kes suudab seisata vastase manöövri ja anda ise otsustava löögi.”<sup>15</sup>

Eelnev mõttekäik annab vihje, et kõige tugevamaid üksuseid ei tohi saata lahingusse esimesena, vaid neid tuleb säästa otsustavaks lahinguks. Eesti kontekstis tuleks seega mehhaniseeritud brigaadid planeerida operatsioonitasandi reserviks, mille ülesanne on anda otsustavaid lööke maakaitseüksuste poolt ebasoodsasse seisu viidud vastase pihta. Seetõttu tuleb koos nn löögirusikaga samaväärselt arendada üksusi, kes on võimelised lahinguvälja vastavalt vajadusele kujundama.

Järgnevalt tulevad vaatluse alla kaks näidet sõjaajaloost, kus rikuti mõlemat ülalkirjeldatud printsiipi. Esimene näide on 2008. aasta Gruusia sõjast ja teine Prantsusmaa langemisest 1944. aastal.

### 1.3. Gruusia sõja õppetunnid juhtimisstruktuuri tasandil

Augustis 2008 toimus sõda Venemaa ja Gruusia vahel. Sellest konfliktist on palju kirjutatud, kuid praeguse artikli kontekstis on oluline vaadelda, miks siiski ei suutnud Gruusia kaitsejõud osutada piisavat vastupanu, vaatamata arvestatavale relvastusele ja armee suurusele.

Kaitseuringute keskuse teadur Kaarel Kaas on leidnud, et taktikatasandil (kompaniide ja pataljonide tasemel) võitlesid grusiinid hästi, kuid operatsioonijuhtimine lagunes käest. Üks põhjustest oli just vähene operatsioonijuhtimiskogemus.<sup>16</sup>

Erukindral Ants Laaneots annab grusiinide võitlusvõimele palju karmima ja otsekohasema hinnangu: „Vananenud tehnika, puudulike sidevahenditega, ilma tänapäevaste luure- ning öövaatlusseadmeteta Vene vägede kiire edu tugines eelkõige Georgia poliitilise juhtkonna vigadele ja väejuhatuse oskamatusel planeerida, valmistada ette ning juhtida suuri sõjalisi operatsioone.”<sup>17</sup>

Endine kaitseminister Mart Laar nõustub, et staabitöö ja hästi läbi mõeldud plaanid määravad sõja käigu, ja leiab, et Gruusia plaanid olid liiga

<sup>15</sup> **Beaufre, André** 1965. Introduction to Strategy. London: Faber and Faber, pp. 34–35.

<sup>16</sup> **Kaas, Kaarel** 2009. Georgia lahingute sõjalised paradoksid. – *Diplomaatia*, 25.09. <<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/georgia-lahingute-sojalised-paradoksid/>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>17</sup> **Laaneots, Ants** 2012. Venemaa kasvatab muskleid. – *Postimees*, 08.04. <<http://arvamus.postimees.ee/799456/ants-laaneots-venemaa-kasvatab-muskleid/>>, (25.12.2013).

hägusad<sup>18</sup>. Kolonelleitnant Riho Ühtegi, Eesti endine kaitseatašee Gruusias, on seda sõda põhjalikult analüüsinud. Üks tema peamisi järeldusi on, et Gruusia relvajõudude väljaõpe toimus valdavalt rühma- ja kompaniitasemel. Neil puudusid suuremad koostegutsemisõppused, kus oleks saanud harjutada tegutsemist operatsioonitasandil ja koostööd teiste relvaliikidega. Ühtegi väidab isegi, et „sõjalisi operatsioone juhiti tihti otse poliitiliselt tasandilt. Jäi mulje, et sõjaväelt ei oodata peale täieliku allumise poliitilistele otsustele mitte mingit omapoolset initsiatiivi.”<sup>19</sup>

Ühtegi jätkab talle omase otsekohesusega: „[r]ahvuskaardil ja reservil, mis sõja ajal isegi korra mobiliseeriti, puudus täielikult juhtimine ja ülesanne. Mingisugust maakaitset ega organiseeritud tegevust polnud neile ette nähtud. Toetustüksused olid küll olemas, kuid puudulike sõjaaja ülesannetega ja olematu tehnikaga. Varustus ja laskemoon tuli laiali vedada peamiselt Thbilisi piirkonnast. Sisuliselt võib öelda, et Gruusial oli hulk elukutselisi sõdureid kolmes väeliigis ning maaväes omakorda jalaväelased, tankistid ja suurtükiväelased, kes omavahel eriti koostööd ei teinud.”<sup>20</sup>

Intervjuus siinse artikli autorile lisas Ühtegi, et grusiinide juhtimine oli väga tsentraliseeritud ja kolme võitlevat brigaadi juhiti otse poliitiliselt tasandilt: peamiselt tegi seda president, kuid mingil perioodil ka Thbilisi linnapea. Ka puudusid Gruusia juhtimisstruktuuris kaitseringkonnad.<sup>21</sup>

Kuigi eelnev näide ei tõesta, et operatsioonitasandi juhtivad vahestaapid oleksid iseenesest suutnud sõja käiku muuta, võib järeldada, et Gruusia vägede liigselt tsentraliseeritud juhtimismudel ei olnud parim lahendus. Kõrgem juhtkond – kes juhtis distantsilt, Thbilisist – keskendus kolme võitleva brigaadi juhtimisele ja nende tegevuse kooskõlastamisele, teisisõnu: suunas oma põhipingutuse lahingutegevusele. Samas esines olulisi vajaka jäämisi mobiliseerimisel ning oskuses kasutada rahvuskaarti ja reservväelasi, kes ei olnud võitlevate brigaadide koosseisus. Seega jäi oluline osa võitlusvõimelistest üksustest suuresti tarvitamata.

Võis tekkida ka teine – küll hüpoteetiline – probleem, mis on vastuolus manööversõjapidamise põhimõtetega: võitlevaid üksuseid tuleb juhtida

<sup>18</sup> **Laar, Mart** 2013. Vene-Gruusia sõda – 10 õppetundi Eestile. – Postimees, 09.08. <<http://arvamus.postimees.ee/1326502/mart-laar-vene-gruusia-soda-10-oppetundi-eestile>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>19</sup> **Ühtegi, Riho** 2013. Vene-Gruusia 2008. aasta sõjast viis aastat hiljem. – Diplomaatia, august. <<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/vene-gruusia-2008-aasta-sojast-viis-aastat-hiljem/>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Telefoniintervjuu kolonelleitnant Riho Ühtegiga, 05.02.2014.

lahinguväljal, mitte distantsilt. Puudus eesliinilt juhtiv ülem, kes oleks tunnetanud kogu lahingusituatsiooni. Vastasel korral oleks tõenäoliselt olnud võimalik teha paremaid otsuseid brigaadide suunamisel ja tegevuste kooskõlastamisel. Samuti oleks sellisel paikkondlikul ülemal olnud lihtsam juhtida mobiliseeritavaid rahvuskaardi üksuseid ja reservväelasi. Kõrgem juhtkond pealinnas ei saanudki omada vahetut lahinguväljatunnetust ning on tõenäone, et just seetõttu jäid kasutamata paljud võimalused.

Eesti riigikaitse eelmises struktuuris oli kaitseringkondade staapide peamine ülesanne korraldada ringkonnas juhtimist ja koostööd kõigi allüksuste vahel oma vastutusalas. Selleks pidid need staabid rahuajal planeerima ja korraldama ringkonnas vajalikke ettevalmistusi, õppekogunemisi ja kõiki muid tegevusi, mis on tarvilikud sõjaks valmistumisel. Niisiis oli täidetud eesliinilt juhtimise nõue.

#### 1.4. Prantsusmaa langemise põhjuseid 1940. aastal

Klassika valdkonda kuuluv ja mitmeid olulisi õppetunde andnud näide on Prantsusmaa kaotus Saksamaale 1940. aasta kevadel. See oli operatsioon, mis hämmastas tervet maailma, kuna Prantsusmaa langes vaid kuue nädalaga. Sisuliselt lõikas poole väiksem Saksa vägi Prantsusmaa pooleks, olles sisenenud riiki suunast, mida peeti võimatuks lähenemisteks. Saksa väe kiirus ja tegutsemise kooskõlastatus põhjustas Prantsuse juhtkonnale tõelise n-ö strateegilise šoki. Saksa väe edu põhjuseid aitab hästi avada toonase rünnaku- plaani autor ja täideviija kindraloberst Heinz Guderian, kes käsitleb neid oma mälestusteraamatus<sup>22</sup>.

Guderian teadis, et jõudude tasakaal on tema kahjuks. Inglise-Prantsuse relvajõudude kasutuses oli 1940. aasta mais umbes 4800 tanki, Saksa relvajõududel oli pealetungi algul umbes 2200 tanki. „Meie vastas oli seega kahekordne ülekaal, mis osutus veelgi suuremaks seetõttu, et Prantsuse tankid ületasid Saksa omi nii soomustatuselt kui ka suurtükkide kaliibrilt,“ kirjutab Guderian.<sup>23</sup>

Oma mälestustes toob kindraloberst esile peamised põhjused, miks prantslased koos liitlastega rünnakule vastu seista ei suutnud. Esiteks esines vajakajäämisi luures. Siiski suudeti madalamal tasandil Guderiani võimalikku plaani ette näha, kuid kõrgem juhtkond ei pidanud seda tõenäoliseks.

<sup>22</sup> **Guderian, Heinz** 2009. Ühe sõduri mälestused. Tallinn: Olion. [Edaspidi *Guderian 2009*]

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 87–117.

Teiseks: kui rünnak oli hoos ja prantslased said aru, mis oli toimumas, puudusid piisavalt tugevad reservüksused, et läbitunginud Saksa üksusi peatada. Jäiga juhtimiskultuuri tõttu ei moodustatud või ei kasutatud reserve ilma kõrgema juhtkonna loata, kes paraku magas maha kõik olulised võimalused. Guderian kirjeldab seda järgnevalt: „Prantsuse juhtkond soovis oma vägesid juhtida nõnda, et kindlatele plaanidele rajatud otsused tagaksid kindlaviisilise liikumise ja plaanipärased ründe- või kaitsesammud.” Kokkuvõtteks kaotas tugevam vägi ja terve riik sõja juhtide liigse enesekindluse ja jäikuse tõttu.<sup>24</sup>

Oluline on ka esile tuua, et Guderian kooskõlastas isiklikult ja vahetult oma lahinguplaane teda toetava õhuväe allüksusega, mis oli ambitsioonika rünnakuplaani elluviimisel olulise tähtsusega. Märkimata ei saa ka jätta asjaolu, et algusest peale ei olnud kõrgemal juhtkonnal plaani teostumisse mingit usku. Guderian viis plaani siiski ellu, eirates Hitleri enda keeldu ja riskides sõjakohtu alla andmisega.<sup>25</sup>

Prantsuse juhtimismudel eeldas üldjuhul kõrgema staabi heakskiitu alluvate üksuste tegutsemiseks, niisiis oli juhtimine rangelt tsentraalne. Viimane nõudis üksuste suhteliselt jäika juhtimist kõrgemalt juhtimistasandilt, kus püüti esmalt ise saavutada vastase olukorrast võimalikult täpset arusaama. Alles seejärel anti üksustele korraldus ja luba sooritada vastukäik. Paraku jäid prantslased just seetõttu pidevalt oma käikudega hiljaks, kaotades sel moel lahingutempo ja initsiatiivi.

Eelnenud näidete kokkuvõtteks saab öelda, et juhtimise ja otsustusõiguse liigne tsentraliseerimine ning lahingutegevuste raamnõuete ignoreerimine aitab kaasa vastase lahinguedule.

Kaitseringkondadega riigikaitsemudel pakkus tõenäoliselt paremat lahendust eelkirjeldatud probleemide vältimiseks kui uus. Kuigi iseseisva otsustusõiguse andmine on rohkem juhtimiskultuuri küsimus, hakkab sõjategevuses olulist rolli mängima üksuste tegevuste kooskõlastatus. Eesmärk on olla kiirem kui vastane, lüüa tema nõrkusi enne, kui need muutuvad tugevusteks<sup>26</sup>. Lahingutempot suudab hoida vaid kohapealne ülem, kes on kõigi oma meeltega keskendunud just tema vastutusalas toimuvale ning kellel on loodud varusidesüsteemid.

Keegi peab tegema pädevaid otsuseid konkreetses lahingupiirkonnas, näiteks kus võidelda ja kus mitte, et plaani oleks hõlmatud kõik vajalikud jõud. Tallinna piirkonnast oleks selliseid, näiteks Sillamäe lähistel toimuvaid

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Wylly 2014, lk 97–99.

lahinguid keeruline juhtida vähemalt kahel põhjusel. Esiteks puudub vahetu lahinguväljatunnetus ning teiseks on võimalik, et keskendatus konkreetsele lahingule hajub olukorras, kus peastaap peab samal ajal tegelema veel mitme sarnase olukorra lahendamise muudes piirkondades. Ei saa ka välistada võimalikke sideprobleeme, mille puhul näiteks jalaväebrigaadi ja maakaitsepataljoni ühisoperatsioonikavandi tegutsemisjuhised ei pruugi õigeaks ajaks allüksusteni jõudagi. Kohapealne ülem saaks sellised probleemid, kasvõi käskjalga kasutades, kiiremini lahendatud.

## 2. Kaitseväge uus ja eelmine juhtimismudel: poolt ja vastu

Edasises tuleb kõigepealt juttu uue arengukava aspektidest, mis muudavad oluliselt senist juhtimismudelit. Sellele järgnevad näited nende endiste kõrgete ohvitseride arvamusavaldustest, kes olid seotud eelmiste arengukavade loomise ja rakendamisega.

### 2.1. Kaitseringkondade algidee ja loomine

Siinne peatükk käsitleb Kaitseväge juhtimisstruktuuri loomist 1990. aastate lõpus ja selle taustategureid. Allikateks on peamiselt erialakirjanduses avaldatud seisukohavõttud ja intervjuud toonase mudeli loojatega.

Kaitseringkonnad loodi 1998. aastal Vabariigi Valitsuse määrusega, millega moodustati neli kaitseringkonda (Põhja, Kirde, Lõuna ja Lääne kaitseringkond) koos nende alla kuuluvate maakondadega<sup>27</sup>. 2002. aastal muutis valitsus oma määrusega kaitseringkondade vastutusalasid, kaotades Kirde kaitseringkonna ja viies viimase vastutusalad Põhja kaitseringkonna alla. Ühtlasi nimetati Lääne kaitseringkond Lääne-saarte erikaitsepiirkonnaks ning loodi eraldiseisev Tallinna erikaitsepiirkond.<sup>28</sup> Kuus aastat hiljem otsustati järjekordse Kaitseväge korralduse seaduse<sup>29</sup> ning sellele tuginenud Vabariigi Valitsuse määrusega<sup>30</sup> naasta esialgse struktuuri ja nimetuste juurde.

<sup>27</sup> **Kaitseringkondade moodustamine ja nende staapide formeerimine.** – RT I, 1998, 28, 374. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/74910>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>28</sup> **Kaitseväge struktuur ja paiknemine**, §7. – RT I, 2002, 44, 290. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/110031>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>29</sup> **Kaitseväge korralduse seadus**, §13. – RT I, 20.03.2013, 18. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/120032013018>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>30</sup> **Kaitseväge ülesehitus.** – RT I, 2002, 44, 290. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/12856223>>, (25.12.2013).

Artiklis ei vaadelda seda, mis konkreetselt põhjustas kuueaastase struktuuri-eksperimenti ja hiljem algversiooni juurde tagasimineku, kuid võib järeldada, et ühel või teisel kujul peeti kaitseringkondadel põhinevat juhtimismudelit 14 aastat (1998–2012) parimaks võimalikest.

Kaitseringkondadel põhineva juhtimismudeli loojaks ja ülesannete püstitajaks oli kindral (sel ajal veel kolonel) Ants Laaneots. Kaitseringkondade idee üks esimesi kirjeldusi ilmus ajakirja Kaitse Kodu! veergudel 1995. aastal<sup>31</sup>. Täpsustatult on Laaneots sellest kirjutanud aastatel 1999 ja 2000, millest annab kokkuvõtliku ülevaate 2000. aasta artikkel „Kaitseringkond ja tema ülesanded”.

1. „Kaitseringkond on iseseisvateks operatsioonideks võimeline, mitmetest kaitsepiirkondadest ja erinevate väeliikide üksustest koosnev sõjalis-territoriaalne operatiivne üldväekoondis.
2. Kaitsepiirkonnad moodustatakse Kaitseliidu malevate baasil kui territoriaalkaitse<sup>32</sup> ülesannete täitmiseks ettenähtud, kindlat vastutuspiirkonda omavad taktikalised üksused.
3. Üldotstarbelistesse jõududesse<sup>33</sup> määratakse kaitseväge kõige paremini relvastatud ning väljaõpetatud üksused. Nende hulka kuuluvad mehhaniseeritud, jalaväge-, rannakaitse-, suurtükiväge-, õhutõrje- ja pioneeriväeosad. /.../ Nad ei ole seotud mingite kindlate vastutusalaadega ja neid kasutatakse kaitseväge (ülem-)juhataja otsusega kõige tähtsamate lahinguülesannete täitmiseks riigi territooriumi ükskõik millises osas.”<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> **Laaneots, Ants** 1995. Tahad rahu – valmistu sõjaks. – Kaitse Kodu!, detsember, lk 34–37. <[http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK1995\\_nr\\_2\\_lk\\_34-37.pdf](http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK1995_nr_2_lk_34-37.pdf)>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>32</sup> **Laaneots, Ants** 2000a. Territoriaalkaitse – relvastatud rahva strateegia. – Kaitse Kodu!, november, lk 5–11. <[http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000\\_nr\\_5\\_lk\\_5-11.pdf](http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000_nr_5_lk_5-11.pdf)>, (23.10.2014). [Edaspidi *Laaneots 2000a*] Kindral Laaneots defineerib terminid *territoriaalkaitse* kui riigikaitse ülesehituse ja kaitsetegevuse süsteemi erivormi, millele on iseloomulikud „kaitsejõudude detsentraliseeritud juhtimissüsteem; riigikaitse; territoriaalne ülesehitus; kaitsejõudude jagunemine kahte ossa, üldotstarbelisteks jõududeks ja maa-(territoriaal-) kaitsevägeks; klassikalise ja hajutatud lahingu taktika ning sissitegevuse kompleksne kasutamine”. Vt **Laaneots** 2000a, lk 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* Üldotstarbelised jõud pidid moodustuma kaitsejõudude kõige lahinguvõimelisema ja mobiilsema osa, olles määratud riigikaitse kõige tähtsamate ja vastutusrikkamate ülesannete täitmiseks agressiooni põhikolletes ja vaenlase pealöövide suundadel ükskõik millises riigi osas. Vt **Laaneots** 2000a, lk 9.

<sup>34</sup> **Laaneots, Ants** 2000b. Kaitseringkond ja tema ülesanded. – Kaitse Kodu!, veebruar, lk 5–6. <[http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000\\_nr\\_1\\_lk\\_5-8.pdf](http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000_nr_1_lk_5-8.pdf)>, (25.12.2013). [Edaspidi *Laaneots 2000b*]

Kokkuvõtlikult nägi Laaneots kaitseringkondade staapides väekoondiste staape, kelle ülesandeks on kogu lahingutegevuse juhtimine oma vastutusosalal. Ringkonna staabid pidid alluma otse Kaitseväe juhatajale, olles oma vastutusosalal valmis ka iseseisvalt lahingutegevust juhtima. Kaitseringkond omakorda pidi jaotuma kaitsepiirkondadeks, mille vastutusosalad ühtisid Kaitseliidu malevatega. Kaitseliidu sõjaaja malevad jagas Laaneots organisatsiooniliselt kahte peamisse ossa: lahingu- ja sisekaitseüksused. Sõja korral pidid lisaks Kaitseväe ja Kaitseliidu allüksustele minema kaitseringkondade juhtimise alla ka piirivalve ja päästeameti relvastatud üksused.<sup>35</sup> Kogu süsteem toetus kahele territoriaalkaitsekontseptsiooni alustalale: detsentraliseeritusele ja piirkondlikkusele<sup>36</sup>. Detsentraliseeritus tähendas, et kaitseringkond pidi alustama iseseisvalt vastupanu olukorras, kus vastane on sisenenud tema vastutusalasse, kuid kõrgemast staabist pole juhiseid tulnud<sup>37</sup>.

Oluline on märkida, et kindral rõhutas kaitseringkonna toimimist operatsioonitasandi<sup>38</sup> juhtimisüksusena. Viimane eeldab kõrgetasemelist planeerimisostkust ehk vastava ettevalmistuse saanud ohvitsere, kellel on piisav teadmispagas ja planeerimiskogemus.

Teiseks järeldeb Laaneotsa mudelist üldotstarbeliste üksuste kui operatsioonitasandi reservi olulisus. Nimetatud põhimõtet erukindral küll otsesõnu ei maini, kuid seda saab järeldebada juhtimistasandi ja ülesande kirjelduses mainitust: „/.../ kaitseväe juhataja otsusega kõige tähtsamate lahing[u]ülesannete täitmiseks /..”<sup>39</sup>.

Veel eelmine sõjalise kaitse arengukava (2009–2018) lähtus kaitseringkondadel põhinevast ülesehitusest. Selle järgi pidid sõjaaja Kaitseväe moodustama 2018. aastal keskalluvusega üksused, maaväes (üks) mehhaniseeritud jalaväebrigaad koos kõigi vajalike toetusüksustega ning kaitseringkondades moodustatavad reservüksused ja Kaitseliidu üksused.<sup>40</sup>

Kirde kaitseringkonna endine ülem kolonel Martin Herem tõdeb, et kaitseringkondadel on sõjaväelises juhtimises oluline roll. Probleemiks oli küll piisava hulga inimeste puudumine, mis jättis kaitseringkonna halvasti

<sup>35</sup> Laaneots 2000b.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Suuline intervjuu erukindral Ants Laaneotsaga, 16.12.2013. [Edaspidi *Laaneots 2013b*]

<sup>38</sup> Kuigi nüüd on üha enam levinud seisukoht, et terminid *operatiivne* ja *operatsiooniline* ei kattu mõistesilult, kasutati neid sel ajal sünonüümidena (autori märkus).

<sup>39</sup> Laaneots 2000b, lk 5–8.

<sup>40</sup> *Sõjalise kaitse arengukava*, lk 13.

<<http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/SKAK.pdf>>, (25.12.2013).

komplekteeritud brigaadi suuruseks. Samas on territoriaalse juhtimise ja toetuse seisukohast selline juhtimisstruktuur Heremi arvates iseenesest adekvaatne ja vajalik.<sup>41</sup>

Lisaks kaitseringkonnale rahuajal alluvatele väeosadele (pioneer-, suur-tükiväe-, õhutõrje- ja Viru jalaväepataljon)<sup>42</sup> pidid sellele sõja korral ja Kaitseväge juhataja korraldusel alluma ka Kaitsealiidu Alutaguse, Viru, Järva ja Jõgeva malev<sup>43</sup>.

Kolonel Herem toob esile, et kaitseringkonna ja sealsete malevate koostööharjutustel esines probleeme. Esiteks oli see Heremi arvates tingitud malevate staapide ja nende väljaõppe üldisest nõrgemast tasemest ning teiseks Kaitsealiidu peastaabi toetuse puudumisest. „Probleem oli ka selles, et sõja korral ei oleks tohtinud maleva üksuseid kasutada väljaspool nende maakonda. Kui sellel mingil moel ka mõte on, siis praktikas kaob see sootuks. Kujuta ette Raplamaa mehi, kes ootavad lahinguid oma territooriumil; need jõuaksid sinna siis, kui Lääne-Viru ja Tartu omad on purustatud või laiali aetud,” kirjutab Herem.<sup>44</sup>

Lisaks kritiseerib Herem Laaneotsa kava teostust. Kõneldes vahenditest, mis oleks võimaldanud plaanitud võimeid välja arendada, on ta seisukohal, et neid ei olnud ilmselgelt piisavalt. Lühikese ajavahemiku jaoks oli võetud liiga suur eesmärk. Seetõttu ei toimunud ka kaitseringkonnad nii, nagu nad oleksid pidanud. Struktuuri sissekirjutatud pataljoni tarvis ei olnud tegelikult piisavalt inimesi, laskemoona, sidevahendeid, erivarustust jne. Laaneots ja Kunnas ei toetanud kokkuvõtteid plaane. Vaatamata sellele oli juhtimises ja otsustusvõimeuses rohkem selgust kui uues arengukavas. Praegune struktuur on ebaselge, leiab Herem.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>41</sup> E-kirjavahetus kolonel Martin Heremiga, 15.12.2013 ja 14.01.2014. [Edaspidi *Herem 2013, 2014*]

<sup>42</sup> **Kirde Kaitseringkonna põhimäärus**. – RT lisa, 2008, 104, 1491. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13352503>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>43</sup> *Herem 2013, 2014*.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

## 2.2. Kaitseväe ja Kaitseliidu uus juhtimismudel

Arengukavas seisab, et „Maaväe staap ja Kaitseväe Peastaap liidetakse ja kaitseringkonnad reorganiseeritakse ning territoriaalkaitse<sup>46</sup> antakse tervikuna Kaitseliidu pädevusse. Sõjaaja maakaitsestruktuuris luuakse lisaks Maakaitse staabile viis territoriaalse vastutuselaga maakaitseringkonda, neist üks saab vastutama nn Suur-Tallinna ala eest. Rahu ajal on maakaitse ringkondade staabid Kaitseliidu Peastaabi või Kaitseliidu malevate staapide koosseisus.”<sup>47</sup>

Märgitakse ka, et „/.../ [t]erritoriaalkaitse poolt loodavat kogu Eestit katvat turvavaipa hakatakse senisest veelgi enam tähtsustama ning maakaitse saab konkreetse vastutaja – Kaitseliidu –[,] kellele see saab olema peamine sõjaline ülesanne. Maakaitse (15 Kaitseliidu malevat) tõhus sõjaline juhtimine ka kõige keerulisemas situatsioonis toimub kriisi- ja sõjaolukorras aktiveerivate viie territoriaalse vastutuselaga maakaitseringkonna kaudu.”<sup>48</sup>

Lisaks: „Eesti sõjalise kaitse mobilisatsiooni ja toetuse ülesanded koondatakse loodavasse Toetuse väejuhatusesse. Toetuse väejuhatusesse põhilised ülesanded on mobilisatsiooni ja formeerimise, logistilise toetuse ning vastuvõtva riigi toetuse alaste valdkondade juhtimine ning sõjalise hariduse valdkonna koordineerimine.”<sup>49</sup>

Alates 2014. aasta 1. augustist kehtima hakanud Kaitseväe korralduse seadusest on Kaitseväe struktuuriüksused Kaitseväe peastaap, õhuväe staap, väeüksused, sõjaväepolitsei, Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused, NATO küberkaitsekoostöö keskuse Eesti kontingent, luurekeskus, toetuse väejuhatus ja eriooperatsioonide väejuhatus<sup>50</sup>. Väeüksustena nimetab seadus järgmisi üksusi: brigaad, grupp, pataljon, divisjon, laevastik ja baas<sup>51</sup>. Niisiis puudub nüüdsest väeüksuste loetelust kaitseringkond<sup>52</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> Arengukavas ja ka muudes dokumentides puudub siiani termini *territoriaalkaitse* ametlik definitsioon. Arengukava kasutab termineid *territoriaalkaitse* ja *maakaitse* sünonüümidena (vt joonealune selgitus, lk 4), kuid see ei ole vastavuses seisukohaga, mida on varasemalt kirjeldanud kindral Laaneots. Vt ka märkust 32.

<sup>47</sup> **Riigikaitse arengukava 2013–2022**, lk 5.  
<[http://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/arengukavad/kaitseministeerium/Riigikaitse\\_arengukava\\_2013-2022\\_avalik%20osa.pdf](http://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/arengukavad/kaitseministeerium/Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022_avalik%20osa.pdf)>, (25.12.2013). [Edaspidi *Arengukava 2013–2022*]

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 4.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 5.

<sup>50</sup> **Kaitseväe korralduse seadus**. – RT I, 14.03.2014, 36.  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032014036>>, (13.10.2014). Vt joonist 1.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, §13, lg 1.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, kaitseringkonda kirjeldav §16 on tunnistatud kehtetuks.

Kuna maaväe staap liideti Kaitseväe peastaabiga, siis jäi ainuke võimalus, et uus maakaitsestaap moodustatakse Kaitsealiidu peastaabi baasil. Nii ka tehti ja juba 2014. aasta Kevadtormil osalesid peamiselt Kaitsealiidu peastaabi põhjal moodustatud maakaitsestaap ja üks maakaitseringkond<sup>53</sup>. Kahjuks ei ole õppusel antud hinnangud uue kontseptsiooni kohta avalikult kättesaadavad.

Sõjaväelise juhtimise põhitõdedest ja relvajõudude üldistest tegutsemis-põhimõtetest lähtudes on vaja enne kriisi või sõja puhkemist määrata vastutusosalad ning harjutada koostööd. Sõjaväeline planeerimine ja juhtimis-süsteemi sissetöötamine nõuab piisavat ajavaru ning pädevaid inimesi. Kuna Kaitsealiidul 2014. aastal tegevteenistujaid juurde palgata ei lubata, tuleb saada hakkama olemasolevate jõududega<sup>54</sup>.

Sarnast juhtimissüsteemi on Kaitsealiidus tegelikult juba ükskord varem proovitud rakendada. Alates 1. jaanuarist 2004 kehtis Kaitsealiidus struktuur, mis põhines neljal juhtmaleval. Juhtmalevate staapide põhiülesandeks oli Kaitsealiidu malevate tegevuse planeerimine ning koordineerimine oma ja naabermalevate vastutusosalal. Juhtmalevateks määrati Harju, Tartu, Alutaguse ja Pärnumaa malev.<sup>55</sup>

Tollaegse Kaitsealiidu Peastaabi ülem major Urmas Muld on väitnud, et juhtmalevate eesmärk oli parandada koostöövõimet neis malevates, kus liikmeid, vahendeid ja instruktoreid seatud ülesannete täitmiseks nappis, samuti leida lisaliikmeid. Lisaks määrati juhtmalevatele pataljoni staabi ülesanded, mis pidid hakkama juhtima alluvatest malevatest moodustatud allüksusi sõjaajal.<sup>56</sup>

Paraku ei hakanud see kontseptsioon kunagi korralikult tööle. Viimase kinnituseks võib olla kasvõi see, et juhtmalevate volitusi, struktuuri ega kirjeldust ei leia praeguseks Kaitsealiidu Peastaabi või malevate kodulehtedelt mujalt kui arhiivifailidest. Samas ei ole seda mudelit ka keegi ametlike käskkirjadega tühistanud.

Anonüümseks jääda soovinud, pikaajaline Kaitsealiidu vanemohvitser<sup>57</sup>, kes oli juhtmalevate arendamise ajal juhtival kohal, nimetas põhjused, miks tema arvates toonane juhtimismudel tööle ei hakanud. Kuna tol ajal olid

<sup>53</sup> **Kaitsealiidu Maakaitsestaap liitub Kevadtormiga** 2014. Kaitsealiidu pressiteade. <<http://www.kaitsealiit.ee/et/kaitsealiidu-maakaitsestaap-liitub-kevadtormiga>>, (13.10.2014).

<sup>54</sup> **Simson, Priit** 2013. Meelis Kiili: tulevikus oleme totaalkaitseks valmis. – Riigikaitse, 19.12. <<http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/12/19/meelis-kiili-tulevikus-oleme-totaalkaitseks-valmis/>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>55</sup> **Malevad** (arhiivifail) 2004. <<http://archive.is/ns1GL>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>56</sup> **Muld, Urmas** 2005. Uut Kaitsealiidus 2005. aastal. – Kaitse Kodu!, 1/2, lk 6–7. <<http://www.kaitsealiit.ee/files/kaitsealiit/img/files/KK2005-1-2.pdf>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>57</sup> Telefoniintervjuu anonüümseks jääda soovinud Kaitsealiidu vanemohvitseriga, 24.03.2014.

kõik malevad iseseisvad juriidilised isikud, siis tekitas teistes malevates pahameelt see, et kellelegi antakse suuremad privileegid. Halvenevad suhted ei saa kunagi olla tõhusa koostöö alus ja seetõttu leidis juhtmalevate idee vähest toetust. Siiski märkis intervjuueeritav, et idee kui selline oli hea ja see võiks praeguses olukorras toimida. Esiteks ei ole Kaitseliidu malevad enam iseseisvad struktuuriüksused ega juriidilised isikud ja teiseks on uuenenud isikkoosseisuga malevate staapides nüüdseks parem arusaam koostöö olulisusest.<sup>58</sup>

Tuleb märkida, et ei maakaitsestaapi ega maakaitseringkondi pole teemakohastes seadustes (nt Kaitseväe korralduse seadus, Kaitseliidu seadus, riigikaitse seaduse eelnõu) struktuuriüksustena mainitudki. Neid pole siiani nimeetatud üheski õiguslikku tähendust omavas dokumendis. Selline määramatus võib tekitada tõsisid juriidilisi probleeme koosseisu, ülesannete, volituste jms osas<sup>59</sup>.

Brigaade puudutavas seisab Kaitseväe koduleheküljel järgnev info:

„1. jalaväebrigaad areneb löögijõuliseks mehhaniseeritud brigaadiks. 1. jalaväebrigaad varustatakse ja relvastatakse täielikult ning selles arendatakse välja soomusmanöövervõime. 1. jalaväebrigaad saab omale ühe jalaväe lahingumasinatel pataljoni, kaks soomustransportööridel pataljoni, iseliikuvate suurtükkide pataljoni ning kõik vajalikud toetusüksused. Brigaadi koosseisus olev elukutseline Scoutspataljon saab moodsad jalaväe lahingumasinad, ülejäänud brigaadi manööverpataljonid varustatakse soomukitega. 2022. aastaks luuakse ja arendatakse täielikult välja ka 2. jalaväebrigaad staabiga Võrus, mis tõstab oluliselt Kaitseväe tulejõudu ning kiirreageerimisvõimet. Tegu on motoriseeritud brigaadiga, millel on täielikult mehitatud ja varustatud üksused.”<sup>60</sup>

Teema lõpetuseks tuleb vaadelda ka reformi ametlike põhjendusi: miks oli tarvis kogu juhtimisstruktuur niivõrd oluliselt ringi teha? Arengukava nimetab peamiste argumentidena, et „[t]ulenevalt ohuhinnangutest on vaja luua reaalselt ja vajadusel kiirelt reageerivad üksused. Täna on kiirreageerimisvõime puudulik. Uue arengukavaga suureneb sõjalise kaitse juhtimise efektiivsus ning väheneb bürokraatia. Samuti suureneb tugiteenuste efektiivsus.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Kaitseringkondadel olid põhimäärused (autori märkus). Vt [www.riigiteataja.ee](http://www.riigiteataja.ee), märksõna *kaitseringkond*.

<sup>60</sup> **Arengukava** 2013–2022. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/kaitsevagi/riigikaitse-arengukava>>, (14.10.2014).

Lisaks ei olnud eelmine arengukava täiel määral elluviidav, kuna vahepealne majanduskriis vähendas planeeritud raha rohkem kui kolmandiku võrra.<sup>61</sup>

Kokkuvõtlikult on arengukavas võimalik eristada nelja valdkonda, millega muudatusvajadust põhjendatakse:

- 1) kiirreageerimisvõime paranemine;
- 2) efektiivsem sõjaväeline juhtimine ja vähenev bürokraatia;
- 3) tõhusam tugiteenuste võrgustik;
- 4) majanduslik ökonoomsus.

Nimetatud neljast argumendist on dokumendis vaid viimane selgelt ja faktiliselt põhjendatud, mis siiski ei tõesta mingil viisil, et eelmine juhtimismudel oleks iseenesest olnud liigselt kulukas. Esimese kolme kohta puudub aga arengukavas igasugune selgitus, milliste kaalutluste tulemusel neile järeldustele jõuti.

Kaitseväge korralduse seaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri kinnitab, et muudatuste tõttu „[p]araneb Kaitseväge juhtimine ning suureneb selle efektiivsus. Seadusemuudatuse põhieesmärk on koondada sarnased funktsioonid ühte struktuuriüksusesse, lühendada käsuliini ja vähendada erinevaid juhtimistasandeid. Sellega kaasneb ülesannete täitmise efektiivsuse tõus ning olemasoleva personali optimaalsem kasutamine.”<sup>62</sup> Seletuskirja põhjendused jäävad paraku loosunglikeks, sest ühtegi sisulist selgitust, kuidas lubatu tegelikkuses realiseerub, kirjas ei ole.

Lõpetuseks tuleb tuua välja ka juriidiline ebakõla Kaitseväge ja Kaitseliidu vahel. Nimelt ei sätesta kehtiv Kaitseväge korralduse seadus Kaitseliidu ülema vahetut allumist Kaitseväge juhatajale<sup>63</sup>. Fakt on see, et Kaitseväge korralduse seadus ei maini Kaitseliitu mitte üheski sättes. Samas määrab Kaitseliidu seadus Kaitseliidu ülema Kaitseväge juhataja vahetuks alluvaks, kusjuures ka viimasel on seoses Kaitseliiduga erinevaid ülesandeid<sup>64</sup>. Ebakõlaga on tegemist seetõttu, et Kaitseväge korralduse seadus peaks ka ise selgelt kinnitama,

<sup>61</sup> Arengukava 2013–2011, lk 1, 3, 5.

<sup>62</sup> Seletuskiri kaitseväge korralduse seaduse muutmise ja sellega seondult teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu juurde 2013. – Riigikogu, 24.09, lk 17. <[http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?op=emsplain&page=pub\\_file&file\\_id=c0fd94b6-698e-49e5-b2f8-59be766c0d08&](http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?op=emsplain&page=pub_file&file_id=c0fd94b6-698e-49e5-b2f8-59be766c0d08&)>, (25.12.2013). [Edaspidi *Seletuskiri 2013*]

<sup>63</sup> Kaitseväge korralduse seadus, § 23, lg 1. – RT I, 2008, 35, 213. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/123042014004>>, (13.10.2014).

<sup>64</sup> Kaitseliidu seadus, § 11, lg 1; § 12. – RT I, 20.03.2013. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/121062014052>>, (13.10.2104).

et Kaitseleidu ülem allub vahetult Kaitseväe juhatajale, ja samuti vähemalt viitama Kaitseväe juhataja ülesannetele seoses Kaitseleiduga.

### 2.3. Kriitikud ja nende vastuväited

Eelmine Kaitseväe juhataja erukindral Ants Laaneots on nimetanud plaani otsesõnu toimiva juhtimissüsteemi lõhkumiseks ja territoriaalkaitse sisuliseks likvideerimiseks. Tema väitel ei saa nii olulist vastutust panna Kaitseleidu kui peamiselt vabatahtlikest koosneva organisatsiooni õlule.<sup>65</sup> Laaneots jääb siiski avalikkusega suheldes suhteliselt reserveerituks, kuid on esitanud oma eriarvamuse kirjalikult peaministrile<sup>66</sup>. Autor intervjueris erukindralit, et saada tema eriarvamustest põhjalikumat ülevaadet.

Laaneots on endiselt seisukohal, et arengukavas plaanitud muudatused tähendavad senise kaitsevõime lammutamist. Muudatus on poliitiline otsus, mis ignoreerib sõjaväelise juhtimise ja Kaitseväe sõjaaja koosseisule ülemineku printsiipe. Kaitseringkondade loomise mõte oli juba rahuajal hajutatud juhtimise õpetamine ja harjutamine ehk detsentraliseeritud sõjapidamisvõime loomine. Vastane püüab alati kõigepealt hävitada kõrgemat staapi, seega tuli luua iseseisva juhtimise eeldused ringkondlikul tasandil, kus suudetaks jätkata koordineeritud vastupanu ka siis, kui kõrgemat staapi enam ei ole. See süsteem on praeguseks lõhutatud – kaitseringkondade staabid on juba oma tegevuse lõpetanud.<sup>67</sup>

Laaneotsa hinnangul ei ole põhjendus, et vana süsteemi väljaarendamiseks puudus raha, argumenteeritud. Tõepoolest: majanduslangus aastatel 2008–2009 nullis ligi 30% plaanitud kaitse-eelarvest, kuid vahendite vähenemine ei õigusta kuidagi juhtumismudeli kardinaalset muutmist. Üksuste mehitamist ja hankeid oleks saanud hajutada pikemale perioodile, kuid see ei pea tähendama juhtimisskeemi põhimõttelist muutmist. Erukindral võrdleb olukorda multifunktsionaalse maja ehitamisega, kus on arvestatud kõikvõimalikke tulevikuvajadusi. Ehitus algas 2007. aastal, vundament sai valatud, seinad olid juba püsti ja katus peal. Ootamatult väheneb eelarve. Mõistlik ehitaja pikendab ajaraami ja tegutseb rahulikult võimaluste piires edasi. Praegu aga

<sup>65</sup> **Kaio, Heidit** 2013. Ants Laaneots: ma olen eluaeg õppinud ründama. – Eesti Päevaleht, 06.06. <<http://epl.delfi.ee/news/lp/ants-laaneots-ma-olen-eluaeg-oppinud-rundama.d?id=66399210>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>66</sup> **Laaneots, Ants** 2013a. Kaitseringkondade juhtimine pole kaitseleidule jõukohane. – Delfi.ee, 24.01. <<http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/laaneots-kaitseringkondade-juhtimine-pole-kaitseleidule-joukohane.d?id=65578542>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>67</sup> **Laaneots** 2013b.

leiam end olukorrast, kus on lammutatud kogu senine konstruktsioon koos vundamendiga ning hakatud ehitama uut, väiksemat ja vajadustele tegelikult mittevastavat maja alates uuest vundamendist. Rahaline ja ajakulu on tegelikult suuremad, kui oleks olnud seni ettevõtetu jätkamisel.<sup>68</sup>

Laaneots toob esile ka fakti, et 2010. aastal loodud ja põhjalikult läbi mõeldud kaitseüsteem kui tervik oli aluseks NATO kaitseplaanide loomisel, mis nägid ette, et häda korral tullakse Eestile appi. Lisaks võrdleb ta praegust olukorda ja uut mudelit Gruusia strateegia- ja operatsioonitasandi vigadega 2008. aasta sõjas. Eriti teravalt tulid juhtimisprobleemid esile poliitikute sekkumisel sõjaväelisse juhtimisse. Selle tulemusel puudus lõpuks selge juht, kes oleks suutnud lahingutegevust sünkroniseerida. Gruusia vägede olukord muutus kiiresti kaoseks ja selle tulemusel kadus võime osutada kooskõlastatult vastupanu. Sama olukord võib tulevikus korduda ka Eestiga.<sup>69</sup>

Negatiivne on Laaneotsa hinnang ka maaväe staabi likvideerimisele. Tema arvates toimub sel moel sõjatasandite (strateegia- ja operatsioonitasand) ohtlik segunemine, mis võib tekitada samu tagajärgi nagu Gruusias. Eesti on väike riik, millel puudub „operatiivsügavus”. Kuna agressor püüab alati sooritada üllatusrännakut, siis peab juba rahuajal olema olemas toimiv juhtimissüsteem. Maaväe staap oli selle süsteemi oluline osa.<sup>70</sup>

Samuti ei näe erukindral mõtet uue seadusega loodud toetuse väejuhatusel. Uue kava järgi koondatakse mobilisatsioon ja formeerimine seni ringkondadesse plaanitud kaheksa formeerimiskeskuse asemel kahte. See on Laaneotsa hinnangul ohtlik. Esiteks pikeneb oluliselt reservväelaste saabumise ja ka varustamisele kuluv aeg, kuna paljudel tuleb liikuda kohale kaugemalt. Seega pikeneb oluliselt reservüksuste üleviimine sõjaaja koosseisu. Teiseks on siiani selgusetu, kelle alluvusse määratakse need mobiliseeritavad reservüksused, kes ei kuulu kummagi brigaadi koosseisu. Neid üksusi tuleb pidevalt juurde, kuid brigaadide koosseis on piiratud. Olukord on reservväelaste suhtes niisiis nüüd samasugune, nagu see oli Kaitseväge taasloomise esimesel kümnendil.<sup>71</sup>

Laaneotsa järgi ei ole realistlikult hinnatud Kaitseväe võimet võtta üle kaitseringkondade ülesandeid maakaitseringkondadena. Esiteks ei olnud isegi Kaitseväes piisavat ohvitseri selleks, et mehitada kaitseringkondade staabid vajaliku kiirusega, Kaitseväe ülemkõrgkõrge staabi ülem, kes ei võimalda sel

---

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

olla arvestatav vastane agressori mehhaniseeritud üksuste ja dessantide vastu. Uus plaan tähendab, et sõja korral keskendub üks brigaad Narva ja teine Võru suunale. Kuid kes kaitseb ülejäänud Eestit? Kes kaitseb Tallinna? Arengukava ei näe ette operatiivreservi<sup>72</sup>, mis oleks suuteline tegutsema suundades, kus brigaadid ei tegutse.<sup>73</sup>

Lõpetuseks toob erukindral esile veel mõned olulised aspektid, millega uus arengukava tundub vastuollu minevat. Varem oli plaanitud maaväe ülema alluvusse viis üksust: neli kaitseringkonda (territoriaalüksused) ja üks brigaad (manööverüksus), mis on iseenesest optimaalse juhtimisvõime piir.<sup>74</sup> Seejuures on oluline, et kõik reservväelased olid varasemaga juba määratud konkreetsetesse üksustesse või sinna määramisel ning need üksused pidid alluma olemasolevatele staapidele (kas brigaadile või kaitseringkondadele). Uue arengukavaga tekib aga olukord, kus ühest küljest Kaitseväe juhataja juhitavate lahinguüksuste arv langeb kolmele (kaks brigaadi ja Kaitseliit<sup>75</sup>), kuid samas jäävad selgete suunisteta kõik need reservväelased, kelle sõjaaja ametikohad ei ole kas brigaadides või Kaitseliidus. Mobiliseeritute arv väheneb seega oluliselt, mis on sõjalisest seisukohast ebanõistlik.<sup>76</sup>

Teravalt kritiseerib uut juhtimismudelit ka reservkolonelleitnant Leo Kunnas, kelle hinnangud ühtivad peamistes punktides Laaneotsa omadega. Kunnas tuletab meelde, et kogu juhtimissüsteem peab lähtuma kriisi- ja sõjaaja vajadusest. Ta analüüsib võimalikke sõjastenaariume: olukorda, kus Eestit võidakse rünnata mitmest erinevast suunast. Just eelneva tõttu näeb ta suurimat ohtu ringkonnapõhise juhtimisvõime kaotamises. Nimelt on väikeriigi suurim sõjaline risk juhtimise liigne kontsentreerimine. Detsentraliseeritud juhtimist, mida kaitseringkondade staabid võimaldasid, on palju raskem hävitada.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Tõenäoliselt peab Laaneots operatiivreservi all silmas piisavalt tugevat löögivõimelist üksust lisaks brigaadidele olukorras, kus viimased võivad olla seotud vastasega nii kirde kui kagu suunal samal ajal (autori märkus).

<sup>73</sup> Laaneots 2013b.

<sup>74</sup> Sõjaajalugu on tõestanud, et lahinguolukorras suudab ülem juhtida hästi 3–5 üksust.

<sup>75</sup> Kaitseliit hakkab sõja ajal koosnema viiest maakaitseringkonnast, mis peaks oma suuruse ja vastutusala tõttu olema ise brigaadide ekvivalendid (autori märkus).

<sup>76</sup> Laaneots 2013b.

<sup>77</sup> Kunnas, Leo 2013a. Vene ohvitserid itsitavad Eesti sõjalise riigikaitse arengukava vaadates pihku. – Delfi.ee, 22.11. <<http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/arvamus/leo-kunnas-vene-ohvitserid-itsitavad-estti-sojalise-riigikaitse-arengukava-vaadates-pihku.d?id=67143424>>, (25.12.2013).

Kuigi arengukava nimetab kaitseringkondadega toimuvat reorganiseerimiseks, nii et samad ülesanded lähevad üle Kaitseleiidule, ei pea Kunnas seda reaalselt teostuvaks plaaniks. Esiteks puuduvat Kaitseleiidul selleks inimesed ja vahendid. Teiseks tekib tõenäoliselt kaks paralleelset juhtimisliini, millel võib puududa kokkupuutepunkt enne Kaitseväge juhatajani väljajõudmist. Kolmanda olulise ohuna nimetab ta, et nii kaoks raamistik sõjaaja vajadustele vastava süsteemi loomiseks ja uute üksuste ettevalmistamiseks.<sup>78</sup>

Enne arengukava kinnitamist esitas Kunnas oma ettepanekud otse kaitseministrile. Selle mahuka dokumendi pealkiri oli „Nõuanded kaitseministrile „Riigikaitse arenguplaani 2013–2022” koostamiseks”<sup>79</sup>. Soovitused hõlmasid 24 probleemset valdkonda ja nende likvideerimisetpanekuid. Siinkohal tuleb neist vaatluse alla kaitseringkondadega seotu.

Kaitseringkondade olemasolu tagaks Kunnase sõnul juhtimismudeli toimimise ka olukorras, kus vastane hävitab peastaabi või sellest moodustatud juhtimispunktid, kuna on tagatud piisav detsentraliseeritus. Tarbetud on tema hinnangul kõigi kolme väeliigi staabid. Õhu- ja mereväe staabist tuleks moodustada vastavalt õhu- ja rannakaitsejaoskond, kusjuures maaväe staabi ülesanded võtaks enda kanda peastaap. Enamik staapide senistest vastutus-aladest tuleks anda üle kaitseringkondadele, mis praeguseks on juba saavutanud vajaliku võime hallata nende territooriumil asuvaid väeosi.<sup>80</sup>

Veel toob Kunnas esile, et tulenevalt kaitseringkondade paiknemisest on nende ülesanded unikaalsed, ja põhjendab oma väidet näidetega varem Eesti pinnal toimunud sõdadest. Nimelt jäävad alles kaks peamist vastase rünnaku-suunda – kirdest ja kagust –, kuid neile võib Läti nõrga kaitsevõime tõttu lisanduda ka oht lõuna suunal.<sup>81</sup>

Eelnevale tuginedes jõuab Kunnas järeldusele, et kaitseringkonna staabid peavad ülesehituselt olema ühendstaabid ehk operatsioonitasandi staabid. Sõja korral alluksid kaitseringkonna alal asuvad Kaitseleidu malevad kaitseringkonna ülemale, tagades nii mõistlikuma juhtimismudeli – võrreldes võimalusega, et peastaap ise asub otseselt juhtima nii brigaade kui Kaitseleidu 15 malevat.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> **Kunnas, Leo** 2013b. Nõuanded kaitseministrile „Riigikaitse arenguplaani 2013–2022” koostamiseks (järg), <<http://rb.ekspress.ee/webcache/epl/lisanouanne.doc>>, (25.12.2013). [Edaspidi *Kunnas 2013b*]

<sup>80</sup> **Kunnas** 2013b, lk 10.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, lk 11.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

Kokkuvõtvalt põhjendab Kunnas kaitseringkondade mudeli olulisust väitega, et „juhtimise liigne kontsentreerimine ja territoriaalse juhtimisstruktuuri puudumine muudaks Eesti suurriigile ideaalvastaseks. 1979. aastal halvastid Nõukogude armee eriuksused teatavasti eduka operatsiooniga Afganistani poliitilise ja sõjaväejuhtkonna ning sisuliselt kaaperdasid riigi. See osutus võimalikuks tänu liigselt kontsentreeritud juhtimismudelile. Meil ei oleks mõistlik sama viga korrata.”<sup>83</sup>

#### 2.4. Teiste riigikaitsega seotud autoriteetide arvamused ja selgitused

Septembris Eestit külastanud USA Euroopa vägede ülem kindral Philip Breedlove märkis, et „Eesti riigikaitse arengukava on tunnustust vääri, kuna võtab arvesse lähiaja rahalisi ja arenguperspektiive”<sup>84</sup>. Kindrali arvamust on siinkohal siiski raske hinnata, sest ei ole teada, kui põhjalik ülevaade talle anti.

Detsembris Eestit väisanud Soome kaitseväge juhataja läks konkreetsemaks, leides, et „[n]ii Eesti kui Soome kaitseväge teevad praegu sarnaseid ümberkorraldusi, et muuta kaitseväge juhtimine tõhusamaks ja säästlikumaks: mõlemad on muutnud ringkondade juhtimist, koondavad staape ja logistilisi võimekusi ning kasutavad efektiivselt tehnilisi lahendusi”<sup>85</sup>.

Tõepoolest, Soome relvajõudude kodulehelt leiab info, et kaitseringkonnad (*Sotilasläänit*) ja nende staabid kaovad hiljemalt aastaks 2015<sup>86</sup>. Mitmed allüksused on plaanis viia brigaadide alluvusse ja kokkuvõttes on ette nähtud, et Soome maavägi hakkab koosnema maaväge staabist, kellele alluvad seitse brigaadi ning maasõjakool. Maavägi vastutab terve riigi territooriumi kaitse eest.<sup>87</sup>

Siiski ei ole tegu päris sarnase arengusuunaga mis Eestis. Maaväge staap jääb alles ja läänide funktsioonid võtavad üle brigaadid oma praegustel vastutuseladel. Kokkuvõttes jääb kogu maapealse sõjategevuse eest üheselt

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> **USA Euroopa vägede ülem: Eesti riigikaitse arengukava on näide targast kaitsest.** Kaitseväge pressiteade, 19.09.2013. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/7848>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>85</sup> **Soome kaitseväge juhataja: riigikaitse ümberkorraldus Soomes ja Eestis teenib sama eesmärki.** Kaitseväge pressiteade, 13.12.2013. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/7990/soome-kaitsev%C3%A4e-juhataja:-riigikaitse-%C3%BCmberkorraldus-soomes-ja-eestis-teenib-sama-eesm%C3%A4rki>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>86</sup> **Perustietoa, Puolustusvoimat uudistuu 2015.** <<http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>87</sup> **Rakenne ja henkilöstö vuonna 2015.** <<http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi>>, (25.12.2013).

vastutama Soome maavägi, kusjuures kiirreageerimisjõude ja territoriaal-kaitseüksusi ei eristata.

Brigaadikindral Peeter Hoppe, Kaitseväge peastaabi ülem aastatel 2011–2013, andis arengukava peamistest muudatustest ülevaate veebruaris 2013 ASi Eesti Ajalehed väljaantavas erilehes Riigikaitse. Ta selgitab, et uus „arengukava loob eeldused arendada Kaitseväge kaalutletult ja vastutustundlikult”<sup>88</sup>. Hoppe väidab, et just julgeolekukeskkonna muutused tingisidki vajaduse asetada rõhk kiirreageerimisüksustele. Teiseks argumendiks on eesmärk muuta kiiremaks üleminek rahuaja juhtimiselt sõjaaja juhtimisele, mis eeldab, et rahu- ja sõjaaja struktuurid ning nende toetus oleksid võimalikult sarnased.<sup>89</sup> Samas on peastaabi ülem väitnud vaid aasta varem, mil arengukava tegelikult valmis, et „[o]hustsenaariumeid analüüsides jõudsime eri võimekuste arendamise suhtes samadele järeldustele kui eelmise kümne aasta plaane tehes”<sup>90</sup>. Sellega jääb endiselt arusaamatuks, mis siis ikkagi tingis vajaduse juhtimisstruktuuri kardinaalse muutmise järele.

Hoppele lisaks kinnitab ka Kaitseväge juhataja kindralmajor Riho Terras Kaitseväge aastaraamatus 2012, et „[a]rengukava koostamisel lähtuti sellest, et majandus-, aga ka julgeolekukeskkond on märgatavalt muutunud”<sup>91</sup>. Kahjuks ei selgita Terras, mis konkreetselt niivõrd oluliselt muutus ja mille poolest suudab uus süsteem muutunud oludes paremini toimida.

Kaitseväge juhataja asetäitja kolonel Artur Tiganik, endine maaväe ülem, selgitas ajakirjas Sõdur: „/.../ kui brigaadid manööverdavad, siis maastikul saab neile toeks olla Kaitseleit. Kaitseleidi kohalik üksus võtab brigaadi manööverüksused oma tuttavalt maastikul vastu, aitab orienteeruda ning võtab enda kanda kõik muud funktsioonid, tagab, suhtleb kohalikega jne. See on see Kaitseleidi maakaitseringkond, kes toetab maaväge ja annab manööverüksustele vabad käed tegelemaks sellel alal ainult oma lahinguülesande täitmisega.”<sup>92</sup>

<sup>88</sup> **Hoppe, Peeter** 2013. Muutustest Eesti riigikaitsetes. – Riigikaitse, 21.02. <<http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/02/21/muutustest-est-riigikaitsetes/>>, (25.12.2013). [Edaspidi *Hoppe 2013*]

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> **Ilves: uus riigikaitse arengukava on ambitsioonikas, kuid samas realistlik**. 2012. – Postimees, 10.12. <http://www.postimees.ee/1069958/ilves-uus-riigikaitse-arengukava-on-ambitsioonikas-kuid-samas-realistlik>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>91</sup> **Terras, Riho** 2013. Eessõna. – 2012 aastaraamat. Eesti kaitseväge. Luunja: Greif, lk 5. <[http://issuu.com/kaitsevagi/docs/kaitsevage\\_aastaraamat\\_2012](http://issuu.com/kaitsevagi/docs/kaitsevage_aastaraamat_2012)>, (05.12.2014).

<sup>92</sup> **Jõesaar, Ivar** 2013a. Kaitseväge reformi algatasid väeosade ohvitserid-allohvitserid. – Sõdur, nr 2, lk 8.

Koloneli arutelust saab järeldada, et Kaitseliidu maakaitseringkonnad täidavad sõja ajal põhimõtteliselt samu, kuid eeskätt toetavaid – mitte lahingulisi – ülesandeid, mis on siiani olnud kaitseringkondadel. Siiski ei ühti nimeetatud kontseptsioon sellega, kuidas määratleb ennast Kaitseliit ise ja millele on suunatud selle väljaõpe<sup>93</sup>. Lahingutegevuse raamnduetest tulenevalt peab just Kaitseliidu võtma enda kanda suure osa kujundavatest operatsioonidest, et sundida vastast paljastama oma nõrku külgi ajas ja ruumis, mis omakorda loob brigaadidele võimaluse anda otsustavaid lööke. Kaitseliidu ülesandeid maakaitse kirjeldab sarnaselt erukindral Laaneots<sup>94</sup>.

Isegi kui Kaitseväe seisukoht on praeguseks muutunud, jääb endiselt küsitavaks alluvusvahekord ehk käsuliin brigaadide ja Kaitseliidu allüksuste vahel. Juhtimismudeli tõrgeteta toimimine on kahtlane, kui seda tehakse distantsilt, näiteks juhtides Tallinna piirkonnast, kus puudub vahetu lahinguväljatunnetus. Lisaks pikeneb maakaitsestaabi kaasamisel käsuliin, mis vähendab omakorda lahingutempot. Need kaks ilmingut on aga vastuolus manööversõjapidamise põhimõtetega.

Kaitseliidu ülem brigaadikindral Meelis Kiili tõdes novembris 2013 ilmunud ajakirjas Sõdur, et Kaitseliit ei saa kõiki kaitseringkonna ülesandeid üle võtta juba seadusest tulenevate piirangute tõttu. Kiili eeldab, et organisatsioon võtab üle „kodurahu-, sisekaitse- ja operatiivplaanid, aga ei võta mobilisatsiooni- ega formeerimisplaanid”.<sup>95</sup> Ta tõdeb, et täpseid ülesannete jaotuse plaane selle kohta, mis jääb Kaitseliidule ja mis läheb üle toetusväejuhatusele, ei ole veel tehtud<sup>96</sup>.

Kiili nimetab samuti, et tegemist ei ole kaitseringkondade ülevõtmisega, vaid uute struktuuride moodustamisega vastavalt püstitatud ülesandele: „[k]ui oleks tegu ülevõtmisega, oleksin läinud kohale ja võtnud üle inimesed, taristu ja ülesanded. Meie saime ülesande moodustada üks maakaitsepiirkond järgmisel [2014] aastal. Me alustame nende loomist otsast peale. Me alles koostame kontseptsiooni, kuidas seda ringkondlikku juhtimist tegema hakkame. Esimese ringkonna teeme kindlasti pilootprojektina. Me ei loo endale illusioone. Tegevväelaste hulk, mis meile on antud, on väike. Meil pole muud võimalust kui integreerida oma ülesannete täitmiseks reserv-

<sup>93</sup> Olles ise aktiivne Kaitseliidu liige ja instruktor, saan väita, et pea kogu väljaõpe on suunatud lahingulistele, mitte muul moel toetavatele tegevustele.

<sup>94</sup> Laaneots 2000a, lk 6.

<sup>95</sup> Jõesaar, Ivar 2013b. Kaitseliidu tugevus on selle unikaalsus. – Sõdur, nr 5, lk 12. [Edaspidi Jõesaar 2013b]

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

ohvitserid. Looma tuumiku, selle ümber loome ringi sõjaaja paigutusega reservohvitseri-allohvitseri, kes pole pidevalt tegevad, vaid on hõivatud vastavalt väljaõppevajadustele ja loomulikult nii kriisi kui ka sõja ajal. Kui meile antakse adekvaatne ressurs ja meie oleme ise võimelised organisatsiooni sees seda kompetentsi kasvatama, siis saame hakkama.”<sup>97</sup>

Brigaadikindral kinnitab niisiis fakti, et sel hetkel veel ametlikult toimunud kaitseringkondi ei plaanitud anda üle Kaitseleidule, vaid kästi õigupoolest luua samad struktuurid uuesti. Intervjuust ei selgu siiski, mis on olnud sellise otsuse eesmärk ja kuidas see aitab kaasa riigikaitse kui terviku arengule.

Lisaks andis Kaitseleidu ülem intervjuu detsembris 2013 ilmunud erilehele Riigikaitse. Ta kinnitas, et kaitseringkondade senised toimimisprintsipiibid jäävad kehtima. Peamine vahe on vaid selles, et „[m]aakaitseringkonnad tähendavad lihtsalt regionaalset juhtimist ja need on sõja või kriisi ajal aktiveeritavad”<sup>98</sup>. Samas tunnistas Kiili, et Kaitseväes on suur puudus ühendoperatsioonide planeerimise kogemusega ohvitseridest. „Mul on vaja 15–20 aastase kogemusega inimesi, kes on head planeerijad, kes mõistavad, mida tähendab ühendrelvaliikide tegevuse planeerimine ja ühendoperatsioonide planeerimine laiapindse riigikaitse mõistes.” Brigaadikindrali hinnangul on tal vaja juurde vähemalt 40 ohvitseri ja pidevalt on käimas võitlus Kaitsevägega inimressursi pärast.<sup>99</sup>

### 3. Arutelu

Varem oli sõjaaegne käsuliin selline, et Kaitseväge juhataja otsealluvuses olid maa-, mere- ja õhuväge ülem. Kuigi Kaitseleidu ülem oli käsuliinis viimastega võrdsel kohal, oleks tal sõjaajal arvestatavad allüksused puudunud, sest need pidid liikuma kaitseringkondade alluvusse. Maaväge ülem juhtinuks 1. brigaadi ülemat ja nelja kaitseringkonna ülemat (viis juhitud alluvat<sup>100</sup>). Ringkondade ülemad oleksid pidanud juhtima kõiki oma ringkonnas paiknevaid väeosi (v.a brigaadi), reservüksusi ja sõja korral Kaitseleidu allüksuseid.<sup>101</sup>


<sup>97</sup> Jõesaar 2013b, lk 12, 14.

<sup>98</sup> Simson, Priit 2013. Meelis Kiili: tulevikus oleme totaalkaitseks valmis. – Riigikaitse, 19.12. <<http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/12/19/meelis-kiili-tulevikus-oleme-totaalkaitseks-valmis/>>, (25.12.2013).

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Kaitseringkondi saab tegelikult nimetada manööverüksusteks, kuna nende peamine eesmärk oli vahetu võitlus vastasega. Vt ka manööverüksuse definitsiooni sõjandusterminoloogia andmebaasis Militerm: <<http://mt.legaltext.ee/militerm/>>, (13.10.2104).

<sup>101</sup> Vt Joonis 1.



Joonis 1. Kaitseväe struktuur enne uue arengukava kehtima hakkamist<sup>102</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Hoppe, Peeter 2014. Muutustest Eesti riigikaitse. – Riigikaitse, 21.02. <<http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/02/21/muutustest-est-riigikaitse/>>, (13.10.2014). Ringiga on tähistatud Kaitseväe juhataja otsealluvuses olnud manööverüksused. Kaitseväe juhataja juhtis niisiis kolme väeliiki ja maaväe ülem viit manööverüksust. Kaitseleitide allüksused olid sõja korral allutatud kaitseringkondadele, seega ei saanud tekkida dubleerivat käsuliini.

Suurim ebakõla oli tõenäoliselt Kaitseliidu malevate ja nende allüksuste ebaselge kaasatus kaitseringkonna koostööharjutustesse, kuid vähemalt oli selge sõjaaja alluvussuhe (allutatud kaitseringkonna ülemale). Probleemsed kohad olid siiski Kaitseliidu ülema ja tema staabi sõjaaja ülesanded ning malevate staapide ja allüksuste ebaselge käsuliin kaitseringkonna ülemaga rahu ajal.<sup>103</sup>

Siiski oli täidetud sõjaaegne eesliinilt juhtimise nõue ja selgelt määratud alluvusvahekorrad. See omakorda võimaldas hoida lahingutegevuse tempot ning lahendada võimalikke sideprobleeme kasvõi käskjala abil olukorras, kus vastane häirib raadiosidet.

Uus juhtimismudel on maismaaoperatsioonides seega järgmine: Kaitseväge juhatajale alluvad 1. ja 2. brigaadi ülem ning Kaitseliidu ülem. Kaitseliit ei ole brigaadidega võrdne struktuuriüksus, vaid koosneb arengukava järgi viiest maakaitseringkonnast, mis on ise brigaadide ekvivalendid. Seega võib tekkida olukord, kus Kaitseväge juhatajal tuleb tegelikult juhtida kuni kümnet manööverüksust samal ajal, et saavutada maksimaalne sünkroniseeritus ja lahingutempo. Ametlikult peaks maakaitseringkondi juhtima Kaitseliidu ülem, kuid olukorras, kus on tarvis kiirelt koordineerida samas lahinguruumis brigaadi ja maakaitseringkonna allüksuste vastastikust toetust, võib ametlik käsuliin tekitada olulise viivituse. Jooniselt ei ole võimalik välja lugeda ülejäänud reservväelaste (nende, kes ei kuulu brigaadidesse, Kaitseliitu ega toetavatesse struktuuriüksustesse) alluvussuhet sõja korral.



Joonis 2. Kaitseväge struktuur alates 2014. aasta 1. augustist<sup>104</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Herem 2013, 2014.

<sup>104</sup> Kaitseväge struktuur 2014.

<<http://www.mil.ee/et/kaitsevagi/organisatsioon/struktuur>>, (13.10.2104). Kaitseväge juhataja vahetus alluvuses on niisiis kuus allüksust (joonisel tähistatud ringiga).

Kehtiva arengukavaga tekib siiski tõsine probleem: kes on maakaitseringkondade vahetu ülem – kas Kaitseväe juhataja või Kaitseliidu ülem? Arengukava järgi tuleks Kaitseliidul luua maakaitsestaap, mille ülesanne peaks eeldustele tuginedes olema maakaitseringkondade vahetu juhtimine. Seega peab kehtiva struktuuri järgi Kaitseväe juhataja või tema volitatud ülem juhtima ka maakaitseringkondade tegevust, sealhulgas koordineerima oma vastutusalas (Kaitseliidu maakaitsestaabi kaudu) viimaste ja brigaadide koostööd. Niisiis tekib uus vahelüli, mis suure tõenäosusega pikendab oluliselt üksuste reageerimisaega. Viimane omakorda võib seada ohtu lahingutempo, mis on eduka lahingutegevuse üks alustalasid<sup>105</sup>. Käsuliin on seega vaid näiliselt lühem ja ökonoomsem.

Uue juhtimismudeliga ei tundu ka paranevat brigaadide ja Kaitseliidu koostöö operatsioonitasandil, samuti mitte taktikatasandi väljaõppes, mis oli üks kolonel Heremi esiletõudud puudus ka varasemas struktuuris. Pigem võib väheneda praegunegi koostöö, kuna edaspidi puudub selge rahuaegne ringkondlik planeerija ja koordineerija, kelleks oli varem kaitseringkonna ülem. See, kas Kaitseliidu malevate baasil loodavad maakaitseringkonnad suudavad koordineerida Kaitseväe allüksuste tegevusi ja koostööd maleva allüksusega rahu ajal ning saavad ka vastavad õigused, ei ole praeguseks selge. Iga lisaülesanne aga nõuab inimeste lisaaega ja -energiat. Juhul kui maakaitseringkondade ülesandeid täitvaid malevad ei saa juurde hea väljaõppega tegevteenistujaid, nagu soovib Kaitseliidu ülem, siis ei ole uue juhtimismudeli toimimise hakkamine realistlik.


Kõigest eelöeldust tulenevalt võib uus, näiliselt lühenenud juhtimismudel anda hoopis teistsuguseid tulemusi kui loodetud ning minna vastuollu detsentraliseerituse ja eesliinilt juhtimise põhimõtetega.

Maakaitseringkondade võime vajalikke ülesandeid täita seab kahtluse alla see, et need hakkavad toimima alles kriisi või sõja korral. See on koormus ja ülesannete tase, mis peab olema planeeritud ja harjutatud täies mahus rahu ajal, et oleks olemas süsteemid ning kogemused minimaalsete tõrgetega toimimiseks sõjas.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Vt eespool kirjeldatud ülesandekeskse juhtimise ja lahingutempo hoidmise põhimõtet.

<sup>106</sup> Näiteks on reaalne pedagoogiline põhjus, miks kestab Balti Kaitsekolledžis toimuv operatsioonitasandi ohvitseri kursus 43 nädalat. Vt Baltic Defence College. Course Plan. Joint Command and General Staff Course, Final version 2013–2014, p. 8. <<http://www.bdccl.ee/files/files/courseplans/JCGSC/2013-2014.pdf>>, (13.10.2104).

Maaväe staabi kaotamine iseseisva struktuuriüksusena<sup>107</sup> ja selle funktsioonide liitmine peastaabiga ei pruugi iseenesest pärssivalt mõjuda, nagu leiab Laaneots. Küsimus ei ole staatuses ega paiknemises, vaid juhtimiskultuuris ning määratud volitustes. Praegu ei ole üheselt selge, kes hakkab tegelikult juhtima territoriaalkaitset (brigaadide ja maakaitseringkondade ühisoperatsioone)<sup>108</sup>. Mõistlik oleks anda see ülesanne Kaitseväe juhataja asetäitjale, kelle peamiste ülesannete hulka kuulub üksuste kvaliteetse väljaõppe ja lahinguvalmiduse tagamine<sup>109</sup>.



**Joonis 3.** Üks võimalikest juhtimismudelitest, mis vastaks paremini sõjaväelise juhtimise aluspõhimõtetele

<sup>107</sup> Arengukavas jääb arusaamatuks see, miks ei muudetud osakondadeks mereväe ja õhuväe staabi. Mõlemad on kordades väiksemad kui maavägi ja siinkirjutaja andmeil pole ka plaani nende väeliikide osatähtsust oluliselt suurendada. Praegu jääb mulje, et neid on püütud lihtsalt kunstlikult säilitada. (Autori märkus)

<sup>108</sup> Ametlikult juhib kogu sõjalist kaitsetegevust küll Kaitseväe juhataja, kuid tal on delegerimisõigus, mida oleks mõistlik kasutada ka siinsel juhul. Kaitseväe juhataja tõenäoliselt siiski ei suuda strateegia- ja operatsioonitasandit ainuisikuliselt juhtida. (Autori märkus)

<sup>109</sup> Kaitsevägi. Pressiteade, 01.08.2014. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/8321/kaitsev%C3%A4e-juhataja-aset%C3%A4itja-on-kolonel-artur-tiganik>>, (24.10.2014).

Võttes arvesse, et peastaap ja väeliikide staabid on alates Kaitseväge algusaegadest töötanud koos ühes hoones, siis ei ole karta ka erilist ülesannete ning vastutuste konflikti. Samas tuleb nõustuda, et on vaja hoida lahus peastaabi kui ühendstaabi ja maaväe funktsioonid ning fookus. Selleks võib olla mõistlik luua operatiivosakond, mis allub vahetult Kaitseväge juhataja asetäitjale ning mille ülesanne on keskenduda käimasolevatele operatsioonidele ja väljaõppele. Peastaap jääb sellisel juhul tulevikuoperatsioone planeerima ja kooskõlastab kõigi toetavate struktuuriüksuste tegevust.

Operatiivosakond saaks sel juhul keskenduda maakaitseringkondade ja brigaadide juhtimisele, et oleks tagatud lahingutempo ja maksimaalne mõju. Samas peaks Kaitseväge juhatajale alluv peastaap jälgima sõja kulgu suuremas plaanis. See hõlmaks koostöös liitlastega viimaste tegevuste kooskõlastamist, erioperatsioonide, strateegilise kommunikatsiooni jms korraldamist, pakku- des samas igakülgselt toetust operatiivosakonna ülemale.

Selles mõttes ei ole maaväe staabi või tema funktsioone täitva struktuuriüksuse juriidilises paiknemises probleemi seni, kuni vastutusalad on selgelt eristatavad. Kaitseväge juhataja mitteametlik, kuid ülioluline roll on olla n-ö puhver poliitikute ja lahinguid juhtivate ülemate vahel, et vältida olukordi, mis tekkisid näiteks Gruusia sõjas, kus poliitikud asusid isiklikult lahinguid juhtima.

### Kokkuvõte

Eelnev analüüs püstitab tõsiseid kahtlusi uue arengukava eelistes võrreldes eelmisega. Seatud eesmärgid peaks uue plaani rakendamisel olema võimalik saavutada paremini kui varem, kuid tõendeid selle kohta, et see tõepoolest nii on, paraku napib. Peamised küsitavused ilmnevad lubatud suurema tõhususe ja nende saavutamiseks tehtud struktuurimuudatuste vahel.

Kõneldes juhtimismudeli paremast toimimisest sõja korral, mis oli muudatuste üks olulisemaid eesmärgid, tuleb tõenäoliselt nõustuda nii Laaneotsa kui Kunnase kriitikaga. Uus kava eeldab liigset tsentraliseeritust. Sõjas on üks põhipingutusi alati vastase juhtimissüsteemi hävitamine, seega on risk, et agressori sihtmärgiks saab peastaap. Praegu kehtivas juhtimismudelis jääb küsitavaks maakaitseringkondade võime iseseisvalt lahingutegevust juhtida ja seda nii oma vastutusalal kui ka koostöös teiste maakaitsepiirkondadega. Et eelnimetatud võime loodaks, tuleb maakaitseringkondade staabid mehitada ja neid eesmärgist lähtudes arendada.

Nagu ilmnes, on juhtimismudeli kohatine lühenemine tegelikult vaid näiline. Viimane hakkab omakorda tõenäoliselt oluliselt pikendama otsuste tegemist lahinguväljal ja võib seetõttu seada ohtu initsiatiivi ning lahingu-tegevuste tempo.

Samas ei pruugi eelkirjeldatud ohustsenaarium realiseeruda, kui Kaitseliidu loodavad maakaitseringkonnad saavad sama võimupädevuse, mis oli enne kaitseringkondadel, ja suudavad olla juhtrollis edukad. Juhul, kui nimetatud nõuded täidetakse, peaksid maakaitseringkonnad seega teoorias saama ka endiste kaitseringkondade ülesannetega hakkama. Samas on risk, et juhtimisvõime väheneb teatud perioodiks nii või teisiti, mis on aga eriti ohtlik praegusel pingelisel julgeolekuperioodil.

Mis puutub Kaitseliidu tegelikku võimesse maakaitseülesandeid (sh operatsioonitasandi ülesandeid) täita, siis tuleb esmalt täpsustada Kaitseliidu ülesanded ja vastutusala. Siit lähtub ka tarvidus mehitada maakaitseringkond asjatundliku juhtkonnaga, moodustada allüksused ning hankida tarvilik relvastus ja muu varustus. Inimesed Kaitseliidus ei ole kindlasti vähem võimekad kui Kaitseväes. Seega taandub Kaitseliidu võimete küsimus ikkagi sellele, kas talle Kaitseväe ja Kaitseministeeriumi poolt seatud ülesanded on mõistlikud ning kas Kaitseliidule on antud ka nende elluviimiseks vajalikud vahendid ja toetus.

Maaväe staabi kaotamine iseseisva struktuuriüksusena ei pruugi olla probleem, kuid territoriaalkaitse planeerimiseks ja juhtimiseks on siiski tarvis just sellele ülesandele keskendunud staabielementi, näiteks operatiivosakonda. Viimane peab keskenduma sõjapidamisele Eesti piires ning teda peavad toetama peastaabi muud osakonnad ja teised väeliigid. Peastaabi teiste osakondade põhipingutuseks peab olema strateegiline planeerimine ja organiseerimine, näiteks liitlasvägede appituleku korraldamine ning saabunud vägede sobitamine territoriaalkaitse eest vastutava ülema (Kaitseväe juhataja abi) operatsiooniplaani. Lisaks peavad peastaabi vastutusalas olema vastase territooriumile tehtavad erioperatsioonid, et saavutada vajalikke strateegilisi eesmärke (näiteks ballistiliste raketisüsteemide Iskander-M ja kaugulatusega õhutõrje-raketisüsteemide S-400 hävitamine<sup>110</sup>). Vähem oluline pole ülesanne tagada strateegilise kommunikatsiooni toimimine. Nimetatud teemad vajavad eraldi analüüsi.

<sup>110</sup> **Kaas, Kaarel** 2014. Venemaa relvajõud Läänemere piirkonnas. – *Diplomaatia*, nr 130/131, juuni/juuli. <<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/venemaa-relvajoud-laanemere-piirkonnas/>>, (24.10.2014).

Eelnev jaotus on oluline, et hoida strateegia- ja operatsioonitasand eraldatuna, kuid samas piisavalt võimekatena ning teineteist toetavatena. Kaitseväge juhataja abi määramine territoriaalkaitse ülemaks annab hea aluse pidevaks kommunikatsiooniks kõrgeimal juhtimistasandil ning aitab tõenäoliselt kaasa kiirete ja oluliste otsuste langetamisele. Kaitseleidiu ülem ja temale alluv maakaitsestaap peavad olema tihedalt seotud operatiivosakonnaga ning Kaitseleidiu ülem peaks olema territoriaalkaitse ülema lähim abi.

Lõpetuseks tuleb tõdeda, et kindral Laaneotsa ja kolonelleitnant Kunnase mure ning kriitika võitlusvõime nõrgenemise pärast on tõenäoliselt õigustatud. Uus struktuur hakkab liigse tsentraliseerituse tõttu raskendama edukat võitlust. Teiseks loob see ohtliku lünga niigi keerulisel ajaperioodil: üleminekufaasis Kaitseväge kaitseringkondadelt Kaitseleidiu juhitavatele maakaitseringkondadele. Seejuures ei ole viimaste staapidele tõenäoliselt plaanitud lähitulevikus anda sarnast võimupädevust ega eelarvet, mis oli kaitseringkondadel. Kolmandaks mõjub riigikaitse professionaalide avalik vaidlus negatiivselt kogu rahva kaitsetahtele ning psühholoogilisele valmisolekule oma riiki kaitsta. Kehva plaani on vaja kritiseerida, kuid seda tuleks teha professionaalide ringis mõistlikult argumenteerides ja üksteise seisukohtadest lugu pidades. Siinkohal teen Kaitseministeeriumile ettepaneku kutsuda kokku riigikaitse arengukava foorum, mis koosneb asjatundlikest (sh endistest) kaitseväelastest ning kus nii uue kava arendajad kui kritiseerijad saaksid konstruktiivses õhkkonnas koos leida senisest paremaid lahendusi. Eesmärk on kõigil ju üks – parimal võimalikul viisil kaitstud Eesti.

### Kirjandus

- Baltic Defence College** 2013–2014. Course Plan. Joint Command and General Staff Course, Final version 2013–2014. <<http://www.bdcol.ee/files/files/courseplans/JCGSC/2013-2014.pdf>>, (13.10.2014).
- Beaufre, André** 1965. Introduction to Strategy. London: Faber and Faber.
- Department of the Army. ARDP 3-0 Unified Land Operations**, May 2012. <[http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR\\_pubs/dr\\_a/pdf/adrp3\\_0.pdf](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf)>, (25.12.2013).
- Eesti Kaitseväge maaväge lahingutegevuse alused** 2010. Koost Enno Mõts. Tartu: KVÜÕA. <[http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/maav2e-taktikaline-lahingutegevus\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/maav2e-taktikaline-lahingutegevus_2010.pdf)>, (14.10.2014).
- Guderian, Heinz** 2009. Ühe sõduri mälestused. Tallinn: Olion.
- Hoppe, Peeter** 2013. Muutustest Eesti riigikaitstes. – Riigikaitse, 21.02. <<http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/02/21/muutustest-est-riigikaitstes/>>, (25.12.2013).
- Huggler, Justin** 2014. Putin 'privately threatened to invade Poland, Romania and the Baltic states'. – The Telegraph, 18.09. <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/>>

- worldnews/europe/russia/11106195/Putin-privately-threatened-to-invade-Poland-Romania-and-the-Baltic-states.html >, (13.10.2104).
- Ilves: uus riigikaitse arengukava on ambitsioonikas, kuid samas realistlik.** 2012. – Postimees, 10.12.  
<<http://www.postimees.ee/1069958/ilves-uus-riigikaitse-arengukava-on-ambitsioonikas-kuid-samas-realistlik>>, (25.12.2013).
- Jõesaar, Ivar** 2013a. Kaitseväge reformi algatasid väeosade ohvitserid-allohvitserid. – Sõdur, nr 2, lk 6–11.
- Jõesaar, Ivar** 2013b. Kaitseväe tugevus on selle unikaalsus. – Sõdur, nr 5, lk 10–14.
- Kaas, Kaarel** 2009. Georgia lahingute sõjalised paradoksid. – Diplomaatia, 25.09.  
<<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/georgia-lahingute-sojalised-paradoksid/>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kaas, Kaarel** 2014. Venemaa relvajõud Läänemere piirkonnas. – Diplomaatia, nr 130/131, juuni/juuli. <<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/venemaa-relvajouddaanemere-piirkonnas/>>, (24.10.2014).
- Kaio, Heidit** 2013. Ants Laaneots: ma olen eluaeg õppinud ründama. – Eesti Päevaleht, 06.06. <<http://epl.delfi.ee/news/lp/ants-laaneots-ma-olen-eluaeg-oppinud-rundama.d?id=66399210>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kaitseväe Maakaitsestaap liitub Kevadtormiga** 2014. Kaitseväe pressiteade. <<http://www.kaitsevaet.ee/et/kaitsevaet-maakaitsestaap-liitub-kevadtormiga>>, (13.10.2014).
- Kaitseväe seadus.** – RT I, 20.03.2013.  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/121062014052>>, (13.10.2104).
- Kaitseringkondade moodustamine ja nende staapide formeerimine.** – RT I, 1998, 28, 374. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/74910>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kaitseväe juhataja asetäitja on kolonel Artur Tiganik.** Kaitseväe pressiteade, 01.08.2014. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/8321/kaitsev%C3%A4e-juhataja-aset%C3%A4itja-on-kolonel-artur-tiganik>>, (24.10.2014).
- Kaitseväe korralduse seadus.** – RT I, 14.03.2014, 36. <<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032014036>>, (13.10.2014).
- Kaitseväe korralduse seadus.** – RT I, 2008, 35, 213,  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/123042014004>>, (13.10.2014).
- Kaitseväe korralduse seadus.** – RT I, 20.03.2013, 18,  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/120032013018>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kaitseväe struktuur** 2014.  
<<http://www.mil.ee/et/kaitsevagi/organisatsioon/struktuur>>, (13.10.2104).
- Kaitseväe struktuur ja paiknemine.** – RT I, 2002, 44, 290,  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/110031>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kaitseväe ülesehitus.** – RT I, 2002, 44, 290.  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/12856223>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kirde Kaitseringkonna põhimäärus.** – RT lisa, 2008, 104, 1491,  
<<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13352503>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kunnas, Leo** 2013a. Vene ohvitserid itsitavad Eesti sõjalise riigikaitse arengukava vaadates pihku. – Delfi.ee, 22.11.2013.

- <<http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/arvamus/leo-kunnas-vene-ohvitserid-itsitavad-estli-sojalise-riigikaitse-arengukava-vaadates-pihku.d?id=67143424>>, (25.12.2013).
- Kunnas, Leo** 2013b. Nõuanded kaitseministrile „Riigikaitse arenguplaani 2013–2022” koostamiseks (järg). <<http://rb.ekspress.ee/webcache/epl/lisanouanne.doc>>, (25.12.2013).
- Laaneots, Ants** 1995. Tahad rahu – valmistu sõjaks. – Kaitse Kodu!, detsember. <[http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK1995\\_nr\\_2\\_lk\\_34-37.pdf](http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK1995_nr_2_lk_34-37.pdf)>, (25.12.2013).
- Laaneots, Ants** 2000a. Territoriaalkaitse – relvastatud rahva strateegia. – Kaitse Kodu!, november. <[http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000\\_nr\\_5\\_lk\\_5-11.pdf](http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000_nr_5_lk_5-11.pdf)>, (23.10.2014).
- Laaneots, Ants** 2000b. Kaitseringkond ja tema ülesanded. – Kaitse Kodu!, veebruar. <[http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000\\_nr\\_1\\_lk\\_5-8.pdf](http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2000_nr_1_lk_5-8.pdf)>, (25.12.2013).
- Laaneots, Ants** 2012. Venemaa kasvatab muskleid. – Postimees, 08.04. <<http://arvamus.postimees.ee/799456/ants-laaneots-venemaa-kasvatab-muskleid>>, (25.12.2013).
- Laaneots, Ants** 2013a. Kaitseringkondade juhtimine pole kaitseliidule jõukohane. – Delfi.ee, 24.01. <<http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/estli/laaneots-kaitseringkondade-juhtimine-pole-kaitseliidule-joukohane.d?id=65578542>>, (25.12.2013).
- Laar, Mart** 2013. Vene-Gruusia sõda – 10 õppetundi Eestile. – Postimees, 09.08. <<http://arvamus.postimees.ee/1326502/mart-laar-vene-gruusia-soda-10-oppe-tundi-esttile>>, (25.12.2013).
- Lind, William S.** 2014. Manööversõjapidamise käsiraamat. Tartu: Aburgus.
- Malevad** (arhiivifail) 2004. Kaitseliidu veebileht. <<http://archive.is/ns1GL>>, (25.12.2013).
- Militerm** = Sõjandusterminoloogia andmebaas Militerm. <<http://mt.legaltext.ee/militerm/>>, (14.10.2014).
- Muld, Urmas** 2005. Uut Kaitseliidus 2005. aastal. – Kaitse Kodu!, 1/2. <<http://www.kaitseliit.ee/files/kaitseliit/img/files/KK2005-1-2.pdf>>, (25.12.2013).
- NATO. Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D)** 2010. <[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/33694/AJP01D.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33694/AJP01D.pdf)>, (14.10.2014).
- Perustietoa, Puolustusvoimat uudistuu** 2015. <<http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi>>, (25.12.2013).
- Poom, Raimo** 2014. Putin kuulutas välja „Vene ajalooliste alade” tagasikahmamise poliitika. – Eesti Päevaleht, 19.03. <<http://epl.delfi.ee/news/valismaa/putin-kuulutas-valja-vene-ajalooliste-alade-tagasikahmamise-poliitika?id=68267291>>, (14.10.2014).
- Rakenne ja henkilöstö vuonna** 2015. <<http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi>>, (25.12.2013).
- Riigikaitse arengukava 2013–2022.** <[http://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/arengukavad/kaitseministeerium/Riigikaitse\\_arengukava\\_2013-2022\\_avalik%20osa.pdf](http://valitsus.ee/UserFiles/valitsus/et/valitsus/arengukavad/kaitseministeerium/Riigikaitse_arengukava_2013-2022_avalik%20osa.pdf)>, (25.12.2013).

**Seletuskiri kaitseväge korralduse seaduse muutmise ja sellega seonduvalt teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu juurde** 2013. – Riigikogu, 24.09.

<[http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?op=emsplain&page=pub\\_file&file\\_id=c0fd94b6-698e-49e5-b2f8-59be766c0d08&>](http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?op=emsplain&page=pub_file&file_id=c0fd94b6-698e-49e5-b2f8-59be766c0d08&>), (25.12.2013).

**Simson, Priit** 2013. Meelis Kiili: tulevikus oleme totaalkaitseks valmis. – Riigikaitse, 19.12. <<http://riigikaitse.lehed.ee/2013/12/19/meelis-kiili-tulevikus-oleme-totaalkaitseks-valmis/>>, (25.12.2013).

**Soome kaitseväge juhataja: riigikaitse ümberkorraldus Soomes ja Eestis teenib sama eesmärki.** Kaitseväge pressiteade, 13.12.2013. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/7990/soome-kaitsev%C3%A4e-juhataja:-riigikaitse-%C3%BCmberkorraldus-soomes-ja-eestis-teenib-sama-eesm%C3%A4rki>>, (25.12.2013).

**Sõjalise kaitse arengukava.**

<<http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/SKAK.pdf>>, (25.12.2013).

**Terras, Riho** 2013. Eessõna. – 2012 aastaraamat. Eesti kaitseväge. Luunja: Greif.

**USA Euroopa vägede ülem: Eesti riigikaitse arengukava on näide targast kaitsest.** Kaitseväge pressiteade, 19.09, 2013. <<http://www.mil.ee/et/uudised/7848>>, (25.12.2013).

**Wyly, Michael D.** 2014. Taktika alused. – Lind, William S. Manööversõjapidamise käsiraamat. Tartu: Aburgus.

**Ühtegi, Riho** 2013. Vene-Gruusia 2008. aasta sõjast viis aastat hiljem. – Diplomaatia, august. <<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/vene-gruusia-2008-aasta-sojast-viis-aastat-hiljem/>>, (25.12.2013).

### Allikad

E-kirjavahetus kolonel Martin Heremiga, 15.12.2013 ja 14.01.2014.

Intervjuu erukindral Ants Laaneotsaga, 16.12.2013.

Suuline intervjuu kolonelleitnant Riho Ühtegiga, 05.02.2014.

Telefoniintervjuu anonüümseks jääda soovinud Kaitsealiidu vanemohvitseriga, 24.03.2014.

**RENE TOOMSE**, MA (sõjaline juhtimine ja julgeolek),  
reservkapten, OÜ Aburgus tegevjuht





**Toomse, Rene** (2012). The Concept and Framework of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations. *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol 14 Issue 2. Tartu: Baltic Defence College, pp. 102–146.

## The Concept and Framework of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations

By *Rene Toomse\**

### Introduction

The manner in which today's adversaries wage wars has changed in such a way that Western nations, with their technically superior armies, find it difficult to win wars by ways and means that have worked before. Warfighting against modern insurgents has turned out to be exhausting and endless. While counterinsurgents normally have far better technology, training and weapons than insurgents in on-going conflicts they cannot win quickly and decisively. Many strategies so far have proven impossible to achieve.<sup>1</sup> The "quick in – find – fix – defeat" mindset should, according to current doctrines and policies,<sup>2</sup> work with all the traditional principles of war. Yet still the enemy is not willing to surrender. Something is different in today's battlefield, perhaps even in the nature of war itself.

The protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have dramatically changed the world and its understanding about conflicts. Slowly, but steadily, Western nations are arriving at the conclusion that there is no purely military solution. Yet there are still many complexities to overcome. Additionally, even if the West were to one day conclude the current campaigns, these are unlikely to be the last wars of this type that the West will face.

However, democratic societies need to work hard to prevent wars, as that has been set as one of priorities for NATO.<sup>3</sup> Violent conflict has become discordant to current Western culture. Still, there is a constant need to conduct Crisis Response Operations<sup>4</sup> or be ready to fulfil the obligation of NATO Treaty Article 5<sup>5</sup>. Western nations still need to gather large armies under coalitions and deploy them into crisis areas with the intent to re-establish peace. It has worked most of the time in the past; somehow it does not work so simply anymore. Today's adversary, usually a non-state actor, is somehow stronger than ever. Despite the lack of equipment and training, irregular enemies cause superior armies to bleed and wage long wars.

---

\* Rene Toomse is a Reserve Captain in the Estonian Army and is CEO of Alphard Maritime Security in Tallinn Estonia.

NATO officially recognizes that there is no purely military solution in armed conflict.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, NATO notes that there are other solutions than the military means to prevent a clash. In the strategic picture the main areas or functions of a state are diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). In the more elaborated approach, the political, economic, military, informational and infrastructural (PEMSII) domains.<sup>7</sup> Those functions all are interconnected and disturbances in one can result the collapse of the whole system. Few conflicts start only with military issues. Conflicts are often caused economic or other man made problems that lead to collapse of a secure state system.<sup>8</sup>

To develop informational, diplomatic and economic functions demands much more civilian knowledge than regular armed forces usually possess. An army is probably not the best tool to use for fixing a broken economy. However, Westerners tend to send their soldiers to failed states in the hope they can stabilize a country in turmoil so the civilian experts can make the ground safe by other means than military ones. Yet this paradigm has changed. Even the Comprehensive Approach, if it keeps following Fukuyama's model,<sup>9</sup> will probably not be effective.

The intent of this study is to look into the context of current and likely future conflicts. Some key questions are: why are some insurgencies so successful today? Could one somehow pre-empt those situations? If yes, then how and by what means should this be done? Last but not least, what can small states with fewer resources do to make an effective contribution to Western security? What and how could a nation such as the Republic of Estonia contribute?

NATO adopted a new strategic concept in Lisbon November 2010.<sup>10</sup> Along the emphasis on collective defence in the case of an attack there is also an emphasis on the prevention of conflicts in the world.

*"The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts"* states the fresh NATO Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security.<sup>11</sup>

Most Western nations mean to be actively engaged in the prevention of conflicts. Yet, despite this shared imperative, there is no common understanding of how conflict prevention should take place. Thereby, while the NATO statement acts as a policy and mandate, there should be practical vision for a concept of operations, organization and methods to

meet the need. This article will propose a model and a pre-emptive approach that could be used as a basis for discussion. It is called the Pre-emptive Strategic Development approach. In addition to presenting the theoretical concept, this study will outline a possible organization and actors within it. The intention is to create an approach and organization that can be effective in the prevention of future conflicts.

The pre-emption of most modern conflicts requires, in addition to sophisticated military skills, civilian advice and expertise that addresses the problems within social systems. This expertise, if applied correctly, could bring the desired effects in the target area, reduce the tension and thereby prevent the conflict from occurring at all.<sup>12</sup> This is not likely to be achieved by the military alone; it needs extensive cooperation with civilian subject matter experts from day one on the ground and even before.

That approach is very extensive one, and is not possible for a small state on its own to cover the full range of all the fields of PEMSII that are needed to improve the social systems of failing countries. There are likely to be just a few specialized areas, such as power engineering, healthcare, information technology, and so on where a small state can focus its effort accordingly. These would usually be unique fields where the nation has strong capabilities. Thus, the strengths of a small state should be coordinated within the Alliance to fulfil the common strategy. This would be the essence of the Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations (PSDO).

Small states, being small in their organization, can often be more flexible and creative in their ability to induce internal changes.<sup>13</sup> As long as the national strategists grasp the idea, they can make operations work in multiple ways: to mitigate future threats to the nation and the alliance, and to increase the political credit of their government in the international arena. This PSDO concept is not widely discussed in the current military literature.<sup>14</sup> In fact, I developed the concept from suitable counterinsurgency doctrines. However, since every situation is unique, PSDO does not offer a single solution that is wholly applicable under all conditions. PSDO has to be taken as a basic framework to be considered and revised according to situation and context.

This article will look at the evolution of modern warfare, the causes of recent conflicts, and the new challenges that form the basis for the theory of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations. Then it will develop the concept of how such operations might work in the future.

### Theory of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations

A war is commonly understood and legally defined as an armed conflict between states. However, today a state actor fighting non-state opponents has become the main form of warfare. It is often more difficult to succeed in this type of conflict than to overcome a state actor.<sup>15</sup> In almost all cases the state armed forces will have superiority over the non-state opponents in terms of "combat power": technology, weapons, techniques, training. Despite this, state armed forces often lose in the fight to establish stability.<sup>16</sup> How is this possible? When answering this question one must remember and recognize that the essence of a war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable *human wills*, each trying to impose itself on the other.<sup>17</sup> In a war against an irregular, non-state enemy, local public support and their welfare can often count more than firepower.<sup>18</sup>

Human will is the primary factor in waging war and the will to fight is considered a strategic centre of gravity of a nation or entity at war - that is *the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends*.<sup>19</sup> It is important to keep in mind that a human is the one who also changes the face of war and adapts to its conditions.

The US Marine Corps doctrine describes the three major forces in war: physical, mental and moral. The physical characteristics of war are generally easy to understand and measure. These include equipment capabilities, supplies, force ratios, and so on. Mental forces are the ability to grasp complex battlefield situations and to make effective estimates, and decisions. Moral forces are much more difficult to grasp and measure. One cannot easily weigh factors such as national and military resolve, conscience, emotion, fear, courage, leadership, or esprit. Yet these are primary drivers for other forces.<sup>20</sup> In short, moral force is decisive.<sup>21</sup> Even though the decisions to start, wage and end wars are made at a mental level, these are always driven by rational outcome of conclusions made by the actor in the conflict made under moral pressure.

Today we see often the widespread use of guerrilla tactics *with strategic impact* by a weaker side against a stronger opponent. Some theoreticians such as William S. Lind and Col. Thomas X. Hammes call this phenomenon *fourth generation* warfare, a type of conflict that has emerged from the second and third generations of warfare. The concept of generations of war is disputed by many academics but it has also found some acceptance in Western armed forces. The main argument of the

critics is that this kind of warfare is nothing new and that the four generations concept is unnecessary.<sup>22</sup>

U.S. Marine Col (ret.) Thomas X. Hammes, the author of *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*,<sup>23</sup> argues that, “strategically, fourth generation attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policy makers.”<sup>24</sup> Lind argues that the changes in conflict noted by the fourth generation model centers on *who fights and what they fight for*. According to Lind, it is a mistake to believe that fourth generation fighters focus on the mental level. In fact, the fourth generation fighters turn their state enemies inward against themselves on the moral level, which makes political calculations at the mental level irrelevant.<sup>25</sup>

This might seem contradictory, but is not. What Hammes means is that policy makers, the people who have the power to command war, are making rational decisions based on their electorate’s moral calculations. In that case, the nation’s will is just a tool for the fourth generation to influence policy makers to arrive at a rational decision to terminate the war. Their will is shaped via the unwillingness of their electorate (moral level); the politicians’ sophisticated rationality, and the knowledge (mental level) will force them to make decisions that favor the opponent. Lind is convinced that the fourth generation is not going to be satisfied just by ending the war against their entity but that they will seek for revenge and keep pulling opposing states apart on a moral level.<sup>26</sup> This is a step forward, but it cannot be a rule by itself. Going offensive depends on many factors related to previous conflict outcomes, the needs of a struggling nation, and their reasoning.

Nevertheless, in the scope of physical warfighting it is not as relevant as who fights or what they fight for. The biggest challenge for national armed forces is *how* and *where* the actual fight takes place. Strategies and tactics matter. Fourth generation warriors have modified classic guerrilla tactics and extended the battlefield across the globe, making them difficult to target as a physical entity.<sup>27</sup> If the idea has become the driving principle, and the opposing force has mastered the skill of emerging and dispersing among the civilian population within minutes, there is little to target physically as was the case in the Iraq insurgency.<sup>28</sup> This is the reason why technical superiority on the contemporary battlefield is less important and armed forces cannot by themselves cope with current insurgents.

Per the ideas of Fourth Generation strategists, the opponent’s high tech but structured hierarchical army becomes almost irrelevant.<sup>29</sup> The

insurgent or irregular faction's focus is to undermine the enemy's moral support base in their home country by employing all the powers of war – physical, mental and moral.<sup>30</sup> Irregular warfare, through terrorism, can bring the physical fight into the Western states to enforce their argument. The irregulars' main effort is not focused on defeating their enemy's armed forces physically; it is targeting the public opinion in the opponents' home with the aim to destroy the enemy's will to continue the struggle.<sup>31</sup>

How can one set up a winning strategy against so blurred, undefined and untargetable opponent? What is the actual target? More importantly – in what dimension is that target and how by striking this target one might prevail?

#### **Who are “fourth generation” warfighters and why do they fight?**

In doctrines and theories they are described mainly by their ideological aims. They are called resistance fighters, insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists.<sup>32</sup> Even within those categories they have different agendas that cannot be simplified with a common concept.<sup>33</sup> However, that may be irrelevant at the beginning. Before they emerge there must be a root cause that creates the human will and empowers the moral force to take the path of resistance.

The human will wages wars.<sup>34</sup> There is always an underlying cause for that will to emerge. Something must have gone wrong if people grab weapons or emplace improvised explosive devices (IED) at a roadside. Something must have gone wrong when people carry out suicide attacks. If one focuses the efforts to the original cause, one may be able to prevent that hostile will from escalating to the point where it needs to be fought on a large scale.

Two Chinese Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, the authors of *Unrestricted Warfare*,<sup>35</sup> describe that an official reason for starting a war can be anything from a dispute over a territory and resources, over ideology, or the distribution of power. The real reason for a war can be different from the official reason.<sup>36</sup> One cause for future struggle are limited resources where the population is growing and there exists a fear that a nation will fail to preserve its standard of living, and even fail to survive, if resources are not secured.<sup>37</sup> This can force stronger nations to exploit resources that weaker ones possess. In democratic societies the problem of resources can be solved by cooperation, trade and in other peaceful ways. But resource allocation might still be the main initiator of social conflict within the

weaker nation. While ruling class of weak third world state increases in wealth, the ordinary people face an uncertain future. These conditions create fear at the individual and societal level and provoke a need to defend one's family and social group against the perceived threat. With the right environmental factors resistance to the state or perceived enemy is created.

Though whole populations are unlikely to unite as an organized resistance without capable leadership, there will be smaller groups of people ready to who mobilize and fight and whose local leaders are primarily motivated by a desire to preserve their way of life. As this might not be achieved in a peaceful manner, the situation will turn violent. This causes a snowball effect in which the state kills rebels and their families and tribes take revenge. This was a common local problem in earlier times, but Western technological advances and innovation have created a "globalization effect" and the local now quickly becomes an international issue.<sup>38</sup>

Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, the author of *The Accidental Guerrilla*,<sup>39</sup> finds that the uneven pace and spread of globalization has created the so-called gap countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, sometimes also called "rogue states". These have become safe havens for terrorist activity<sup>40</sup> where the savvier groups can organize, recruit, and promote their cause. This was the case with Al Qaida in late 1990's when they found a sanctuary in Afghanistan under Taliban's protection.<sup>41</sup>

Dr. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the author of *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*,<sup>42</sup> argues that it is globalization that makes terrorists react to what they regard as an infringement of their values.<sup>43</sup> He argues it is the cultural invasion of the West that triggers violent actions in the Third World.<sup>44</sup> This may be true in some cases.

A straightforward intervention in another nation can result in the type of clash as the West has encountered in Afghanistan.<sup>45</sup> However, as globalization is more about the spread of information and lifestyles there is no clear evidence that globalization as a single phenomenon can provoke a deadly conflict against another culture.

For people who engage in an active resistance against the West, or a government perceived as pro-Western, globalization may remain irrelevant. If people lack basic recourses, or they believe their identity and culture are threatened,<sup>46</sup> any justification that promises to preserve their desired *status quo* will initiate a struggle. Once a critical mass of dissatisfied people is mobilized, the fighting might focus on gaining more than just preserving

one's way of life. The conflict might focus on attacking the Western states' systems to prevent future interventions.

Leaders, the initiators of social mobilization and conflict, need proximity with masses of unsatisfied people to exercise influence.<sup>47</sup> This is normally accomplished by physical interaction. But today the media and communication assets multiply this proximity. In this manner globalization plays a great role by bringing the psychological presence via cyberspace and media<sup>48</sup> to remote areas and also potential resistance into Westerners' backyards. Globalization provides opponents with unprecedented access to a number of tools: the Internet, cell phones, satellite communications, and electronic fund transfers. It connects geographically distant groups that previously could not coordinate their actions.<sup>49</sup> This means that today and in the future the battlefield is everywhere.<sup>50</sup>

### **What comes next?**

According to Colonel Hammes, the emergence of the fifth generation warfare will be marked by the increasing power of smaller entities, and the explosion of biotechnology. He uses an example from 2001, namely the anthrax attack on Washington DC's Capitol Hill. He argues that today even a single individual can effectively attack a nation-state, a new level of war.<sup>51</sup> Kilcullen is convinced that today's conflicts combine new actors with new technology and have transfigured the ways of war. But old threats also remain and have to be dealt with. This will stress the resources and overload the Western militaries. This threat is seen as Hybrid Warfare.<sup>52</sup>

Some NATO researchers at Allied Transformation Command agree that Hybrid Warfare is not likely to have distinct borders between conventional, non-conventional and organized crime actors.<sup>53</sup> This view indicates that states may adopt increasingly the *modus operandi* of non-state actors<sup>54</sup> because this approach creates extra uncertainty for the opponent and that is one of the main tools to break adversaries will to fight.<sup>55</sup> Such operations may become the kind of warfare that transcends all established boundaries and limits. It becomes Unrestricted Warfare as suggested by Colonels Liang and Xiangsui. That is a conflict where the distinction between the military and non-military will be destroyed and the battlefield will be everywhere. The current principles of combat will be modified, and the rules of war may need to be rewritten.<sup>56</sup>

NATO's predictions highlight that terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the foreseeable future. Instability caused by failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources are likely to be the main risks and challenges for the Alliance in near future.<sup>57</sup> The Alliance will also need to prepare for the emerging challenges associated with energy, cyberspace, space and maritime security, as well as regional instability.<sup>58</sup>

The list above is a small part of prognosis for the future environment. What should the West do to counter these threats? There are two major options to consider: to stop interfering with possible crisis regions or to pre-empt the rising problems. The first option is unrealistic as the West cannot ignore security issues likely to escalate into something much worse. Secondly, Westerners still need to obtain outside resources.

Pre-empting new threats while sustaining resource needs seems the best option. But to succeed in both aims the traditional military may not be the best force for the job. Peaceful interaction requires a much more sophisticated approach.

### **The concept of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations**

NATO's emphasis on the prevention of future conflicts needs practical application.<sup>59</sup> The concept of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations aims to provide a means to meet the goal of conflict prevention. Committing assets before a conflict is underway might be costly. But applying assets to improve existing systems to prevent the collapse is considerably less expensive than rebuilding all the systems after war has torn them apart. Add this cost to the loss of life in a war, as well as dealing with masses of refugees, then the long term cost advantages are clear.

Examples of long wars are the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both those conflicts were expected to be short and decisive.<sup>60</sup> However, Coalition and Alliance forces faced high attrition of resources. In 2009, the US alone spent in excess of \$400 million per day in Iraq<sup>61</sup> and a total of \$243 billion was spent in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008.<sup>62</sup>

A similar approach of pre-emption is supported by some NATO researchers in the *Future Security Environment*: "[m]eeting the risks created by

weak and failing states requires not only international cooperation in counter terrorism and non-proliferation, but a broad and systematic international effort to help these states move from the category of the failing to the category of the succeeding. A state failure can no longer be seen as a localized or regional issue to be managed simply on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. A more coherent and effective international *response*, which utilizes all of the tools at West's disposal, ranging from aid and humanitarian assistance to support for institution building could well be the course to take."<sup>63</sup>

A common response in the presence of the first indications that a state is about to fall into the downward spiral, is vital and more promising than reacting to a complete failure. That could provide better security and would eventually be less expensive for the Western nations.

Robert Martinage, Senior Defence Analyst at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, indicates that Western nations may not only be called upon to provide and build capacity for internal security and law enforcement, but rather for other "non-military" areas critical to the stability of the state (e.g., electrical power generation and distribution, water treatment and distribution, provision and distribution of food, sanitation, and medical care).<sup>64</sup> Additionally, some RAND researchers found in 2008 that given how long it takes to effect a real change in a society, counterinsurgents need to apply civil tools preventively at the first signs of trouble.<sup>65</sup>

There are three domains and two phases in current conflicts that need to be addressed: the application of informational, political and economic means (soft power) in the period before the conflict (*pre-conflict phase*) as well as during the conflict. The second phase is the transition of military means to civilian support (*transition phase*). In these phases civilian expertise is needed on site, but due to the high threat civilians often cannot operate there. Thus, an intermediate capability is needed-- an entity that can survive in harsh conditions while addressing the conflict area's social systems. This is an entity with the ability counter the physical threats while addressing social problems.

The US Special Forces have conducted this type of operations since their beginning. This approach is captured in their core missions of Foreign Internal Defence and Unconventional Warfare.<sup>66</sup> Recently the U.S. Special Operations Forces have begun deploying Tribal Engagement Teams to Afghanistan to win the trust of tribes and via co-operation with the locals

diminish the power base of Taliban. The main idea is to win the local people's trust, build up and train Tribal Security Forces (*Arbakai*) and promote good governance.<sup>67</sup> The focus is still predominantly on security related activities, but these alone are not sufficient.

In the *pre-conflict phase* the key is to be present and begin needed actions to deal with the root causes of an arising conflict. This can reduce tensions and prevent collapse. However, this phase must be carried out in close interaction with the key players in the area. It is vital to have a strategy to deal with the regional political groups and to ensure their support. However, in many cases it may not be a good idea to impose a democratic system that might clash with the local culture and produce a violent social reaction.

The problem is to recognize root causes and apply the right influence at the right time, in the right location. In the meantime intelligence gathering and a supportive network should be developed to shorten the lead-up time for political decisions in case deployment of conventional military forces is needed. If prevention fails and a conflict still emerges, there will already be networks and communication platforms established so follow-on forces can build on that.

The same modus operandi could be used in case a conflict does emerge. This is most important moment is the *transition phase*. At the end of a high intensity conflict a defeated state's systems will be at their weakest. As in Iraq after the Coalition forces defeated Saddam's the breakdown of the state apparatus and vacuum left by the invading forces contributed to conditions that encouraged an insurgency.<sup>68</sup> In such situations special units with proper resources can address the system breakdown and prevent an insurgency. This transition phase is dangerous in terms of force protection so operators must be competent in military tactics as well as civilian skills. An example of the failure to follow this common sense approach is Iraq, where the civil governance effort went largely unsupported in 2003–2004 when it was most needed.<sup>69</sup>

The strategy and special teams need to be prepared well in advance of an open conflict and their advice should reach policymakers who can coordinate the military response accordingly. In most cases this demands an understanding of the messages from the field. Actors in the decision making process need to understand that other cultures have different values.

---

### **The struggle over perceptions at the strategic level**

Before elaborating the theory of the Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations (PSDO) some issues need to be addressed. First, one needs to recognize where the Western nations have different fundamental beliefs than third world nations. This is a key issue in on-going conflicts.<sup>70</sup> William Lind argues that it was a major mistake to completely destruct an existing state system after a conventional conflict, as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. By doing this the attacker creates a vacuum of legitimate power, an ungoverned space to be exploited by non-state actors faster than a new state can be implemented.<sup>71</sup>

U.S. Senator John Kerry argues that the U.S. should not commit troops to the battlefield without a clear understanding of what decision makers expect them to accomplish, how long it will take, and how to maintain the consent of the people – in short, a clear strategy.<sup>72</sup> A strategy will not be feasible without knowing and appreciating the situation. One must also have sound assumptions. One major situational aspect to an intervention is the local culture as this drives the local decision making. Jaswant Singh, a former Indian finance minister, foreign minister, and defence minister, points out that the coalition in Afghanistan failed to, “realize the historical truth” of the country. Singh argues the conflict is built on miscalculations about Afghanistan culture and is it is therefore unlikely that Western forces can win.<sup>73</sup> His argument is that dissimilar cultures may have different rationalities.<sup>74</sup> Behaviours called irrational by Westerners may not be seen as such outside Western culture.<sup>75</sup> Forcing others to accept the Western beliefs or systems creates friction and even violent resistance. There are also different cultural understandings about democracy and human rights that do not correlate.<sup>76</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen criticizes the tendency to lump all threats together under the banner of a “global war on terrorism”. This tends to have the opposite effect that is intended by unifying disparate groups in the face of common external enemy. This is a fusion mechanism that sociologists call “primary group cohesion”.<sup>77</sup> The amplifying factor is the globalization that allows these disparate groups to unite globally via cyber space. Indeed, Western nations seem to force this process.

Dr. Montgomery McFate, a senior social scientist for the US Army’s Human Terrain System, claims that, “misunderstanding culture at the strategic level can produce policies that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack of cultural knowledge at the operational level can lead to negative public

opinion; and ignorance of the culture at the tactical level endangers both civilians and troops. In summary, the lack of adversary cultural knowledge can have grave consequences strategically, operationally, and tactically.<sup>77,78</sup> That can be seen as a major reason for the failure to create a strategy that can work.

Western perceptions can be incorrect about basic things. Even largely illiterate societies can show a high degree of technical competence and problem solving skills.<sup>79</sup> Over the past several years the Coalition forces in Afghanistan have seen sophisticated developments in the use of IEDs and in other tactics. The *Al Qaeda manual* is highly sophisticated and well developed.<sup>80</sup> Insurgents in third world countries are able to exploit Internet and media very effectively.<sup>81</sup> These same insurgents have even hacked Western communications.

Another problem is the belief that overwhelming force can end disputes. That is probably true in terms of Western rationality, as the Kosovo conflict demonstrated in 1999.<sup>82</sup> However, this may not work in terms of Eastern cultures. McFate notes that winning on the battlefield is irrelevant against an insurgent adversary. Often the use of overwhelming force can have the negative effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing insurgent recruitment, and demonstrating the "brutality" of state or coalition forces.<sup>83</sup> In Afghanistan areas "cleaned" are soon again filled with insurgents, who during major combat operations hid themselves among the people or retreated to wait for the show to be over.<sup>84</sup>

The former ISAF Commander Gen Stanley A. McChrystal understood this dilemma and directed the emphasis for the Coalition forces to be directed on population protection and state building as the most important activities in Afghanistan.<sup>85</sup> Meanwhile he restricted the use of force, particularly air power, which was perceived (correctly or not) as a major cause of civilian casualties.<sup>86</sup>

The biggest contrast between East and West may be different concepts of time. This again comes from culture. In the Western world the "time is money" creates an impatience to achieve the goals without realizing the different value of time.<sup>87</sup> That can be a source of friction between cultures when one tries to influence the other. It may lead to a short term focus while missing long term effects.

Small states like Estonia can take better advantage of their capabilities through a more comprehensive strategy. By contributing conventional

units to conflicts they in Iraq and Afghanistan they win the approval of their allies but do not make much of a difference. Yet there are opportunities for small states in prevention of conflicts as one of them may be a part of the framework of concept of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations.

### **The essence of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations**

The best pre-emptive action to diminish the rising conflicts is the use of balanced development, educational, and participatory strategies to restrain corruption and open alternatives for future generations in the target societies.<sup>88</sup> This is based on the reasoning that participants satisfied with their market position and with a positive expectation about the future are more risk averse are less likely to challenge the state order than those who are unsatisfied and pessimistic about the future.<sup>89</sup>

James Corum emphasizes that a counterinsurgency strategy must address *all* of the major issues: politics, economics, infrastructure, social problems, security of a population, foreign involvement, and so on.<sup>90</sup> In a functioning state system all these elements work together, but breakdown in one can cause the others to collapse and bring down the whole system. This is essential to understand while assisting a failing government to sustain the whole arrangement, as otherwise the West might face the protracted war.

The type of assisting presence has to be agreed upon and given legitimacy by the local authorities and main political movements in the area because only these groups that can create a stable situation in long-run. One cannot simply impose stability from the outside. Direct contradiction with local beliefs and traditions is to be avoided to prevent friction. Efforts should be made to identify and address failing systems *before* the situation becomes a conflict. Therefore, Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen suggests applying two new mission sets: *Strategic Disruption* and *Military Assistance*.

Strategic disruption aims to keep potential enemy's groups off balance, prevent the emergence of new terrorist threats, disrupt safe heavens, and defeat adversary propaganda. This may include lethal effects. That looks offensive and is that on a tactical level, but it is actually defensive on a strategic level, because it deals only with today's threats and does not contribute to preventing a next generation of enemies from emerging. A decisive mission set is actually military assistance. This is aimed at restructuring the environment over a long term by denying an enemy or potential enemy a role, reducing the recruitment base, and influencing

conditions that may generate a threat. This requires a low-profile civilian type presence over and above the overwhelming military display in a crisis area. All the activities aimed at influencing the situation should be carried out as indirectly as possible to avoid negative reactions from local populace. This mission set is seen defensive tactically, but it is actually offensive on a strategic level.<sup>91</sup>

Both of these mission-sets can be seen as vital components of PSDO because one will always complement the other. Depending on the area and other factors the emphasis on disruption activities may vary greatly but the capability for this will always exist.

However, the idea of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations will take a step further. First, the strategy of this approach should be planned, coordinated, and supported in an alliance and not single-handedly by a nation leading or conducting the operation. That allows using more assets and unique capabilities that different nations have. Additionally, it is vital to deconflict different national ambitions and aspirations in Third World countries and in any case enforce an ethical approach..

Secondly, Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations are meant to do much more than just communications and promotions. The focus is to be placed on physical improvement of actual weak points in a social system, where economic, informational, diplomatic and military support is designed to shape the conditions favourable to social stability in target area. The operators should use all available recourses and subject matter expertise to implement those assets with minimum losses to corruption or misuse by lack of expertise on spot. The focus will be to build loyalty “to empower local people to act as partners with government and foreign aid agencies toward shared, long-term objectives”.<sup>92</sup> All the activities are to be carried out using non-provocative methods – there should be no reasons for discontent of populace and the projects are to be sensed as leading to improvement of their future. These are to be long-running operations, where physical presence and support in recourses should be granted until the situation has actually improved and can be sustained without external assistance.

The cornerstone of PSDO is the shift of attention to human dimension, local culture and economic situation in possibly failing states and *application* of the necessary means *before* a conflict arises. The aim is to improve social systems before they break down and thereby to deny the option, reason and space for violent conflict.

According to Professor Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College and Gen Charles F. Wald, USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, a counterinsurgency strategy must offer alternative sources of identity and empowerment for bored, disillusioned, and disempowered young males who are the main risk group that can become insurgents. Simply providing low paying, low status jobs or the opportunity to attend school is not enough.<sup>93</sup> Again, the same paradigm has to apply to Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations, as the creation of *resilient* job options as well as outputs to market are most likely to be the main preventive factor of conflict as that is the source of hope for better future.

For PSDO operations the approach may be substantially different from the Clear-Hold-Build model in counterinsurgency operations as it is described in the draft NATO COIN doctrine. The participation and presence of host nation (HN) security forces (that should include the armed forces and police) may be misleading. The NATO description leaves the impression that NATO forces usually *solely* conduct the clear - hold phases and transition to HN security forces in the build phase.<sup>94</sup> That contradicts most of principles of the same doctrine and the outsider in the lead model has been unsuccessful in the past. In fact, embedding the HN security forces as much as possible is necessary from the start, as only their presence can diminish the people's negative perception of NATO forces as an occupying force. Not committing HN security forces will lead to a fragile hold phase and thus never reach the effective build phase. The creation and activation of HN security forces should start as soon as possible in order to commit them as much as possible in following phases. Lost time in creation of HN power will likely lead to a protracted conflict as in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

For PSDO the approach could follow the phases of *Identify-Invest-Supervise*. The operation begins with the identification, and all phases are conducted concurrently. The identification is aimed at spotting the root causes of emergent conflicts. This includes reconnaissance to identify the key personnel and gather information. This initiates the Strategic Development Group that will work on plans, and committing partners and NGOs to addressing the weak spots. Invest means building relationships with key personnel to apply solutions together while leaving actual operators in shadow. The control of monetary assets remains in the hands of the operational team. The operators invest their subject matter expertise and control the use of donated money and equipment to ensure an honest and purposeful application. Supervision of assets is conducted throughout the

invest phase, but this function should remain running in a background even when the parts of the development program are withdrawn after a successful operation. That is to track the continuity of the strategy and to be ready to insert a specialist team with necessary resources quickly in case of breakdown or the likelihood of breakdown.

To be effective in the Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations actors at all levels need to understand and accept the following three major principles: First, every project and action should take local cultural context into consideration.<sup>95</sup> The population's worldview and social systems must be understood and accepted as they are. If their existing systems are not effective then change must be implemented using acceptable methods. Rushing and enforcing may create friction and lead to failure. Patience and understanding are the key words.<sup>96</sup> One cannot make another culture similar to one's own, especially in short timeframe. Enforcing democratic values and even women's rights in Islamic world can create enormous friction<sup>97</sup> and therefore jeopardize the mission. The change of values is an extremely sensitive topic and a major source of conflict. If a change is needed, it should be introduced as carefully as possible and within a timeframe that is acceptable to the target audience.

Second, there is no need to enforce changes in systems when these are not needed. This understanding is dependent on understanding the reasoning of the target group. Systems in different cultures that seem dysfunctional or ineffective to Westerners may be acceptable and even practical in their systems.<sup>98</sup>

NATO nations should reconsider the belief that armies can prepare secure security situation that allows civilian expertise to follow. The leading role in most situations should be placed even more in the civilian hands. The military, in maintaining a low profile, can generally provide local security for civilian experts to implement development programs. The role of armed forces is to be supportive and low key as an overwhelming display of force will most likely provoke insurgents and pose a threat to operational goals.<sup>99</sup> Still, a sufficient force to defend the project team must be located in an area and should be held in low profile and high readiness. In case of hostile actions quick reaction forces should take direct and decisive action to extract the project teams. The use of kinetic power must be carefully calculated to cause minimum negative effects to overall aims. The same approach, with necessary variations, should be used in the

*transition phase.* The aim is to reduce people's uncertainty towards their future and this will diminish the pool of possible insurgents.

This should be implemented as early as possible, not just as a response to an insurgency once it begins. Constant monitoring of a situation becomes vital, necessitating the use of all intelligence assets, including human presence, in a target area. Creation of vital networks, intelligence collection and preparation of kinetic targets as contingencies for conventional military intervention will take place correspondingly. To prepare a region and to ensure the right form of development at the right time in right locations, conceptual and organizational improvements are needed.

### **Need for a common understanding and policy**

Professor Miemie W Byrd of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies suggests that a (U.S.) counterterrorism strategy should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for better living. Initiating and sustaining economic growth in the poorest areas requires creativity and cooperation among organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, governmental aid agencies, military forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private businesses.<sup>100</sup> In that context, the same strategy should be universal to the whole Western world. Key organizations that should agree are the European Union (EU) and the NATO.

The PSDO approach needs a common policy and this is difficult to achieve.<sup>101</sup> Every nation has its own interests and agendas, and even the EU and NATO, although sharing democratic values, compete for influence.<sup>102</sup> This can be an obstacle in forging a common Western strategy to deal with frequent threats.

Encouraging news comes from NATO regarding its emphasis on cooperation with the EU. The new Strategic Concept promises to:

- strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations;
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;

- broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development to minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness.<sup>103</sup>

At the strategic level the EU is beginning to understand the need to mix military and civilian planning capabilities for effective crisis response. Integration is planned to take place in the Crisis Management Planning Directorate established in December 2008.<sup>104</sup> However, that concept has major challenges. Political, cultural and branch centric approaches are obstacles to overcome. However, understanding and actual integration will take place at higher levels in the EU in a slow and steady fashion.<sup>105</sup> This means that the capability to deploy to crisis areas will be expected from member states.

This approach suggests that nations should build coordinated bilateral liaison and cooperation with target states to create a framework in which consultants, trainers, and project managers with access to national and international funds would be present in the area. They would work in a civilian posture and follow local rules while monitoring the situation and sending information back home. Connections to civil society networks, often operating behind the scenes, support to local initiatives, and diplomatic persuasion to modify the target area's government behaviour are important tactics in those operations.<sup>106</sup> Such an approach does not require a UN mandate and provides reliable advice to decision-makers if the need for military intervention arises.<sup>107</sup> A common policy and strategy would deconflict national interests and use the limited resources with maximum effectiveness. However, it is not assured that NATO will accept integrated crisis planning, which in addition to civilian planners gives full authority to the EU representatives from the strategic to the tactical level.

In Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations there could be practical coalitions where states develop projects together that complement each other's capabilities within commonly agreed strategies. This partnering is most relevant to smaller states that have fewer resources and need to focus on their specific fields of expertise. The most important thing is to have a well-defined and agreed strategic aim common to all actors. If the project teams are as civilian as possible there is a better chance to attract the involvement of non-profit organizations and privately funded organizations.

In the case of failure to prevent the conflict and a subsequent agreement to commit military forces project teams should become advisers to the Joint Force Commander. They would be responsible for suggesting proper methods, uses of force, and targets as they will have the most experience concerning the political, social and cultural conditions.

### **Improvements needed in current operational systems**

While some needed strategic improvements have been described, there are also gaps in the current systems at operational and tactical levels. As planners and primary executors, armed forces need to adjust their way of thinking to be more open. Here are some examples.

*Military culture.* Armed forces are designed to take life, not to improve it and this can produce friction between military and civilian agencies. However, to be effective in current and future conflicts interagency cooperation is crucial. Thereby, all actors need to drop the mode of competition and co-operate to create and implement a working strategy. Strategic thinking has to be the guideline for all players at all levels. Extensive collaboration between allied states, governmental, and non-government organizations, private funding bodies, and investors is the new power in any operation, even on tactical level. Power does not lie in the military alone.<sup>108</sup> The military, by using conventional means, is the last resort, but even then it must work according to the guidelines of civilian authorities. This may mean that the actual leading role in an area of operations is in the hands of civilian staff, and the military may be a supporting asset.

Creating cultural change is a big challenge for Western armed forces. Western military structures are still characterized by top-down management, a lack of innovative goals, long and complex approval cycles, short-term orientation due to frequent personnel turnover, and paralysis that can result from a risk-free culture.<sup>109</sup> Military culture itself should undergo major changes. Within PSDO the military staff may become just a section of a civilian-led staff. Civilian authorities and assets are to take the lead and be supported by military units as needed. This means a new design of operations. Instead of the current doctrinal and Comprehensive Approach where militaries secure the environment to allow civilian support to follow as soon as practical<sup>110</sup> the civilian capabilities need to be alongside the military from the first. More than that, they need to be there before operations.

*Provincial Reconstruction Teams.* The Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept and Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are good examples of addressing the whole range of issues and stressing the social dimension. PRTs are designed to improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development. Teams are made up of international civilian and military resources that allow the PRT to have wide latitude in implementing its mandate. There are currently 26 PRTs in Afghanistan.<sup>111</sup>

However, there are significant problems with coordination, leadership, conflicting interests and pre-mission training of PRT members.<sup>112</sup> The concept seems to lack a clear overarching strategy and a lead entity that could better coordinate the national efforts in build-up the country and win locals to government's side.<sup>113</sup> David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, the authors of *War by Other Means*,<sup>114</sup> find three main reasons why the PRT concept is not fully successful: lack of an operational culture, insufficient personnel, and inadequate funds.<sup>115</sup>

However, there have been successful applications of this principle in the past, among others in Malaysia and Vietnam. The Malaysian emergency of 1948-1960 was a communist insurgency mainly consisting of ethnic Chinese fighting to create a Marxist Malaysian State. Initially the British plan was to defeat the insurgents militarily. After four years of ineffective operations, British governor and military commander Sir Gerald Templer in 1952-54 developed a political and social strategy. He built an organization that focused on raising the life quality of local population by constructing schools, new housing for the Chinese, and controlling the distribution of food. He electrified rural villages and increased the number and quality of local security forces. He also empowered the Chinese community to govern and secure themselves with British support. These actions undermined the insurgents' appeal and made the local government stronger and more popular in the eyes of the people. This strategy and unified organizational focus that integrated military and civilian efforts at all levels were key to successfully bringing peace and stability to Malaya.<sup>116</sup>

During the Vietnam War the *Civil Operations and Rural Development Strategy (CORDS)* was implemented in 1967 in South Vietnam. This involved the creation of advisory teams composed of military and civilian personnel at the provincial and district levels to handle community development, including public health and administration, civil affairs, education, agriculture, psychological operations, logistics and management of military

issues. The province chief, usually a South Vietnamese Army or Marine colonel, was assisted by an American counterpart who was the province senior adviser, who was either military or civilian depending on the security situation of the respective province. Within the program a sub-project called Phoenix was conducted. Project teams were created to collect intelligence on insurgents, neutralize them, and assist local security forces to maintain order. The strategy was so effective that it was a major concern and special target for North Vietnam leaders.<sup>117 118</sup>

*Information domain.* The Internet has become an avenue of approach leading to the military objective.<sup>119</sup> This fact should be considered as an augmentation to other operations.<sup>120</sup> Insurgents need a close and relevantly undisturbed proximity with the population in order to influence them. Meanwhile, intervention forces can be too thin on the ground and that creates the opportunity for insurgents to influence the population as insurgency is often a competition for uncontrolled spaces.<sup>121</sup> Western nations need to understand and use virtual space more effectively.<sup>122</sup> Cyberspace presence may be a reasonable alternative that is less provocative, but at the same time a direct tool for exercising influence. “Internetization” with the aim of contributing to rural development and information sharing from local government can shape public opinion and improve the quality of life.<sup>123</sup> This could be implemented within Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations as a main effort as the use of the Internet is spreading constantly.<sup>124</sup> However, one also sees a trend in third world countries that allows adversaries a chance to use the World Wide Web to coordinate actions and inflame attitudes against the West.<sup>125</sup>

Information is the only means to change a person’s opinion.<sup>126</sup> By creating Internet coverage and providing the assets to use it one has the option for more sophisticated information operations. That could have a twofold effect – first, it would blur the adversaries’ propaganda as it would face a mass of other opinions. This is effective denial of the single source input to an uncommitted population that has not yet taken sides. It can even create doubts about previously acquired perceptions. Second, by exposing people to the pictures and stories of different lifestyles and values one can change their perceptions and, in the long-run, even culture.<sup>127</sup>

The World Wide Web has also become a terrorist propaganda and recruitment system, and even a support mechanism for physical attacks.<sup>128</sup> However, there are other uses for the Web. There are options for pro-government homepages, banners, cyber social networks and other

information. The Internet can be seen as a threat, but can also be used for positive development purposes. It can be a way to outmanoeuvre the enemy in that dimension – because on the net they have the same vulnerabilities as the West.<sup>129</sup> Today a laptop computer with a freeware operating system is relevantly cheap.<sup>130</sup> Thus, networking could be set up using the existing mobile phone infrastructure.<sup>131</sup> Power can be produced by donated generators, guarded by local village security teams, but maintained by government services until power lines are available. *Smartphones*, for example, will enter the Afghanistan market in the near future and then the Internet will penetrate even to the most remote areas.<sup>132</sup> If the West does not take the lead on controlling this network, someone else will.

*Time perspective and development of the next generation.* Lastly the perspective of time and a focus on the next generation is important. No country wants to be committed to a protracted war. However, this is a problem today and the phenomenon will continue as long there are developing insurgencies. Relevantly short term perspectives are likely to extend current problems for decades. The question is – who will be in charge in ten years? Current counterinsurgency doctrines do not stress the need to educate and develop the next generation.

A school system could be the one of the most important projects for failing countries to invest in. During the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in the 1980's a whole generation of youth was educated in *madrasahs* (religious schools) in Pakistan, where they were, from a Western perspective, radicalized.<sup>133</sup> This generation is now in their 40s. According to UNICEF the average life expectancy in Afghanistan in 2008 was 44 years.<sup>134</sup> This means that the men in charge now who are shaping the perceptions of the next generation have all been in one way or another shaped by the West since 2001. However, this has not been done in a way that would support the Western cause.

The median age in Afghanistan is 18.2 years.<sup>135</sup> Latest reports show that midlevel Taliban leaders are now younger than before, often in their mid-20's,<sup>136</sup> which indicates that the fighters' age is below that – early 20's on average. The most troublesome fighters today were in elementary school age in the early 2000's. Had the West supported a school system that shaped the youth then we might not have as large a corps of insurgents today. That might already be a strategic consideration.

The simple truth is this that today's young people will have the vote tomorrow. Ignoring the shaping of their world view can keep a conflict protracted. From the military viewpoint the most worthwhile parts of the system of supporting the youth include the infrastructure, teachers, and routes from villages to schools. There are numerous ways to make the education attractive by adding lunches, clothing, and additional family support for school attendance. For local people their children remain the most important factor and through the children the perceptions of parents can be shaped as well. This can be a powerful indirect approach to the problem that must inevitably be tackled.

### **Strategic Development Group as the lead body of a national effort**

To conduct Strategic Pre-emptive Development Operations a national Strategic Development Group could be created and tasked with advising national leaders and coordinating plans with partners. The purpose of this group would be to study and create strategies in conjunction with the *total strategy*<sup>137</sup> of the nation. As with national strategies, planning and executing of Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations should be done with fully integrated civil and military expertise. The intention is to fill the gap between academics and practitioners by joining them under a permanent working group.<sup>138</sup> This requires that the service centric attitudes and competition have to be avoided. Every ministry and office should have a role in that body and the focus on the endstate maintained – this being the improvement of the nation's position in the international arena and mitigation of future security risks. This body would also be responsible for monitoring, analysing, planning and guiding the action process. The body represents the interagency cooperation needed to combine the best practices from all necessary fields. The group needs a direct communication link to the government and allied partners to conduct multidimensional coordination.<sup>139</sup>

The group should be comprised of leading experts in a variety of sectors – economy, intelligence, internal security, defence forces, science, education, energy industry, info-technology. The group should exercise its authority by guiding all national departments, experts, advisors, civil companies in their involvement in development operations. When an operation is identified the planning, leading, supporting and monitoring the execution become the tasks at hand.

The primary tasks of the group would be to monitor global trends and conduct analysis on strategic and operational issues to include the military, economic, diplomatic and informational domains. The guideline is to identify developments that may pose a threat or an opportunity. These developments should be identified and projects launched as soon as possible. To avoid exhausting national resources communication and liaison with international organizations, non-government organizations and foundations is to be maintained. Once needed actions are identified and validated, the group will put together an integrated action team to gather data from the ground and then execute the mission. While the operation is on-going, a reach-back system is needed to advise and coordinate the efforts.

The group should work on developing specific domains for future improvement, by analysing the needs and advising state departments and other organizations. This approach does not demand many additional resources to be committed. This approach uses the existing range of capabilities already in place by combining them. Resource needs that exceed the national ability will be agreed to and committed from umbrella organizations, such as the EU or NATO, strategic bilateral partners, or non-government organizations and private groups.

The Strategic Development Group should encompass the following phases: monitoring the situation and trends, analysing information to identify the need to become committed, devising a preliminary plan of execution, conducting reconnaissance by a comprehensively combined expert team, finalize the plan, commit partners and resources, support the execution of the operation, and finally, gather and analyse the feedback and lessons identified.

Who should belong to the comprehensive combined action teams? What entity possesses the required civil expertise and can survive in the high threat areas?

### **Special Operation Forces transformation**

The physical threat situation in remote areas, in failing states, or in conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can be extremely challenging. Planning at home is worth little if there is no one to send to implement the fieldwork. Often the situation is so tense of violence that civilian experts, even under close protection, are in grave danger.<sup>140</sup> That can be overcome by creating or modifying “intermediate” units. The ideal platforms to build

on are Special Operation Forces (SOF), whose nature is to cooperate with indigenous people in a low-key mode in remote areas and in high risk environments.<sup>141</sup> Modified SOF units should receive additional training in skills other than soldiering and language/cultural awareness and develop expertise in vital civilian areas. They should look, talk and act like civilians while having strategic “reach back” communication options to experts in homeland. However, when under physical attack, these forces would be able to turn into fighters and defend themselves.

This might be the future of SOF operations as this force loses core tasks to conventional units. At the NATO SOF Symposium in Deauville, France 2008 this problem was addressed and a primary topic was how to move SOF into new, more sophisticated, fields and more strategic operations.<sup>142</sup> However, integrating national strategic requirements and NATO demands for allied SOF remains a problem.

The *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* defines Special Operations as “military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using operational tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the spectrum of conflict independently, integrated with, or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, informational, and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require low prominence, covert or discreet techniques, and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.”<sup>143</sup>

In comparison, the *U.S. Doctrine of Special Operations*, one notes that, “Special Operations can be designed and conducted to *influence the will* of foreign leadership and/or populations to create conditions favourable to US *strategic aims or objectives*. This may involve a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. Alternatively, special operations may be principally directed at high-value targets of *strategic significance*. Such operations are often time-sensitive and rely on surprise, security, and audacity, and frequently employ deception to achieve success. These missions can be overt, clandestine, or covert in nature. Some operations may involve high physical and political risk, and can offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first attempt fail.”<sup>144</sup>

One can draw some conclusions from these broad definitions. First, the NATO glossary does not mention the strategic aims of the Special Operations as the way it is done per US doctrine. This leaves open an

option to use this scarce resource in tactical roles by theatre commanders. Sometimes this might be justified, but in general it is a misuse of this this capability. Political, military, informational, and economic objectives are stressed that might lead to strategic or operational objectives, but the levels should be expressed clearly.

Gen Peter J. Schoomaker, former US Army chief of staff, finds that, “in the essence Special Operation Forces should support *directly* the strategy by shaping, responding, and preparing for the future in the path towards the strategic aims.”<sup>145</sup> Interestingly, even the NATO SOF study finds that SOF should provide a strategic offensive and defensive asymmetric capability that will provide the political and senior military leaders with options that retain freedom of action while at the same time employing an economy of force.<sup>146</sup> However, this understanding has not found its way to the *Allied Doctrine for Special Operations*, where the description of the Special Operations repeats the standpoints of the *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.<sup>147</sup>

National Special Operations Forces usually fall under the highest authorities of political or military leadership and are used according to national policies. As the relevance of SOF in recent and on-going operations was recognized and operational gaps identified, NATO nations realized the need to integrate these strategic assets.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, the NATO SOF transformation initiative (NSTI) was declared at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006. The initiative was aimed at increasing national SOF ability to train and operate together, including improving equipment capabilities.<sup>149</sup>

In June 2007 the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC) was established at SHAPE in Casteau, Belgium as the centrepiece of the NSTI. In March 2010 it was re-designated as the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) with the aim to provide focused Special Operations advice to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO Chain of Command and to provide a collaborative, inter-dependent platform to enhance the Alliance SOF network.<sup>150</sup> The mission of NSHQ is to be “the primary point of direction and coordination for all NATO Special Operations-related activities in order to optimize employment of Special Operations Forces to include providing an operational command capability when directed by SACEUR.”<sup>151</sup> The NSHQ does this by providing the Alliance SOF a proposal for a “NATO SOF policy, standards, doctrine, training, education

and assessments, which maintains and develops a robust operational command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capability equipped with organic SOF enablers to ensure interoperability and enhance employment of NATO Special Operations.<sup>152</sup>

That new structure has already produced some remarkable developments in the commitment of national Special Operations Forces into the conflict in Afghanistan. With the assistance of NSHQ the national SOF units and staff officers' contributions to the mission have been impressive. Within the first two years of its existence (2007 – 2008) the NSCC was able to mobilize five new Special Operations Task Groups under a unified command. That was a more than 250% increase of this type of force on the ground.<sup>153</sup>

According to the NATO SOF doctrine, the three principal tasks of NATO SOF in any operation are: Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Direct Action, and Military Assistance, where the last is the closest to the non-kinetic and indirect influence mode. That again is limited to assistance via training and advising of host nation military personnel.<sup>154</sup>

The use of coalition SOF units within NATO SOF doctrinal tasks may produce strategic problems. There is a criticism that the kinetic approach by NATO SOF units can be counterproductive in meeting strategic goals in Afghanistan.<sup>155</sup> RAND researchers in 2008 found it appropriate for special operations to focus primarily on training local military forces and conduct kinetic tasks mostly aimed at high-value targets.<sup>156</sup> SOF units could be used in a more indirect manner to shape the strategy. The current kinetic focus could also wear out the teams and lower the ability to employ SOF in social domains where the vital civilian expertise is missing.

Currently the three core missions of NATO SOF described above are less relevant on the national strategic level. The core missions are clearly not enough to provide guidance for Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations. The current doctrine is more combat focused and pays little attention to pre-emptive non-military actions. However, NATO SOF doctrine also provides a useful assessment tool for special operations operational missions by giving criteria that should be considered when evaluating SOF employment. According to the doctrine the SOF mission should be:

- *Appropriate.* Is the mission suitable for SOF capabilities, and does it accord fully with the higher objectives? Could another asset be

used? The mission must have a unique aspect that requires the special skills and capabilities of SOF, and which renders the mission unsuitable (or less suitable) for action by other assets.

- *Feasible.* If the mission is appropriate, can it feasibly be accomplished by the SOF assets available? Does the SOF element have the appropriate training, skills, planning and rehearsal time as well as the required cultural understanding?
- *Sustainable.* Are the resources adequate? Is the intelligence sufficient? Is there adequate infiltration, logistic sustainability on the ground, exfiltration, survivability, and communication support? Even if the target is appropriate, feasible and vulnerable to SOF, a lack of dedicated support resources may prevent the execution of a special operation.
- *Justifiable.* Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of successful task execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the task. Assessment of risk should take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on Alliance interests should the mission fail.<sup>157</sup>

The reason these criteria are useful is captured in the *SOF Truths* that have been framed for the US Army SOF and recognized by other countries' services:

- Humans are more important than hardware
- Their quality is more important than quantities
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.<sup>158</sup>

According to retired U.S. Army Colonel John M. Collins (the author of the truths above in 1987) he would complement them with a fourth: "Competent SOF cannot be created RAPIDLY after emergencies occur" and he suggested re-instating the original 5<sup>th</sup> truth:

- Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.<sup>159</sup>

Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, apparently agreed with Collins. Olson reinstated the fifth truth into the US

SOF doctrine. Admiral Olson noted the assistance of all sister services and other branches whose commitment has made SOF successful.<sup>160</sup> Even though he did not mention the civilian, the last truth is equally relevant for them.

Byrd finds that the cooperation with all relevant actors must become routine. Military personnel must be educated in emerging concepts and trends in the business sector and the military should invite business leaders and decision makers to counterterrorism conferences and seminars.<sup>161</sup> Close ties and common understanding should be created to help a nation to make rational decisions on how to contribute to crisis prevention around the world. In this case the National Strategic Development Group should have the leading role.

Lieutenant Colonel Moore argues that the future roles of SOF are to shape and prepare the strategic context to enable the application of the elements of national (or international – author’s comment) power. SOF should operate across the spectrum of crisis (before, during, and after) and conduct overt, covert, and clandestine operations to support the strategic objectives of the nation (or coalition – author’s comment). SOF will conduct engagement activities to detect a crisis and try to prevent it. Successful engagement operations can lead to shutting down a crisis before it escalates to war. All elements of national (and international – author’s comment) power are to be focused on identifying a potential crisis and taking actions to impede its development. The critical periods become the periods before and after a crisis.<sup>162</sup>

Gen Peter J. Schoomaker envisages that, “Special Operations Forces need to access such diverse areas as commercial information technologies, utilization of space, biomedicine, environmental science, robotics, organizational design, and commercial research and development”.<sup>163</sup>

The NATO New Strategic Concept defines cyber-attacks conducted by NATO adversaries’ as one of the greatest security and stability risks. It recognizes that such attacks can nowadays inflict costly damages to the Western societies.<sup>164</sup> However, the answer to this threat, especially as it may come from well protected systems, is highly complicated. Martinage sees the option of educating and empowering SOF units to gain the access to closed cyber network systems in remote areas where no other means can reach. He then advises SOF to master the skills of tapping the fiber-optic and other lines, as well to acquire the necessary hacking skills.<sup>165</sup>

The good news is that, in recognition of the need for further development of operational approaches, the NATO SOF Headquarters is conducting NATO SOF symposia annually. At the symposium at Deauville France in 2008 Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen raised ideas about SOF for the allied countries. Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen admitted that contemporary conventional war is actually unconventional. So the question is which roles should SOF have in a situation where regular forces have taken over the most of their special skills such as close combat, training of indigenous forces, and so on.<sup>166</sup> Kilcullen argues that there will always be a need for SOF to react quickly to strategic situations that require a low-visibility force that is not possible for a mass of regular forces. However, that is not enough. SOF needs to become more pre-emptive because by simply reacting to situations the West has already lost the international initiative. Kilcullen suggests the use of NATO SOF to pre-empt and prevent conflicts. That would be the most politically and economically attractive endstate.<sup>167</sup>

Kilcullen proposed a new focus for SOF to assure better strategic results than it has achieved so far. He argued that the West may need to start using similar guerrilla tactics against adversaries. Combined with Information Operations experts, NATO should send SOF to provide assistance to the military in potential threat areas following four main tenets:

- Long duration operations to ensure constant and continuous influence;
- Low profile performance – not advertising one’s presence with Western outfit. Employ a look and behaviour that is as similar as possible to locals while, at same time not hiding itself;
- Small footprint – respect of local people and avoidance of major changes that could outbalance the local community;
- Integration with locals and with all possible organizations and players in the area of operations.<sup>168</sup>

However, the political and economic development in target areas demands much more civilian knowledge than covered by the traditional Special Operations skills. Education in vital civilian skills, in addition to military training, can produce the desired effects on target and reduce the tension and thereby prevent the occurrence of conflict at the first place. That creates the need for a qualitative shift in SOF training and its focus on

deployments. This does not mean that SOF needs to drop their current training and tasks. They just need to learn and do more.<sup>169</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen argues that purely military operations, such as Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action, are offensive at tactical level but actually defensive at strategic level. On the other hand, military assistance is defensive at tactical level, but can be strategically offensive because it denies the support of local people to the enemy.<sup>170</sup>

Therefore, Kilcullen suggested focusing on two major operations as described above:

- Strategic Disruption – this involves mainly Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action and focuses on disrupting existing or emerging organizations and individuals that pose a threat, while keeping in mind that this is only a support effort for the most important mission set that is;
- Military Assistance – this should be the main effort and involve all players in the operations area, including police, government officials, non-government organizations, local companies etc. From Kilcullen's point of view this is the most important mission set for current and future operations as this is the only one that can assure achievement of desired end states.<sup>171</sup>

Kilcullen argues that via this type of new Military Assistance, when SOF units are first in a potential crisis area they can create a system of networks where all follow-on actors (conventional forces, civil agencies, NGO's etc.) can plug into later. Most importantly, leaders must understand that to create this capability takes time and effort. The training of such operators should include civilian expertise, sophisticated cultural awareness, and languages and related skills. Interagency cooperation becomes more important than ever before, and every opportunity should be taken to enhance it.<sup>172</sup> The need for similar approach is recognized by NATO analysts who suggest formulating plans to respond quickly to a variety of warfare models, ranging from high-intensity operations to the conduct of security assistance missions, to an advisory role in support of civilian authorities.<sup>173</sup>

However, this *modus operandi* is not likely to be conducted by SOF or any other entity alone. This method of operations requires extensive cooperation with civilian subject matter experts while SOF trains for, plans

and executes missions. Operators must go through the educational process in important areas such as anthropology, power engineering, law, healthcare, IT, communications, media campaign strategies to become competent to apply those tools effectively in a high threat environment. The rationale is that SOF operators, with high survivability skills, are the best placed to assist failing non-military systems in difficult conditions while still maintaining a low profile and high survivability. This is true for situations where the civilians would not take the risk, or where protecting civilians would endanger the operation by greatly enlarging the footprint.<sup>174</sup>

For Pre-emptive Strategic Development Operations the Special Operations Forces should become directly subordinated to previously described Strategic Development Group or its equivalent in a theatre of operations. For strategic missions it is vital to have direct communication between these two actors. However, it must be made clear that there should be no direct influence of daily political affairs on operations in target area. The strategy previously agreed on has the primacy.

What makes SOF suitable for pre-emptive operations? Dr. Rasmussen summarized the advantages of SOF.

*“Special forces are special because they are not part of the bureaucratic organization of the armed forces as such. Symbolic of this is the way they prefer to choose their own weapons. Their own fighting does not depend on the operation of weapons systems in concert with other soldiers, such as guns and tanks. They fight on their own initiative – in other words, they embrace the risks of war. Where other soldiers place their lives at the mercy of the system and thus fear risks, the special forces embrace risks because they can still choose to fight, and find death, on their own terms.”<sup>175</sup>*

---

<sup>1</sup> James S. Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008), 181-185.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 76, 77.

<sup>3</sup> NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (accessed 7 March 2011), 6.

<sup>4</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.4, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, 2005, p 1-1.

<sup>5</sup> NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, nato.int, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed 23 February 2010), Article 5.

<sup>6</sup> NATO's Strategic Commanders, *Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge*, aco.nato.int,

---

[http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple\\_Futures/StrategicVision2004.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/StrategicVision2004.pdf)  
(accessed 23 December 2009), 4, 10.

<sup>7</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.4.4, Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency*, February 2011, 5-128.

<sup>8</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators" in *State Failure and State Weakness in the Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1, 22.

<sup>9</sup> Allard Wagemaker, "Twisting arms or flexing muscles?" in *The Comprehensive Approach. Challenges and Prospects*, ed. Hansen Splidsboel Flemming (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2009), 23, 26. Fukuyama's model distinguishes three distinct phases: in first phase, outside powers provide the short-term stability. The goal is to (re-)build state authority. That phase is critical and military has an important role in it. In second and third phases, development agencies take the lead. In second phase civilian agencies assist the systems directly, in third more indirectly.

<sup>10</sup> NATO, *NATO's New Strategic Concept*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html> (accessed 12 April 2011).

<sup>11</sup> NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (accessed 7 March 2011), 6.

<sup>12</sup> David B. Carment, "Preventing State Failure" in *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Oxford: Princeton Press, 2004), 145.

<sup>13</sup> Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Introducing Small state Foreign Policy" in *Small States in World Politics. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 4.

<sup>14</sup> Col Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2005), 33. Colonel Celeski mentions a concept of *preventative counterinsurgency*. He recognizes the need for early improvement of struggling or failed states in the social and economic conditions. However, the rest of his monograph is focusing on ongoing campaigns, and David B. Carment, "Preventing State Failure" in *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Oxford: Princeton Press, 2004), 144, 145. Professor Carment stays very broad in his suggestions. He focuses mainly on models to identify signs of failure not the actual action to prevent the collapse of a state.

<sup>15</sup> Col Gintautas Zenkevicius, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Rebuilding Afghanistan – Is That Post-conflict Reconstruction?" *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, 2007, 28.

<sup>16</sup> Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps. *FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation War*, [globalguerillas.typepad.com](http://globalguerillas.typepad.com), <http://globalguerillas.typepad.com/files/4gwmanuals/FMFM-1A%20%20.pdf> (accessed 23 December 2009), 4.

- <sup>17</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MDCP 1, Warfighting* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 3.
- <sup>18</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 1-27.
- <sup>19</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Edited and translated Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 595, 596.
- <sup>20</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MDCP 1, Warfighting* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 15, 16.
- <sup>21</sup> William S. Lind, "Critics of the Fourth Generation," lewrockwell.com, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind85.html> (accessed 31 January 2010).
- <sup>22</sup> Frank Hoffman, "4GW as a Model of Future Conflict," panel presentation in Boyd 2007 Conference, 13 July 2007, Small Wars Journal Blog, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/4gw-as-a-model-of-future-conflict/> (accessed 12 April 2011).
- <sup>23</sup> Col Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: on war in the 21st century* (St. Paul: Zenith, 2004).
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid. 208.
- <sup>25</sup> William S. Lind, "The Sling and The Stone," lewrockwell.com, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind45.html> (accessed 6 March 2010).
- <sup>26</sup> William S. Lind, "Critics of the Fourth Generation," lewrockwell.com, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind85.html> (accessed 31 January 2010).
- <sup>27</sup> Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps. *FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation War*, globalguerillas.typepad.com, <http://globalguerillas.typepad.com/files/4gwmanuals/FMFM-1A%20%20.pdf> (accessed 23 December 2009), 86.
- <sup>28</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 9.
- <sup>29</sup> Col Frans P. B. Osinga, *John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era*, au.af.mil, [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga\\_boyd\\_postmod\\_copyright2007.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_boyd_postmod_copyright2007.pdf), 9 (accessed 11 March 2011) and William S. Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" in *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989.
- <sup>30</sup> William S. Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" in *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989.
- <sup>31</sup> Col Frans P. B. Osinga, *John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era*, au.af.mil, [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga\\_boyd\\_postmod\\_copyright2007.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_boyd_postmod_copyright2007.pdf), 10, 11 (accessed 11 March 2011).
- <sup>32</sup> Col Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2005), 20. Colonel Celeski even summons modern resistance under type of terror-guerrilla (terrorist-guerrilla cooperation) insurgency.
- <sup>33</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, ix.
- <sup>34</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MDCP 1, Warfighting* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 13.
- <sup>35</sup> Col Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid. 38.

<sup>37</sup> Col. Frans P. B. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 132.

<sup>38</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, smallwarsjournal.com, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf> (accessed 12 January 2010), 3.

<sup>39</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big On*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>41</sup> Camille Tawil, *The Other Face of Al-Qaeda*, quillamfoundation.org, [http://www.quillamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/the-other-face-of-al-qaeda.pdf?dm\\_i=JL3,AZ98,3031IN,UGW9,1](http://www.quillamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/the-other-face-of-al-qaeda.pdf?dm_i=JL3,AZ98,3031IN,UGW9,1) (accessed 11 March 2011), 7, 8.

<sup>42</sup> Mikkel V. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 165.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Egdunas Raciū, "The 'Cultural Awareness' Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan" in *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, 2007, 60.

<sup>46</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big On*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 263.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 28-38.

<sup>48</sup> Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0. Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 128.

<sup>49</sup> Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 9, 10.

<sup>50</sup> Col Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 43.

<sup>51</sup> Col Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges" in *Military Review*, June-July 2007, 22.

<sup>52</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 5, 6.

<sup>53</sup> Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating towards 2030, Final Report*, aco.nato.int, [http://www.act.nato.int/MultipleFutures/20090503\\_MFP\\_finalrep.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/MultipleFutures/20090503_MFP_finalrep.pdf) (accessed 20 December 2009), 33, 55.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, dni.gov [http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF\\_2025/2025\\_Global\\_Trends\\_Final\\_Report.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf) (accessed 20 December 2009), 71.

<sup>55</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MDCP 1, Warfighting* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 7-9.

<sup>56</sup> Col Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 12.

- <sup>57</sup> Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, *Future Security Environment*, aco.nato.int, [http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple\\_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf) (accessed 20 December 2009), 38.
- <sup>58</sup> Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating towards 2030, Final Report*, aco.nato.int, [http://www.act.nato.int/MultipleFutures/20090503\\_MFP\\_finalrep.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/MultipleFutures/20090503_MFP_finalrep.pdf) (accessed 20 December 2009), 55.
- <sup>59</sup> NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (accessed 7 March 2011), 6.
- <sup>60</sup> Martin Shaw, *The new Western way of War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 76, 77.
- <sup>61</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big On*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25.
- <sup>62</sup> John F. Kerry, et al., *Tora Bora Revisited: How we failed to get Bin Laden and why it matters today*, foreign.senate.gov, [http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora\\_Bora\\_Report.pdf](http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf) (accessed 20 February 2010), 20.
- <sup>63</sup> Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, *Future Security Environment*, aco.nato.int, [http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple\\_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf) (accessed 20 December 2009), 39.
- <sup>64</sup> Robert Martinage, *Special Operation Forces. Future challenges and Opportunities*, csbaonline.org, [http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_.pdf](http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special_Operation_.pdf) (accessed 15 September 2009), 75.
- <sup>65</sup> David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011), 101.
- <sup>66</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations*, June 2001, 2-1, 2-2, 2-11, 2-12.
- <sup>67</sup> Maj. Jim Gant, *A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan, One Tribe at the Time*, stevenpressfield.com, [http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one\\_tribe\\_at\\_a\\_time\\_ed2.pdf](http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf) (accessed 21 December 2009), 25-27.
- <sup>68</sup> Lt Col Kalev Sepp, *Prepared Statement before House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations*, globalsecurity.org, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005\\_hr/050314-sepp.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/050314-sepp.pdf) (accessed 11 March 2011), 1, 2.
- <sup>69</sup> David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org,

---

[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011), 120.

<sup>70</sup> Jacob W. Kipp and Lt Col Lester W. Grau, "Military Theory, Strategy, and Praxis" in *Military Review*, March-April 2011, 17.

<sup>71</sup> William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," antiwar.com, <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702> (accessed 31 January 2010).

<sup>72</sup> John F. Kerry, "Testing Afghanistan Assumptions. The lesson of Vietnam is don't commit troops without a clear strategy" in *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 September 2009, wsj.com, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574438660617984826.html> (accessed 25 December 2009).

<sup>73</sup> Jeswant Singh, "The March of Folly in Afghanistan," project-syndicate.org, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jsingh5/English> (accessed 13 August 2010).

<sup>74</sup> Egdunas Raciuis, "The 'Cultural Awareness' Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan" in *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, Volume 9, 2007, 61, 62.

<sup>75</sup> Mikkel V. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 166-168.

<sup>76</sup> Peter C. Choharis and Lt Col James A. Gavrilis, "Counterinsurgency 3.0," *Parameters*, Spring 2010, carlisle.army.mil, [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010\\_choharisAndGavrilis.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_choharisAndGavrilis.pdf) (accessed 6 March 2011), 38.

<sup>77</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 21.

<sup>78</sup> Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture" in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 38 Summer 2005, 43, 44.

<sup>79</sup> Maj Jim Gant, *A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan, One Tribe at the Time*, stevenpressfield.com, [http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one\\_tribe\\_at\\_a\\_time\\_ed2.pdf](http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf) (accessed 21 December 2009), 13.

<sup>80</sup> *Al Qaeda manual*, fas.org, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2010).

<sup>81</sup> Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0. Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 3.

<sup>82</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: the logic of war and peace*, revised and enlarged revision (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 76.

<sup>83</sup> Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship," army.mil, [http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/august\\_2005/7\\_05\\_2.html](http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/august_2005/7_05_2.html) (accessed 21 December 2009).

- <sup>84</sup> Emma Graham-Harrison, “Analysis: Why the military plays down vital Afghan battle,” Reuters 31 October 2010, reuters.com, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69U0EI20101031?pageNumber=1> (accessed 1 March 2011).
- <sup>85</sup> Gen Stanley A. McChrystal, *ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance*, nato.int, [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official\\_texts/counterinsurgency\\_guidance.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf) (accessed 29 December 2009), 2, 3.
- <sup>86</sup> Lt Col Paul Darling and Lt Justin Lawlor, “Updating close-air support. New doctrine and aircraft are needed for COIN warfare,” *armedforcesjournal.com*, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/11/5009090> (accessed 2 March 2011).
- <sup>87</sup> Department of the Army, *FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, March 2009, 1-5.
- <sup>88</sup> Ted R. Gurr, “Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails” in *The New Global Terrorism. Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Jr. Kegly (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2003), 215.
- <sup>89</sup> Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf> (accessed 22 December 2009), 45, 46.
- <sup>90</sup> James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars. Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Kansas: University Press, 2003), 27.
- <sup>91</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 114, 286, 289.
- <sup>92</sup> Peter C. Choharis and Lt Col James A. Gavrillis, “Counterinsurgency 3.0,” *Parameters*, Spring 2010, carlisle.army.mil, [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010\\_choharisAndGavrillis.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_choharisAndGavrillis.pdf) (accessed 6 March 2011), 41.
- <sup>93</sup> Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf> (accessed 22 December 2009), 53, and Miemie W. Byrd, “Combating Terrorism. A Socio-Economic Strategy,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 41, 2d Quarter 2006, 16.
- <sup>94</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.4.4, Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency*, February 2011, 5-15 – 5-17.
- <sup>95</sup> Col Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2005), 40.
- <sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 31, 74, 95.
- <sup>97</sup> Dalia Mogahed, *Islam and Democracy*, media.gallup.com, <http://media.gallup.com/MuslimWestFacts/PDF/GALLUPMUSLIMSTUDIESIslamandDemocracy030607rev.pdf> and Tom A. Peter, “Women’s rights in Afghanistan lose steam,” *The Christian Science Monitor* 2011, csmonitor.com, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0308/Women-s-rights-in-Afghanistan-lose-steam> (accessed 13 April 2011).
- <sup>98</sup> Mikkel V. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 166-168.

<sup>99</sup> Col Robert M. Cassidy, "Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars," in *Baltic Security & Defence Review* Volume 10, 2008, 68-70.

<sup>100</sup> Miemie W. Byrd, "Combating Terrorism. A Socio-Economic Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 41, 2d Quarter 2006, 16.

<sup>101</sup> Jean-Jacques de Dardel, "Whither the Euro-Atlantic Partnership? Partnership and NATO's New Strategic Concept," *Geneva Papers* 10 (Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009). Dr. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, the Ambassador of Switzerland to NATO, is criticizing NATO on attitude and misunderstanding the added value of non-NATO partners' in common strategic goals.

<sup>102</sup> Paul Cornish, *EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition?*, chattamhouse.org, [http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3379\\_nato\\_eu.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3379_nato_eu.pdf) (accessed 2 January 2011), 4.

<sup>103</sup> NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence, *nato.int*, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68580.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm), (accessed 9 March 2011).

<sup>104</sup> Carmen Gebhard, "The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capacities" in *CFSP Forum*, Volume 7 no. 4, 2009, [carmengebhard.com](http://carmengebhard.com), [http://carmengebhard.com/CFSP\\_Forum\\_vol\\_7\\_no\\_4\\_Gebhard.pdf](http://carmengebhard.com/CFSP_Forum_vol_7_no_4_Gebhard.pdf) (accessed 2 January 2011), 13.

<sup>105</sup> Stephanie Blair, "Towards Integration? Unifying Military and Civilian ESDP Operations," *European Security Review* no 44, 2009, [isis-europe.org](http://www.isis-europe.org), [http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009\\_artrel\\_272\\_esr44-civmil-integration.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_272_esr44-civmil-integration.pdf) (accessed 3 March 2010), 1-4.

<sup>106</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big On*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15, 16.

<sup>107</sup> David B. Carment, "Preventing State Failure," in *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Oxford: Princeton Press, 2004), 141.

<sup>108</sup> NATO's Strategic Commanders, *Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge*, [aco.nato.int](http://www.act.nato.int), [http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple\\_Futures/StrategicVision2004.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/StrategicVision2004.pdf) (accessed 23 December 2009), iii, iiiii, 7.

<sup>109</sup> Miemie W. Byrd, "Combating Terrorism. A Socio-Economic Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 41, 2d Quarter 2006, 17.

<sup>110</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.4, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, 2005, 2-7, and Allard Wagemaker, "Twisting arms or flexing muscles?" in *The Comprehensive Approach. Challenges and Prospects*, ed. Hansen Splidsboel Flemming (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2009), 23.

<sup>111</sup> USAID Afghanistan, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams," [afghanistan.usaid.gov](http://afghanistan.usaid.gov), <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx> (accessed 20 January 2011).

<sup>112</sup> Nima Abbaszadeh, et al., *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, Princeton.edu, [http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports\\_f07/wws591b.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf) (accessed 11 March 2011), 16, 17.

<sup>113</sup> Lawrence Vasquez, *Time to Reevaluate the Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?*, brookings.edu, [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1104\\_afghanistan\\_vasquez.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1104_afghanistan_vasquez.aspx) (accessed 8 March 2011).

<sup>114</sup> David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>116</sup> Lt Col Kalev I. Sepp, *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency*, au.af.mil, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf> (accessed 11 March 2011), 9. See also David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011).

<sup>117</sup> Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, *CORDS/Phoenix Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future*. Smallwarsjournal.com, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/milreviewmarch2.pdf> (accessed 12 February 2011), 15, 16, 18, 19, 21.

<sup>118</sup> David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011), 106-108.

<sup>119</sup> Col Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: on war in the 21st century* (St. Paul: Zenith, 2004), 214.

<sup>120</sup> Billy K. Rios, "Sun Tzu was a Hacker: An Examination of the Tactics and Operations form a Real World Cyber Attack" in *The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare*, eds. Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers, (Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, 2009), 153, 154.

<sup>121</sup> Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB790.pdf> (accessed 22 December 2009), 11.

<sup>122</sup> Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence webpage, ccdcoe.org, <http://www.ccdcoe.org/76.html> (accessed 5 March 2010).

<sup>123</sup> *Estonian Information Society Strategy 2013*, riso.ee, <http://www.riso.ee/en/system/files/Estonian%20Information%20Society%20Strategy%202013.pdf> (accessed 11 March 2011), 7.

<sup>124</sup> Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0. Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 137.

---

<sup>125</sup> Lt Col David Kilcullen, 9, 10.

<sup>126</sup> Col Thomas X. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges” in *Military Review*, June-July 2007, 15.

<sup>127</sup> In 2006 author had a discussion with a local doctor in Afghanistan. He was skeptical to ISAF approach to the current problem. He suggested that all we need to do is “spray” the country with Satellite TV assets and in some time people start identifying themselves with the West – that could be the best influence the West can get.

<sup>128</sup> J. P. I. A. G. Charvat, “Cyber Terrorism: A New Dimension in Battlespace” in *The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare*, eds. Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009), 77-87.

<sup>129</sup> Billy K. Rios, “Sun Tzu was a Hacker: An Examination of the Tactics and Operations form a Real World Cyber Attack” in *The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare*, eds. Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers, (Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, 2009), 144, 145.

<sup>130</sup> *Asus unveils ultra-low-cost Linux laptop*, linuxfordevices.com, <http://www.linuxfordevices.com/c/a/News/Asus-unveils-ultralowcost-Linux-laptop/> (accessed 8 March 2011).

<sup>131</sup> Mobile internet network capabilities introduced in Estonia by EMT Ltd., emt.ee, <https://www.emt.ee/en/internet> (accessed 8 March 2011).

<sup>132</sup> Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0. Irregular Warfare in the Information Age*, 172.

<sup>133</sup> Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples and Thomas Wood, “Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” in *Military Review* May-June 2008, 61.

<sup>134</sup> UNICEF, *Afghanistan statistics*, unicef.org, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html) (accessed 7 March 2011).

<sup>135</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, Afghanistan*, cia.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed 7 May 2011)

<sup>136</sup> Rubin Shanker, “Quest to Neutralize Afghan Militants Is Showing Glimpses of Success, NATO Says,” *The New York Times* 28 June 2010, nytimes.com, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29military.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29military.html?_r=1) (accessed 8 March 2011).

<sup>137</sup> Gen André Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 30.

<sup>138</sup> David B. Carment, “Preventing State Failure,” in *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Oxford: Princeton Press, 2004), 138.

<sup>139</sup> Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 214. Multidimensional coordination – coordinating and allocating all the forces which can be mobilized in the military and non-military spheres covering an objective.

<sup>140</sup> David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011), 120.

<sup>141</sup> Robert Martinage, *Special Operation Forces. Future challenges and Opportunities*, csbaonline.org, <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special Operation /R.20081117.Special Operation .pdf> (accessed 15 September 2009), 7, and Col Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2005), 9.

<sup>142</sup> Author has participated personally in that symposium on 3-5 June 2008 in Deauville, France.

<sup>143</sup> NATO, *AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2010.pdf> (accessed 11 March 2011), 2-S-9.

<sup>144</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, *JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, December 2003, I-4.

<sup>145</sup> Gen Peter J. Schoemaker, "Special Operation Forces. The way ahead," in *Force of Choice. Perspectives on special operations*, eds. Bernd Horn et al. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 162, 163.

<sup>146</sup> NSCC, *The NATO SOF Study*, nsc.bices.org, [http://www.nsc.bices.org/GetFile/?File\\_ID=29](http://www.nsc.bices.org/GetFile/?File_ID=29) (accessed 3 March 2011), 10.

<sup>147</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, Ratification Draft, 2008, 1-1.

<sup>148</sup> NSCC, *The NATO SOF Study*, nsc.bices.org, [http://www.nsc.bices.org/GetFile/?File\\_ID=29](http://www.nsc.bices.org/GetFile/?File_ID=29) (accessed 3 March 2011), 2.

<sup>149</sup> NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>, (accessed 3 January 2010).

<sup>150</sup> NSHQ webpage, *Overview*, nsc.bices.org, <http://www.nsc.bices.org/page/overview/>, (accessed 4 March 2011).

<sup>151</sup> NSHQ webpage, *Mission*, nsc.bices.org, <http://www.nsc.bices.org/page/mission/>, (accessed 4 March 2011).

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> NSHQ, *SO/LIC Symposium slideshow*, 9, Dtic.mil, <http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009SOLIC/1DeZelicourt.pdf>, (accessed 3 January 2010).

<sup>154</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, Ratification Draft, 2008, 2-1 – 2-3.

<sup>155</sup> Gareth Porter, "Doubling of SOF Night Raids Backfired in Kandahar," *Global Geopolitics & Political Economy /IPS*, Globalgeopolitics.net, <http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/09/15/doubling-of-sof-night-raids-backfired-in-kandahar/>, (accessed 8 March 2011).

<sup>156</sup> David C. Gompert and John IV Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities*, RAND 2008, rand.org,

---

[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.2.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf) (accessed 7 March 2011), 291.

<sup>157</sup> NATO, *AJP 3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, Ratification Draft, 2008, 1-5, 1-6.

<sup>158</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, *JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, December 2003, II-4.

<sup>159</sup> Col John M. Collins, *U.S. Special Operations - Personal Opinions*, Smallwarsjournal.com, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/148-collins.pdf> (accessed 23 December 2009), 3.

<sup>160</sup> Sean D. Naylor, "Admiral Olsen adds "lost" 5th SOF Truth to doctrine," navyseals.com, <http://www.navyseals.com/adm-olsen-adds-lost-5th-sof-truth-doctrine> (accessed 23 December 2009).

<sup>161</sup> Miemie W. Byrd, "Combating Terrorism. A Socio-Economic Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 41, 2d Quarter 2006, 19.

<sup>162</sup> Lt Col Scott Moore, "Special Operations Forces. Visioning for the Future" in *Force of Choice. Perspectives on special operations*, eds. Bernd Horn, et al. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 189.

<sup>163</sup> Gen Peter J. Schoemaker, "Special Operation Forces. The way ahead," in *Force of Choice. Perspectives on special operations*, eds. Bernd Horn et al. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 167.

<sup>164</sup> NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, nato.int, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (accessed 7 March 2011), 4.

<sup>165</sup> Robert Martinage, *Special Operation Forces. Future challenges and Opportunities*, csbaonline.org,

[http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_/R.20081117.Special\\_Operation\\_.pdf](http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special_Operation_.pdf) (accessed 15 September 2009), 36.

<sup>166</sup> Lt Col Kilcullen's remarks at the NATO SOF Symposium, 3-5 June 2008 in Deauville, France.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Col Joseph D. Celeski, *Operationalizing COIN* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2005), 83. Col Celeski appoints the need of additional skills as law enforcement, intelligence agent, and humanitarian areas; as well he stresses the need of education on "human terrain".

<sup>170</sup> Kilcullen's remarks at the NATO SOF Symposium, 3-5 June 2008 in Deauville, France.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating towards 2030, Findings and Recommendations*, aco.nato.int, [http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple\\_Futures/20090503\\_MFP\\_findings.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_findings.pdf) (accessed 20 December 2009), 16-17.

<sup>174</sup> *Amici Curiae* Special Forces Association and U.S. Army and Ranger Association, *Brief on Appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in support of Appellants*, [michaelyon-online.com](http://www.michaelyon-online.com), [http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh\\_%20amicus\\_as\\_filed.pdf](http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/maqaleh_%20amicus_as_filed.pdf) (accessed 10 February 2011), 25, 26.

<sup>175</sup> Mikkel V. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 180.

## KOKKUVÕTE

### **KAITSTES EESTIT RAHUS JA SÕJAS. VÄIKERIIGI JULGEOLEKU TAGAMISEST AGRESSIIVSE NAABERRIIGI LÄHEDUSES, KASUTADES MITTEKONVENTSIONAALSEID STRATEEGIAID.**

Riigi valmisolek pidada sõda, selleks, et ennast kaitsta, on alati olnud ja jääb oluliseks teguriks riigi püsijäämisel. Oleks enesepetmine uskuda, et tänapäeval ei ole riikidele tõsiseid füüsilisi ohte. Hiljutine ajalugu, nagu sündmused Ukrainas, Süürias ja Iraagis tõestavad vastupidist igapäevaselt. Seetõttu sõjaline võime ja heidutus, potentsiaalse agressori vastu, on endiselt oluline ja relevantne.

See dissertatsioon on hüpoteetiline näide, kuidas väikeriik, nagu Eesti, saaks füüsiliselt täiendada oma julgeolekusüsteemi läbi *tasakaalustamise* strateegiate *järgijooksja* strateegiate asemel rahvusvahelistes suhetes. Kirjeldatud lähenemiste kaudu on võimalik tõsta nii kodumaist julgeolekutaset, kui ka mõjutusjõudu rahvusvaheliselt.

Esiteks, et väikeriigid saaksid tagada paremini oma ellujäämise pikas perspektiivis, peavad nad pidevalt olema edumeelsed, leidlikud ja olulised rahvusvahelises keskkonnas. Eriti viimane on võtmeküsimus liitlaste otsustusprotsessis, kas aidata reaalselt väiksemat liitlast sõja korral. Potentsiaalselt tasuv ja samuti strateegiliselt oluline on väikeriikide puhul ennetava rahutagaja roll, mille eesmärk on ära hoida relvastatud konfliktide tekkimist maailmas. See on peamiselt tehtav läbi tsiviilabi osutamise kasvavate rahutuste juurpõhjuste elimineerimiseks. Viimase tulemusena ei materialiseeru konflikt.

Selliste operatsioonide käigus on oluliseks lisandväärtuseks väikeriigi tunnustus rahvusvahelisel areenil kui positiivne ja efektiivne rahutegija. See omakorda suurendab riigi mõjukust ja arvestatavust rahvusvaheliselt ning muudab sellise väikeriigi väärtuslikuks liitalaseks, keda tasub aidata agressiooni korral tema vastu.

Teiseks, tõenäoliselt iga väikeriik, nagu näiteks Eesti, omab tunduvalt paremat võimalust saada füüsiliselt vastu suuremale potentsiaalsele vastasele kasutades sõjapidamiseks hübriidset lähenemist puhaste konventsionaalsete taktikate asemel. See ei vähendaks kuidagi riigi traditsioonilisi sõjapidamise võimeid, mis on tavaliselt vajalikud ühistes operatsioonides koos liitlastega. Siiski pakuks selline lähenemine sõjapidamisele tugevat alternatiivi olukorras, kus liitlased mingil põhjusel ei suudaks appi saabuda soovitud ajaraamis või ei saa oma vägesid üldse saata.

## ELULOOKIRJELDUS

*Nimi* Rene Toomse  
*Sünniaeg ja -koht* 06.05.1972, Kuressaare, Eesti  
*Kodakondsus* Eesti

### *Hariduskäik*

2011–2015 Tallinna Ülikool, doktoriõpingud riigi- ja poliitikateadustes  
2009–2011 Läti Rahvuslik Sõjakool, magistrakraad sõjalises juhtimises ja julgeolekus  
2001–2006 Tartu Ülikool, bakalaureusekraad õigusteaduses

### *Täiendkoolitus*

2010 Ühendanalüüsi- ja õppetundide keskus (Rootsi), NATO õppetundide analüüsi staabiohvitseri kursus  
2009–2010 Balti Kaitsekolledž (Eesti), ühendstaabiohvitseri kursus  
2009 Balti Kaitsekolledž (Eesti), brigaadi staabiohvitseri kursus  
2008 NATO Erioperatsioonide Koordineerimiskeskus (Saksamaa), NATO ühendväe erioperatsioonide osise staabiohvitseri kursus  
2006 Ühendriikide Armeed John F Kennedy nimeline Erioperatsioonide Keskus ja Kool (Ameerika Ühendriigid), rahvusvaheline erioperatsioonide treeningkursus  
2005 Ühendriikide Armeed Euroopas (Saksamaa), inimluure baaskursus  
2004 Ühendriikide Armeed Kool (Ameerika Ühendriigid), jalaväe kapteni karjäärikursus  
1999 Ühendriikide Armeed Kool (Ameerika Ühendriigid), patrullija kursus Ranger  
1998 Ühendriikide Armeed Kool (Ameerika Ühendriigid), jalaväeohvitseri baaskursus  
1995 Maakaitsekool (Soome), allohvitserikursus

### *Töökogemus*

Alates 2012 OÜ Aburgus, tegevjuht  
2009–2011 Eesti Kaitsevägi, Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutuste lektor  
2008–2009 Eesti Kaitsevägi, Maaväe staabi luureosakonna ülema abi  
2006–2007 NATO, osalemine rahutagamisoperatsioonil Afganistanis  
2003–2008 Eesti Kaitsevägi, Luurepataljon, Erioperatsioonide Grupi ülem  
2001–2003 Eesti Kaitseliit, instruktor  
1996 NATO, osalemine rahutagamisoperatsioonil Bosnia ja Hertsegoviinas  
1993–2001 Eesti Kaitsevägi, ajateenistus, jaoulem, kompanii veebel, rühmatülem

## CURRICULUM VITAE

*Name* Rene Toomse  
*Date and place of birth* 6 May 1972, Kuressaare, Estonia  
*Citizenship* Estonian

### *Education*

2011–2015 Tallinn University, PhD studies in Government and Politics  
2009–2011 Latvian National Military Academy, MA in Military Leadership and Security  
2001–2006 University of Tartu, BA in Law

### *In-service training*

2010 Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (Sweden), NATO Lessons Learned Staff Officer Course  
2009–2010 Baltic Defence College (Estonia), Joint Command and General Staff Course  
2009 Baltic Defence College (Estonia), Army Intermediate Command and Staff Course  
2008 NATO's Special Operations Coordination Centre (Germany), NATO Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command Staff Officer Course  
2006 The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (United States), International Special Forces Training Course  
2005 United States Army Europe (Germany), HUMINT Basic Course  
2004 The United States Army Infantry School (United States), Infantry Captains Career Course  
1999 The United States Army Infantry School (United States), Ranger Course  
1998 The United States Army Infantry School (United States), Infantry Officer Basic Course  
1995 Finnish National Defence College (Finland), Non-Commissioned Officer Course

### *Work experience*

Since 2012 Aburgus Ltd., CEO  
2009–2011 Estonian Defence Forces, Estonian Military Academy, lecturer  
2008–2009 Estonian Defence Forces, Land Forces Headquarters, Chief Assistant of Intelligence Section  
2006–2007 NATO, peace enforcement deployment to Afghanistan  
2003–2008 Estonian Defence Forces, Intelligence Battalion, Special Operations Forces Group commander  
2001–2003 Estonian Defence League, instructor

1999 NATO, peace enforcement deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina  
1993–2001 Estonian Defence Forces, conscription service, squad leader,  
company sergeant, platoon leader

**TALLINNA ÜLIKOOI  
SOTSIAALTEADUSTE DISSERTATSIOONID**

**TALLINN UNIVERSITY  
DISSERTATIONS ON SOCIAL SCIENCES**

1. MARE LEINO. *Sotsiaalsed probleemid koolis ja õpetaja toimetulek*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 1. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2002. 125 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-227-6.
2. MAARIS RAUDSEPP. *Loodussäästlikkus kui regulatiivne idee: sotsiaalpsühholoogiline analüüs*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 2. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2002. 162 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-231-4.
3. EDA HEINLA. *Lapse loova mõtlemise seosed sotsiaalsete ja käitumisteguritega*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 3. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2002. 150 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-240-3.
4. KURMO KONSA. *Eestikeelsete trükiste seisundi uuring*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 4. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2003. 122 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-245-2.
5. VELLO PAATSI. *Eesti talurahva loodusteadusliku maailmapildi kujunemine rahvakooli kaudu (1803–1918)*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 5. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2003. 206 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-247-0.
6. KATRIN PAADAM. *Constructing Residence as Home: Homeowners and Their Housing Histories*. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 6. Tallinn: TPU Press, 2003. 322 p. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-268-3.
7. HELI TOOMAN. *Teenindusühiskond, teeninduskultuur ja klienditeenindusõppe kontseptuaalsed lähtekohad*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 7. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2003. 368 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-287-X.
8. KATRIN NIGLAS. *The Combined Use of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Educational Research*. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 8. Tallinn: TPU Press, 2004. 200 p. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-298-5.
9. INNA JÄRVA. *Põlvkondlikud muutused Eestimaa vene perekondade kasvatuses: sotsiokultuuriline käsitlus*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 9. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2004. 202 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-311-6.
10. MONIKA PULLERITS. *Muusikaline draama algõpetuses – kontseptsioon ja rakendusvõimalusi lähtuvalt C. Orffi süsteemist*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 10. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2004. 156 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-309-4.
11. MARJU MEDAR. *Ida-Virumaa ja Pärnumaa elanike toimetulek: sotsiaalteenuste vajadus, kasutamine ja korraldus*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 11. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2004. 218 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-320-5.
12. KRISTA LOOGMA. *The Meaning of Learning at Work in Adaptation to Work Changes*. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 12. Tallinn: TPU Press, 2004. 238 p. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-326-4.

13. МАЙЯ МУЛДМА. *Феномен музыки в формировании диалога культур (сопоставительный анализ мнений учителей музыки школ с эстонским и русским языком обучения)*. Таллиннский педагогический университет. Диссертации по социальным наукам, 13. Таллинн: Изд-во ТПУ, 2004. 209 с. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-330-2.
14. ЕНА RÜÜTEL. *Sociocultural Context of Body Dissatisfaction and Possibilities of Vibroacoustic Therapy in Diminishing Body Dissatisfaction*. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 14. Tallinn: TPU Press, 2004. 91 p. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-352-3.
15. ENDEL PÕDER. *Role of Attention in Visual Information Processing*. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 15. Tallinn: TPU Press, 2004. 88 p. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-356-6.
16. MARE MÜÜRSEPP. *Lapse tähendus eesti kultuuris 20. sajandil: kasvatusteadus ja lastekirjandus*. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 16. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2005. 258 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-366-3.
17. АЛЕКСАНДР ВЕЙНГОЛЬД. *Прагматическая диалектика шахматной игры: основные особенности соотношения формально- и информально-логического эвристик аргументационного дискурса в шахматах*. Таллиннский педагогический университет. Диссертации по социальным наукам, 17. Таллинн: Изд-во ТПУ 2005. 74 с. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-372-8.
18. OVE SANDER. *Jutlus kui argumentatiivne diskursus: informaal-loogiline aspekt*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 18. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2005. 110 lk. ISSN 1406-4405. ISBN 9985-58-377-9.
19. ANNE UUSEN. *Põhikooli I ja II astme õpilaste kirjutamisoskus*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 19. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2006. 193 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 9985-58-423-6.
20. LEIF KALEV. *Multiple and European Union Citizenship as Challenges to Estonian Citizenship Policies*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 20. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 164 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN-10 9985-58-436-8. ISBN-13 978-9985-58-436-1.
21. LAURI LEPPIK. *Eesti pensionisüsteemi transformatsioon: poliitika valikud ja tulemid*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 21. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2006. 155 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-440-8. ISBN 9985-58-440-6.
22. VERONIKA NAGEL. *Hariduspoliitika ja üldhariduskorraldus Eestis aastatel 1940–1991*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 22. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2006. 205 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-448-4. ISBN 9985-58-448-1.
23. LIIVIA ANION. *Läbipõlemissümptomite ja politseikultuurielementide vastastikustest mõjudest*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 23. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2006. 229 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-453-8. ISBN 9985-58-453-8.
24. INGA MUTSO. *Erikooliõpilaste võimalustest jätkuõppeks Eesti Vabariigi kutseõppeasutustes*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 24. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2006. 179 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-451-4. ISBN 9985-58-451-1.
25. EVE EISENSCHMIDT. *Kutseaasta kui algaja õpetaja toetusprogrammi rakendamine Eestis*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 25. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2006. 185 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-462-0. ISBN 9985-58-462-7.

26. TUULI ODER. *Võõrkeeleõpetaja professionaalsuse kaasaegne mudel*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 26. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 194 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-465-1.
27. KRISTINA NUGIN. *3-6-aastaste laste intellektuaalne areng erinevates kasvukeskkondades WPPSI-r testi alusel*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 27. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 156 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-473-6.
28. TIINA SELKE. *Suundumusi eesti üldhariduskooli muusikakasvatuses 20. sajandi II poolel ja 21. sajandi alguses*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 28. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 198 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-486-6.
29. SIGNE DOBELNIECE. *Kodutus Lätis: põhjused ja lahendused*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 29. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 127 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-440-8.
30. BORISS BAZANOV. *Tehnika ja taktika integratiivne käsitus korvpalli õpitreeningprotsessis*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 30. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 95 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-496-5.
31. MARGE UNT. *Transition from School-to-work in Enlarged Europe*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 31. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 186 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-504-7.
32. MARI KARM. *Eesti täiskasvanukoolitajate professionaalsuse kujunemise võimalused*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 32. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 232 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-511-5.
33. KATRIN POOM-VALICKIS. *Novice Teachers' Professional Development Across Their Induction Year*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 33. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 203 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-535-1.
34. TARMO SALUMAA. *Representatsioonid organisatsioonikultuuridest Eesti kooli pedagoogidel muutumisprotsessis*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 34. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2007. 155 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-533-7.
35. AGU UUDELEPP. *Propagandainstrumentid poliitilistes ja poliitikalähistes telereklaamides*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 35. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2008. 132 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-502-3.
36. PILVI KULA. *Õpilaste vasakukäelisusest tulenevad toimetuleku iseärasused koolis*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 36. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2008. 186 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-578-8.
37. LIINA VAHTER. *Subjective Complaints in Different Neurological Diseases – Correlations to the Neuropsychological Problems and Implications for the Everyday Life*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 37. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2009. 100 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-660-0.
38. HELLE NOORVÄLI. *Praktika arendamine kutsehariduses*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 38. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2009. 232 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-664-8.
39. BIRGIT VILGATS. *Välise kvaliteedihindamise mõju ülikoolile: Eesti kogemuse analüüs*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 39. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2009. 131 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 987-9985-58-676-1.

40. TIJU TAMMEMÄE. *Kahe- ja kolmeaastaste eesti laste kõne arengu tase Reynelli ja HYKS testi põhjal ning selle seosed koduse kasvukeskkonna teguritega*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 40. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2009. 131 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-680-8.
41. KARIN LUKK. *Kodu ja kooli koostöö struktuuraalsest, funktsionaalsest ning sotsiaalsest aspektist*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 41. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2009. 93 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-681-5.
42. TANEL KERIKMÄE. *Estonia in the European Legal System: Protection of the Rule of Law through Constitutional Dialogue*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on social sciences, 42. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2009. 149 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-693-8.
43. JANNE PUKK. *Kõrghariduse kvaliteet ja üliõpilaste edasijõudmine kõrgkoolis*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 43. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2010. 124 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9985-58-664-8.
44. KATRIN AAVA. *Eesti haridusdiskursuse analüüs*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 44. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2010. 163 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-18-3.
45. AIRI KUKK. *Õppekava eesmärkide saavutamise üleminekul lasteasutusest kooli ning I kooliastmes õpetajate hinnanguil*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 45. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2010. 175 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-35-0.
46. MARTIN KLESMENT. *Fertility Development in Estonia During the Second Half of the XX Century: The Economic Context and its Implications*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 46. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2010. 447 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-40-4.
47. MERIKE SISASK. *The Social Construction and Subjective Meaning of Attempted Suicide*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 47. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2010. 181 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-61-9.
48. TIJA ÕUN. *Koolieelse lasteasutuse kvaliteet lapsekeskse kasvatuses aspektist*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 48. [ei ilmunud] Vt. Analüütiline ülevaade, 46. (online, PDF) Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2011. 60 lk. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-67-1.
49. JANIKA BACHMANN. *Sustainability of the Japanese Retirement System in the Context of Pension Age Population Labour Force Participation*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 49. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 100 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-77-0.
50. EVA-MARIA KANGRO. *Manifestation of Impulsive Behaviour: The Role of Contextual Demands and Reflective Competence*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 50. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 100 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-85-5.
51. GERLI NIMMERFELDT. *Identificational Integration: Conceptualisation and Operationalisation on the Example of Second Generation Russians in Estonia*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 51. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 161 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-84-8.

52. JARKKO VILKKILÄ. *Curriculum, Capitalism, and Cognitive Science: a History of the Present*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 52. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 148 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-94-7.
53. PEETER SELG. *An Outline for a Theory of Political Semiotics*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 53. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 200 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-463-96-1.
54. MARGARITA KAZJULJA. *Social Network and Education as Resources for Agency Formation on the Estonian Post-Socialist Labour Market*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 54. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 172 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-004-8.
55. TUIRE JANKKO. *Vuoden 2004 perusopetuksen tavoitteiden määrittäminen hallinnon tapahtumaketjussa Suomessa vuosina 1993–2004. Tavoitteiden arvoisäältö ja ymmärrettävyys*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 55. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 342 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-013-0.
56. KARMEN TOROS. *Assessment of Child Well-Being: Child Protection Practice in Estonia*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 56. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2011. 204 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-021-5.
57. ANDRIY YUR'YEV. *Dimension-Specific Impact of Social Exclusion on Suicide Mortality in Europe*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 57. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2012. 108 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-025-3.
58. TRIIN ROOSALU. *Taking Care of Children and Work in Estonian Society: Running Out of Post-Socialist Time?* Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 58. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2012. 186 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-031-4.
59. KIRILL MASLOV. *Seeing the Blindness: Body and History in Dialogical Relation*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 59. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2012. 209 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-064-2.
60. MARION PAJUMETS. *Post-Socialist Masculinities, Identity Work, and Social Change: an Analysis of Discursive (Re)Constructions of Gender Identity in Novel Social Situations*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 60. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2012. 176 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-073-4.
61. TIJU ERNITS. *Muusikaõppekirjandus ja laulmisõpetus saksa õppekeele koolides Eestis aastatel 1860–1914*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 61. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2013. 407 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-080-2.
62. KRISTI VINTER. *Digitaaalse ekraanimeedia tarbimine 5-7-aastaste laste seas ja selle sotsiaalne vahendamine Eestis. Pedagoogiline vaatekoht*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 62. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2013. 174 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-083-3.
63. MONICA SAKK. *Õpilaste, lapsevanemate ning õpetajate hinnangud õpilase toimetulekule kooli kontekstis eesti ja vene õppekeele koolide põhikooli II astmes*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 63. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2013. 268 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-085-7.
64. VAIKE KIIK-SALUPERE. *Performance Preparation and Coping with Performance Anxiety in the Vocal Pedagogy of Classical Singers*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 64. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 161 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-092-5.

65. MARIT MÕISTLIK-TAMM. *Teraapilisest lähenemisest muusikaõpetuses: muusikatund kui heaolu ja elukestva muusikaharrastuse allikas*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 65. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2013. 157 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-094-9.
66. INGE RAUDSEPP. *Riho Pätsi fenomen Eesti muusikapedagoogikas*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 66. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2013. 198 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-098-7.
67. KAIRIT TAMMETS. *Learning and Knowledge Building Practices for Teachers' Professional Development in an Extended Professional Community*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 67. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 157 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-100-7.
68. KRISTINA LINDEMANN. *Structural Integration of Young Russian-Speakers in Post-Soviet Contexts: Educational Attainment and Transition to the Labour Market*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 68. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 175 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-104-5.
69. VLADIMIR TOMBERG. *Learning Flow Management and Teacher Control in Online Personal Learning Environments*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 69. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 147 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-108-3.
70. MAIKI UDAM. *Meeting State, Market and Academic Concerns: Challenge for External Quality Assurance of Higher Education Institutions. Estonian Case*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 70. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 153 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-110-6.
71. MART LAANPERE. *Pedagogy-Driven Design of Virtual Learning Environments*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 71. Tallinn University, 2013. 138 p. ISSN 1736-793X. ISBN 978-9949-29-113-7.
72. MAARJA KOBIN. *Drinking Culture Among Young Estonian Adults: Perceptions of the 'Limit' and Mechanisms to Stay 'Within-Limits'*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 72. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 137 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-115-1.
73. ÜLLE KASEPALU. *Vananemine Eestis: eakate toimetulek ja põlvkondade koostoime*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 73. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2013. 142 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-125-0.
74. GRETE ARRO. *Children's Self-Reflection Ability and its Relations to the Word Meaning Structure: Signs of Life Beyond the Five-Point Scale Format*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 74. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2014. 113 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-140-3.
75. JING WU. *European Older Adults' Well-Being and Suicide in the Societal and Family Context*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 75. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2014. 116 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-142-7.
76. ILONA-EVELYN RANNALA. *Dialoogi olulisusest töös riskikäitumisega noortega. Alaealiste komisjonide näitel*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 76. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2014. 127 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-144-1.
77. SILVI SUUR. *Õpetajate, direktorite ja lastevanemate hinnangud koostööle koolieelses lasteasutuses*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 77. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2014. 145 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-148-9.

78. HELIN PUKSAND. *Teismeliste lugemisuskuse mõjutegurid*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 78. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2014. 205 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-149-6.
79. MARI-LIIS JAKOBSON. *Citizenship in Transformation: Political Agency in the Context of Migrant Transnationalism*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 79. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2014. 161 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-155-7.
80. KATRIN KALAMEES-RUUBEL. *Eesti keele ja kirjandusõpetuse roll eesti õppekeelega üldhariduskooli õppekavas 1917-2014. Ajaloolis-analüütiline käsitus*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 80. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2014. 295 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-168-7.
81. MERLE KALDJÄRV. *Riigieksamikirjandite argumentatsiooni uuring*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 81. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2014. 191 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-171-7.
82. RIIN SEEMA. *Mindfulness and Time Perspective Scales, and Their Relations with Subjective Well-Being in Estonia*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 82. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2014. 132 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-173-1.
83. EDNA VAHTER. *Looking for Possibilities to Improve the Visual Art Teaching in Primary School*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 83. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2014. 125 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-178-6.
84. MART SOOBİK. Dissertatsioon esitatud kaitsmisele.
85. MARIT KOIT. *Muusikateadvus, muusikakäitumine ning noortekultuur kui koolinoorte elustiili väljendavad ja kujundavad tegurid*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 85. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2015. 407 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-186-1.
86. ANNE UUKKIVI. *Infoteaduste eriala koolituse kaasajastamine kultuuridevahelise kommunikatsiooni kaudu*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 86. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2015. 205 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-206-6.
87. IMBI HENNO. *Loodusteaduste õppimisest ja õpetamisest Eesti koolides rahvusvaheliste võrdlusuuringute taustal*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 87. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2015. 225 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-208-0.
88. PEETER VÄRNIK. *Mortality from External Causes, Particularly Suicides, in European Countries: Trends, Socio-Demographic Factors and Measurement Issues*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 88. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2015. 175 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-209-7.
89. SERGEI IVANOV. *Sümboolne võim Eesti etnopolitikas mitte-eestlaste riigivalitsemises esindatuse näitel*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 89. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2015. 237 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-211-0.
90. MEELIS STAMM. *Kehaehituse ja mänguedukuse terviklik seostatud hindamine võistlustel võrkpallipoistel vanuses 13-15 aastat*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 90. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2015. 130 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-215-8.
91. KATRIN TIIDENBERG. *Image Sharing, Self-Making and Significant Relationships: Understanding Selfie-Practices*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on

- Social Sciences, 91. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2015. 177 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-217-2.
92. TRIIN LAURI. *Governing the School Choice: From Market Mechanisms to Equity Enabling Configurations*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 92. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2015. 200 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-219-6.
93. INDREK KALDO. *University Students' View of Mathematics in Estonia*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 93. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2015. 209 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-221-9.
94. MERIL ÜMARIK. *Adopting Reform Policies in Vocational Education and Training: the Case of Post-Soviet Estonia*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 94. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2015. 165 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-226-4.
95. ENE VARIK-MAASIK. *Erineva sotsiaalse tagapõhjaga Eesti noorte kirjaoskus*. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 95. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2015. 158 lk. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-228-8.
96. JUAN DANIEL MACHIN MASTROMATTEO. *The Mutual Shaping of Social Media, Learning Experiences, and Literacies*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 96. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2015. 255p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-233-2

## **AVALDATUD ANALÜÜTILISED ÜLEVAATED PUBLISHED ABSTRACTS**

<http://e-ait.tlulib.ee/>

1. HELI TOOMAN. *Teenindusühiskond, teeninduskultuur ja klienditeenindusõppe kontseptuaalsed lähtekohad*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2003. 35 lk. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 7. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-289-6.
2. KATRIN NIGLAS. *The Combined Use of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Educational Research*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn Pedagogical University Press, 2004. 39 p. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 8. ISSN 11736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-299-3.
3. INNA JÄRVA. *Põlvkondlikud muutused Eestimaa vene perekondade kasvatuses: sotsiokultuuriline käsitlus*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2004. 36 lk. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 9. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-312-4.
4. MONIKA PULLERITS. *Muusikaline draama algõpetuses – kontseptsioon ja rakendusvõimalusi lähtuvalt C. Orffi süsteemist*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2004. 37 lk. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 10. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-310-8.
5. MARJU MEDAR. *Ida-Virumaa ja Pärnumaa elanike toimetulek: sotsiaalteenuste vajadus, kasutamine ja korraldus*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: TPÜ kirjastus, 2004. 34 lk. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 11. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-321-3.

6. KRISTA LOOGMA. *The Meaning of Learning at Work in Adaptation to Work Changes*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn Pedagogical University Press, 2004. 39 p. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 12. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-327-2.
7. МАЙЯ МУЛДМА. *Феномен музыки в формировании диалога культур (сопоставительный анализ мнений учителей музыки школ с эстонским и русским языком обучения)*. Аналитический обзор. Таллинн: Издательство ТПУ, 2004. 42 с. Таллиннский Педагогический Университет. Диссертации по социальным наукам, 13. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-331-0.
8. EHA RÜÜTEL. *Sociocultural Context of Body Dissatisfaction and Possibilities of Vibroacoustic Therapy in Diminishing Body Dissatisfaction*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn Pedagogical University Press, 2004. 34 p. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 14. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-353-1.
9. ENDEL PÕDER. *Role of Attention in Visual Information Processing*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn Pedagogical University Press, 2004. 16 p. Tallinn Pedagogical University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 15. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-357-4.
10. MARE MÜRSEPP. *Lapse tähendus eesti kultuuris 20. sajandil: kasvatusteadus ja lastekirjandus*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikooli kirjastus, 2005. 29 lk. Tallinna Pedagoogikaülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 16. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-366-3.
11. АЛЕКСАНДР ВЕЙНГОЛЬД. *Прагматическая диалектика шахматной игры: основные особенности соотношения формально-логических эвристик аргументационного дискурса в шахматах*. Аналитический обзор. Таллинн: Издательство ТУ, 2005. 14 с. Таллиннский Университет. Диссертации по социальным наукам, 17. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-373-6.
12. OVE SANDER. *Jutlus kui argumentatiivne diskursus: informaal-loogiline aspekt*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus, 2005. 20 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 18. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-378-7.
13. AILE MÖLDRE. *Publishing and Book Distribution in Estonia in 1940–2000*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2005. 35 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-402-3.
14. LINNAR PRIIMÄGI. *Klassitsism: inimkeha retoorika klassitsistliku kujutavkunsti kaanonites*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus, 2005. 53 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-0730. ISBN 9985-58-399-X.
15. ANNE UUSEN. *Writing Skills of 1st and 2nd Stage Students*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 22 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 19. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 9985-58-424-4.
16. LEIF KALEV. *Multiple and European Union Citizenship as Challenges to Estonian Citizenship Policies*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 41 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 20. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-437-8.
17. LAURI LEPPIK. *Eesti pensionisüsteemi transformatsioon: poliitika valikud ja tulemid*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus, 2006. 17 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 21. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-441-5.

18. VERONIKA NAGEL. *Die Bildungspolitik und das Allgemeinbildungswesen in Estland in den Jahren 1940–1991*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Verlag der Universität Tallinn, 2006. 16 S. Universität Tallinn. Dissertationen in den Sozialwissenschaften, 22. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-449-1.
19. LIIVIA ANION. *Reciprocal Effects of Burnout Symptoms and Police Culture Elements*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 27 lk. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 23. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-454-5.
20. INGA MUTSO. *Possibilities of Further Studies for Students of Special Education Schools in Vocational Schools in Estonia*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 22 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 24. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-452-1.
21. EVE EISENSCHMIDT. *Implementation of Induction Year for Novice Teachers in Estonia*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 21 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 25. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-463-7.
22. TUULI ODER. *The Model of Contemporary Professional Foreign Language Teacher*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 16 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 26. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-466-8.
23. KRISTINA NUGIN. *Intellectual Development of 3 to 6 Years Old Children in Different Rearing Environments According to WPPSI-T Test*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 17 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 27. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-474-3.
24. TIINA SELKE. *Music Education in Estonian Comprehensive School: Trends in the 2nd Half of the 20th Century and at the Beginning of the 21st Century*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 26 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 28. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-487-3.
25. SIGNE DOBELNIECE. *Kodutus Lätis: põhjused ja lahendused*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus, 2007. 19 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 29. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-491-0.
26. BORISS BAZANOV. *Integrative Approach of the Technical and Tactical Aspects in Basketball Coaching*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 17 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 30. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-497-2.
27. MARGE UNT. *Transition from School-to-Work in Enlarged Europe*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 24 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 31. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-505-4.
28. MARI KARM. *Professional Development Opportunities of Estonian Adult Educators*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 28 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 32. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-512-2.
29. KATRIN POOM-VALICKIS. *Algajate õpetajate professionaalne areng kutseastal*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus, 2007. 15 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 33. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-536-8.
30. TARMO SALUMAA. *Representation of Organisational Culture in the Process of Change by Estonian Teachers*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2007. 21 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 34. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-534-4.

31. AGU UUDELEPP. *Propaganda Instruments in Political Television Advertisements and Modern Television Commercials*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2008. 26 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 35. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-503-0.
32. PILVI KULA. *Peculiarities of Left-Handed Children's Success at School*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2008. 18 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 36. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-579-5.
33. TIJU TAMMEMÄE. *The Development of Speech of Estonian Children Aged 2 and 3 Years (based on Reynell and HYKS test) and its Relations with the Factors of the Home Environment*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2008. 23 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-612-9.
34. KARIN LUKK. *Structural, Functional and Social Aspects of Home-School Cooperation*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2008. 46 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-614-3.
35. KATRIN KULLASEPP. *Dialogical Becoming. Professional Identity Construction of Psychology Students*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2008. 34 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-597-9.
36. HELLE NOORVÄLI. *Praktika arendamine kutsehariduses*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli kirjastus, 2009. 40 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid, 38. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-665-5.
37. TANEL KERIKMÄE. *Estonia in the European Legal System: Protection of the Rule of Law through Constitutional Dialogue*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2009. 58 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-675-4.
38. BIRGIT VILGATS. *The Impact of External Quality Assessment on Universities: Estonian Experience*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2009. 33 p. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 987-9985-58-677-8.
39. LIIS OJAMÄE. *Valikute kujunemine eluasemeturul: Eluaseme väärtuse sotsiaalne konstrueerimine. Eeslinna uuselamupiirkonna näitel*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2009. 24 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9985-58-681-5.
40. KATRIN AAVA. *Eesti haridusdiskursuse analüüs*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2010. 26 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-20-6.
41. ANU LEPPIMAN. *Argielamusi. Laagri- ja elamuspõhine argipäevade pereteenus sotsiaalse kogemuse tootjana*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2010. 32 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-27-5.
42. JANNE PUKK. *Kõrghariduse kvaliteet ja üliõpilaste edasijõudmine kõrgkoolis*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2010. 30 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-17-6.
43. AIRI KUKK. *Õppekava eesmärkide saavutamise üleminekul lasteasutusest kooli ning I kooliastmes õpetajate hinnanguil*. Analüütiline ülevaade. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool, 2010. 48 lk. Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-37-4.

44. MARTIN KLESMENT. *Fertility Development in Estonia During the Second Half of the XX Century: The Economic Context and its Implications*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 2010 57 lk. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-42-8.
45. MERIKE SISASK. *The Social Construction and Subjective Meaning of Attempted Suicide*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 2011. 68 lk Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-63-3.
46. TIIA ÕUN. *Koolieelse lasteasutuse kvaliteet lapsekeskse kasvatus aspektist. Analüütiline ülevaade*. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool. 2011. 60 lk Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-67-1.
47. RAILI NUGIN. *Coming of Age in Transition: Some Self-Reflexive Social Portraits of the 1970s Cohort*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 2011. 75 lk Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-80-0.
48. INGE TIMOŠTŠUKK. *Õpetajaks õppivate üliõpilaste kutseidentiteet. Analüütiline ülevaade*. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikool. 2011. 58 lk Tallinna Ülikool. Sotsiaalteaduste dissertatsioonid. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-90-9.
49. PEETER SELG. *An Outline for a Theory of Political Semiotics*. Abstract. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 2011. 69 lk Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-463-26-8.
50. TRIIN ROOSALU. *Taking Care of Children and Work in Estonian Society: Running Out of Post-Socialist Time?* Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 50. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2012. 83 p. ISSN 1736-3675. ISBN 978-9949-29-032-1.
51. KRISTINA LINDEMANN. *Structural Integration of Young Russian-Speakers in Post-Soviet Contexts: Educational Attainment and Transition to the Labour Market*. Tallinn University. Dissertations on Social Sciences, 51. Tallinn: Tallinn University, 2013. 175 p. ISSN 1736-3632. ISBN 978-9949-29-104-5.

## **DISSERTATSIOONINA KAITSTUD MONOGRAAFIAD (ilmunud iseseisva väljaandena)**

1. TIJU REIMO. *Raamatu kultuur Tallinnas 18. sajandi teisel poolel*. Monograafia. Tallinna Ülikool. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2001. 393 lk. ISBN 9985-58-284-5.
2. AILE MÖLDRE. *Kirjastustegevus ja raamatulevi Eestis*. Monograafia. Tallinna Ülikool. Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2005. 407 lk. ISBN 9985-58-201-2.
3. LINNAR PRIIMÄGI. *Klassitsism. Inimkeha retoorika klassitsistliku kujutavkunsti kaanonites*. Monograafia. Tallinna Ülikool Tallinn: TLÜ kirjastus, 2005. 1242 lk. ISBN 9985-58-398-1. ISBN 9985-58-405-8. ISBN 9985-58-406-6.
4. KATRIN KULLASEPP. *Dialogical Becoming. Professional Identity Construction of Psychology Students*. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2008. 285 p. ISBN 978-9985-58-596-2.
5. LIIS OJAMÄE. *Making Choices in the Housing Market: Social Construction of Housing Value. The Case of New Suburban Housing*. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2009. 189 p. ISBN 978-9985-58-687-7.